THE RECONSTITUTION OF EMOTIONS IN POLITICAL LIFE: A CRITIQUE

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Abstract

This dissertation begins with the query: how can the exclusion of emotions, and the presence of a dichotomy of reason and emotion, be accounted for in political life? Using the social history method of political theory—a method premised upon the interdisciplinary and socially-embedded character of political ideas and theoretical works—I investigate the premises of the notion of the reason-emotion dichotomy through a historical, philosophical, and political examination of the passions/emotions and rationality within the framework of the divide between the private realm and the political realm, or the public-private dichotomy. Working through Jürgen Habermas's influential conceptualisation of the bourgeois public sphere, and placing it in dialogue with the history of the "countervailing passions" theory of early modern moral and political philosophy, I discovered a historical tendency by which the conception of reason is narrowed to comprise self-interested calculative behaviour, set against that which is irrational or passionate. A deep historical investigation into the origins of the concept of "emotions" reveals a second related tendency, by which what is deemed "emotion" is reduced through the broadening of the category to be divorced from and oppositional to the rational. My work demonstrated that these two tendencies are intertwined with the foundational public-private dichotomy of modern politics, by which the political is deemed wholly rational, and the irrational/passionate/emotional must remain outside of politics, in the private realm. These two dichotomies, of reason and emotion and the public and the private, are fundamental tenets of liberal political philosophy, thus posing an insurmountable challenge for contemporary political philosophy which seeks to include emotions in liberal politics. I demonstrate that the exclusion of the emotions, the crux of the reason-emotion dichotomy, is not based on a general exclusion of emotions in themselves, but is actually based upon the social exclusion which is a necessary determinant of liberal politics. My analysis of emotion in liberal politics, and critique of contemporary projects of political emotions, challenges dominant understandings of democracy and of inclusionary versus exclusionary political ideas, theories, structures, and institutions.

For Philip Martin Merklinger (December 29, 1954 – June 18, 2017), Professor, Mentor, and Friend: I never imagined that you would not be able to read this.

"A man's maturity is to have rediscovered the seriousness he possessed as a child at play."
(Beyond Good and Evil, §94).

For Mozart Mozzarella: Who simply cannot read this.

"...Immortal Mozart, to whom I owe all!"
(In Vino Veritas)

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Adam Smith says in *The Moral Sentiments*, “a philosopher is company to a philosopher only; the member of a club, to his own little knot of companions." I have been made so lucky to have found so many companions over the course of my PhD. First and foremost, I need to say thank you to Andrew Ivan Brown for years of immense support, encouragement, and growth. I am endlessly thankful for his presence in my life and I am very proud of the work he has done, and for his admiration of my own. I have been able to rely on him at the highest and lowest, most joyful and most difficult, points in my life. I also need to specifically give thanks for his inspired interventions that led to the solving of a lifelong mystery of mine, the discovery and diagnosis of my sleep disorder (DSPS/DSPD), and the assistance he provided me in process of that diagnosis, as well as the many instances of wake-up phone calls! Thank you also to Rimmy Riarh and Indigo Carson, for our “cocoa and crafting” over the years, for all the deep conversations (whether on videogames and Christmas movies, or on the content of our book clubs, political history, or just venting our cynicism) and continued support in all facets of my life. Thank you as well to Cindy Liu (how would we have survived our Master’s degrees without each other?), Lina Nasr El Hag Ali (so many enriching conversations on campus, at social events, or even just on the train), Thania Vega (colleague, friend, and, to my good fortune, neighbour), Brent Toye (a specific thanks for carrying that really heavy chair down the stairs), and Adam T. Kingsmith (perhaps my first consistent friend in Toronto), and to all others who have engaged with my work or even just have been a go-to karaoke companion. Though they were mostly far away, I also need to thank Tina Marjanovic, who was always a reliable foundation of any form of support I needed whether emotional or material, so much so I need to begin mailing her cards on Mothers Day. And thank you to Lucy Locvan (Christmas Spirit 2015 will live on forever in our hearts), Celest Schrader (till ghosts…and after…), and Carolyn Howe Pawluk, who were my biggest cheerleaders from the very start, whose cards and letters provided so much warmth over the years, and who I will always appreciate for creating a mysterious cult of personality for me without my prior approval or knowledge of how they managed it. There are so many other friends across the world, from all different moments of my life, who have supported me in so many ways, and I am thankful for all. Importantly, I must acknowledge Phil Merklinger. Phil was an incredibly impactful professor who has left such a legacy on his community, but it was his mentorship and what became a friendship that made a momentous impression on me. Whether it was our conversations in specialised reading courses, research projects, or just going for a walk nearby the campus, Phil always grounded our philosophical musings in everyday life. I could always rely on him for academic support (even if things arrived a little late!) but I could even more so count on him for personal support, in family and friendship matters, or even just discussions about music or the perfectness of toast as a food. I treasure all the stories, jokes, books, comics and quotes, and CDs that Phil shared with me, and go forward in my career and in my life enormously proud of the confidence that Phil had in me.

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Introduction

Years ago, a question that persistently preoccupied me as I started my political-philosophical career was: where are the emotions? Why does politics, and participating in politics often feel so cold? It did not actually feel cold—politics has always felt very warm and intense to me—but I recognised that I could not express myself in emotive or passionate ways without accusations of being unable to properly assess the political circumstances, or of behaving inappropriately. This was particularly curious to me, as I have never been a person often charged with being too emotional—usually the opposite in fact, no doubt based on gendered expectations of correct or predictable behaviour. Yet it was clear to me that the ways I would be able to express myself about "personal" or intimate matters, such as the betrayal of a close friend, were expected to be passionate, deeply connected to the notion of *feeling*, but such expressions were judged very differently if it came to political matters, even if I *felt* those matters just as or more deeply. One was deemed rational, understandable, or justified—emotions in the intimate—and the other deemed biased, incompetent, irrational—emotions in the political. Emotions are however an ever-present aspect of human existence, impossible to push out of politics in actuality. Yet there is a deep sense at the very least that emotions are and must continuously be severed from politics—or at least for some people, as there is a clearly apparent disparity along gender, race, and class lines that dictate the degree of appropriateness of an emotional display. Even so, very few can get away with performing, displaying, or showcasing emotions in politics without being accused of being irrational, or manipulative.

At the beginnings of my investigation, an early phase which produced the article "You Can't Take It with You: On Leaving Emotions Out of Political Life,"[1] the literature on emotions and politics consistently told the same story: though the originating moment shifted, there was an historical point where emotions were demonised and had to be excluded from political, even moral, life lest they cause harm and lead one astray. This was at least until the twentieth century, either in the 1970s or after, when emotions finally were re-examined and appreciated as a potentially positive force, or at least a neutral reality, of human life, especially for political life. Leah Bradshaw argues "the relationship between passions and reason is one of the central concerns of political philosophy" (Bradshaw 2008, 172). In her book *On the Political,* Chantal Mouffe declares in a statement that echoed past statements, and would be reformulated in new ways by others, that "the theorists who want to eliminate passions from politics and argue that democratic politics should be understood only in terms of reason, moderation and consensus are showing their lack of understanding of the dynamics of the political" (Mouffe 2005, 28). With these pronouncements that the emotions were finally to be taken seriously, the literature of the twenty-first century focused on redeeming select historical thinkers by demonstrating they actually considered or positively-appreciated emotions, or on making a call to consider or include the emotions (broadly) in political life: the emotions *are* important, and their neglect is detrimental to public life. However, there is not much beyond that, no forward trajectory to carry the work of including the emotions in politics. So, not unlike writing a get-well card and sending it through the mail (with no medicine), this problem of emotional exclusion in the political realm remains stuck in the exact same place. While the idea that emotions must be exorcised before

[1] Melançon, Jérôme, and Veronika Reichert. 2016. "You Can't Take It with You: On Leaving Emotions Out of Political Life." *Janus Head* 15 (2): 19-42.

entering the public realm is deemed unacceptable, there is nothing offered to theoretically or practically allow for their inclusion. The tension between politics and emotions persists.

It seemed that the tension not only was never resolved, but that its source was never properly diagnosed. The origin of the antagonism of political life and emotions remained obscured, as only the tension itself had ever been identified. For even if this or that thinker, in this or that period of time, was the originator of anti-emotional sentiment, rarely ever was there a given explanation for how this sentiment became permanent and socially all-encompassing. One revelation named throughout the literature was the opposition of emotion to reason, and that politics was a realm of reason and thus the emotions could not be permitted. Still, the identification of the phenomenon was all that was ever given, there was little to no excavation of the phenomenon and its social-political entrenchment (in addition to various historical origin points being offered). Only vague insinuation that it was generally morally accepted, made normative perhaps through theology or preceding ideology (never named as such). It did give me a more useful and concrete starting point however: what are the forces behind the creation and upkeep of this philosophical and socio-historical reason-emotion dichotomy, institutionalised in thought and practice?

Yet I still anticipated that I would be building upon the conventional narrative, the one I encountered time after time in the literature, even if the questions being pursued within were as deeply unsatisfying as the half-answers given. But as none had offered a concrete or compelling solution for how to meaningfully reconstitute emotions in political life, neglected as they reportedly were since the Ancient period, and nor had there been any satisfying explanation for the origin or institutionalisation of the reason-emotion dichotomy, it became clear that I would need to take a much different approach. The literature on the topic by and large is speculative and rather tenuous, taking a "just go with it" approach to answering the questions raised: in trying to place the origin of the dichotomy, one or another thinker, or moral idea, is speculated as the first move to demonise the emotions. But there is much historical speculation without equal connection to materially embedded, relational history.

If I was able to historically ground this question, the origin of the reason-emotion dichotomy, I believed I would be able to pursue my original driving question of how to bring the emotions back into politics, as a means to increase meaningful political participation. I thus found as my methodological inspiration the social history approach, as articulated by Neal Wood in his 1978 article "The Social History of Political Theory." The first basic premise of Wood's approach is that political theory is inevitably practical, rooted in everyday life, and concerned with the relationships that exist between groups and individuals who act in the public realm (Wood 1978, 345). Following from that, all political theory is thus related to the practical sociohistorical context in which it is conceived, or in essence, it is a product of the time in which it is produced (*ibid*). As every text is a reflection of its times, every text is also unavoidably a partisan stance on the issues of its times (real neutrality is, of course, a political impossibility) (*ibid*, 345, 347). Wood argues that "political theory is ideological, although not exclusively so, in that its core consists of sociopolitical recommendations—intellectually supported and justified by arguments from science, religion, theology, metaphysics, epistemology, psychology, ethics and history—that are to the interests of certain social groupings and not to the interest of others" (*ibid*, 345). This sociohistorical embeddedness does not mean that these works of the past are valueless, irrelevant, or incomprehensible to those living outside of the time in which it emerged (*ibid*, 359). Quite the opposite, as modern individuals, institutions and ideas—including understandings of history and politics themselves—are all descendants and relatives of past theories and their contexts. This is true not only of political theory, but of all history—especially as histories are properly never compilation of vulgar "facts" but are analytical narratives created within the limits of the historical evidence through theorising, conceptualising, and hypothesising—as no discipline, idea, or event ever emerged from a vacuum. This means that the social history of political theory is fundamentally interdisciplinary (*ibid*, 346).

It was imperative that I approach the political theory around the reason-emotion dichotomy, and politics of emotions broadly, as embedded in history—that critical history mentioned by Neal Wood, created through engagement—and perhaps deeply rooted in the ideas and ideologies of different eras. This approach would not only be crucial in assessing the work of the past, but also in assessing contemporary work, especially the work dominating the literature on emotions and politics. It also demands that political theories of emotion, existing and yet to be, must be situated in broader and relational ways with other disciplines and *their* historical context and transformations, such as natural sciences and psychology, ethics and moral philosophy, and theology (which can never be truly disconnected, anyway).

This means that my research will not only impart a significant intervention in political theory—as it challenges dominant philosophical frameworks, specifically liberal philosophy and public sphere theory—but also in terms of the history of ideas and sociology of knowledge, as my examination of the emotions will disrupt conventional thinking of feelings and emotions from philosophical to conventional every-day conceptualisations. Most significantly, my work here provides a novel understanding of the presence, or lack there of, of emotions in politics. As I undertook this research, I realised I would no longer be able to adhere to the conventional narrative, I would have to not only break from it but fracture the narrative itself. My arguments counter the dominant narrative and completely change the ways in which institutions and political participation can be understood in terms of the role of the emotions, and provide a new starting point for interrogations of fundamental ideas and questions of political concepts and systems, from the history of political thought to contemporary democratic theory.

Before going more into detail about what my research provides, how I will make my arguments, and how I come to the conclusions I do, it is important to set some boundaries and demarcate what my project is not. Firstly, my work here is not an investigation of one or several specific emotions that are used by politicians or other political participants (especially "citizens," a term I try to avoid using broadly given the tenuous connections many people have to political citizenship) in past or present political regimes, neither broadly and abstractly, nor in efforts to glean information from case studies. Secondly, I am not making an argument that emotions, or any specific emotions, ought to (now) be included or emphasised in political life, in any particular political regime—while that was my intention upon beginning this work, not only is this covered by a plethora of other works, but as I will demonstrate, it is a very dissatisfactory argument, and only a partial political mobilisation. Thirdly, this is not an investigation of the dangers of emotions in politics: not of the emotions as manipulative agents, and not an examination of emotions as used in populism and fascism—in conversationally introducing my work on politics and emotions, I would always hear that it was good that I was addressing "Trump" (meaning of course the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States in 2016), or it was convenient that I had such material to write on given Trump's election. I do, like most other thinkers on politics and emotions, want to take down this notion that emotions are only a part of politics when there is certain type of rhetoric involved or certain performances displayed, or when "bad" politics come about. However, that topic cannot be addressed adequately without analysing the material I lay out here in this dissertation. Finally, the other conversational interjection I would receive often was that given my project was on emotions, it must be situated within women's/gender studies. My research absolutely cannot neglect the gendered dimension of understanding and relating to emotions, but the seemingly automatic association between emotions and women is quite revealing—and so, I will state directly, this project is not one focusing on gender roles or dynamics and the emotions, though as mentioned I will touch on gendered aspects where relevant but with the aim of illuminating this frankly sexist, though significant, association.

What I have discovered in my research is the presence of two tendencies, two forces of transformation, that provide the foundation for the two pertinent dichotomies: the dichotomy of public and private, and the dichotomy of reason and emotion. The first tendency is the narrowing of the concept of *reason*. The second is the narrowing of the concept of *emotion*. While these two tendencies not surprisingly can be shown to be the originating point for a division and increasingly stark bifurcation of reason from emotion in human existence, it is likely less obvious how these tendencies contribute to and reinforce the divide between the public and the private (and how the public and private dichotomy reinforces the reason-emotion one). However, the narrowing of reason and emotion as concepts works to reinforce very specific configurations of what is deemed public (and thus permitted in the public) and what is private (and should stay private). As Mary-Ann Tétreault puts it, the public is the realm of the seen, where one appears, while the private is the realm of the unseen (Tétreault 1998, 277). So, the private is the prison, the closet, the chest, of everything that should remain unseen, everything unsuitable for political, public life. While many authors correctly associate reason with the public, their efforts to allow emotions into the public realm leave out of consideration the way public and private are intimately intertwined with reason and emotion. In fact, most of the literature on emotions and politics treats emotions as distinct entities that can be moved, included or excluded, rather than as a concept that is shaped in tension and in unison with other concepts over the course of a complicates history, let alone with physical human beings to experience and express these emotions. A broad history of emotions, a social history, reveals a much more complex picture of the political history and role of reason and emotion than has been hitherto offered. Many theorists identify the more emotionally inclusive politics of the ancient world, or in other singular figures of classical political thought (most Western European), yet they fail to consider the emotions as a concept in flux, being shaped by and shaping other phenomenon in the moral, psychological, political, and economic world through the centuries of political philosophy. As Thomas Dixon writes, “the histories of our social lives, our language, and our self-understanding proceed together” (Dixon 2011, 308), and as these are all fluid and intertwined, any concept must be analysed as a part of this ongoing historical process.

The history of commercialisation and of capitalism, and the transformations of social relations that occurred with its development, are absolutely crucial in understanding the tendencies of the narrowing of reason and narrowing of emotion, and thus to the understanding of the dichotomies themselves. Further, the process of secularisation that moved alongside it made an immense impact on moral thought throughout the modern period, and it is important to understand how this secularisation was a response to scientific and economic movements of the period. Liberalism, politically and philosophically, in practice and in theory, is tangled with this history and is, I will argue, the main contributor or even creator of, and undoubtedly the primary force of maintenance for, the modern dichotomy of public and private and the dichotomy of reason and emotion. The principles which underlay these dichotomies are baked into liberalism and its institutions as indispensable ingredients, inseparable from the fundamentals of liberal thought. These tenets are not only crucial in a basic way, in tackling the problematic of emotions in politics. But the dominant projects of political theory and political science, and even outside of it (for instance, in history and psychology), are liberal projects, many of them explicitly projects of political liberalism.

It will then be inevitable that a few of the enormously influential figures of these dominating liberal projects of political emotions be rigorously engaged with here. These works are referenced by almost all other works on theories of emotion and political theories of emotion, taking central places within the literature, and they have dramatically altered the topography of these areas of thought. First and foremost is Jürgen Habermas, whose work on the idea of the public sphere was foundational and still directs the discussion of the public sphere and what I call sphere theory—understanding society by the categorisation and differentiation of "spheres" of activities. Habermas tends to be still the main conversationalist in any discussion of the public sphere—either simply because of the concretization of his model, or because of the need to respond to that model—and will also be my main interlocutor when it comes to addressing the concept of the public. These thinkers are all controversial to varying degrees, but only became so through the significance of the ideas they put forth. Albert O. Hirschman, though less notorious than Habermas, is another major thinker who must be drawn from, engaged with (and also corrected) for his arguments about the political-economic creation of a reason-emotion dichotomy—one of few thinkers who homes in on the connection between developments with economic thought and the changes to moral and human self-understanding that came about in the modern period.[2] Martha C. Nussbaum is the last giant of engagement, hailed as the "philosopher

[2] The idea of modernity is itself contentious, but it is not the focus of this dissertation and thus "modern" in this work will simply be a historical notion and refer to the period following the year 1500, with no attachment to any idea of cultural, social, economic, or political features.

of emotions" or "philosopher of feelings" in public discourse, and whose stature mostly pertains to the status of her public presence, more so than her ideas themselves. Other major figures that will prominently feature are Rebecca Kingston, who explicitly works on political theories of emotions; William Reddy, who created a theory of emotions for historical analysis while also contributing an understated liberal political project; Thomas Dixon, who is an historian of emotions especially in terms of their links to moral thought and psychology; and Jan Plamper, who has undertaken projects to survey the state of emotional theories across disciplines and who directly works with other major thinkers on the subject including Dixon, as well as Barbara Rosenwein and others.

In Chapter One, "The Public Sphere Or, the Entrenchment of a Particular Public-Private Dichotomy," I will present the sphere model of society, the configuration and division of social and political life into "public" and "private" as it has been described in theory and implemented in practice in ancient and medieval politics, before turning to Habermas's concept of the bourgeois public sphere. This will lay the foundation for the discussion of the formation of the, first, dichotomisation of public and private, and also the conceptual developments of reason as it moulds itself in relation to bourgeois politics and self understanding, particularly in terms of the significance of private property, and thus provides the fertile soil for the, second, dichotomisation of reason and emotion. I will introduce here my articulation of the concept of bourgeois universalism, which I argue profoundly determines the constitution of rationality, and greatly shapes the foundational principles of liberalism, and liberalism as a political philosophy through to contemporary politics. As a consequence of these tendencies, I will also demonstrate in this chapter how that which is considered feminine and/or non-propertied comes to be conflated with passionate, emotional, or generally unreasonable.

In Chapter Two, “The Reason-Emotion Dichotomy,” a closer look is taken upon the emotions themselves, beginning with an inquiry into “passions,” and specifically the passion of avarice, as it was treated in the domain of moral thought from the ancient period onward, with necessary attention to theological understandings. This will set up Hirschman’s argument of the narrowing of reason to mean specifically self-interested economic behaviour, through the theory of the countervailing passion(s)—the notion in modern moral thought that the ill-effects of passionate behaviour could be tempered and regulated through setting them against a stronger passion, with that passion coming to consistently be avarice. Through an exploration of the interactions of commericialising forces in society, and moral and ethical problems of modernity, the ideal of interest, or self-preserving, self-advancing behaviour—specifically in an increasingly marketised context—as the ultimate countervail[3] is suggested through Hirschman and with some interventions I will be making from the thought of Adam Smith (who Hirschman, unfortunately, misrepresents, hence the corrections to Hirschman’s argument). From this, I discuss the metamorphosis of interest from the strongest passion, the most suitable countervail to the other passions, to a force and measure of rationality. Reason, now a term meaning behaviours of constancy and predictability, and calculability of action, becomes the opposite of the mercurial, unpredictable, *irrational* passions. Calculative, predictable reason was moreover the behaviour of capitalist market interaction, and thus bourgeois rationality was the defining characteristic of *rational economic man*, *homo economicus*.

Chapter 3, “The Liberal Sphere Model: A Unity of Two Dichotomies,” returns to the discussion of the public sphere and the sphere model of society, with a focus on the contemporary articulations of the public sphere, to demonstrate the continuation of bourgeois

[3] Passion as a countervail to other passion(s), a specific theory of early modern moral and social thought.

universality into twentieth and twenty first century politics. Beginning with Habermas's own discussion of the decline of the bourgeois public sphere—a process he describes as refeudalisation—it is crucial to assess first, the degree to which a public sphere in terms akin to Habermas's exists presently; second, the degree to which Habermas's theory of the public sphere holds up historically (taking into consideration a pamphlet culture and religious public sphere that precedes the century of Habermas's focus); and third, emphasise just how deeply embedded Habermas's articulation of the public sphere is in contemporary political theory. A survey of the contemporary elaborations upon Habermas's theory, to account for contemporary political developments and to expand the public sphere, is undertaken, discussing alternative public spheres and counterpublics. I argue that this expansion of the public sphere framework is merely that, an expansion with little or absolutely no challenge to the premises or composition of sphere theory or the bourgeois public sphere.[4] This chapter will particularly emphasise the abstractification of the public sphere itself, and of public opinion (an embodiment of bourgeois rationality), highlighting the narrow exclusivity of the bourgeois political subject, the model which all political participants are to embody—in which white, male, propertied, and educated becomes "neutrality" against all that is "characteristic" and must be excised from the public realm—and which harbours a specific set of interests that cannot be separated from this bourgeois actor.

Chapter 4, "Re-Enter the Emotions," emotions as a contemporary category is examined in depth. First, the main theories that attempt to answer the question, "what are the emotions?" are explained, such as physicalism and cognitivism, with attention to the reason-emotion relationship

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[4] With the exception of the proletarian public sphere as defined by Alexander Kluge and Oskar Negt, but which they argue does not practically exist.

that they describe. These theories, which emerged largely from experimental psychology, have come to dominate theories of emotions in social sciences and have contributed to the narrative of broad emotional exclusion up until the affective turn in the later twentieth century—however, my chapter brings forward critical historical research that problematises this narrative. Taking account of the theory of the countervail, and an increasingly centralising constitutional bourgeois state, the creation of the category of emotions, a new entirely modern category, is provided within the history of theological change and challenge, shifts in moral philosophy, and secularisation and the emergence of the secular discipline of psychology, pioneered by figures such as Thomas Brown and William James, which would come to take over understandings of the passions from religion and moral thought. This newly secular, scientific category of emotions, borne out of new theoretical frameworks—ethical and scientific, political and economic—of the Victorian period and passed through twentieth century psychology and into the discipline of neuroscience by the twenty-first century, would be wholly oppositional to reason. Hence, an answer to one of the troubles of emotional theories: the Ancients, medieval thinkers, even Descartes and Hume, are not mysterious outliers of positive emotional representation, nor crafty instigators of a demonization campaign against them. They were working with completely different categories of understanding, of passions, or sentiments, or affections, and even also emotions, that were not categorically opposed to reason. Yet, the supremacy of the emotions as a category has steered contemporary thought on feelings, with political projects of emotion being no exception. As Dixon puts it, the over-inclusivity of the term emotions has allowed for a degree of certainty as to what is being invoked—a general and broad "involuntary feeling or a cognitive act" (Dixon 2003, 25). This certainty has been a lingering veil on the attempts to discuss the history and politics of emotion.

My concluding chapter, Chapter 5, “Overcoming *Homo Economicus* and Thinking Beyond the Dichotomy,” synthesises the past chapters directly with the contemporary theories of political emotions. The leading projects of political emotions, namely those undertaken by Nussbaum and Kingston, as well as Reddy, are explicitly liberal projects, projects which not only are written within liberal philosophical paradigms, but are expressly crafted with the intention of further securing and enhancing liberalism as a political philosophy. These projects maintain, explicitly and/or implicitly, the public-private dichotomy while expressing their intended goal of including emotions in the public realm. However, these ventures demonstrate that through not only their cognitivist interpretations of emotions, of emotions as rational or potentially-rational entities, but through their motivational orientation to liberal philosophy, not all emotions are to be included or evaluated equally or neutrally. Only certain emotions are capable of supporting liberal political-philosophical commitments, and others will remain inappropriate for politics, all based on the criteria of liberal rationality. This makes historical revisionism an essential for these projects, which must maintain and uphold the bourgeois-universality perspective. Thus, these projects simultaneously maintain an exclusionary model of politics, centred on the abstract and neutral bourgeois political actor, and maintain the reason-emotion dichotomy. Directly counter to the expressed desire to bring the emotions into political life and to argue for the rationality of emotions to be recognised, these projects reinforce the dichotomisation of emotions with reason, and thus the exclusion of emotions. These projects must be recognised as situated within the liberal model of market discipline and the capitalist commodification of emotions, producing intense social and political alienation, rather than as challenges to a political framework that excludes emotion. These projects do not deviate from the abstraction of bourgeois universalism, a product of specific capitalist conditions, against concrete human needs and the diversity of human experience. Counter to the claims of these projects, I argue that it is not entirely true that emotions are excluded from politics. Bourgeois emotions, or emotions that are in keeping with bourgeois rationality and bourgeois interests, are accepted in the political realm, even if they are denounced or criticised from any partisan angle. Non-bourgeois emotions, emotions that do not align with bourgeois interests and thus pose a challenge to bourgeois universalism and liberal institutions, are deemed irrational and thus excluded from politics.

Together, these five chapters indicate a different question. Emotions cannot be detected apart from embodied expressions—I may not subscribe to the doctrine of physicalism, but William James was not wrong to write "a purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity" (James 1983, 174). Emotions cannot be excluded apart from the people who express them. From the vantage point of bourgeois universalism, there may be some participants able to sufficiently shed their distinguishing qualities (some forms of womanhood for instance), supress emotional expressions, and participate in public life so long as those expressions do not surface to "bias" their political acts. But for many, that is not possible, as either their distinguishing qualities or their political acts themselves cannot ever be taken into bourgeois politics. As Lauren Berlant remarks, many women and people of colour, especially black people, do not get to "supress" their bodies into the neutral (U.S.) citizen; these citizens remain embodied in contrast to the universal justice distributed to the disembodied, abstract citizen (Berlant 2008, 111). So the real question has become, *who* is included versus excluded from political life? As demonstrated in each chapter, liberal representative politics and its capitalist-market twin is a highly exclusionary political system under the guise of non-domination and inclusivity. For many different *particular* reasons, many people are excluded outright from almost all political participation, but by and large the interests, the interests that define rationality, dictate who is to be excluded from political life. Who expresses emotions which are expressions of political will, that oppose the so-called non-dominating, universal bourgeois interests? Whose emotions challenge the *status quo* of liberalism?

In this work, I present an argument that the reason-emotion dichotomy is based on a configuration of the public-private dichotomy determined by the specific socio-historical, ideological and material, conditions that continue to maintain it: bourgeois morality that was birthed from private property and abstract rights. Rather than an all-encompassing exclusion of emotion from political life, we have an appearance of broad emotional exclusion that is a manifestation of the much more direct exclusion of marginalised groups and the consequent socio-political alienation they experience. These groups, marginalised in ways that serve the liberal political and economic order, tend to be marginalised first for their interests which in whole or in part run counter to those of property, and their lack of reason, conflated with emotionality, is the *ad hoc, ex post facto* justification for that exclusion. Therefore, it is redundant to endeavour to simply include emotions into a system of structures designed to keep out certain interests, ideas, feelings, and of course the people who express them. To achieve an unalienated, complete human experience in the political arena, the structures that created and uphold the dichotomies of reason-emotion, and public-private—the premises of liberalism, especially the interests of private property—must be challenged, and overcome, to create a genuinely inclusive and democratic politics.

Chapter 1: The Public Sphere

Or, the Entrenchment of a Particular Public-Private Dichotomy

"Was vernünftig ist, das ist Wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig." – Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*

In modern states, political subjects operate within a framework of spheres, navigating what is public, what is private, and the spaces that seem to be in between. This framework is what I call the "sphere model" of society and politics. Whether it exists as a tangible way of organising social life (or perhaps regardless of the extent to which it organises social life), or is merely conceptual, constituting only the way people envision themselves and their behaviour within society, it tends to be the default way of understanding the political world. Various departures from the theory of the bourgeois public sphere of modernity put forth by Jürgen Habermas offer different depictions of how the spheres of modern society are constituted. Disputes about the precise historical moments and class composition of the spheres abound, as do different formulations of varying spheres (the private, the intimate, the social, civil society, the public) and what fits into them, as well as contestations about specific spheres, mostly the public sphere (the public sphere, multiple publics, counterpublics). These variants will be tackled in Chapter 3. Regardless of the specifics of exact time, place, and/or composition, "something resembling a public sphere did begin to coalesce in parts of early modern Europe, and the practices that constituted this sphere represent radically new assumptions about knowledge, social authority, and individual rights" (Zaret 1997, 213). More often than not, the boundaries between these different spheres and organisations of spheres are blurred and overlapping. While a distinction between a private realm and a public one is as old as the Western philosophical canon itself, that same distinction cannot be held congruent with the distinction between the private and the public in modernity. Ancient thought and politics was defined by its divide between an exclusive public political realm and its opposing private realm, and though the distinction properly collapsed in the Middle Ages after the arguable fall of Rome, it lingered in political thought, and was boldly revived in the Enlightenment, ultimately to be crafted into the aforementioned sphere model. But that revival took a starkly new historical form, and we can detect this in the examination of the modern bourgeois public sphere as articulated by Habermas (and subsequent theorists of the public sphere, liberalism, and democracy) (Habermas 1989 A, 232). This novel form of the public-private dichotomy contains within it a second, and equally blurred dichotomy, that of reason versus the irrational (and namely, the *emotional*, or the passionate), seen in and descending from the rational-critical bourgeois literary and public spheres.

The Public and the Private

There is an exceptional familiarity with the notion that the private—chiefly the personal, familial, and intimate yet equally the economic—is starkly opposed to the public—anything political and sometimes “social” (in this sense, public but not directly political). Thinkers like Hannah Arendt have contributed significantly to the contrasting of these two spheres of life, and draw from the sharp divide between the public and private realms of ancient politics and thought in order to reflect on the politics of modernity, and open up new paths for contemporaneous thought and action. Arendt, however, and as must be expected, does not replicate the perspective of the ancient world and its thinkers. Her work reveals the extent to which these classical concepts are idealised (Arendt 1998, 48-49).

Ancient life splits the public, political realm—effectively the *polis*, the assembly of citizens—from the private realm of production—*oikos*, the hierarchical household which provides but stays in the background, irrelevant to politics. The *polis* is common to all free citizens, while *oikos* can be seen to be individual, as Habermas views it (Habermas 1989, 3). The predominant depiction of the ancient dichotomy of the public and private realms holds that it is entirely dependent on the ancient patrimonial slave economy, in which wealthy citizens are freed from production and thus nature and necessity, and participation in the public depended upon being the master of a household—status in the *polis* was based upon status in *oikos* (*ibid*). The Ancient Greek public was the "realm of freedom and permanence," the only place of visibility, while all types of reproduction—birth, labour, and death—occurred in the hidden realm of the private (*ibid*, 3-4). The *polis* was the realm of discussion, "which could also assume the forms of consultation and of sitting in the court of law, as well as in common action (*praxis*), be it the waging of war or competition in athletic games" (*ibid*, 3). Discussion amongst free and equal citizens allowed issues to take form, and competition amongst equals allowed for excellence, renown, and immortality (*ibid*, 4).

Upheld in thought by both Plato and Aristotle, and other aristocratic thinkers, *oikos* is a lower form of being, with Plato asserting the contemplative life to be the best and highest good (and then places those engaged in contemplation as the rulers of his ideal *polis*) and Aristotle deciding the state, the political association, was the highest good (Plato 1992, 146; Aristotle 1992, 54). As a productive realm, concerned with the necessities of maintaining the survival of the community as it is, *oikos* is not distinguished as the truly human, as above the animalistic nature of men, and hence why the realm of necessity is the realm of those who are dominated: women, children, and slaves.

Republic offers us a clear hierarchy of being as Plato constructs his ideal *polis* in parallel to his conception of the tripartite soul (Plato 1992, 117). Necessity, inevitable as it is, is brute and appetitive, and the lowest level of the soul (the dominating part of the soul in children, women, slaves, and the “inferior majority, according to Plato) and society (*ibid*, 106). In the ideal city, the necessary, economic work (that which takes place in the household or carried out by craftsmen), is considered to be at this level, and is embodied by those whose souls are dominated by the appetitive part. Plato not only finds them less capable of ruling, but dangerous to the city, unable to strive for anything other than the pursuit of wealth and luxury (*ibid*, 224). The highest part of the soul, which dominates in the rulers of Plato’s ideal *polis* (the philosophers), is the deliberative part, the one which embodies reason. The deliberative aspect of the soul, and the deliberative person, are engaged in the more human activity of reasonable contemplation.

There is one more segment of the soul for Plato, and that is the spirited part, which perhaps could be called the emotive part. This element might also be found to lay between the appetitive and deliberative, based on Plato’s descriptions. But Plato’s descriptions of this spirited element also indicate that it retains a stronger and more significant relationship with the deliberative, especially acting in concert against the ruinous temptations of the appetitive element (Plato 1992, 117; 118). The understanding of the emotive (or spirited) element of the human soul as being bound with the reasonable (or deliberative) part is rather standard for ancient through medieval thought, and tends to mark who belongs in which realm, based on how they are able to temper or even eliminate their base, animalistic, appetitive, destructive part. The spirited soul acts as a mediating force. So, Plato gives those who are primarily dominated by their spirited aspect the role of the guardians of the order of his *polis*.

As distinguishing as they are, the divergences of Aristotle’s thought from Plato’s do nothing to dispel the distinct realms of the private and the public. Aristotle recognises that the *polis* does derive from the household, the private realm of necessity, the *polis* growing out of the pursuit of mere life in the private realm to form a public realm that purses the good life (Brown

1988, 32-33). But these domains are not the same, and Aristotle insists that the political, the domain of kings or statemen, is not the same type of association as anything in the private realm (Aristotle 1992, 54). A ruler in the political realm is not merely a "larger" kind of ruler than those with power in the private realm, one who simply governs over more people (*ibid*). The political realm, the state in short, is a more significant type of association, the one that aims at the highest and most sovereign of all goods, and this distinguishes it sharply from the more base aims of the private (*ibid*). But as Brown notes, the self-sufficiency of the *polis* relies on its parasitic relationship to this realm of necessity (Brown 1988, 37). Aristotle does declare man to be a political animal (Aristotle 1992, 59), intended for life in the *polis*, but only some men (and specifically men) have such a political nature (and thus only some can engage in this genuinely human realm and life) (Brown 1988, 35). While the political realm, and those who act in it, depend on the private realm for their existence, Aristotle also asserts that the meaning and function of those in the realm of necessity is dependent on the thriving of the *polis*—those in the private realm have no self-inherent meaning; they are "instruments for the purpose of life" (*ibid*, 37; 38). Those who are instruments of the private realm in Aristotle's eyes are naturally as such, only able to recognise reason while not themselves possessing it, and distinguished by bodies that are strong and suited for mere labour (Aristotle 1992, 69).[5] Aristotle's political man, the inhabitant of the public realm, is thus defined by his alienation from the private realm which sustains him, and alienated from his own mortality (Brown 1988, 37).

Not too far from the hierarchy of Plato's tripartite soul, Aristotle's hierarchy of being, in which the lower forms exist for the sake of the higher, aligns the lower forms with the inferior

[5] Such passages indicate to the extent Aristotle, like Plato, discounted the democratic labouring citizen of periods of Athenian democracy, and how distinctly undemocratic the thought of these two ancients truly is.

body and necessity and the higher forms with the superior mind and reason (Brown 1988, 39). In keeping with his differentiation of the public and the private, Aristotle describes in *The Politics* how each realm parallels the human condition, first explaining that the rule of the soul over the body is akin to a master or head of household's rule (Aristotle 1992, 68). The rule of intelligence over desire is like that of the rule of the king or statesman, political rule (*ibid*). Emotion must be ruled by the intellect, and the body by the soul, just as man ought to tame and rule animals, and as men should hold authority over women, according to Aristotle (*ibid*). The highest form of action is contemplation, for Aristotle, and any action which is not purely thought contains within it irrationality because of its inclusion of the body (Brown 1988, 47). Further for Aristotle, political life and action is the highest good for man (*ibid*, 49). The citizen, inhabitant of the public and exerciser of reason freed from the body, is capable of the good life, while those of the private realm (women and slaves) who are merely bodies are only capable of providing for the public (*ibid*, 39-40). Articulated as metaphor, Aristotle tells us that tame animals are superior to wild animals in virtue of their obedience—their mind rules over their appetites and bodies (*ibid*, 41). As mentioned in the previous paragraph, those who cannot exercise their minds (the natural slaves) are of a lower order, and whose bodily natures require they be ruled over by those who can use their reason (*ibid*). As it is nature, for Aristotle, which instills the faculties that determine whether one is to rule or be ruled, this dominance is justified. So, for Aristotle, the public realm is a realm of freedom, while the private realm is one of domination, which further necessitates the distancing of these two realms (*ibid*, 42). As Wendy Brown articulates, "the maintenance of this fiction through the 'naturalization' of the domination and violence in the *oikos* and through masking the agency that sustains this domination is what necessitates such severe boundaries around the political realm" (*ibid*, 44). The political realm, based on the equality of citizens,

citizens who cannot dominate one another, and so no matter how dependent the *polis* is upon *oikos*, and no matter whether we could identify political relations both in the separation of these realms and within the private realm, the private can never be political because it is founded upon inequality and domination (*ibid*, 43-44). Ultimately, for Aristotle, there is a distinction between the *political* (public), the realm of the free and immortal, and the *natural* (private), the realm of the dominated and mortal.

Such understandings of politics, necessity, and nature reveal a deep fear of the body—and labour, and mortality—held by classical thinkers. Not only was there a concern that dealing with the realm of necessity would distract from the truly political matters of free citizens were the boundaries of the realms to be blurred, but the realm of necessity serves to symbolise the possibility of bodily entrapment and the labour that is required to survive in this world—necessity, the body itself, is dehumanizing (Brown 1988, 45). The good life itself is defined against the necessities of sustenance and procreation (*ibid*).

It is also worth noting that for both Plato and Aristotle wealth is not a concern of the highest good and therefore is unfit for politics, and a person concerned with the accumulation of wealth is someone who is preoccupied with the lower realm of necessity. Plato is very firm that money-makers and those concerned with wealth belong to the lowest level and have appetitive-dominant souls, and belong neither with the spirit-dominant types or in politics with the deliberative types (Plato 1992, 109). Aristotle distinguishes politics from wealth right in his definition of the state, noting that it is incorrect to assume that political roles such as that of the statesman or a king were just higher or larger versions (ruling the most people) of a household manager (a smaller association of people) or master of slaves (only a few people) (Aristotle 1992, 54). He then goes on to devote sections of *The Politics* to the discussion of what are natural and unnatural means of accumulating goods in the household, and declares that trading—as it is characterised by the use of money and driven by the pursuit of monetary gain—is not a natural means, and goes beyond the needs (and often at the expense) of the household (*ibid*, 83). Both Plato and Aristotle characterise the pursuit of wealth as exclusively part of the private sphere, and furthermore associate it with a licentious and untamed appetite.

However, despite the predominance of this view of the ancient *polis*, Athenian democracy and the ancient distinction between the public and the private never existed the way Plato and Aristotle characterised it, or the way in which Arendt would revive it. Their presentation, however, of the public-private distinction is significant and highly influential, and thus must be taken into account to understand the creation and development of this distinction in thought and practice. Theirs is an account that has been idealised as "true" politics, taken to be the noble pursuit of the good life actualised politically. But nevertheless, it is certainly a departure from the reality of the politics of the *polis*, and the ancient distinction of the public and private.[6]

The idea of a wealthy head of the household as the typical Athenian citizen, or the only Athenian citizen, is actually a purely aristocratic notion. The majority of the citizens of Athens were relatively poor, and laboured for their living—thus, totally engaged in the realm of necessity. They also could by no means afford to employ slaves: two thirds to three quarters of the citizen population of Athens likely did not own any slaves (Jones 1952, 23). As such, this dispels two related notions associated with this "anti-necessity" view of the private-public

[6] It is worth noting that the Roman Republic was the general inspiration for the revolutions and new governments of the Enlightenment period, not Athenian democracy (Sellers, Mortimer Newlin Stead. 2003. "Republican Influences on the French and American Revolutions". M.N.S. Sellers, *Republican Legal Theory*, Ch. III, Macmillan. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1141202).

distinction in ancient politics. Firstly, it dispels the notion that the majority of those who were citizens relied upon the labour of slaves most of all for their needs, freeing them to participate in political matters, and secondly, that the labour in the realm of necessity, the reproduction of life in the ancient world, was exclusively carried out by slaves (and of course, others excluded from the *polis* such as women and children). From the time of Pericles pay was given for participating in the assembly, since it was essential "that every citizen, however poor, should be able to afford the time for exercising his political rights" if the system was to be authentically democratic (*ibid*, 14).[7] If every citizen was a household head, living off of the labour of the enslaved, such measures would be unneeded. It is also important to mention that an Athenian citizen would not be able to live off of the pay provided for participating, especially if he had a family, and so a poor citizen still would have to labour (*ibid*, 23). Male citizens who had family did certainly depend upon the labour of wives and children, and in that sense could be a patriarchal "head," but this is a far departure from being the aristocratic, land owning head of a productive estate (*ibid*, 21). And to the contrary, slaves often were engaged in tasks that would not be seen as those of pure labour and necessity, such as banking and artisinal crafting, and where they did labour, it was less likely agriculture, and more frequently mining (*ibid*, 21-22). Most of the work done in industry and agriculture in Athens was carried out by its citizens (*ibid*, 22). Labour was not denigrated by the ancient Athenians; it was servitude itself that was the opposite of freedom (*ibid*, 19).

It has been argued, as well, that the separation between the public and the private for the ancients was not as rigid as is often portrayed. There was no ancient sphere model, as in

[7] Economics still made a vital impact on participation; for instance, those who were sent to settle Athenian colonies, rarely able to exercise their political rights in Athens, tended to be of the poorest class (*thetes*) (Jones 1952, 16).

modernity, in which these different realms are sectioned off from each other only able to meet in the spaces in the middle. Those who engage in productive work in the *oikos* come to the *polis* to practice politics; they are not shunned for having engaged in the realm of “necessity.” And further, the regulation of the *oikos* seemed to be quite acceptable through the *polis*; the political is not unwilling to touch necessity (Ojakangas 2020, 408-409). Even Plato and especially Aristotle engage *oikos* extensively in their treatments of politics (including in human reproduction) (Plato 1992, 135; Aristotle 1981, 439, 443).

However, care must be taken to ensure modern, liberal, bourgeois conceptions of the private, and therefore also what characterises a distinction between public and private, are not being applied to the ancient world.[8] The *oikos* is not the autonomous private sphere of the bourgeoisie, or a pre-political space (Ojakangas 2020, 404), and so interference in the *oikos* by the *polis*, or lack there of, should not be taken to indicate that there is no distinction in ancient society between the public and the private at all. While the ancient Greeks did not believe that a private realm meant an individual was not to be interfered with and left completely to their own devices, they did indeed distinguish between a private and a public (*ibid*, 409). While Plato and Aristotle’s distinction might be exaggerated, and given an inaccurate basis (the total rejection of labour and necessity versus immortality), the ancient Athenians certainly do see a distinction between public and private, between what is common and what is individual or particular, and what is political and what is not. The *polis*, a political space for citizens, is characterised by participation and freedom, and that is something that cannot be given to non-citizens who only have the *oikos*. No matter how rich a *metic* might be, or how much leisure time a wealthy

[8] Mika Ojakangas warns against this yet also ends up not quite escaping this, seeming to determine that a real distinction should entail no interference of the *oikos* by the *polis* at all (Ojakangas 2020, 406, 410).

citizen’s wife might have, their significance in the *oikos* did not extend to them the ability to participate in the *polis*, in governance, because of their lack of political status (Jones 1952, 18). Necessity did not provide citizenship, and citizenship determined the public and who could participate in that realm. And it was the *polis* that granted freedom and autonomy, not the *oikos*.

The distinction between the political and the economic, the public and the private, collapses in the medieval period with the so-called fall of the (at least Western) Roman empire and the rise of feudalism across Western Europe. This results in noticeably different expectations of behaviour that are based not on different realms of being, but on a shared moral and religious system within a hierarchy of status. Clans, kingdoms, courtly circles, kin groups, and factions, princes, officials, magistracies, assemblies, estates, and privileged orders, all existed as simultaneously private and public entities in medieval society (Chittolini 1995, S40, S45). Things that are assumed to be obviously private in the modern world were not held to be entirely private in the medieval period: religious practice and heresy, sexual misconduct, and marriage and marital problems, to name a few (McSheffrey 2004, 961). Highlighting the difficulties in describing a medieval public or private using modern understandings of these concepts, Chittolini writes:

> The term ‘private’ is used not only to define forces, interests, and practices that are contrasted to a ‘public’ order and apparatus (thus recognising by implication the existence of that order and its institutions). It is also involved by way of contrast to suggest a social and political organization based on structures that are not public-minded and that do not refer to the concept of the state (or to conceptions of the public and of public law developed together with the concept of the state but not appropriate to a society that does not recognize the public/private dichotomy, like that of the Middle Ages and Renaissance, and therefore needs to be understood according to its own principles). (Chittolini 1995, S55).

The absence of such a dichotomy in the Middle Ages makes speaking of the contents of a private or public sphere quite complicated within this period.

In the Middle Ages, the distinction between the public (*publicus*) and private (*privatus*) was familiar via Roman Law, but it had no usage in society (Habermas 1989, 5). There was no opposition between the private and the public, for there were no longer distinctly public or private realms (*ibid*). A society organised by manorial estate has no way for its members to step from public to private, because elements of what would be seen as private or public in prior or later times were highly integrated throughout that social structure. The social organisations of the European medieval era were simultaneously political organisation, characterised by a "diffuse sovereignty" which "dissolved and obliterated distinctions between the social and the political and created the sort of continuum between the private and public spheres mentioned earlier" (Chittolini 1995, S57, S58). A feudal lord is the closest thing to the master of a household in the medieval period, yet this position really is not comparable to that private authority (Habermas 1989, 5). There was in fact a reversal, if anything, of the concepts regarding the spheres, with the "common" man becoming the "private" man, and "lord" used synonymously with "*publicus*" (*ibid*, 6). Illustrated with an example, there is a "private" soldier, being a common, rankless soldier who lacks any particularity for command (public) (*ibid*). Effectively, the contrasts in the language of the public-private dyad come to be made irrelevant, as Habermas explains, by their total integration within the feudal social structure: "The ambivalence in the meaning of '*gemein*' (common) as 'communal,' that is, (publicly) accessible to all and 'ordinary,' that is, without special right (namely, lordly prerogative) and without official rank in general still reflects the integration of elements of communal (*genossenschaftlich*) organization into a social structure based on manorial authority" (*ibid*). There is thus no dichotomy of the public and the private in medieval feudalism.

It is not the case that the two realms were simply combined, or more interconnected, than in the ancient world. The realms themselves, these demarcated places, vanished, and "…a public sphere in the sense of a separate realm distinguished from the private sphere cannot be shown to have existed in the feudal society of the High Middle Ages" (Habermas 1989, 7). Publicity was a status attribute in the medieval world, not a social realm (*ibid*). Princes and estates *were* the country, not just representatives for it—their representation was not representing the country, or subjects to the country, but rather they represented the country before the people (*ibid*). The King is France, and the King represents France as he embodies it before the people. And that is the same with the lord who "displays himself, represents himself as the embodiment of a "higher" power" (Habermas 1989 A, 232). The feudal lord embodies a higher power, representing that power before those who do not have it, and that constitutes the publicity of this epoch (Habermas 1989, 7). Further, there were not specific locations for publicity, or specific venues for politics. The political and economic and social, the contents of a public and private, were diffuse.

Only as the medieval period comes to an end, as modernity rises, do we see the re-emergence of a public and private realm. There is a polarization of the princely powers, which by the eighteenth century "had decomposed into private elements on the one side and public on the other" (Habermas 1989 A, 232). The crystallisation of the nation state propelled the creation of the new public realm against the private realm which emerged to counteract the growing power of absolute monarchies and their parliaments (Horowitz 1982, 1423). In late medieval England, law came to differentiate between the private property of the monarch—land over which the monarch was considered feudal lord and could be alienated as private—and the public crown lands (*ibid*). And the centralisation of the market in society was key to reviving the two distinct realms of the public and the private, with two different kinds of law developing for each respective realm (*ibid*, 1424). After social contract theories and particularly the natural-rights arguments made by thinkers like John Locke, the dichotomy of the public and the private slowly becomes more enshrined in modern thought and political practice, solidifying in liberalism and becoming naturalised by the nineteenth century (*ibid*; McSheffrey 2004, 989).

Machiavelli, whom I place as a cusp figure between the classical and the modern, both represents and challenges the conceptions of public and private held in classical thought and in medieval life. Machiavelli, against ancient thought, argues that politics is bodily, earthly, and pertains to the matters of life (Brown 1988, 71). While he does not go so far as to argue that the peasants' work is in itself political, he denies that politics is a purely contemplative exercise that is based on truth-seeking. In fact, it is quite the opposite, operating largely in the realm of appearance. For Machiavelli, appearance, or deceit, is just as important in politics as reality and truth (Machiavelli 2011, 70)[9]—certainly an impossibility for ancients such as Plato, and certainly not compatible with medieval Christian ethics (which, again, for Machiavelli only strictly apply to those outside of political life). He does venerate politics as a special realm of glory (Brown 1988, 96), but it is not detached from living in the way that Plato and Aristotle conceived of it. And, most importantly, Machiavelli views necessity as an important and crucial characteristic of humanity and politics, driving people to be good and industrious, and countering laziness—it creates *virtù*, making cities strong (*ibid*, 98-99, 114). Machiavelli actually insists upon the animalistic nature of man and politics, even denying the role of politics as a special and the most-

[9] As K.R. Minogue put it, politics is an exercise in theatricality, an idea further developed by Arendt; according to N.O. Brown, to see through the show "is to put an end to politics" (Brown 1988, 102-103).

human of activities (*ibid*, 73-74, 77). Politics is power, the ability to control environments, situations, and people. As Brown states, “Machiavelli is one of the few theorists of politics to have recognized the power borne by that which is oppressed, power generated by the very act of oppression, power that must be perceived and addressed by any successful political actor” (*ibid*, 87). And Machiavelli granted the securing of freedom to the people, and attributed the greatness and freedom of Rome to the plebeians (Breaugh 2013, 49). Not to some isolated, contemplative, and pure political agents extracted from labour and necessity.

This view also alters the relationship of politics and reason for Machiavelli. Politics is not distinctly human, nor is it a contemplative activity, and reason thus cannot be the distinguishing trait of the public realm. Reason is not excluded, it is certainly required for those who act in the political realm (Brown 1988, 85), but it is not a stand alone or definitive feature, and often must take a back seat to less rational or even “irrational” qualities. Machiavelli replaces the guiding light of reason with *virtù*, the qualities that are necessary for those in politics. Politics, argues Machiavelli, is a realm that obeys its own logic and cannot be subjected to the morals or ethics that apply outside of that realm such as those prescribed by religion (Christianity) or reason (classical philosophy). This logic is embodied in Machiavelli’s concept of *virtù*. In *The Prince*, he writes:

> Many writers have dreamed up republics and kingdoms that bear no resemblance to experience and never existed in reality; there is such a gap between how people actually live and how they ought to live that anyone who declines to behave as people do, in order to behave as they should, is schooling himself for catastrophe and had better forget personal security: if you always want to play the good man in a world where most people are not good, you’ll end up badly. Hence, if a ruler wants to survive, he’ll have to learn to stop being good, at least when the occasion demands. (Machiavelli 2011, 60).

Machiavelli here first denounces works like Plato's *Republic*, which attempt to prescribe a politics based on assumptions made about an imaginary *polis*, rather than the real circumstances in which political actors are situated. From that, Machiavelli makes his argument that behaving as we "ought"—whether according to the dictates of morality or rationality—is dangerous and inappropriate for politics. The moral "ought" does not correspond to the operating logic of the political. What is moral for the individual could be disastrous for the state and *vice versa*. And this is no easy task; leaders are not simply able to consult a singular ethic or consistently follow rules. Those in the public realm must cultivate and learn to use their instincts—as is natural for animals—to become highly adaptable and shrewd in this turbulent and high-stakes realm (Machiavelli 2011, 69).

So, central in the work of Machiavelli is honing the capacities to ensure a stable and enduring polity. For Machiavelli, stability and order are a major concern in any given state (Brown 1988, 106),[10] but contrary to his contemporary caricature, this was not to be realised through some monarchial iron grip on the populace. Rather than mapping out an ideal city, Machiavelli classified regimes based on the balance present between the perpetual tension (resulting in principalities, republics, or regimes of *licenzia*) between the forces of domination—those in power, the nobility—and the forces of freedom—the populace with no, or significantly less, formal political power—which he saw as the two humours that characterised all political communities and drove all political conflict (Breaugh 2013, xvi, 48). One of the many significant aspects of this understanding of politics, of making those classically deemed non-political

[10] *The Prince* is advice for a ruler on most effectively maintaining as stable and orderly a rule as possible. In *Discourses on Livy*, Machiavelli analyses both republican and princely states, in specific and varying historical circumstances, and again, attempts to ascertain how best to secure stability in a state. For instance, the sections in the *Discourses* in which he discusses the difficulties in maintaining order between two consecutive princes and whether they are weak or strong leaders (Machiavelli 1996, 52-53).

indisputably political, is that the notion of a public-private separation is collapsed in a very distinct way. The notion of *virtù* may grant the appearance of a distinct political realm separated from all else, but in fact there is no isolated political venue that demarcates clearly what is, and what is not, political. Politics and its logic is distinct, but its arena is vast and permeable. However, into the Renaissance we encounter the revival—not in social formation, but in thought—of the Ancient model of the public (Habermas 1989, 4).

Hannah Arendt's modern revival of classical thought on politics as the highest and most human of goods (and the ideas which uphold such a conception) is possibly even more potent than their ancient articulations. Arendt holds that neither Plato nor Aristotle ever doubted the divide between the *polis* and the *oikos*, and nor does she harbour any doubt (Ojakangas 2020, 405). For Arendt, politics, the *vita activa*, is a uniquely human realm of action, which allows us to construct an existence for ourselves above mere nature and necessity; action alone reveals our humanity (Brown 1988, 23; 49). It is a realm that can only exist through the creative action of humans acting in concert, which is what provides its striking contrast to labour (for the tasks of *animal laborans* can be carried out in isolation and indeed even by non-humans) and work (the *homo faber* can work alone and the nature of that work in no way changes) (Arendt 1998, 22). Arendt writes, "the distinction between man and animal runs right through the human species itself: only the best (*aristoi*), who constantly prove themselves to be the best…and who 'prefer immortal fame to mortal things,' are really human; the others, content with whatever pleasures nature will yield them, live and die like animals" (*ibid*, 19). As it was for the Ancients, for Arendt freedom is only possible in the public realm, because it requires being free from necessity and labour (Brown 1988, 24). Arendt, citing Aristotle, writes that the life of the citizen, which is the "good life", "was not merely better, more carefree or nobler than ordinary life, but of an altogether different quality. It was ‘good’ to the extent that by having mastered the necessities of sheer life, by being freed from labor and work, and by overcoming the innate urge of all living creatures for their own survival, it was no longer bound to the biological life process” (Arendt 1998, 36-37). And, again echoing Aristotle, the private realm exists for the sake of the public: “Without mastering the necessities of life in the household, neither life nor the ‘good life’ is possible, but politics is never for the sake of life. As far as the members of the *polis* are concerned, household life exists for the sake of the ‘good life’ in the *polis*” (Arendt 1998, 37).

The free realm of the public allows its participants to strive for and attain immortality and attempt to transcend the “futility of individual life”, something entirely impossible in any other realm, and this is why, according to Arendt, the pursuits of political action should never be reduced to mere life (as in, the social or economic) (Brown 1988, 24). Shunning the mortal, for Arendt, is the truly free and truly human (*ibid*). Arendt and Aristotle both deny a political status to the provider of the *polis*, and supremely elevate the public realm (*ibid*, 43). But, Arendt further argues that politics is even higher, and a superior achiever of immortality, to pure contemplation, since political action brings something into existence (*ibid*, 24). She even believes that Aristotle is actually traitorous to the political by placing its origins in the private realm of necessity (*ibid*, 25). Such a view justifies exclusion and exploitation of those who must be concerned with the realm of necessity, and greatly limits what can be included in political discussion (*ibid*, 26).

The immortality of the political realm consists in the “striving toward excellence of speech and deed in a genuinely public realm where this excellence can be seen and heard my others and recorded for posterity” (Brown 1988, 24). To prioritise consequences, namely those pertaining to economic or social issues, is to degrade the unique concerted action of politics, and thus Arendt’s understanding of politics, which despite emphasising the purely collective nature of political action, ultimately severs the political from nature and need (*ibid*, 27). Brown notes a nearly pathological fear of nature and necessity in Arendt, far more exaggerated than in the Ancient world, and concludes that for Arendt “there is perhaps no clearer testimony to the loss of the public realm in the modern age than the almost complete loss of concern with immortality” (*ibid*, 29).

A new social order began to form as early finance and trade capitalism emerged in western Europe (Habermas 1989, 14). As feudalism declined, the new bourgeois culture integrated into the courtly public, notably based in the humanist thought of the scholars who were educating the princes and nobles as early as the fifteenth century, effectively replacing the knight of Christian virtue with the cultivated courtier (*ibid*, 9). For the aristocracy no longer represented itself and their own lordliness, but rather served to represent the centralised monarch (*ibid*, 10). Drawing from Gadamer, Habermas explains “their serene and eloquent sociability was characteristic of the new ‘society’ centered in the court. The independent provincial nobility based in the feudal rights attached to the land lost its power to represent; publicity of representation was concentrated at the prince’s court” (*ibid*, 9). This integration occurs also as the court is closing off and becoming a distinct realm. Metaphorically to be sure, but also quite materially as the architecture of the castle and palace alter with the baroque castle park emerging in mid-seventeenth century France and then across Europe with the popularity of French architecture (*ibid*, 10). With the court effectively moving from the accessible public spaces to within the chambers and ballrooms, becoming effectively sealed off from the outside world; jousts and parties and festivities move from the streets into the castle park (*ibid*, 9-10). Moreover, these palace festivities were no longer held for pleasure, but were displays of the grandeur of the hosts and guests before the people as spectators—this still contrasts the bourgeois events, held behind totally closed doors in the private home (*ibid*, 10). Even the royal bedchamber became a stage, and the courtly etiquette demanded by Louis the XIV turned all courtly participants into his performers. Consequently, this produces an individuated nobility in a demarcated court of "good society", disintegrated from its social foundations (*ibid*, 10-11).

These are the social changes which reintroduce the private and public distinction into Western Europe, even if only as a seed to be germinated. "The reduction in the kind of publicity involved in the representation that went hand in hand with the elimination of the estate-based authorities by those of the territorial ruler created room for another sphere known as the sphere of public authority," Habermas writes (Habermas 1989, 18). This could only emerge under the conditions of the newly ascending national and territorial states, as the commercial economy grew and fractured the feudal foundations of society (*ibid*, 10). After the mid-sixteenth century, "private" (*privatus*, *privat*, *privé*) gains its meaning as *without publicity*, not holding public office, or more succinctly, exclusion from the realm of the state (*ibid*, 11). This contrasts the "public", which now refers to the state (though specifically, to the absolutist state which takes the place of the personal ruler) (*ibid*).

Habermas states that "the final form of the representative publicness, reduced to the monarch's court and at the same time receiving greater emphasis, was already an enclave within a society separating itself from the state. Now for the first time private and public spheres became separate in a specifically modern sense" (Habermas 1989, 11).[11] Public authority itself took on an altered form, as princely authority became polarised; the public budget was separated

[11] Though even nowadays, we have these feudal ruins in that the highest level of political authority—however much distance it has gone beyond its former lordly representativeness—takes the form of representation via the head of state (Habermas 1989 A, 232). But bourgeois representation is not the "representative publicness which inheres in the concrete existence of a lord" (Habermas 1989 A, 232).

from the ruler's private holdings, and the bureaucracy, military, and even in some cases justice administrators became independent institutions separate from the court (*ibid*, 12). The public person and public authority are supposed to be concerned with and serve public welfare, while the private person and private office allowed for the pursuit of private interests (*ibid*, 11). With these transformations, the ceremonial nature of noble publicity began to give way, and instead it began to take on the intimacy that characterised the bourgeoisie, becoming an almost inaccessible secluded residence (*ibid*, 31, 32). With the further creation of a standing army and permanent administration, the state authority became depersonalised—civil society comes into existence as a result of this (*ibid*, 19).

The (re-)privatization of economic production also occurs amidst these political changes, yet it was not the same as the private *oikos* of the ancient world. Now, the private economy holds public relevancy as it is oriented towards the commodity market, taking place outside of the confines of the single, individual household (Habermas 1989, 19). The expansion of the market had been expanded through public direction and supervision, and for the first time the production and exchange of commodities became a "general interest" (*ibid*). The town ended up taking on the function of the now retreated court, first in England and France, supported by new institutions (*ibid*, 32). The merchants outgrew the towns, and ended up linking themselves to the state through companies, and "thus, the 'capitalists,' the merchants, bankers, entrepreneurs, and manufacturers…belonged to that group of the 'bourgeois' who, like the new category of scholars, were not really 'burghers' in the traditional sense. This stratum of 'bourgeois' was the real carrier of the public, which from the outset was a reading public" (*ibid*, 23).[12] This is the

[12] "The public sphere was realized not in the republic of scholars alone but in the public use of reason by all who were adept at it. Of course, they had to emerge from the confines of their private spheres as if they were scholars" (Habermas 1989, 105).

stratum that leads to the *publicum*, "the public of the now emerging public sphere of civil society," "the abstract counterpart of public authority," the opponent of the state (*ibid*). This was the sphere which belonged to the subjects of public authority, not confined to those authorities (*ibid*). The private sphere became a chief focus of this newly developing sphere of critique, as the society of which it is constituted separated sharply their private domain from that of public authority, and more over, the sphere of (re-)production began to transcend its original private, domestic confines and become a topic of public interest (*ibid*, 24).

Arendt describes this phenomenon as the rise of the social, the "private sphere of society that has become publicly relevant," characterising the modern relationship of the public sphere to the private, in contrast to the ancient configuration (Habermas 1989, 19). Arendt writes, "society is the form in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else assumes public significance and where the activities connected with sheer survival are permitted to appear in public (Arendt 1998, 46).[13] The term "economic," limited to the tasks of the *oikodespotes*, the *pater familias*, until the seventeenth century, was now used "in the context of a practice of running a business in accord with the principles of profitability", the modern usage (Habermas 1989, 20). *Oikos*, the household, had been replaced by the market to make a commercial economy (*ibid*). It should be remarked that a commercial economy was not born naturally or self-actualised, but was brought forth through the state administration and its ties with the newly

[13] Arendt holds, and Habermas echoes, that it is only in modernity that we posit the household as a model for society at large, and that economic matters are permitted to be discussed in the public, with Arendt going so far as to say political economy would have been a contradiction in terms for the ancients; however, not only did political economy (*oikonomia politikê*) exist as a term, but the Athenians also often employed the image of Athens as a great family, not to mention the extent to which Aristotle intervenes in matters of *oikos* (Ojakangas 2020 404, 409, 411, 415).

emerging science of finance and developments of agricultural technology—the private sphere and civil society were intimately linked with public authority (*ibid*).

The distinction between the public and private is thus revived in modernity, returned in the form of a sphere of public authority, consisting of the state and those who represent it though no longer truly embody it, and a private sphere of the market and the intimacy of the family, both inhabited by private people, who do not represent the state—chiefly, the bourgeoisie.

The Bourgeois Public Sphere

The bourgeois public sphere can be defined as a "sphere of private people come together as a public" engaging in a public use of reason, or the "…critical judgement of a public making use of its reason" (Habermas 1989, 27, 24; Postone 1997, 165). It consists of individuals who come together, without being subject to any coercion, to engage in discussion of "matters of general interest" (Habermas 1989 A, 231). It becomes a political public sphere when those public discussions are concerning objects connected to public authority and state practice (*ibid*). Baker writes, "participants in this modern public sphere were to be conceived of not as citizens of an ancient polis assembling together to engage in the common exercise of political will but as the dispersed members of 'a society engaged in critical public debate'" (Baker 1997, 183). Of course, it is necessary to note from the outset that the bourgeois public sphere is obviously based upon the bourgeoisie, the class of property owning, educated townspeople, and very specifically, the bourgeois conjugal family. From the mid-seventeenth century onward, reference to a public came into being out of the circles of debate, which was formally referred to as "the world," "mankind," or "the world of readers" (Habermas 1989, 26). This was a critical public; that which was submitted to the judgement of public gained "publicity" (*ibid*). Particularly, this public served to counter the public authorities through debate—the judgements of this sphere were deemed public in regard to the sphere of public authority, and this sphere "was now casting itself loose as a forum in which the private people, come together to form a public, readied themselves to compel public authority to legitimate itself before public opinion" (*ibid*, 25-26). Paradoxically, the principle of publicity, as it emerged from the private bourgeois sphere of critical debate, was used to counter secrets of state, of public authority (*ibid*, 52). And significantly, this critical judgement comes out of what was argued to be humanity's genuine site—not the public, as it would be for the Ancient Greeks, but the intimate, conjugal family of the bourgeoisie (*ibid*, 51).

The patriarchal conjugal family as a family type emerged from structural changes in the family that resulted from transformations in society towards capitalism, and it became the dominant and defining type of family: that of the bourgeoisie (Habermas 1989, 44). While a married noble couple lived not necessarily in the same house, the new patriarchal conjugal family was characterised by a permanent intimacy (*ibid*). And yes, this intimate new family life contrasted with the aristocratic family, but it also contrasted with the large communality of the extended family that was still the basis for family amongst the population—these extended families and their pre-bourgeois forms could not fit within the "public" and "private" distinction (*ibid*).

The conjugal bourgeois family, the intimate sphere, was seen as independent of society, though dependent on the twin private sphere of labour and commodity exchange (Habermas 1989, 46). But the view of its separate, private autonomy denied the economic basis that gave the bourgeois conjugal family its self-consciousness—it appeared that this family was maintained entirely voluntarily, by free people, without any coercion, of course primarily resting on the community of love created by two spouses (*ibid*). But this idea and self-image of the intimate conjugal family contrasts with its real function: the reproduction of capital (*ibid*, 47).

As independent as a property owner may have been in the market, this independence did not come without the dependence of this head-of-household's wife and children—the private autonomy in the market, transformed into authority in the intimate family (Habermas 1989, 47). Even marriage was a consideration of capital preservation and augmentation, more so than purely a contract of love (and the conflict between marriage for love and marriage for socio-economic considerations was a contemporaneous concern too, a major theme of the day, especially as it threatened to expose the freedom of the bourgeoisie as illusory) (*ibid*). But though perhaps illusory, this notion of freedom in the intimate, based on love more than anything else, distinguished the bourgeois private from the Ancient Greek *oikos*. The Ancient Greek head of household knew his social status rested upon his being the head of a household, a relation of domination over what we call the intimate was entirely recognised as such—the intimacy held no freedom (*ibid*, 52).

The intimate sphere (the bourgeois family) was embedded in and relied upon the sphere of the social (or, civil society). Civil society—the private sphere of commodity exchange and social labour—was centred in the towns, with their coffee houses, *salons*, and table societies (*Tischgesellschaften*) (Habermas 1989, 30). Both humanistic aristocrats and bourgeois intellectuals participated in the discussion carried out in these entities, and these discussions would become public criticism (*ibid*). With the decline of the representative public, the remains of courtly publicity were carried over and bridged the bourgeois public sphere (*ibid*). However, civil society really belonged to the bourgeoisie, and the regulation of this sphere by public authority would become the focus of critical debate, and the crux of the challenge to public authority (*ibid*, 52). This totally shifts the meaning of the public sphere from "the properly political tasks of a citizenry acting in common (i.e., administration of the law as regards internal affairs and military survival as regards external affairs) to the more properly civic tasks of a society engaged in a critical public debate (i.e., the protection of a commercial economy)" (*ibid*). Now, "the political task of the bourgeois public sphere was the regulation of civil society" (*ibid*).

The bourgeois public sphere emerged from a society separated from the state (Habermas 1989, 127). The market must be differentiated from the state, with the now privatised market creating a privatised civil society, and consequentially the public sphere comes into being to mediate between private society and state publicity (Verhoest 2019, 50). Practically, the public sphere has these four characteristics: 1) a site for debate, either a physical one (such as a *salon* or coffee house), or through media (such as through newspapers, pamphlets, and journals); 2) universal accessibility to this site; 3) it should be protected as a space for rational critical debate from coercion and censorship; and 4) the opinions which emerge from this site should be taken as legitimate by public authority (*ibid*).

A bourgeois public sphere functioning in the political realm can be seen at the turn of the eighteenth century in Great Britain (Habermas 1989, 57). The bourgeois element of the Protestant middle class, engaged in commerce and business and holding capitalist interests, were not represented in parliament, and so they produced what might be called a "pre-parliamentary forum" (*ibid*, 62-63). Participants endeavoured to influence the decisions made by state authority, appealing to the critical public for legitimation of their demands in this new forum (*ibid*, 57). Aided with the emerging publicist organs, this new critical public followed the Parliamentary deliberations and decisions, regardless of whether they had the vote (as in London and Westminster), or were disenfranchised (*ibid*, 63). The minorities in Parliament could seek out support in the public sphere, appealing to their critical judgements (*ibid*, 63). Gradually, through Parliament, the public active in the political realm became established as an organ of the state, assuming functions of political control (*ibid*, 58-59, 62). At the turn of the nineteenth century, the "public's involvement in the critical debate of public issues had become organized to such an extent that in the role of a permanent critical commentator it had definitively broken the exclusiveness of Parliament and evolved into the officially designated discussion partner of the delegate" (*ibid*, 66).

As Pascal Verhoest defines it, "public opinion is the voice that emerges from the public sphere and reaches into the realm of the public authorities" (Verhoest 2019, 57). Habermas considers public opinion to be definitive of the public sphere, noting that a public sphere is a space, in principle open and accessible to all citizens, where "public opinion can be formed" (Habermas 1989 A, 231). He defines public opinion as referring "to the functions of criticism and control of organized state authority that the public exercises informally, as well as formally during periodic elections" (*ibid*).

Not surprisingly, public opinion as a notion came about in practice before being properly coined by Enlightenment philosophers (Verhoest 2019, 49). One meaning of opinion, from the Latin *opinion*, refers to an "uncertain, not fully demonstrated judgement"—Plato's *doxa* or Hegel's *Meinen* (Habermas 1989, 89). This is the definition that seems to be the "common sense," default understanding. The second meaning is more significant, however, in understanding the bourgeois public sphere: opinion as reputation or regard, as in "what one represents in the opinion of others…'Opinion' in the sense of judgement that lacks certainty, whose truth would still have to be proven, is associated with 'opinion' in the sense of a basically suspicious repute among the multitude"—it carries the connotation of a collective opinion (*ibid*). However, both of these meanings stand contrastingly against the supposed rationality the public sphere claimed (*ibid*, 90). For opinion and public opinion were deemed to be different things, as public opinion was a product of public discussion, applied to public affairs (*ibid*, 91). Public opinion also had to be tied to the preconditions of public sphere participation—education and property—whereas opinion appeared to be far more general and more "mass" based (*ibid* 91-92). Public opinion is not the aggregation of individual opinions, but actively created by people in a public (Postone 1997, 164). This is demonstrated in Burke's *Speech to the Electors of Bristol*, in which he argues that the opinion formed by a public using its critical reason was no longer mere opinion, as it no longer arose "from mere inclination but from private reflection upon public affairs and from their public discussion" (Habermas 1989, 94). Public opinion, the public sphere's source of authority, "was construed as the universal reason of the generality of the thinking individuals continuously engaged in open discussion. Under its aegis, power and domination in human life were to give way to free acceptance of the enlightened order of human rationality" (Baker 1997, 183). Only a public engaged in rational discussion can produce public opinion, and such a public only developed "in a specific phase of bourgeois society, and only by virtue of a specific constellation of interests could they be incorporated into the order of the bourgeois constitutional state" (Habermas 1989 A, 232).

Public opinion (or general opinion, or public spirit, or *l'opinion publique*) "was the enlightened outcome of common and public reflection on the foundations of social order," it was "an authority that could compel lawmakers to legitimize themselves" (Habermas 1989, 95, 96). Legislation should be able to be traced back to popular will, sourced in the reason of the public agreement of a critically debating public (*ibid,* 107). If there is no recognition by public authority of the opinions emerging from the public sphere, "if they can be ignored and left without consequence," there is no purpose in a public sphere (Verhoest 2019, 57).

In 1792, three years after the outbreak of the French revolution, public opinion was officially introduced into Parliament in England[14] through Charles James Fox in a speech made before the House of Commons (Habermas 1989, 65). Fox spoke:

> It is certainly right and prudent to consult the public opinion….If the public opinion did not happen to square with mine; if, after pointing out to them the danger, they did not see it in the same light with me, or if they conceived that another remedy was preferable to mine, I should consider it as my due to my king, due to my Country, due to my honour to retire, that, they might pursue the plan which they thought better, by a fit instrument, that is by a man who thought with them…but one thing is most clear, that I ought to give the public the means of forming an opinion. (Habermas 1989, 65-66).

Heretofore, "the sense of the people," or "vulgar" or "common opinion" was used, but not anymore—now, it was public opinion, "formed in public discussion after the public, through education and information, had been put in a position to arrive at a considered opinion" (*ibid*, 66). Public opinion was further: defined by issues, not to rely on common sense, nor to revolve around support for one person or other (i.e., a representative); public opinion is formed through the conflict of arguments around substantive issues (*ibid*, 66-67). Encapsulating both the fall of representative publicity and the issue-based nature of public opinion, is the Whigs patronising caution in their election proclamation: "Remember that you are now fighting for things, not men" (*ibid*, 67).

Long-distance trading spurred into prominence by early capitalists created new commercial relationships, trafficking in not only commodities but news (Habermas 1989, 15).[15]

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[14] France was a bit behind England, for while a critically debating public focused on political issues arose in the mid-eighteenth century, they were greatly censored before the Revolution (and yet, the revolution happened nevertheless) meaning political journalism could not be developed (Habermas 1989, 67).

[15] The poet Samuel Butler complained about the commodification of the news, declaring that it made the truth irrelevant (Verhoest 2019, 53).

When communication was still dominated by publicity of representation, a public sphere, which relied on published word, was of very little threat (*ibid*, 16). However, in the mercantilist phase of commercial society, which arises simultaneously with the cementing of the modern state (a state based on taxation, with the treasury bureaucracy at its core) and its territorial and national economies, the trafficking of news began to take on a transformative role (*ibid*, 17). At the end of the seventeenth century, the regular supply of news became publicly accessible, in large part due to the needs and influence of the mercantile class (*ibid*, 16, 20). As early as the mid-seventeenth century journals, called "political journals," began circulating weekly, and then daily, providing the educated with detailed accounts of the current news: wars, Imperial Diets, harvests, taxes, and reports on foreign trade and commodity transport (*ibid*, 20). These accounts—whether news from the court or from abroad, updates of commercial events, advertisements for miracle cures, reports of murders, pestilences, and weather incidents—were all strained through the official censorship of the state administration, as well as the unofficial controls of the merchants (*ibid*, 21). More than simply being reliant upon the needs of commerce and merchants, "the news itself became a commodity" (*ibid*).

Incoming news became regularised and accelerated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when printers were printing news books first biannually, then becoming weekly newspapers (Gestrich 2006, 420). The end of the seventeenth century saw a vast increase in journals and tracts, which attempted to fuse political news and reasoning with entertainment (*ibid*, 426). The early papers were of good quality and highly critical (though Habermas argues they were not made political until later), and undoubtedly increased the general knowledge of the populace (*ibid*, 420). The rise of the newspapers and news as commodity coincides with the rise of the early modern state and its absolutist form of government, meaning all that was published had to be tolerated and approved by rulers who felt politics was not something to be discussed by common people (*ibid,* 420, 421).[16] However, the courts themselves released the "official" news, and used regular papers for inter-courtly communication (*ibid*, 421).

The British press in particular had unique liberties (Habermas 1989, 59). In the eighteenth century, "the press was for the first time established as a genuinely critical organ of a public engaged in a critical political debate as the fourth estate" (*ibid*, 60). And according to Kluxen, the establishment of independent journalism, with its ability to assert itself against public authority, normalised critical commentary and public opposition to the government (*ibid*). Even those in representative positions recognised the usefulness of the printed word: Robert Harley as a Whig, together with Daniel Defoe, defended the cause of the party in new journals and pamphlets, and later in 1722, the Whigs purchased the *London Journal* (*ibid,* 59). And this is the seed that, according to Habermas, will germinate to produce the public sphere, but in actuality a far broader public sphere than the one of which Habermas conceived: "The fact that ordinary people could read about political subjects several times a week sparked off conversations in taverns, coffee houses, reading clubs and similar locations where newspapers were normally available, often read out loud so that even those who were not able to read could partake in political debate" (Gestrich 2006, 421). Not only was the debating public not restricted to the nobility, but it was not even restricted to the bourgeoisie, and further, contrary to

[16] In June of 1662, an "Act for preventing Abuses in printing seditious treasonable and unlicensed Bookes and Pamphlets, and for regulating of Printing and Printing Presses" was passed, and was hence generally known as the Licensing Act because of its strict rules regarding pre-publication (Astbury 1978, 296). This act was "a comprehensive measure for the control of the press," and heavily emphasised "the pre-printing censorship of all forms of printed materials" (Astbury 1978, 296).

Habermas, the politicization of the public was not a gradual conversion from purely literary discussion (*ibid*, 421, 424).[17]

The bourgeois public sphere is inextricably linked with the literary public sphere, the world of letters, which according to Habermas originates largely in the intimate sphere of the conjugal family as they consumed letters and early novels, offering the opportunity of self-reflection and the self-clarification of private people as private people (a novelty) (Habermas 1989, 29). In the eighteenth century, the reference point of the public was through the consumption of print, consumed with an awareness than an indefinite number of others were also consuming these printed goods (Warner 1997, 379-380).[18] It was only through the postal service, periodicals, and other systems of communication that, according to Habermas, private people could become a consultable reading public (Baker 1997, 184). This allowed for the development of a very particular subjectivity, one which is intersubjective, linked with the political economy of their social class, demonstrating the rise of psychological reflection carried out in the reading rooms of the bourgeoisie, as well as in museums, theatres, and concert halls (Habermas 1989, 29; Baker 1997, 184). Once the aforementioned communications systems had attained a regularity in conjunction with a market economy, the individual access to printed materials "could be sustained only insofar as it fed the commercial expansion of the printing and publishing trades," a person's personal cultural tastes "could be satisfied only in the coffee houses, salons, reading societies, theaters, museums, and concert halls opened to them in the urban centers of a bourgeois society," and the collective judgement of the bourgeoisie "could be informed only be the new class of writers and critics whose livelihood now depended upon the

[17] However, there are significant factors that I would argue maintain the justification of this public sphere Habermas describes being specifically bourgeois, as will be discussed shortly.

[18] "This awareness came to be built into the meaning of the printed object, to the point that we now consider it simply definitional to speak of printing as 'publication'" (Warner 1997, 380).

production of culture as a commodity" (Baker 1997, 184-185). Thus, "the literary public sphere was constituted by the market institutions of bourgeois civil society" (*ibid*, 185).

The fifty years from 1680 – 1730 is characterised as the "Golden Age of coffee houses" (Habermas 1989, 32).[19] In the 1670s, coffee houses were "considered seeds beds of political unrest," as evidenced in this descriptive Royal Proclamation:

> Men have assumed to themselves a liberty, not only in the coffee-houses, but in other places and meetings, both public and private, to censure and defame the proceedings of the State, by speaking evil of things they understand not, and endeavouring to create and nourish an universal jealousie and dissatisfaction in the minds of all His Majesties good subjects. (Habermas 1989, 59).

Coffee houses (largely in England), *salons* (particular to France), and to a lesser degree, table and literary societies (*Tischgesellschaften* and *Sprachgesellschaften*) in Germany were centres of first literary, then political, criticism, featuring a "parity of the educated," where aristocratic and bourgeois intellectuals could interact and evaluate the matters at hand on equal footing (*ibid*, 32). The earliest of these societies often involved nothing more than a collective subscription to journals, lowering the cost of these papers and increasing their accessibility, but ultimately they "exclusively served the need of bourgeois private people to create a forum for a critically debating public: to read periodicals and to discuss them, to exchange personal opinions, and to contribute to the formulation of an opinion that from the nineties on will be called a 'public'" (*ibid*, 72, 73). The late eighteenth century saw the size and frequency of public meetings increase, particularly through an enormous increase in political associations—Germany had over 270 reading societies, for instance (*ibid*, 65, 72). The literature (and other content) brought into these settings had to legitimate itself, and discussion on political and economic matters was

[19] The mid-seventeenth century was also a point in time in which tea, chocolate, and coffee became common beverages, at least for the well off (Habermas 1989, 32). A caffeinated person becomes the norm.

undertaken with the cognizance of potential consequences (*ibid*, 33). Authority was given to the better argument, against the social hierarchy of those attending such a reading circle (*ibid*, 36). Such liberation from noble authority allowed for the questioning of all areas and topics, which beforehand were never to be questioned (*ibid*).

But it was the Levellers who connected free press and public opinion to their conviction of freedom and conception of natural law (which was contrarily intended to justify the rule of the properties classes), with their insistence that "every man born in England cannot, ought not, neither by the Law of God not the Law of Nature…be exempt from the choice of those who are to make laws for him" (Zaret 1997, 219). The Levellers further demanded that Parliamentarians "will precisely hold yourselves to the supreme end, the freedom of the people; as in other things, so in that necessary and essential part of speaking, writing, printing, and publishing their minds freely" (*ibid*). It is absolutely necessary, they argued, for the government "to hear all voices and judgments, which they can never do but by giving freedom to the press" (*ibid*). The Levellers being such a strong force for free press and a public sphere of discussion indeed poses a challenge to the dominance and uniqueness of the bourgeois public sphere historically, and this will be returned to shortly.

A factor that made such discussion possible, though, was the commodification of philosophical, literary, and art works, and the general accessibility that commodification gave to the bourgeoisie (Habermas 1989, 36). Such works become no longer the components of the Church and Court's publicity of representation, and this liberated thinkers and artists from the economic dependence of patronage, and the opinion of private people was freed: now in principle, economic dependencies and disparities had no influence, for the rules of both market and state were held to be suspended (*ibid*, 33, 36). Further, in England, the institution of censorship was eliminated by the eighteenth century with the failure to renew the Licensing Act in 1695, making “the influx of rational-critical arguments into the press possible and allowed the latter to evolve into an instrument with whose aid political discussions could be brought before the new forum of the public (*ibid*, 58, 59). Yet despite the supposed freedom from state and market rules, it was on the basis of the commodification of these works that allowed these readers, listeners, and spectators to participate in a “market of objects” that had now become available for discussion, for all private people (*ibid*, 37). The patron was replaced by the publisher, and they instituted the organised commercial distribution of literary works (*ibid*, 38). This was echoed in the theatres and concert halls, where admission for payment commodified the performance (*ibid*, 38-39). Journals grew independent from the conversation circles from which they came, and circulated through publishing—these essays in periodicals were integral to the coffee house discussions (*ibid*, 42).

This so-called inclusive (for the propertied and educated) public, a sphere of discussion, took up issues now deemed “general” or of “common concern” in accessibility and significance; “everyone had to be able to participate”; in this arena of public discussion, all should be able to engage in informed debate on matters of the common good (Habermas 1989, 37; Fiig 2011, 294). These were places of “the equality of association amongst persons of unequal status”, the public noble and the private bourgeois citizen met as “common” human beings with a parity of subjectivity, an equality only possible outside of the state (Habermas 1989, 34, 35, 54). While the *salons*, though intimate, still retained a few characteristics of a less-accessible noble court, coffee houses even more widely extended the accessibility of participation in the public sphere (*ibid*, 33). As Habermas puts it, “the coffee house not merely made access to the relevant circles less formal and easier; it embraced the wider strata of the middle class, including craftsmen and shopkeepers…the ‘wealthy shopkeeper’ visited the coffee house several times a day, this held true for the poor one as well” (*ibid*). Yet these meeting places were still very private, and “the coming together of private people into a public was therefore anticipated in secret, as a public sphere still existing largely behind closed doors” (*ibid*, 35). This sphere was not to be equated with the public, but rather acted as the public’s mouthpiece, or educator (*ibid*, 37).

Pamphlets and The Plebeian Public Sphere

The Reformation is commonly acknowledged as the first step towards the reintroduction of the private sphere, as the consequential ideas of religious tolerance and freedom of religion turns church and faith into a private matter (Habermas 1989, 11). Yet “it was printing that brought Parliamentary debates on religion and politics into the streets, and printing also presented Parliament with popular views on these topics” (Zaret 1997, 218). Pamphlets were the predominant medium for Luther and other reformers to communicate their ideas to followers in the first half of the sixteenth century (Verhoest 2019, 48). Arguably, these printed political materials allowed readers to view the current political and religious conflicts of the Reformation as an ongoing debate (*ibid*, 48-49). In 1642, John Thayer wrote that “religion is now become the common discourse and table-talk in every tavern and alehouse”, and it was the printing of pamphlets that made that possible (Zaret 1997, 217). In a pamphlet likely from 1643, attacking the royalist position, the author wrote that it was “printed in a year when men think what they list, and speak and write what they think” (*ibid*, 218). However, in England both royalists and parliamentarianists deemed it a necessity “to ‘communicate with the people’ to explain policies and to generate and sustain support,” which institutionalises the pamphlet, and professionalises pamphlet authorship (Verhoest 2019, 59).

From the sixteenth century onward, the publication of religious pamphlets for the purpose of religious and political persuasion was made illegal, "subject to severe regulation", and by the beginning of the seventeenth century, some insubordinate pamphleteers had been hanged (Verhoest 2019, 57). Publishers and authors of such pamphlets always risked prosecution, though it was rare, and very hard to repress—despite the extreme consequences for those aforementioned, attempts to curtail pamphleteering were largely ineffective: pamphleteers were highly motivated to publish and quite resourceful, resorting to anonymous publishing, clandestine printing, and importing foreign pamphlets, largely from the Netherlands (*ibid*, 57-58).

Pamphlets are an important testimonial to the changes which occurred in early modernity, both in terms of their content and function, and scholars such as David Zaret argue that pamphlet history may contribute to an increasingly empirical, historical understanding of the public sphere, as opposed to Habermas's perhaps overly bourgeois, Enlightenment rhetoric-based interpretation (Verhoest 2019, 48). Further, the history of these pamphlets demonstrates an existing, steady flow of communication that already exists in the seventeenth century, a site for the genesis for a public sphere that is broader than that of the nobility and bourgeoisie comprised one (*ibid*, 51). Indeed, pamphlets likely surpassed, "in amplitude, magnitude, and political significance," the literature circles of the *salons* and coffee houses that Habermas considers to be the formative spaces for developing a critically reflecting public (*ibid*, 52). A pamphlet in the seventeenth century was typically a short tract of "religious, political, or topical interest, written in the vernacular, generally printed in a quarto format, and sold at a low price in order to reach a wide audience", functioning both as a means of persuasion and as a commodity (*ibid*, 48). Often they were of low quality to ensure they were as cheap as possible and thus more likely to be widely disseminated, but also because of their timely nature, requiring a short production time (*ibid*, 51). Yet pamphlets could actually provide a fairly good source of revenue, particularly in uncertain times, as pamphlet consumption increased significantly in times of upheaval and instability (*ibid*). Authors in fact complained that "trashy pamphlets" were selling better than their works, as the anonymous purchasers overtook the aristocratic patrons (*ibid*, 53). But despite their commodity nature, their primary purpose was still to influence public opinion and promote the causes of their political allegiance (*ibid*).

By the end of the seventeenth century, the pamphlet was the most important medium in England, the Netherlands, and France (Verhoest 2019, 48). Their importance is reflected through parliament as well, with pamphlets issued directed at parliament (ex. the Grand Remonstrance in 1641), and parliamentary discussions leading to more informative pamphlets (*ibid*, 54). Often, with or without the consent of the author, Parliamentary speeches were printed and circulated, "violating the convention that parliamentary proceedings should not be publicised, yet very few complaints of breeches of privilege ensued" (Zaret 1997, 217).

The political purpose of a pamphlet was ultimately to influence and conquer public opinion, and were simultaneously sources of information (albeit the informational value was low) and opinion (particularly around a specific cause) (Verhoest 2019, 51; 53). But it was not a one way flow: "the networks of communication and production that led from the writer's desk through the printing house to the reader, and back again, was a circuit in which readers did not just passively consume but actively participated, forcing writers to anticipate readers' expectations and appetites, and to respond to readers' reactions" (*ibid*, 51-52). Pamphleteers were also responding to each other, and to other prior-existing texts (*ibid*, 54). It was recognised gradually by publishers and readers through the seventeenth century that there was a circuit of connection between pamphlets, printed news, and public debate (*ibid*). Argumentative pamphlets increased in number, with higher quality arguments and increased factual accuracy, spanning political commentary, opinion, and advice (*ibid*). In the 1580s, persuasive pamphlets were new and controversial; by the 1680s, there were entirely normalised (*ibid*).

While not exclusive to the common people, the masses were a crucial component of the pamphlet audience (Verhoest 2019, 55). This is apparent both in the formal parameters of pamphlets (their size limits, accessible language, and low price, for instance), and also in the general rhetorical stance of pamphlet writers, which always positioned them as standing with the common people (*ibid*, 55-56). The cheapness of pamphlets increased the availability and accessibility of print, and thus fostered a less elitist culture of reading, but their price was not the only factor that contributed to this increase (*ibid*, 53). And their cheapness did not mean they were affordable for everyone. In France in 1620, pamphlets were affordable for the urban elites, but not yet for the artisans, meaning the upper and upper-middle classes were likely the primary consumers of pamphlets (*ibid*, 56). But the reduction of costs in the seventeenth century did nonetheless expand the audience of these works (*ibid*). Quite often, pamphlets would be shared amongst friends, mailed to one another and discussed in letters, or even resold, or reprinted as pirated copies (*ibid*). But most accessibly, pamphlets were read aloud amongst friends or in public settings (such as taverns, churches, or porches); their contents were discussed in sermons and town hall meetings, and in regular conversations—pamphlets were an integrated part of everyday discourse (*ibid*). So beyond an audience of readers, there was an audience of listeners (*ibid*).

The style of pamphlets was aimed to appeal to a less educated audience (Verhoest 2019, 57). The early pamphlets drew on early traditions: “poetry, song, texts, fables, allegories, dialogues, and satire" (*ibid*, 53). As with the sixteenth century Protestant tracts, pamphlets were written in the vernacular (not Latin, the state language and the language of the Church and science) for the sake of a broad audience—not a universal audience necessarily, but a far greater one than the elite, learned circles (*ibid*, 56). And pamphlets did not shy away from incorporating the passions. The literary and emotionalist pamphlets tended to reach a wider audience than those of the argumentative pamphlets, it should be noted (*ibid*, 57). But the emotionalist pamphlets did not disappear with the introduction of more argumentative pamphlets; they coexisted, defining each other through their complimentary functions (*ibid*, 54-55). In this regard especially, the history of pamphlets provides a very illuminating look into the history of emotions and politics: "insofar as the constitution of the 17^{th}-century public sphere is concerned, this tension between rationalisation and emotionalism in politics is well documented by the rich historical critique of pamphlets as a form of literary and political writing" (*ibid*, 52-53).

Early modern pamphlet culture is clear evidence of an earlier, not restrictively bourgeois, public sphere, and demonstrates the undeniable and ever present role of the people or the masses in political life—a legacy which Martin Breaugh describes as the "plebeian principle." Plebeian participation, a direct challenge to exclusionary political domination and even the notion that those who labour are incapable of political thought and action (Breaugh 2013, 44), has made its political mark from ancient times onward, and Breaugh as well as E. P. Thompson have described what should be clearly recognised as a plebeian public sphere that operated distinctly from and counter to the bourgeois public sphere from which they were excluded. While the bourgeoisie proclaimed the end of political domination following the French Revolution, they actively tried to seclude political participation from the masses, the *sans-culottes*. Contrary to the idea that bourgeois interests could represent those of humanity as a whole, the *sans-culottes* insisted that representation was insufficient to the participation all were entitled to, as the logical conclusion of equality (Breaugh 2013, 114). Thus, they organised themselves towards direct action and immediate expression, an expression of popular sovereignty through political organisation, in sectional and popular societies (*ibid*). In direct opposition to the claims of universal representation of the bourgeoisie, the organisations of the *sans-culottes* demonstrated a commitment to fraternal social relations and direct democracy, actualised through non-secret votes, deliberation, and denunciation of that which threatened these principles (*ibid*). The *sans-culottes* proved the political capabilities of the plebeians, and attested their equality through their political organising and activities (*ibid*, 125, 126), demonstrating that the bourgeois claim to a unique political role was false.

The *sans-culottes* instituted a much more profoundly inclusionary public sphere—though strategically with the exclusion of their French Jacobin enemies of this space—constituted by fraternity, a deep solidarity, with all ordinary people, transcending boundaries of occupation (Breaugh 2013, 124, 205). Fraternity was not an abstract principle or virtue but was a grounding feeling and sensation of the unity of their movement (*ibid*, 208). The plebeian public sphere of the *sans-culottes*, like that of pamphlets, was rooted in political debate as much as the bourgeois literary public sphere. Even complicated philosophy and radical ideas, such as those of Rousseau, were disseminated in highly accessible formats, from chapbooks, songs, and oral propaganda—the latter two being especially effective regarding low literacy rates (*ibid*, 214). Specifically, the section associations would often feature public readings and speeches through which people would be exposed to these ideas and be able to respond to them (*ibid*, 215).

The English Jacobins, very unlike their French namesake, also organised a plebeian, or proto-working-class, public sphere counter to the public sphere of the landed classes. The

English Jacobins constituted, like the *sans-culottes*, a heterogenous body not demarcated by occupation, from lawyers to shoemakers, to sailors and soldiers to teachers (Breaugh 2013, 144). Participants would read what they were able to at their level,[20] and/or go to the pub (public house, in contrast to private houses) where readings were held aloud (Thompson 1966, 712). Thompson writes, "thus working men formed a picture of the organisation of society, out of their own experience and with the help of their hard-won and erratic education, which was above all a political picture" (*ibid*). Furthermore, despite the picture of the struggle for the freedom of the press being waged by the bourgeoisie, this was a battle primarily waged by the plebeian element, by the labourers and artisans, in England—Thompson argues that "there is perhaps no country in the world in which the contest for the rights of the press was so sharp, so emphatically victorious, and so peculiarly identified with the cause of artisans and labourers" (*ibid*, 720). Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge emphasise that it was the working class, and its predecessors, who valued the freedom of press, speech, and assembly (Negt and Kluge 2016, 191), against a royal and bourgeois government that strived to keep the press contained and restricted to certain interests. They cite Michael Vester, who shows in *Die Entstehung des Proletariats als Lernprozeß* that from the 1800s to 1840s, "cycles of learning and current struggle follow one another in such a way that the English working class is initially fighting above all to consolidate autonomous structures of communication" (*ibid*, 187). The other side of the so-called laissez faire market "was a strict regulating of the freedoms of correspondence, speech, press, assembly, and association, which was initially practiced violently, later increasingly manipulatively" (*ibid*, 188). As such, Thompson argues "…a reading public which was increasingly working class in

[20] E. P. Thompson describes the struggle to teach reading and writing amongst the poor through Sunday Schools, especially radical ones, throughout *The Making of the English Working Class* (Thompson 1966, 276, 354, 378-379, 713).

character was forced to *organise itself*" through the radical press, in contrast to the government-kept press (though the middle class press had managed to get rid of some immediate government influence) (Thompson 1966, 727).

The London Corresponding Society, founded in 1792, was a major site of the plebeian public sphere (and site of what would become the working class's self organisation, as Thompson argues) in England. The first principle of this society was "that the number of our Members be unlimited," and it aimed at the political education of its members towards full political participation (Breaugh 2013, 151). The L.C.S. fully embodied the principles Thompson ascribed to plebeian politics: anonymous denunciation of political power, a counter theatre of political action (including threats and sedition), and the capacity for direct and swift political action (*ibid*, 143-144). This society demonstrated not the caricature of a blind mass, but a disciplined crowd that held clear objectives and the capacity to negotiate with authority (*ibid*, 144). For the L.C.S., all people are capable of making political decisions and should have the ability and opportunity to participate in political deliberation, for all are capable of reason (*ibid*, 167). Thus, it was self-emancipation that drove the society and this public sphere (*ibid*, 166). And unlike the bourgeois public sphere which was founded within a specific gendered configuration of social spheres and thus excluded women, this was not the case for the English Jacobins[21] and their public sphere where the recognition of women's rights was a possibility, and records show women were indeed participating (*ibid*, 166, 167). Thompson observes that the claim for women's rights extended from the intelligentsia right through to artisans, and Negt and Kluge note that a fifth of all the injured at the Peterloo massacre were women (Thompson 1966,

[21] Whereas the French Jacobins were opposed to the feminist element of the revolution and in 1793 banned women's clubs.

730, Negt and Kluge 2016, 190). An advocacy for tolerance and an emphasis on plurality, or the embrace of otherness and difference, was another principle of the L.C.S., and both socially and individually all were welcomed and embraced for their differences (Breaugh 2013, 168). This was vastly different once again from the unmarked abstract universality of the bourgeois public sphere.

Excluded from public authority as well as the bourgeois public sphere, the people transformed formerly apolitical spaces into political ones (Breaugh 2013, 169). Thompson says that in the lives of the emerging English working class, "everything, from their schools to their shops, their chapels to their amusements, was turned into a battle-ground of class" (Thompson 1966, 832). Thompson writes: "The countryside was ruled by the gentry, the towns by the corrupt corporations, the nation by the corruptest corporation of all: but the chapel, the tavern and the home were their own. In the 'unsteepled' places of worship there was room for a free intellectual life and for democratic experiments with 'members unlimited'" (*ibid*, 51-52). Locked out of the sites of state power and bourgeois public opinion, the plebeian element turned to work and social spaces to create their public sphere. In the taverns and cafés, all distinctions dissolve, and all become equals; the factory and political society loses any distinction (Breaugh 2013, 170; 226). And active participation, counter to the liberal practice of elections and restricting political activity to a selection of professional politicians, was fostered by the associations of the plebeian public sphere (*ibid*, 170).

Günther Lottes also affirms the actual historical existence of an independent plebeian public sphere in England at the end of the eighteenth century (Lottes 1979, 113).[22] Lottes does

[22] "…Die plebejische Öffentlichkeit der klein- und unterbürgerlichen Schichten am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts war ein eigenständiger Typ von Öffentlichkeit..." (Lottes 1979, 113).

make a note that there is insufficient homogeneity present in this public to imply the possibility of it being characteristically proletarian, and moreover there were no servants recorded in the membership of the London Corresponding Society, indeed it was primarily craftsmen and tradesmen leading Lottes to categorise this plebeian public sphere as mostly petty bourgeois and generally plebeian (*ibid*, 112, 115, 116).

Counter to the submissive non-political subject that conservatives and even radical intellectuals imagined the English plebeians to be, plebeian culture demonstrated that the common person was capable of expressing their own political and social values (Lottes 1979, 142). Ritual and symbol were key forms of expression in traditional plebeian culture, and the use of the ritualised threat of violence in particular (*ibid*). Lottes argues that traditional plebeian culture existed side-by-side with patrician culture, and the traditional plebeian conception of freedom was invested in this independence and respect for fundamental rights and values in a plebeian context (*ibid*, 175, 150). One such right was the right to protest or riot when justified in instances of violation of this plebeian freedom (*ibid*, 150). The Jacobin reformers believed it was crucial that traditional plebeian culture be reformed, foremost with an emphasis on the desire for respectability and recognition as citizens (*ibid*, 177). A radical change in the way life was lived by the plebeians, and the way the plebeians expressed themselves politically, was necessary, hence the immense focus on political education, towards political participation, on the part of the Jacobins and societies like the LCS (*ibid*, 140, 175). So the Jacobins condemned the act of rioting, supressing the theatrically violent ritual component as well, with the aim of providing a new and more directly political content for plebeian political expression (*ibid*, 178, 184). This new content and new for expression was given to the plebeians, again, through a reforming education in the political societies (*ibid*).

The plebeian public sphere of late eighteenth century England, Lottes argues, was essentially a model of bourgeois public sphere with its exclusive conditions abolished (Lottes 1979, 110)—education and property. It was expressly based on direct democracy and the existence of an organisationally-internal public sphere (*ibid*, 194). But rather than emphasising plebeian liberty, with the independence of plebeian life (which even frowned upon plebeians attempting to enter patrician society and social climb) (*ibid*, 263-264), it emphasised the broader humanist and liberal freedom, moral and universal. With that, as Habermas also observed, this particular plebeian public sphere was oriented towards and reflective of the bourgeois public sphere (Habermas 1989, xviii). Consequentially, the plebeian participants were expected to model themselves to demonstrate their equal capacity for moral and political worth. Article 9 of the "Form of Admission and Duty of a Member" reads: "It is the duty of every member to study concord, and for that purpose to moderate his own passions, particularly his personal attachments and aversions" (Lottes 1979, 207). The plebeians were to be political participants, but not with an expression of plebeian culture or morality. Lottes argues that this does not mean there was a direct and full cultural domination of plebeian life through the Jacobin reformers, but there was absolutely a reform and transformation of traditional plebeian culture through the lens of bourgeois and literary-journalistic culture (*ibid*, 263). This was to the end of plebeian inclusion, and used against an exclusionary and domineering social and political order, but it was not organically of a plebeian life-context (*ibid*). From natural law and humanism of bourgeois thought, English Jacobinism emphasised the notion of freedom through rationality, which was contingent *freedom from the passions*, as the core of moral liberty—the very condition of political freedom and the grounds of political participation (*ibid*, 264).[23] The correct use of freedom was in rational moral calculations (*ibid*).[24] So along with the fight for civil liberties, and the right to secure those liberties through political participation, freedom for the English Jacobins intertwined with moral self-realisation, and hence the necessity of plebeian education towards a more morally proper (petty) bourgeois lifestyle, or towards the development of the capacities for such a lifestyle (*ibid*, 264, 265). To this end, the political education of the English Jacobins in the English plebeian public sphere demonstrated an opposition between traditional plebeian and bourgeois morality, and ultimately the traditional plebeian culture and understanding of liberty was not recognised (*ibid*, 266, 267). Even so, the English Jacobins had replaced property as a moral-political qualifier, with natural right, and through plebeian political education and organisation revealed that any requirement for property as a condition for political participation was only in the interest of protecting property, and certainly not to guarantee independent moral political decisions (*ibid*, 285). This was a colossal challenge to the *status quo*. State authority and the bourgeois public sphere worked vigorously to restrict this plebeian public sphere, for instance through the *Proclamation Against Seditious Writings* and other similar legislation (*ibid*, 110).

Though the origins of the public sphere were far broader and mass based, as particularly the history of pamphlets demonstrates, the popular element was carefully excised in the creation of the formal bourgeois public sphere. Because the propertied bourgeois class was able to react against the masses with the landed aristocracy, they were able to constitute the public sphere on their terms. As a bourgeois state, the constitutional state "established the public sphere in the

[23] "In der naturrechlich-puritanischen Moralphilosophie hatte Price den gleichen Gedanked weniger anschaulich, aber ebenso eindeiutig formuliert, als we die *moral liberty*, die Freiheit von Leidenschaften, zur Bedingung der *political liberty*, der Freiheit von Unterdrückung, erklärte" (Lottes 1979, 264).

[24] In der utilitarischen Ethik schließlich, die Priestley und Godwin auf der Seite des Radikalismus populär machten, war die Fähigkeit zum kühl rationalistischen Moralkalkül die Voraussetzung für den richtigen Gebrauch der Freiheit" (Lottes 1979, 264).

political realm as an organ of the state so as to ensure institutionally the connection between law and public opinion” (Habermas 1989, 81). The bourgeois constitutional state itself was set up to facilitate the *citoyen-homme* and their two spheres of action, with the dichotomised sphere model and its split subject codified into law:

> A set of basic rights concerned the sphere of the public engaged in rational-critical debate (freedom of opinion and speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly and association, etc.) and the political function of private people in this public sphere (right of petition, equality of vote, etc.). A second set of basic rights concerned the individual’s status as a free human being, grounded in the intimate sphere of the patriarchal conjugal family (personal freedom, inviolability of the home, etc.). The third set of basic rights concerned the transactions of the private owners of property in the sphere of civil society (equality before the law, protection of private property, etc.). (Habermas 1989, 83).

Further, it was the basis of what became foundational human rights:

> The basic rights guaranteed: the *spheres* of the public realm and of the private (with the intimate at its core); the *institutions* and *instruments* of the public sphere, on the one hand (press, parties), and the foundation of private autonomy (family and property), on the other; finally, the *functions* of the private people, both their political ones as citizens and their economic ones as owners of commodities (and, as “human beings,” those of individual communication, e.g., through inviolability of letters). (Habermas 1989, 83).

But the universality claimed by the constitutional bourgeois state was, of course, fictional, based on the limited subjectivity of the bourgeoisie and their view of themselves as the natural human subject, and even their constitutionally guaranteed civil society and public sphere were a far cry from reality (*ibid*, 84). The bourgeois public sphere was an exclusionary sphere of propertied elites, a sphere that aristocrats could enter with ease that the peasant could not. The actors that the bourgeois public sphere is based upon, “…the ‘private people’ on whose autonomy, socially guaranteed by property, the constitutional state counted just as much as on the educational qualifications of the public formed by these people, were in truth a small minority, even if one added the petty to the high bourgeoisie"—the "common people," especially rural, were more numerous by far (*ibid*).

The world of letters was not exclusively occupied by bourgeois readers, it was linked to the publicity and representation of the princely court, and the aristocrats who dwell in that realm (Habermas 1989, 29). Here, the nobility in the *salons* tended to be more inclined towards the ideas of the bourgeois intellectuals, than the bourgeoisie itself was (*ibid*, 68). And so the aristocrats were very involved in the early bourgeois public sphere, as the nobles distanced themselves from the courts and met with the bourgeoisie as private people, but this privacy is what characterised the sphere, and thus "the 'great' public that formed in the theatres, museums, and concerts was bourgeois in its social origin" (*ibid*, 43). That participation of the nobles was indicative of them moving out of their own sphere, and into the one shaped by this other social class. The bourgeoisie, a property owning, educated, town-based class, were private citizens, as they had no authority to rule (*ibid*, 28). These private people related to each other as a public, in order to challenge those who did rule and, eventually, in order to attempt to change the order of domination (*ibid*). Ultimately, "the fully developed bourgeois public sphere was based on the fictitious identity of the two roles assumed by the privatized individuals who came together to form a public: the role of property owners and the role of human beings pure and simple" (*ibid*, 56).

As a consequence of its development out of the intimate sphere and the literary public sphere, the bourgeois public sphere in its political form assumed the format of the eighteenth century bourgeois reading public; regardless of its political functions, it was rooted in the world of letters, and the criteria for access was the same—property and education (and generally, the educated were propertied, and the propertied were educated, as education was a consequence and not precondition of class (i.e. a title or property)) (Habermas 1989, 85).[25] Unquestionably the bourgeois public sphere of civil society was defined entirely upon the principle of universal access—how could you have a public sphere if any group of people were excluded or prevented from participating (*ibid*)? The public sphere of the bourgeois constitutional state did indeed hold a view of itself as wholly inclusive, as something to which all human beings belonged, even if the majority of the people do not get to represent themselves (*ibid*).[26] After all, the bourgeois view was that a private person, defined by their material status in the private realm, was *the* human being, *the* moral person (*ibid*). There is no break between *homme* and *citoyen* for the private person, "as long as the *homme* was simultaneously an owner of private property who as *citoyen* was to protect the stability of the property order as a private one" (*ibid*, 87). And reason itself, which is the foundation theoretically of public sphere participation, was supposed to ensure that class divisions and interests would be overcome (Verhoest 2019, 50).

The private person of the bourgeois public sphere is defined as an owner of property, commodities, and the head of a family—and thus for them, and in the society they strive to shape, the idea of the human being is taken to be that of a property owner (Habermas 1989, 28, 29). A bourgeois as a privatised individual is simultaneously both an owner of goods and persons, and a human being, *bourgeois* and *homme*, a combination of the attributes of ownership and of education (*ibid*, 55, 56). Consequentially, the interests of property owners are taken to converge with those of general humanity and the general freedom of an individual (*ibid*, 56). And further, such a definition excludes women and other dependents from participation in the

[25] Habermas notes: "The census, which regulated admission to the public sphere in the political realm, could therefore be identical with the tax list" (Habermas 1989, 85). Additionally, "…the French Revolution already used the latter as the standard for the distinction between full citizens and those of lesser status" (Habermas 1989, 85).
[26] The bourgeois state features a peculiar contradiction: its anti-royal and pro-representative government stance effectively means that it favours the rule of the people's representatives (Habermas 1989, 81).

political public sphere, legally and in practice (*ibid*). The conflation of the property owner with the "natural person," the human being itself, fostered the (obviously classed and highly gendered) notion of a separation within the private sphere between what might be called truly private individual affairs, and the ones which involve interaction that brings private people together into a public (*ibid*, 160). Habermas argues that the understanding of the public use of reason, by those who were participants of this public sphere, grew out of their particular private experience of the audience-oriented subjectivity of the intimate sphere—the realm of the conjugal family (*ibid*, 28). This is the sphere in which the political self-understanding of the bourgeois public sphere originated (*ibid*, 29). The intimate sphere represented a polarization (a second polarization, after that of princely authority) of state and society again, in that this intimate sphere of the conjugal, domestic family was distinct from the sphere of social reproduction, the economic sphere proper (*ibid*, 28).

These private commodity owners saw themselves as effectively anonymous and free from government directives and control as they were, their decisions could be based only on profitability (Habermas 1989, 46). Obedient to no one, the bourgeoisie were "subject only to the anonymous laws functioning in accord with an economic rationality immanent, so it appeared, in the market" (*ibid*). Market exchange, in this bourgeois ideology, was obviously right, natural, and just, particularly in contrast to the state's coercive apparatus; in the market, justice triumphed over force (*ibid*).[27] Negt and Kluge argue in light of this that the bourgeoisie of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not even really care about the public sphere, about a realm of

[27] And triumphed over violent/unruly/arbitrary passions, as will be examined in Chapter 2.

discussion upon matters of public authority and concern, but only were concerned about the effects of the public sphere on their private interests (Negt and Kluge 2016, 11).

Public opinion itself was based upon a foundation of particular class interests (Habermas 1989, 87). And these class interests are also the foundation of bourgeois ideology, Habermas argues:

> Its origin would be the identification of "property owner" with "human being" as such in the role accruing to private people as members of the public in the political public sphere of the bourgeois constitutional state, that is, the identification of the public sphere in the political realm with that in the world of letters; and also in public opinion itself, in which the interest of the class, via critical public debate, could assume the appearance of the general interest, that is, in the identification of domination with its dissolution into pure reason. (Habermas 1989, 88).

By contrast, the lower classes were to be excluded from the formation of public opinion, deemed to be too concerned with mere physical well-being and their immediate needs to focus on things such as politics (or truth, or justice, or the good, etc.) (*ibid*, 102)—in other words, they were trapped by necessity, and unable to enter the realm of the political. Even in its purely literary form, the bourgeois public sphere carried a political character in the Greek sense, in that it is and must be "emancipated from the constraints of survival requirements" (*ibid*, 160). So whether by the bourgeois criteria of a person, the conditions that allowed one to participate in public debate, or the exclusionary franchise, the bourgeois public sphere is quite clearly anything but open access (*ibid*, 132).

According to Habermas, by and large, the masses of the eighteenth century—all those with no title and no property—could neither read, nor pay for literature (Habermas

1989, 38).[28] Habermas's depiction and understanding of the bourgeois public sphere writes the masses out of such public deliberations and political participation, it is the *bourgeois* public sphere after all. To be sure, the eighteenth century public sphere is exclusionary and elitist, demanding the twins of property and education as entry criteria, but Habermas *knew* that it was elitist and exclusionary: the term bourgeois is descriptive, directly recognising the class relationship of this public, and not a prescriptive term (Verhoest 2019, 55; Postone 1997, 165).[29] However, there is much evidence (including the history of pamphlets) that shows a literate public not exclusive to the bourgeoisie (Verhoest 2019, 55). According to David Zaret, while there was of course an unevenness in access and participation in the public sphere, to only view the public sphere as a realm that solely extended from the privileges of the bourgeoisie and social elites is to underestimate the actual distribution of literacy and general accessibility, and presumes a too-great distinction between the means and cultures of the bourgeoisie and the populace (*ibid*). In England in 1600, ten percent of women and thirty percent of men were literate; by 1700, thirty percent of women and fifty percent of men were literate,[30] though the ability to read print was more common than the ability to write, which expands the readership but greatly limits the authorship, and the most basic reading skills at the time were insufficient to understand the content of pamphlets (*ibid*, 56). Pascal Verhoest writes, "what emerges is the image of a core communications space, open in principle to everyone, and within which the elite reverted to argumentative reason to resolve their

[28] "The proportion of illiterates, at least in Great Britain, even exceeded that of the preceding Elizabethan epoch" (Habermas 1989, 37).
[29] There is a perpetual desire in Habermas to transcend the property-dependent bourgeois public sphere, for a broader and more inclusive post-bourgeois public sphere (Hohendahl 1997, 99-100).
[30] Literacy in France was stable across the seventeenth century, at ten percent for women, and twenty-five percent for men; France's population was also ninety-five percent rural, and more than eighty percent were peasants (Verhoest 2019, 56).

conflicts….that communications space extended into a wider circle in which these elites used different communication modes to generate popular support for their actions" (*ibid*, 57).

Joan Landes argues that Habermas is not attentive enough to women in the public sphere; but, though he does note the role of women in the *salon*, just as with class, Habermas recognises that the universality of the bourgeois public sphere was a fiction, and thus women were not admitted entrance into it—the bourgeois public sphere was for property owning, educated men (Baker 1997, 198). Landes further argues that it was not that universality and reason were not extended to women, but instead that in the bourgeois public sphere, the principles of universality and reason were crafted in order to make the public sphere exclusionary, obviously for women, but also for any non-'universal' bourgeois male (*ibid*, 199). From the outset, the symbolic politics of the public sphere were framed by masculinist interests and assumptions (Baker 1997, 199). The plebeian public spheres certainly included women, but the bourgeois public sphere, inherently exclusionary, was characterised by distinct sexism.

In France, women came to be excluded from the bourgeois public sphere as it gained its conceptual form in the Enlightenment and gained institutional form after the French Revolution,[31] particularly as male anxiety grew as women claimed inclusion in universal rights and therefore the right to political participation (Baker 1997, 199, 200). New distinctions began to take hold, as well—universal and particular, natural and artificial, transparent and masked, and these tended to be aligned in different ways with male or female (*ibid*, 199). There is also public and private, of course, and emotional and rational. Jean-Pierre-André Amar wrote:

[31] The ideals of Republican Motherhood define clearly the role women were pushed to take by some of the thinkers of the French Revolution, including Rousseau (Baker 1997, 199).

> …women are disposed by their organization [i.e., the constitution of their physical and moral being] to an over-excitation which would be deadly in public affairs and that interests of state would soon be sacrificed to everything which ardor in passions can generate in the way of error and disorder. Delivered over to the heat of public debate, they would teach their children not love of country but hatreds and suspicions. (Baker 1997, 200).

Here, of course, we see the distinction between emotion and rationality attributed directly to gender, with the feminine being susceptible to dangerous over-excitement of the passions that goes so far as to prevent reason from holding authority.

Nicolas de Condorcet, however, used the public sphere and Enlightenment discourse to argue in favour and defense of women in the public, writing that (while nature "seems" to have given certain roles to women) "the rights of men result simply from the fact that they are sentient beings, capable of acquiring moral ideas and of reasoning concerning these ideas. Women, having those same qualities, must necessarily possess equal rights" (Baker 1997, 202). He cautions, too, that "utility…cannot outweigh a true right," and so any such argument for utility (often a pretext for tyrants), or that women participating in the public would deprive homes and children, is invalidated (*ibid*, 203). And besides, "women would be torn from their homes no longer than agricultural laborers from their plows or artisans from their workshops" were they all to be included in the public, Condorcet argued (*ibid*). So, even if nature had made women better care givers—of house and children—there is no reason to believe they would abandon these allegedly natural roles; they would return to their jobs like any man would, and—Condorcet says—would likely become better care givers through their participation in the public sphere (*ibid*).

Even more pertinently, Mary Wollstonecraft argued for the inclusion of women in the public sphere, via the public sphere, issuing a challenge: men should have to prove the inferiority of women's reason by allowing them into the rational-critical public sphere—if men do indeed have superior, and women inferior, reason, then male rationality would be demonstrated and win out every time (Baker 1997, 206). Wollstonecraft here is demanding the realization of women's rights within the Enlightenment discourse of progress and individual human reason, deriving an argument for women's emancipation and inclusion in the public from the contemporaneous rationalist discourses taking place in the public sphere (*ibid*, 207).

What is particularly interesting about this is it reveals the extent to which emotionality—the passions—are seen to be a threat to the rational public sphere. Inferior reason will always be conquered by superior reason, this is crux of rational-critical debate. Yet, emotions, lesser as they may be in this view, are powerful, wild, and dangerous for reason. It is not seemingly the alleged inferiority of women's reason that makes them unfit for the public sphere, it is their alleged excess of passions (to which Amar refers) that constitute the root of their inferior reason.

Conclusion

The bourgeois public sphere, as a historical phenomenon and as a concept, designed the dominant social configuration of modernity, shaping "the concomitantly developing nation-state, hemming it in with pacts—constitutions, laws, conventions, and gentlemen's agreements—that delineated the respective spheres of legitimate activity of the capitalist and state classes" (Tétreault 1998, 279). We now have a society conceptualised (with, of course, material consequences) as a composite of separate spheres, each with supposed boundaries and specific criteria for moving from sphere to sphere. The private realm further is bifurcated into two private spheres, the "private" sphere of (re-)production, and the "intimate" domestic space of the bourgeois family (Habermas 1989, 29). Generally, though both are within the private sphere, the sphere of the market is the "private" sphere, while the sphere of the family, the core of the private sphere as a whole, is the "intimate" (*ibid*, 55). While the intimate sphere is held as independent in bourgeois thought, it is fully bound up with the private sphere of the market and its economic relationships (*ibid*). Further, civil society is located within the realm of the private as a sphere of commodity exchange and social labour (*ibid*, 30). Civil society is the sphere of private autonomy, in which it is argued someone may pursue "happiness"[32] however they wish (*ibid*, 107). The private sphere contrasts with the sphere of public authority, which encompasses the state, and the court of noble society (*ibid*, 30). In between these two spaces lay the bourgeois public sphere: the public sphere of the political realm, the public sphere of the world of letters (the literary public sphere, including the press and reading clubs, etc.), and the public sphere of the town's market of cultural products (such as the museums and theatre) (*ibid*). The liberal public sphere presupposes a "separation between a private sphere dominated by commodity production and a public realm of sovereign authority," a structural dichotomy based on capitalist development (Zaret 1997, 215). The capitalist economy also produced the new predominant actors (the bourgeoisie) and new topics and issues for discussion in the public sphere (*ibid*, 216). The bourgeois public sphere is a social space in which "propertied people reasoned in public on those private interests that were of general relevance, such as the rules of markets and economic production, and referred those interests back to the state" (Gestrich 2006, 415). This sphere came about due to the rise of private property in early modernity, and the division between state and civil society that was its consequence (*ibid*). It is intended to be a sphere free from coercion, generally secular, and totally rational, founded upon rational debate and universal argumentation,

[32] Wealth; the accumulation of capital and/or commodities.

and emphasising individual rights which protect citizens from state authority (Fiig 2011, 294). But, as has been demonstrated, the universality is false, limited to the upper classes, and particularly the bourgeoisie as the natural, universal human. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, the reality of the public sphere's rationality is the same.

Habermas holds that the public sphere, which he emphasises is a concrete historical situation, not merely a model or ideal, in which opinion and public opinion can be distinguished, did not form until the eighteenth century (Habermas 1989 A, 232). Yet the seventeenth century, perhaps more so than the eighteenth, seems to be a crucial time for the formation of a public sphere, and Habermas tends to fluctuate between specifying the distinct eighteenth century historical formation of the bourgeois public sphere, and the public sphere as something genuinely broader and more universal. And along with this, Zaret argues that the increase in importance given to "public opinion as the arbiter of politics had intimate links with initiatives in a more popular social milieu than in the learned culture that is the focus of Habermas's account" (Zaret 1997, 220). Many of the criticisms of Habermas's bourgeois public sphere stem from disputes of its true class composition or the proper decade or century in which it first formed, not so much its actual existence or function (though Habermas himself argues that the public sphere has been all but eroded) (Habermas 1989, 142; Verhoest 2019, 54; Zaret 1997, 213, 220). And Habermas admitted there were blind spots and omissions in his work (for example, a lack of depth on gender and the public sphere), but insists the core of his argument stands (Gestrich 2006, 414; Verhoest 2019, 50). But again, besides the historical specifics, criticisms largely amount to the inclusivity or democratic potential of the public sphere, and rarely if ever attempt to analyse the consequences of public sphere theory in thought and practice, i.e. what does a belief in, or the actual manifestation of, a (bourgeois) public sphere, imply for how we envision and partake in politics? What consequences does it have on the composition of our social and political lives?

The sphere model of society, developed through the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere, reintroduced the public-private distinction into society. Modernity itself, its political and social formations, in thought and in practice, are dependent upon this dichotomy of the public and the private. The bourgeois public sphere, and the sphere model it is embedded in, is also highly exclusionary and elitist, despite its claims to and origins in Enlightenment universality and rationality. This is blatantly hypocritical and contradictory, but moreover, it is essentially the defining feature of the public-private dichotomy in modernity. This modern configuration is a stark contrast to the ancient one. Regarding the ancient world in thought, theorised by Plato and Aristotle, venerated by Hannah Arendt, both are dependent upon a rejection of, and an attempt to overcome, the realm of necessity by only permitting entrance to those who dominate the sphere of reproduction, but the theoretically ancient model admits this. The ancient world in reality bases the distinction of the private and public on political criteria, on citizenship in the *polis*, and not on the status or capacities of the *oikos*. However, the modern sphere model hides the reality of its basis upon economic status through the criteria of *rationality*, bestowed in bourgeois subjectivity through property and education. Thus, the modern dichotomy of the public and private, is predicated upon a dichotomy of reason and unreason, and very particularly, the passions, as tied to specific interests. And just as the bourgeois individual held themselves to be the truest representative of humanity, rationality itself harbours distinctly bourgeois criteria.

Chapter 2: The Reason-Emotion Dichotomy

"The will to overcome an emotion is ultimately only the will of another emotion or of several others." – Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* §117

As demonstrated in the preceding chapter, the dichotomy of the public and the private was revived for the modern period with a new root as its basis: a newly formed distinction between the "emotions"[33] (the passions, sentiments, affections, etc.) and reason. But how did this new distinction come about, and why was a new dichotomy needed in restoring the public-private distinction? This chapter will trace the formation of a specific conception of reason designed to oppose and counter the passions, later emotions, that was borne of the changes wrought by commercial society as it developed into early capitalism. Albert O. Hirschman's arguments about the creation of a directly contrasting dichotomy between passions and reason in his work *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments For Capitalism Before Its Triumph* will be a major component in understanding this transformation, though with crucial amendments in his interpretations—even more plainly, misunderstandings—of Adam Smith and sentiment as conveyed by the Shaftesbury school.

Passions, Sin, and Avarice

The public-private divide of the ancient world did not dichotomise reason and emotion. To the contrary, emotions can be argued to have formed the basis for participation in the Greek *polis* and acted as the bridge to the private realm for the participating citizens (Ludwig 2002, 2, 1). Though modernity may reserve *eros* for romantic/sexual desire alone, it was not restricted in such a narrow way for the ancient Greeks, nor was it deemed to be an exclusively private

[33] "Emotions" as a term and concept is rather new, and the development of this concept, and the erasure of the understandings preceding it, will be discussed in Chapter 4.

passion. Rather, it was potentially greatly political. Paul W. Ludwig writes: “Eros, the most private of passions, was believed by ancient political thinkers to be of the utmost public relevance. For them, the term eros included the ordinary meanings of love and sexuality but went beyond these to embrace a wide array of inclinations comprising ambition, patriotism, and other aspirations that were properly political in nature” (*ibid*, 1). Passions were not seen as merely the roots of political aspirations. They were directly invoked in the *polis*, and Greek political language in the assembly was crafted with the aim of creating emotional responses (Chaniotis 2018, 59). Lysias makes clear in his oration *Against Eratosthenes* that emotions can have public causes as much as private causes, and then proceeds to argue for the importance of public anger in the pursuit of justice in the *polis* (specifically, that anger must be expressed in the trials of the oligarchs in order to ensure their crimes are not simply dismissed) (Cohen 2001, 351).

But the emotions were not merely *included* in the ancient world, for the ancient view of emotions saw them as inseparably intertwined with reason, as the body and the soul are intertwined in mortal lives. Plato’s philosophy, recalling discussion from the previous chapter, understands emotions or desires to be movements of the tripartite soul (Knuuttila 2004, 7). Each part of the tripartite soul (recalling from Chapter 1, the rational, spirited, and appetitive) may share capacities with another, and each part of the soul deals with the elements of the other three—the rational part has its own desires and pleasures, like the love of truth and wisdom (*ibid*, 9, 12). Further, the rational part of the soul should not shun the spirited and appetitive parts, but instead work with them to control them (*ibid*, 13). Conversely, desires such as a love for truth should have the strength of the spirited and appetitive parts behind them. It is the object that is desired, or the object that inspires passion, that is most crucially evaluated, approved or condemned, not the emotions themselves. The understanding of the interconnectivity of the passions and reason (and will) was carried into the Middle Ages through the Christian tradition. The Christian tradition focused upon the objects of emotions and the actions that would come about as a result of pursuing passions, and held that there was always a rational component of in emotions (Feros Ruys 2015, 21). Interestingly, this led to different types of love being a large theological focus in the medieval period, as love could take on various forms with different degrees of reason and appetite, for instance *amor* which was experienced by human and animals (rational and non-rational beings) alike, versus *caritas*, which was a high level and rational love (*ibid*, 19, 20, 21).

Barbara H. Rosenwein argues that the Desert Fathers—the monks, hermits, and ascetics of third century Christianity who lived in the Scetes desert in Egypt (Valley of Natron/*Wadi el Natrun*)—changed emotions from their older understandings by creating the capital or principle vices, which turned some passions from ancient repertoires into sins themselves (Young 2015, 69). These capital sins or vices, more famously known as the Seven Deadly Sins, would come to establish and identify the emotional parameters of communities of the medieval era (*ibid*, 69). These parameters would not be static though, as Silvana Vecchio points out there was a changing relationship between the passions and sins/vices throughout the middle ages (*ibid*). There was no doubt in the medieval mind that there was a relationship between emotions and morals, and the performance of emotions in establishing moral claims is documented in pastoral writings of the period (*ibid*, 71, 77). The emotions in the medieval period provided a "domain for moral assertion, where the morality of particular behaviours determined how the feelings that motivated them were assessed" (*ibid*, 84). So the observation and classification of the passions, affections, and sentiments was never a neutral practice, but rather was inextricably bound with social ordering, inclusion, and exclusion (*ibid*).

Avarice was one of these capital vices, considered a “root sin” that would lead to subsidiary sins (also known as daughter sins or species), such as the twentieth species of avarice, “the unmerciful hardening of the heart” or “mercilessness, a lack of compassion and hardness of heart towards the poor and the afflicted” (Young 2015, 74, 75, 76). The Greeks saw greed as a vice, something that was an irrational and harmful indulgence, but for the Hebrews, greed and the hoarding of wealth was explicitly prohibited (Suttle 1987, 460). Augustine, who of course had profound influence on medieval thought, denounced the “lust for passions” as one of the three capital sins defining fallen man, along with the lust for power and sexual lust (Hirschman 1997, 9). 1 Timothy 6:10 proclaims avarice “as the root of all evils” and medieval thinkers insisted that combating it must be the focus of preaching, else we focus on the mere branch of evil rather than the root (Young 2015, 74-75). The love of gain, acquisition, accumulation perverts the legitimate love that should exist between people and with God (*ibid*, 76). Avarice was a particularly toxic and damaging sin, and medieval moralists blamed it “for the corruption of emotional norms, destroying relationships with God, family members, and fellow Christians” (*ibid*, 70)—in effect, avarice was a particularly anti-communal, anti-social sin. Those who were “avaricious were both emotionally unfit and a threat to the community” and in some cases, were worthy of being removed from the community (*ibid*, 84).

Avarice also poisons familial relationships, namely those of parent and child and siblings (Young 2015, 82, 83). Medieval society mandated limits to inheritance to prevent concentrations of wealth, as social inequality was a major concern for medieval moral thinkers (*ibid*, 80). This was important for avaricious persons particularly, who will want their children to have excessive accumulations as well, and who will teach their children to love such temporalities which itself would be morally wrong (*ibid*, 81). Overly affective familial ties were cautioned against, as these can obstruct virtue through the favouring of relatives at the expense of spiritual stewardship (*ibid*, 79). All people, regardless of familial ties, were to be shown the same Christian neighbourly kindness—to put your family members above all other was to show preference for a worldly institution (*ibid*, 79). The three capital sins that were warned against by St. Augustine—avarice, lust for power, and sexual lust—persisted through out the middle ages as an indissoluble trio, even making it as far into Kant's *Idea for a General History* (as *Ehrsucht*/ambition, *Herrschsucht*/domination, and *Habsucht*/greed) (Hirschman 1997, 21). These three were even further reinforced through being contrasted and opposed as a bloc to either the requirements of salvation or the dictates of reason (*ibid*).

In medieval allegories, this dangerous trio of vices were set against virtues in the battle for the soul of man; early modernity would re-stage this battle scene, pitting one passion against another in the fight for the benefit and improvement of mankind (Hirschman 1997, 21). The rise of commercial growth which began in the thirteenth century contrasted dramatically with the mendicant friars and the theology they espoused and lived, and they ultimately declared that this newly emerging epoch was a "renaissance of greed," prompting their notice that avarice had "debilitating effects on emotional health" (Young 2015, 70, 71). But the friars were arguing for the position that would ultimately lose.

Passions, sins, and vices were deemed particularly concerning in rulers—indeed, much in Machiavelli is about trying to create more strategic—and people-oriented—rulers to curtail the risks of capricious princes (Machiavelli 2011, 3). Indeed, Albert O. Hirschman notes that the stark social shift towards the favouring of avarice with the Renaissance was not the result of a new ethics developing, but instead can be traced through developments in state theory, and the attempt to improve statecraft (Hirschman 1997, 12). This specifically can be seen in the new focus on the real world, as opposed to imaginary republics and monarchies, that Machiavelli brought into political theory, sustained by subsequent thinkers (*ibid*, 13, 14). Arising in the Renaissance, and becoming a firm conviction in the seventeenth century, was the notion "that moralizing philosophy and religious precept could no longer be trusted with restraining the destructive passions of men" (*ibid*, 14-15).[34] So something new, something different, would need to be discovered and used to keep the violent and dangerous passions at bay in rulers and the populace at large. Additionally, new forces brough about by the commercialisation of society demanded new understandings of social and moral life with checks on avarice. This prompted a fixation on discovering and dissecting human nature, "undertaken to discover more effective ways of shaping the pattern of human actions than through moralistic exhortation or the threat of damnation" (*ibid*, 15).

Three general lines of argument developed in relation to controlling the sinful passions. The first was in appealing to coercion and repression, in which "the task of holding back, by force if necessary, the worst manifestations and the most dangerous consequences of the passions is entrusted to the state," a line of argument which drew from St. Augustine and Calvin (Hirschman 1997, 15). However, this was a cyclical solution. The state is ruled by sovereigns, who may first of all be incapable of quelling dangerous passions in the masses (*ibid*), and secondly may be taken by such passions themselves. So, the second line of argument proposed that the passions be harnessed instead of repressed or countered (*ibid*, 16). In this case, the state and/or society would have to become a transformer, a "civilizing medium" that would create

[34] Montesquieu, *On Politics*: "It is useless to attack politics directly by showing how much its practices are in conflict with morality and reason. This sort of discourse convinces everybody, but changes nobody…I believe it is better to follow a roundabout road and to try to convey to the great a distaste for certain political practices by showing how little they yield that is at all useful" (Hirschman 1997, 76-77).

good out of what was originally wicked (*ibid*). Giambattista Vico perhaps illustrates this proposal best:

> Out of ferocity, avarice, and ambition, the three vices which lead all mankind astray, [society] makes national defense, commerce, and politics, and thereby causes the strength, the wealth, and the wisdom of the republics; out of these three great vices which would certainly destroy man on earth, society thus causes the civil happiness to emerge. This principle proves the existence of divine providence: through its intelligent laws the passions of men who are entirely occupied by the pursuit of their private utility are transformed into a civil order which permits men to live in human society. (Hirschman 1997, 17).

Hirschman points out that Vico does not actually elaborate on how society produces such transformations, how these destructive passions become virtues (Hirschman 1997, 17). Bernard Mandeville similarly calls for the "Skilfil Management of the Dextrous Politician" in *The Fable of the Bees* "as a necessary condition for the turning of "private vices" into "publick benefits"" (*ibid*, 18). The transformation, nevertheless, remains a mystery.

And so here arises the third argument. The first and second arguments both failed to persuade—neither actually answered how dangerous passions will be tempered (Hirschman 1997, 20). The third argument, instead of trying to either stop all passions or unleash all passions, proposed that fire be fought with fire: that "one set of comparatively innocuous passions" could be used "to countervail another more dangerous and destructive set or, perhaps, to weaken and tame the passions by such internecine fights in *divide et impera* fashion" (*ibid*). This third argument, that of the countervailing passion, arose in the seventeenth century, founded upon a view of the passions as dangerous and destructive, and a particularly somber view of human nature (*ibid*, 27). In the eighteenth century, both the passions and human nature become regarded far more positively (*ibid*). But even as passions were taken to be "invigorating rather than pernicious" in this later century—with Helvétius arguing in *De l'esprit* in favour of the passions, with chapters entitled “On the power of the passions,” “On the intellectual superiority of passionate over sensible people (*gens sensés*),” and “One becomes stupid as one ceases to be passionate”—the theory of the countervailing passion remained popular (*ibid*, 26, 27). Hirschman observes that “the idea of engineering social progress by cleverly setting up one passion to fight another became a fairly common intellectual pastime in the course of the eighteenth century” (*ibid*, 26). Not merely stalling harms at this point, but actually advancing social progress. Baron d’Holbach put it succinctly: “The passions are the true counterweights of the passions; we must not at all attempt to destroy them, but rather try to direct them: let us offset those that are harmful by those that are useful to society. Reason…is nothing but the act of choosing the passions which we must follow for the sake of our happiness” (*ibid,* 27). Helvétius, defender of the passions, had his own such formulations: “…only a passion can triumph over a passion”, suggesting if one wanted to motivate a “forward woman (*femme galante*)” into becoming modest, they should employ vanity to do so, rather than trying to motivate through moralising (*ibid*, 28). Helvétius frames it in a way that harkens back to that initial problem of the inadequacy of moralising: “The moralists might succeed in having their maxims observed if they substituted in this manner the language of interest for that of injury” (*ibid*). Curb one passion by presenting another, perhaps less harmful passion as an alternative, something more beneficial to the individual, and society will also receive the benefits of that alternative passion. And individuals will be far more receptive to behaving less harmfully if they see it as being in their interests—through the presentation of an alternative passion—than they would be in facing coercion or moral arguments. At this time, it is extremely important to note, interest really was a broad term, only referring to general benefit (*ibid*, 32), and given to the passion which was bestowed with the countervailing function (*ibid*, 28).

Francis Bacon argues for the setting of "affection against affection and to master one by another", comparing this to the taming (and training) of certain animals to hunt others (Hirschman 1997, 22). Baruch Spinoza argued that "an affect cannot be restrained or taken away except by an effect opposite to, and stronger than, the affect to be restrained", and "no affect can be restrained by the true knowledge of good and evil insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered an affect" (Spinoza 1996, 120, 123). Bacon's aim was to, not surprisingly, cast off anything that would inhibit inductive and experimental thinking (Hirschman 1997, 21). But Spinoza's aim was for the "triumph of reason and love of God over the passions," and a theory of a countervailing passion was the only way, Spinoza thought, to counter passions, which clearly are seen to have the utmost strength and autonomy (*ibid*, 23, 24). Spinoza's concluding proposition of *Ethics* is "Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; nor do we enjoy it because we restrain our lusts; on the contrary, because we enjoy it, we are able to restrain them" (Spinoza 1996, 180). As he explains further in this proposition, Spinoza's vision of this control over the affects is rooted in self-trust and self-respect, and he confesses it is a difficult path to take (*ibid*, 181).

Hume is especially famous for his defense of the passions, often depicted a little too extravagantly as a condemner of reason over passion. He did indeed hold passions as entities more forceful, even more grounded than reason, but before explaining why Hume is seen as a friend of the passions, one of the few outliers in the canon who seems to hold reason is lesser regard than passion, it is important to note that Hume was careful in his defining of reason, noting it pertained mostly to abstract logic, and the realm of judgement (Hume 1966, 126). Hume notes that reason is often used too broadly, merely connoting something agreeable or calm, rather than actually being a product of logical calculation. Thus he declares "it is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. It is not contrary to reason for me to chose my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian, or person wholly unknown to me" (*ibid*, 128).

Ultimately, Hume endeavoured to show that reason and passion could not be opponents, because "reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will" and "it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will" (Hume 1966, 125). For Hume, it is the human will that needs to be considered when accounting for reason and passion. What motivates the human will towards any action? It is the passions. Hume writes that "nothing is more fluctuating and inconstant on many occasions than the will of man; nor is there anything but strong motives which can give us an absolute certainty in pronouncing concerning any of his future actions" (*ibid*, 37). Human actions cannot be predicted through abstract logical deductions like a mathematical proof. It is the passions, which act almost like sensible external causes upon the soul, that move human will. Reason then responds to passions like it responds to other entities and events in the world, reason as a logical process must follow from original causes, it could not be the cause itself. Thus Hume argued that "since reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition,…the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion" (*ibid*, 126-127). Hence, his supremely famous lines, "nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse", and "reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" (*ibid*, 127). Passions, on the other hand, Hume regards as "an original existence" or "a modification of existence," without any representative quality—like being sick, or thirsty, or five-feet tall, a passion is simply an existing thing in itself, an impactful real "thing" present in reality (*ibid*). Therefore a passion cannot be contradictory to, or opposed by, truth or reason, it is simply a matter-of-fact (*ibid*). The only way a passion might be defensively called irrational is if it is founded upon non-existent objects (a person, for instance, believes their friend said something cruel and thus became angry, and later learn that cruel remark was never made—the anger dissipates, it was founded upon something no-real), or if an incorrect or insufficient course of action is chosen in response to a passion (*ibid*, 128). But Hume argues, neither of these truly even make the passion irrational, as it is the opinion or judgement itself is wrong, not the feeling-state which simply is, simply exists (*ibid*, 128). Our reason responds to passions, but passions are as forceful as events, as concrete physical objects, and thus are the more significant and motivational influence on the human will. Only a passion can cancel or change another passion, or in other words, a passion is the necessary countervail to another passion.

If passions can be a countervail to other passions, how is it determined whether one passion or another should be the countervail? Which passions need taming, and which passions are those that tame (Hirschman 1997, 31)? What seemed necessary was a permanent, general countervail for any harmful passions that would arise in daily life (*ibid*, 32). Hume remarks that avariciousness, or "interested affection," was a particular form of passion that could not be stemmed or countered by another, only redirected. He writes, "there is no passion, therefore, capable of controlling the interested affection, but the very affection itself, by an alteration of its direction" (Hume 1966, 197). Self-interest, according to Hume, can be either virtuous or vicious case by case, depending on the outcome and its social impact (*ibid*, 198). And as the most forceful passion, one that could not be countered but only redirected, self-interest, or the self-interested passion/affection, seemed to be the most practical and capable countervail. The *interests* took on the role of countering the passions, and not merely in the sense that one passion is more in the interest or to the benefit of individuals, though it began in those terms. The interests, believed to produce favourable effects on society, were contrasted with the potentially calamitous consequences of the free reign of passions (Hirschman 1997, 32).

The interests taking a central role in human motivation was a chief moral issue of early modernity, and a disturbing turn in the eyes of many. Anglican historian and divine Peter Heylin feared the replacement of a “serene tripartite balance” with chaos upon the introduction of the new force of self-interest guiding policy making, in which “‘…the differences of opinion, and pretence of interesses, would keep them at perpetual distance’”, as he wrote in 1644 (Gunn 1969, 45). Robert South was concerned with this emerging “selfish” individual, the person who would not see themselves as benefitting from the common, but by the enclosure, “who would rejoice at the wrecking of the ship of state, could he but salvage the debris” (*ibid*, 268). The question that had persisted for centuries of humans falling short of human nature, had turned into a question of changing the standards of behaviour, of human nature, as South saw it (*ibid*). Yet still altruism was the expectation, the behavioural assumption of the time (Gunn 1968, 557). Self-interest as articulated along commercial, mercantile lines was not embraced as a moral good. Clearly a contrast remained between these notions of self-interest, and an ethic expected amongst people within their communities (*ibid*, 557). As David McNally writes, “the great problem of moral philosophy in the eighteenth century was that ‘of reconciling the old ethics with the new economics’” (McNally 1988, 163). He continues:

> This problem revolved around the dilemma of finding a unifying principle of social life in a commercial society characterized by competition and individual pursuit of self-interest. How were the atomic individuals of commercial society held together? What was to prevent a society characterized by economic individualism from flying asunder? How was virtue—a commitment to the priority of the body politic over the interests of the individual—to be maintained in an individualist social order? (McNally 1988, 163).

Interest as a concept had come to destroy the once guaranteed nature of social relations, challenging the old order that held transcendental meaning for humans and human society (Gunn 1968, 564). The established divine order, of moral persons acting and interacting upon spiritually ordained natural behaviours of body and soul, had been undermined. Commercial society pushed the view that economic competition and the drive for profit was the model of human interaction, thus reducing all social relations to ones of cash and profit, operating as objects or atoms on a course of selfish action (McNally 1988, 172). These concerns demonstrate clearly that, as Gunn states, the notion of "economic man" predates Adam Smith by at least a century (Gunn 1968, 557). Gunn in fact argues, "from the age of Hobbes to that of Bishop Butler and beyond, ethical speculation was dominated by the nature and consequences of self-interest" (Gunn 1969, 277).

One of the stalwart critics of the commercial spirit and the economic reductionism of the interests/self-interest was Adam Smith. Despite the torrent of half-done, mischaracterised readings of his works that hail Smith as the first economist who insisted that self-interest and market interactions were the bastion of freedom and happiness, Smith was a moral philosopher preoccupied with the new challenges that the burgeoning commercial dynamics were bringing forth in the world around him. Rebecca Kingston argues that Smith charted a completely new course in the modern examination of the passions by examining the causes of sentiment (Kingston 2008, 122). Contrary to the more than predominant view of Smith as a champion of individualism and free market commercial society, perpetuated everywhere from high school and university classrooms to newspapers to scholarly works, Smith was fervently concerned with the common good, and with ensuring the interests of merchants and manufacturers—which he saw as dangerously opposed to those of the general interests of society—did not threaten or destroy that common good (McNally 1988, 152-153). While he is often painted "as an ideologist in the service of the industrial bourgeoisie" (*ibid*, 152), Smith's contemporaries saw him in an opposing light. To Smith, Scottish Minister Hugh Blair remarked: "You have done great service to the World…by overturning all that interested Sophistry of Merchants, with which they had confounded the whole Subject of Commerce" (*ibid*, 221).

Smith was concerned with the morally and politically corruptive tendency of what he called the "commercial spirit" that was gaining strength in the eighteenth century. Smith despaired at the "dispossession to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean condition," calling this "the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments" (Smith 2009, 73). He complains that at least to the superficial, the vices of the upper classes seem agreeable, while the virtues of the poor seem disagreeable (*ibid*, 235). Smith feared that the commercial spirit would come to influence and direct politics, chiefly as the increasing division of labour would in turn fragment the morality and opinions of the community (McNally 1988, 188). Mercantile economics not only invert the proper order of society, the proper relationship between production and consumption, but merchants mislead the populace into believing the private interests of merchants, a small group, are the general interests (*ibid*, 222). Smith writes "…the clamour and sophistry of merchants and manufacturers easily persuade them, that the private interest of a part and of a subordinate part, of the society, is the general interest of the whole" (Smith 2007, 84). In an era where avarice was being posited as a countervail for the allegedly more dangerous passions, Smith argued that "avarice and injustice are always short-sighted…" (*ibid*, 254). For Smith, avarice was a path to injustice.

Smith argued that "wherever there is a great property, there is great inequality. For one very rich man, there must be at least five hundred poor, and the affluence of the few supposes the indigence of the many" (Smith 2007, 462). Avarice was not a lesser passion, and if unchecked it would absolutely produce misery and a break down of the social order. For Smith, the interests of merchants and manufacturers run counter to the general public interest (McNally 1988, 221). Smith describes merchants as "an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the publick, who have generally an interest to deceive and even oppress the publick, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it" (*ibid*). Smith considered the interests of landowners and wage labours to be inseparable from the general interest of society, while merchants and manufacturers have "an interest to deceive and even oppress the public" (*ibid*, 153). Smith views commercial society as characterised by the absence of virtue, though such a society may be preserved through utility rather than benevolence (*ibid*, 191). Benevolence is admirable, but not necessary for society; justice on the other hand, *is* necessary, the very pillar of society (*ibid*). Thus, for Smith "it is necessary to insulate the political sphere against the spirit of commerce" (*ibid*). And that was the project undertaken in the moral philosopher's *The Wealth of Nations*, which "advanced a stirring plea for a new set of policies which would ensure that commercial activity served the general interest, and that it conceived of an agrarian capitalist commonwealth as the social foundation of a modern system of liberty and justice" (*ibid*, 209). It contained a "sustained attack" on the industrial and commercial classes "and an argument for agrarian-based capitalist development in a landed commonwealth ruled by prosperous and public-spirited country gentlemen" (*ibid*, 257). The *Wealth of Nations* is "an attempt to free British politics—and especially its commercial regulations—from those groups most infected with the defects of the spirit of commerce: merchants and manufacturers" (*ibid*, 192). An institutional framework that would restrict the self-interested action of commercial relations would be essential to prevent the deterioration of society's moral fabric (*ibid*).

Smith's outline for such a framework is starkly different from the picture painted of him in contemporary neoclassical economic thinking. For instance, Smith argued for policies that would dampen the rate of profit, as "…Smith wished…to see the profit rate fall to its lowest possible rate—the rate which would be just sufficient to maintain economic activity" (McNally 1988, 219). For Smith, wealth should be just at the level of consumption, bringing forth low commodity prices and a highest possible standard of living, with rising real wages (*ibid*, 219, 214). A low rate of profit, which Smith perceived as resulting from free competition, would force "capitalists to behave like the prudent individual described in the *Moral Sentiments*" (*ibid*, 227). So the praise Smith gives the market, or the Invisible Hand, is actually "praise for a mechanism which he believes can counteract the competing influence of commerce on the behaviour of those most closely connected with commercial activity" (*ibid*, 227). McNally writes that:

> Unlike later theorists of perfect competition who looked to the market to channel and control the selfish passions of all members of society, Smith was concerned almost exclusively with the imposition of market discipline upon merchants and manufacturers whose selfish interests—unlike those of landowners and labourers—run directly counter to that of the public. (McNally 1988, 227-228).

So when Smith asserts that there exists "the natural effort of every man to better his own condition" and that the efforts of betterment are able to surmount "a hundred impertinent obstructions with which the folly of human laws too often encumbers its operations," it is only on the grounds of an existing political order that would secure individual liberty, and community well-being (*ibid*, 251).

Smith’s wariness of avarice and narrow self-interests leads him to vigorously condemn the “selfishness school” of Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Mandeville. For instance, Smith complains that Mandeville thinks everything is or stems from vice, even wearing a clean shirt (Smith 2009, 366). He complains that Mandeville sees all passions as “wholly vicious” and everything is treated as vanity and selfishness (*ibid*, 367). Smith denounces Hobbes for believing that people do not come together out of natural love, but exclusively for basic survival (*ibid*, 371). Smith concludes the selfishness school totally misunderstands what sympathy is, if they can construe it so badly to see it as selfishness (*ibid*, 373-374). Smith even states that Hobbes is offensive to all moralists and theologians as he regards no difference between right and wrong (Smith 2009, 374). The selfishness school is directly counter to the Shaftesbury school of which Smith was part, through Francis Hutcheson back to Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury had argued for the social affection, emphasising the naturalness of human sociability and a pre-social natural understanding of moral right and wrong (Kingston 2008, 120). Human reason allows for the recognition and approval of the right and good, and the social affection prompts human beings to seek the good of and for one’s fellow human beings along with oneself (*ibid*). Further for Shaftesbury, virtues for the individual self and those of society could not be in conflict, though virtuous behaviour ought to be encouraged among the community by public authorities (*ibid*, 120-121).

Hume’s work was another profound influence upon Smith. Hume argues that human beings are dependent on living in a society to meet their needs (Hume 1966, 190). Our nature, he argues in *A Treatise on Human Nature*, is anti-social, as we are selfish and self-interested and only have confined or limited generosity—but, we are compelled to live in society as human beings need each other for their physical survival and mental happiness, and so are willing to be restrained by rules to ensure a functional society (*ibid*, 203). These rules become conventions and we are conditioned through them to value the social good of the whole society, but nevertheless, following the rules is an interested action, and hence society and governance is borne of interest (*ibid*). So for Hume, self-love is the origin of law and of governance, and society is made up of competing self-loves which must be moderated and adjusted in order to manage living together (McNally 1988, 168). The adjustments to self-love each individual makes become customary, developing from the human capacity for sympathy, for wanting to be held in high esteem by others and be worthy of sympathy from others oneself (*ibid*). For Hume, sympathy is not a natural faculty but comes through cultivation and habit (*ibid*, 169). And the enforcement of these customs is the origin of justice, with Hume arguing that "it is only from the selfishness and confined generosity of man, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his needs, that justice derives its origin" (Hume 1966, 200). Thus it is interest that establishes the rules of justice, though Hume does not synonymise interests with justice and remarks that single acts of justice can actually run counter to public interest (for instance, a magistrate restoring a large fortune to a miser), as well as justice possibly necessitating the sacrifice of a private interest (even if consequently one wishes that justice in that instance maybe was not enacted) (*ibid*, 201, 202). Hume further argued that "men often act knowingly against their interest," for though men are governed by interest, with their concern not extended very far past friends and acquaintances, and self-interest is often chased over the social good, ultimately it is in human interest to uphold society and protect the common good or common interest (*ibid*, 129, 235, 236). In fact for Hume, a commercial exchange economy allows the behaviours that ground social bonds to be seen transparently (McNally 1988, 169). As McNally observes, "Hume believed that the forms of human intercourse which characterize commercial society provide the surest foundation for moral behaviour and justice" (*ibid*).

Even further, it is property that specifically necessitates justice, the self-interest of securing and maintaining property—in the fictitious state of nature there was no property and therefore neither justice nor injustice (Hume 1966, 205). Hume carefully defines property as "such a relation betwixt a person and an object as permits him, but forbids any other, the free use and possession of it, without violating the laws of justice and moral equity" (*ibid*, 34). Property has no sensible qualities, it is a relation between an object and intelligent, rational beings (*ibid*, 229). But in society, in order to secure property and produce peace and stability, laws exist to govern property in order to guard against selfishness and the specific ruinous harms of avarice (*ibid*, 207). Sympathy and justice are thus borne of society for Hume, in response to self-interested passions, but they are vital forces in the human condition and in preserving society.

Sympathy plays an immense role in human motivation and behaviour for Hume. Human being, Hume remarks, have such strong sympathetic capabilities that in many cases, people feel more strongly from the communicated feelings of others than they do from their own temperaments (Hume 1966, 41). Hume carefully articulates how he envisions the process of the sympathetic passion: beginning with an effect or external sign (or countenance or conversation by or with another), it conveys an idea of affection that is converted to an impression which acquires force or vivacity, and that becomes a passion in itself producing equal emotion as though it were an original affectation, happening to oneself (*ibid*, 41). Humans can and will always find parallels of themselves in others (*ibid*). Humans also are immediately cognizant of the sympathetic capacity of others, and thus behave in ways believed to bring about esteem and positive emotions through sympathy. Hume writes, "…there remains nothing which can give us an esteem for power and riches and a contempt for meanness and poverty, except for the pride of *sympathy*, by which we enter, into the sentiments of rich and poor, and partake of their pleasure and uneasiness" (*ibid*, 80). Sympathy is the "animating principle" of all passions (*ibid*, 81).

For Smith, sympathy is not selfish (McNally 1988, 181). Morality is natural and rational (Smith 2009, 375). And social life requires at least some transcendence of immediate self-interest (McNally 1988, 182). Smith writes:

> Sympathy…cannot, in any sense, be regarded as a selfish principle. When I sympathise with your sorrow or your indignation, it may be pretended, indeed, that my emotion is founded in self-love, because it arises from bringing your case home to myself, from putting myself in your situation, and thence conceiving what I should feel in the like circumstances. But though sympathy is very properly said to arise from an imaginary change of situations with the person principally concerned, yet this imaginary change is not supposed to happen to me in my own person and character, but in that of the person with whom I sympathize. (Smith 2009, 373).

Sympathy by its nature, Smith says, is not about imagining oneself in the circumstances of another, but imagining one *is* the other. It is not, "I would not like that to happen to me" but "it pains me also that this has happened to you." For sympathy is the shared, unified identification with another's feelings—if it is not this, it is not sympathy in Smith's eyes. Sympathy is not imagining oneself directly in the place of another, not about imagining your own suffering in the same circumstances, but is to imagine what the other person is suffering in their current circumstances—not you in their place, but you become them in your sympathy, and "my grief therefore, is entirely upon your account, and not in the least upon my own. It is not, therefore, in the least selfish" (Smith 2009, 373). While Smith acknowledges that a society can be formed through mere utility, and that human beings do indeed depend on assistance from each other necessarily, societies are far better off, happy and flourishing, if this "necessary assistance is reciprocally afforded from love, from gratitude, from friendship, and esteem" (*ibid*, 103). Human beings by nature, are given feelings, sentiments, and the ability for sympathy, because we are necessarily social beings (*ibid*). And so all members of society "are bound together by the agreeable bands of love and affection, and are, as it were, drawn to one common centre of mutual good offices" (*ibid*, 104).

Smith credits Francis Hutcheson, his teacher, for demonstrating that the moral sense was not founded on self-love, indeed not selfish (Smith 2009, 378). The "moral sense" or benevolence is central to Hutcheson's theory, being the central social passion, and all people have "a natural impulse to society with their fellows" (McNally 1988, 166). The capacity for the moral sense is natural, and for Smith "conscience supposes, indeed, the existence of some such faculty, and properly signifies our consciousness of having acted agreeably or contrary to its directions" (Smith 2009, 384). Humans all crave compassion and friendship as inherently social creatures, and all are innately concerned with the well-being of society in being endowed with the moral sense, according to Hutcheson (McNally 1988, 166). Benevolence operates much like gravity for Hutcheson, who frames the nature of passions along the lines of a Newtonian style physics, and "while self-love is the principle which moves the atoms of society, benevolence is the principle of the whole which acts to moderate, order, and control the selfish impulses" (*ibid*, 167, 166). So, self-love does not need to be strictly repressed, only regulated, as it interacts with this balance of different passions including benevolence and sympathy (*ibid*, 166).

Smith also argues that things that are often viewed perhaps as mere vanity or selfishness, are in actuality rooted in the human desire for love and sympathy. Smith argues that men are happy when they notice others share in their passions/feelings and feel the same way, and grieve when it is the contrary (Smith 2009, 18-19). Smith writes that "humanity does not desire to be great, but to be beloved" (*ibid*, 192). For Smith, the desire to better one's condition is perhaps vanity, but that vanity stems from wanting to be loved, wanting to be regarded with sympathy, and wanting positive attention (*ibid*, 63). Poverty causes estrangement, and makes those in it feel left out and disregarded (*ibid*). Smith argues that people show off when they have wealth and hide their poverty because people sympathise more with joy than sorrow—this is the real reason people pursue riches (*ibid*, 62). When experiencing sympathy, humans feel joy—for instance at weddings and christenings, Smith observes, people often get emotional at what they are witnessing (*ibid*, 59). Yet often, people do not genuinely feel the sorrows of others, and though it is common to perform or feign being affected in front of sad or hurt friends after they depart there is often no lasting shared sorrow (*ibid*). However, Smith also remarks that we experience shame at not being able to sympathise with others, hence the performance of the same passion. Envy is always hidden out of shame, Smith describing that one will say they are happy at the good fortune of a neighbour, "when in our hearts, perhaps, we are really sorry" (*ibid*, 56). Anti-social feelings, like anger or envy, are ones that produce aversion (*ibid*, 44). People desire to share in feeling with others.

And so Smith argues "that to feel much for others and little for ourselves, that to restrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of human nature; and can alone produce among mankind that harmony of sentiments and passions in which consists their whole grave and propriety" (Smith 2009, 31). Morality and justice, further, depend on these benevolent affections, on sympathy and social feelings, and reason itself is dependent on feeling for Smith. He argues that yes, the rules of justice determined by reason (*ibid*, 376). But this depends on feeling. Smith writes that "nothing can be agreeable or disagreeable for its own sake, which is not rendered such by immediate sense and feeling. If virtue, therefore, in every particular instance, necessarily pleases for its own sake, and if vice as certainly displeases the mind, it cannot be reason, but immediate sense and feeling, which, in this manner, reconciles us to the one, and alienates us from the other" (*ibid*, 377). It is by feeling that pleasure and pain are ascertained, and the moral sense operates much like a physical sense, allowing human beings to ascertain right and wrong through feeling (*ibid*). In fact, going against the concerns about passions being utterly dangerous and unpredictable, Smith argues that such great passions that mortally endanger (like envy, malice, or resentment) are rare, and most people are restrained by prudence (Smith 2007, 462). Smith goes on to argue that stability and property are actually threatened by avarice and ambition on the part of the rich, and laziness from the poor (*ibid*).

Rather than conceive of self-interest as the guarantor of predictability and stability, Smith turns to his concept of prudence. Security is the first principle of prudence—people are cautious in order to keep from harm (Smith 2009, 251). Prudence is what, for Smith, guarantees wise behaviour—such as sincerity, modesty—and fulfills a role of constancy in human behaviour rather than self-interest (*ibid*, 252-253). And unlike self-interest, prudence remains social, as it is governed by Smith's impartial spectator (*ibid*, 253), that conscience that makes one aware of the right or wrongness of their actions, or more specifically directs one to evaluate whether their actions are worthy of praise. Smith's example of a prudent person is one who lives within their means, and who "has no anxiety to change so comfortable a situation, and does not go in quest of new enterprises and adventures, which might endanger, but could not well increase, the secure tranquility which he actually enjoys" (*ibid*, 253, 254). This person "is averse to enter into any party disputes, hates faction, and is not always very forward to listen to the voice even of noble and great ambition" (*ibid*). Instead of arguing that people are driven by gain, or even simply for their own selfish security, a prudent person desires both their own well-being and more importantly social well-being or social approval. He states that “wise and judicious conduct, when directed to greater and nobler purposes than the care of the health, the fortune, the rank and reputation of the individual, is frequently and very properly called prudence” (*ibid*, 254-255). It is certainly not contrary to or opposed to self interest, but its rootedness in the social distinguishes it from the rote interests that will not lie. Smith writes:

> Since the practice of virtue, therefore, is in general so advantageous, and that of vice so contrary to our interest, the consideration of those opposite tendencies undoubtedly stamps an additional beauty and propriety upon the one, and new deformity and impropriety upon the other. Temperance, magnanimity, justice, and beneficence, come thus to be approved of, not only under their proper characters, but under the additional character of the highest wisdom and most real prudence. (Smith 2009, 351).

It is not the interests for Smith that are reliable, but prudent behaviour that is guided by the moral sentiments. He argues that “vice is always capricious: virtue only is regular and orderly. The attachment which is founded upon the love of virtue, as it is certainly, of all attachments, the most virtuous; so it is likewise the happiest, as well as the most permanent and secure” (*ibid*, 265). And so for Smith, regard for others is of the highest value and the most stable way of living, as he writes “kindness is the parent of kindness; and if to be beloved by our brethren be the great object of our ambition, the surest way of obtaining it is, by our conduct to show that we really love them” (*ibid*, 266). His is not a vision of calculating and predicting the behaviours of others by presuming their selfish interests, but of showing kind regard to others in the knowledge that all persons wish to be loved. And, sometimes this will run contrary to selfish interests, but according to Smith “the wise and virtuous man is at all times willing that his own private interest should be sacrificed to the public interest of his own particular order or society” (*ibid*, 277). It is inferior prudence that is concerned with private interests while “superior prudence” is concerned with public good (McNally 1988, 190).

Where Smith does concede the role of the interests, it is again only in an economic capacity within the confines of good governance. Like animals, human beings rely on others but individuals cannot befriend everyone in this world, so it is useful to cultivate people's own self-love "and show then that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them" (Smith 2007, 9). Thus, Smith's famous and usually heavily decontextualised statement, "it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest" (*ibid*, 9-10). A society that only runs on self-interest, again, for Smith is far from a good one. But he concedes that "society may subsist among different men, as among different merchants, from a sense of its utility, without any mutual love or affection; and though no man in it should owe any obligation, or be bound in gratitude to any other, it may still be upheld by a mercenary exchange of good offices according to an agreed valuation" (Smith 2009, 104). Smith thus declares "beneficence, therefore, is less essential to the existence of society than injustice. Society may subsist, though not in the most comfortable state, without beneficence; but the prevalence of injustice must utterly destroy it" (*ibid*). In a commercial society, employers only employ out of their own interest, as they gain from an employee's labour (Smith 2007, 31, 44). Market behaviours and supply and demand, Smith admits, are ruled by self-interests (*ibid*, 37, 40-41). However, the increasing predominance of market forces and their intrusion into other aspects of life, for Smith, is hazardous. It must be remembered that the success of a person depends on neighbours holding them in good opinion (McNally 1988, 186).

Clearly commercial society is not necessarily virtuous for Smith (McNally 1988, 186). Reciprocal need through self-interest and the bonds it develops are not sufficient for virtue, and Smith was concerned that the utility that dominated economic life would come to dominate political life (*ibid*, 187). And so this necessitates a robustly just system of governance in order to preserve society against the invasion of narrow self-interested market dynamics. Utility and interests may be sufficient for the economy for Smith, but not for government, which needs benevolence (*ibid*, 193). Law-makers must exercise the most propriety and judgement of all members of society, they must rise above commercial society (Smith 2009, 98-99; McNally 1988, 191). And they must ensure that the moral order remains in tact and that the public interest is secured. For instance Smith argued that state regulations are needed to maintain and advance the common interest, such as tax subject to all within a particular trade to care for their poor/sick/orphans (Smith 2007, 85). As his teacher Hutcheson had insisted, a balance of passions and a need to moderate selfish affections through public and benevolent sentiments was a requirement for social harmony and moral law, and following the classical civil tradition, political participation by those who were free from labouring was an absolute duty (McNally 1988, 165).

As McNally argues Smith wanted essentially a system of agrarian capitalism overseen by a "state based upon progressive country gentlemen" (McNally 1988, 154). Unlike mercantile activities and trade, land is stable and thus "ownership of a substantial estate was the avenue to full participation in the life of the political elite" (*ibid*, 156). Landowners have a fixed interest in the country, whereas merchants and industrial wealth is mobile (*ibid*, 224). And so, those tied to land, agriculture, and labour in such socially/nationally rooted industries reflect the general interest, unlike the self-oriented, mutable, and roaming private interests of merchants. For Smith, a government should be judged by how it promotes human happiness in the societies over which it governs, and a political system, the machine of politics, should never be admired as an end to aspire to itself (*ibid*, 187, 188). And it is to the lower and middle classes of society that are to be assessed in their well-being in the promotion of happiness by governments, and who would determine the overall wealth of society (determined by the living standard of a common labourer)—those who Smith believed produced the most beneficial effects in their society (*ibid*, 186, 214). What is especially significant, however, is that Smith saw political institutions, the state and government, as playing the determining role in society, not commerce or the interactions of atomised individuals (*ibid*, 206). Further, the political order was also "the crucial determinant of the economic state of society" (*ibid*, 254). It also should be observed that Smith saw the government not as a product of a social contract but as a specific product of the emergence of property, "an institution designed primarily to preserve inequality of property and to protect the property of the rich from the incursions of the poor" (*ibid*, 201).

In *The Moral Sentiments*, Smith remarks that as of his time of writing, 1759, "moral sense" as an ideal and concept was not yet a part of the English language (Smith 2009, 383). Unfortunately for Smith, the "moral sense" never managed to catch on completely and certainly never won out, and taken alongside the proliferation of the erroneous reading of Smith, the power of those commercial forces that so worried him seem to be compellingly apparent. A decade earlier, Montesquieu observed in *The Spirit of the Laws* that while "other nations have made the interests of commerce yield to those of politics; the English, on the contrary, have ever made their political interests give way to those of commerce" (Montesquieu 2002, 321). The dynamic Smith was responding to dominated in the end. This is even to the extent that Hirschman charges Smith with that which he opposed, with Hirschman arguing it was Smith who used the interests to turn vice into virtue (alleging the interests were Smith's against Mandeville's more pure acceptance of selfishness), and who collapsed all noneconomic drives into economic ones (Hirschman 1997, 19, 109). While Smith did have to reconcile the dynamics of the era with his moral system, he only granted the interests their rule in the market, and as discussed just prior, not only never let the interests touch political or moral grounds, but insisted politics and morality had to keep the economic interests in check. But despite Smith, the narrowly economic conception of the interests won out. The narrowing of the term interest had incredibly profound consequences. Interests in general, even the maxim "Interests Will Not Lie", set up against passions was "an exhortation to pursue *all* of one's aspirations in an orderly and reasonable manner, it injected an element of calculating efficiency, as well as of prudence, into human behaviour whatever might be the passion by which it is basically motivated" (*ibid*, 40). Contemporaries of Smith certainly were much more willing to advocate for commercial self-interest, as mentioned Montesquieu, and Voltaire also. In his *L'écossaise*, he "contrasts the harmless, even beneficial character of commercial self-interest when compared with the slavish court etiquette of Versailles" (Reddy 2001, 243).

The narrowing of the meaning of interests produced a profound and abrupt new outlook on the dilemma of the passions; in Hirschman's words, "one set of passions, hitherto known variously as greed, avarice, or love of lucre, could be usefully employed to oppose and bridle such other passions as ambition, lust for power, or sexual lust" (Hirschman 1997, 40, 41). Avarice, one of the three capital vices, comes to be viewed as a passion that is particularly good at overpowering other passions and thus recommended as a countervail to the passions deemed more harmful than avarice itself. But avarice was then transformed into interests, a far milder, and less sinful-sounding term which now as a countervail not only hinders worse passions, but produces general benefits. Though the literature on the passions had always considered avarice to be the "foulest of them all" and the deadliest Deadly Sin—even in the seventeenth century it was the same position as in the Middle Ages—once avarice, that lust for accumulation, was called by the name of interests instead, suddenly it was acclaimed and bestowed with the role of holding back other passions (formerly held to be far milder and less reprehensible) (*ibid*, 41-42). Bishop Butler even proclaimed that “reasonable self-love”—self-interest that is rational—is actually with morality against the passions (*ibid*, 35). This transformation in moral thought and language is alarming and significant.

The Interests

Hirschman calls upon a verse from Goethe’s *Faust* to illuminate the turn towards the interests in modernity—and this line is echoed by at least one writer who follows from Hirschman (Suttle 1987, 461). The line is spoken by Mephisto as a self-description, articulated as “a portion of that force that always wills evil and always brings forth good” (Hirschman 1997, 19). This line is suspiciously similar to Genesis 50:20, in which Joseph tell his family that though they committed their acts (selling their brother into slavery, though the initial plot was murder) out of evil intentions, God brought about good via those actions: an indisputably evil act did bring about good, through God. It would not be surprising for this Mephistopheles line to have been inspired by, or to be drawing upon, this line of Genesis—indeed, there was a whole scholarly trend of trying to trace potentially biblical origins from lines in *Faust* (Durrani 1977, 837). This line from Goethe’s work would be a reference to Joseph’s brothers’ interests dominating over their murderous passions, in choosing to profit from selling their brother as a slave, rather than killing him. The desire for profit overtakes the brothers, making it possible for Joseph’s survival and thus for God’s plan of bringing about good—allowing Joseph’s people to survive starvation by entering Egypt—and stemming the passion for murder, which would not have let any of the good to come about.[35] Whether or not Goethe and/or his contemporaries were using this passage from Genesis with the new interests in mind, or Hirschman simply found this line in *Faust* to be a perfect illumination of the transformation of evil into good the interests underwent as was intended to accomplish in society,[36] the actions of Joseph's brothers in this story do demonstrate the "lesser" evil nature perceived in the interests, despite the apparent absence of God's guiding presence in the transactions of early commercial society.

As seen much earlier in Meinecke, from Machiavelli's prescribed behaviour for rulers, two terms came about in the sixteenth century, *interesse* and *ragione di stato*, which "aimed at identifying a 'sophisticated, rational will, untroubled by passions and monetary impulses,' that would give clear and sound guidance to a prince" (Hirschman 1997, 33). Huguenot statesman Henri the Duke of Rohan quipped: "*Les princes commandent aux peoples, et l'intérêt commande aux princes*"/ Princes rule people, and interest rules princes (*ibid*, 34). Interest is the "tyrant of tyrants" and *ragione di stato* "the prince of the prince", and in the words of Rohan, "in matters of state one must not let oneself be guided by disorderly appetites, which makes us often undertake

[35] It has been said that there are more than 2000 verses regarding wealth in the bible. Some examples: Proverbs 11: 28 (NIV) "Those who trust in their riches will fall, but the righteous will thrive like a green leaf"; Ecclesiastes 5:10 (NIV) "Whoever loves money never has enough; whoever loves wealth is never satisfied with their income"; 1 Timothy 6: 17-18 (NIV) "Command those who are rich in this present world not to be arrogant nor to put their hope in wealth, which is so uncertain, but to put their hope in God, who richly provides us with everything for our enjoyment. Command them to do good, to be rich in good deeds, and to be generous and willing to share"; and the very direct lines of James 5: 1-6 (NIV) "Now listen, you rich people, weep and wail because of the misery that is coming on you. Your wealth has rotted, and moths have eaten your clothes. Your gold and silver are corroded. Their corrosion will testify against you and eat your flesh like fire. You have hoarded wealth in the last days. Look! The wages you failed to pay the workers who mowed your fields are crying out against you. The cries of the harvesters have reached the ears of the Lord Almighty. You have lived on earth in luxury and self-indulgence. You have fattened yourselves in the day of slaughter. You have condemned and murdered the innocent one, who was not opposing you".

[36] What is fascinating, and what I wonder, is whether contemporaries were using this Genesis passage to articulate the interests favourably, Goethe being one, or is this merely an illumination that Hirschman uses because he found a parallel in this Faust line? Does Hirschman believe Goethe is intending to cast the interests in a favourable light as a specific commentary, as Mephistopheles also criticises Church and State in an uncensored performance (August 29th, 1829) to resounding applause (mostly by students) (Durrani 1977, 834), or did this dominant idea just fall into this work because of its prevalence? Or, is it simply a Genesis reference to call to familiar understandings of evil?

tasks beyond our strength; nor by violent passions, which agitate us in various ways as soon as they possess us;…but by our own interest guided by reason alone, which must be the rule of our actions" (*ibid*). In 1638 the Duke of Rohan published a book of advice for princes, specifically on the princes of Europe and their interests, advising that rulers ought to put "aside both irrational passions and whimsies and the advice of unreliable councillors," and that "they were to pursue their goals as defined by the objective requirements of national preservation and the maintenance of the European balance of power" (Gunn 1968, 552-553). These national aspirations were not only compatible with, but were effectively indistinguishable from, the princes personal interests (*ibid*, 553). In the context of an England mired with fears of a fracturing, self-destructing nation, such notions were welcome (*ibid*, 554). And it was Charles Herle who took the French notions of interest and elaborated upon them more thoroughly for the English context. He wrote of interest as the "centre of every things safety"; and "interest will not lye"—a phrase he attributes to French, and states its meaning as "if a man know what is his true interest, hee is undoubted true to it" (*ibid*, 556). Parliament was composed of propertied men and thus it would follow interests of its members, and that would undoubtedly be good for the nation according to Herle (*bid*). The interests for Herle were really rather simple, essentially just meaning men will do the best they can for themselves (Gunn 1968, 556). But what was novel was the claim that all men had interests, not just a king or a prince; private men were capable and interested as well (*ibid*). But though this understanding of the interests was simple, the maxim was not particularly clear: men are inclined to follow their interests, but it does not indicate the capacity to know what ones interests were—rather, one could only deduce that a failure likely indicated one was not pursuing their truest interests (*ibid*). It was Marchamont Nedham, the Civil War pamphleteer and propagandist, in his tract *Interest Will Not Lie*, who extended the meaning of the maxim in English thought. Like Herle, he wrote that "if a man state his own interest aright, and keep close by it, it will not lie to him or deceive him, in the prosecution of his aim and ends of good unto himself, nor suffer him to be misled or drawn aside by specious pretenses to serve the ends and purposes of other men" (*ibid*, 557). Like Herle, he writes that following one's interests is the best course of action. But further, Nedham argues that others can make predictions and assessments about one person if their interest is identified. He writes, "if you can apprehend wherein a man's interest to any particular game on foot doth consist, you may surely know, if the man be prudent, whereabout to have him, that is, how to judge of his design" (*ibid*). Gunn remarks upon this tendency, writing that "the emphasis on rational calculation on the part of each political actor thus allowed the observer to anticipate the direction of events" (*ibid*).

So "Interest Will Not Lie" became the seventeenth century English maxim, spawned from Rohan's "*l'intérêt seul ne peut jamais manquer*"/interest alone can never fail (*ibid*, 36). Interests as a term became prominent in the sixteenth century in western Europe, denoting concerns, aspirations, and advantage, it was not limited to the material or economic wellbeing of individuals (Hirschman 1997, 32). Instead, it referred to the full range of human aspirations, albeit aspirations determined in a particular way: these aspirations were pursued through reflection and calculation (*ibid*). On the other hand, *ragione*, reason, moves to become an instrumental thing, its role the determination of what and where the true interests of the state are (*ibid*, 34). Interest thus denotes a mixture of self-seeking behaviour and rationality, specifically the aforementioned form of instrumentalised rationality (*ibid*, 35). Ironically, the interests as the countervailing force to passions and appetites were not very useful in constraining rulers—interests were too vague in the domain of princely rule—and though the use of interests to constrain rulers was not abandoned, this theory was greatly applicable to groups and individuals within the state (*ibid*). Dr. John Fell attempted "to show how all interests might be secured and advanced," while insisting "that citizens should be considered not as members of various interests but as private men" (Gunn 1969, 51). It was "in this capacity they would then be concerned with such aspects of the general interest as establishing the fundamental laws 'upon which every one's prosperity and liberty are built'" (*ibid*). For Fell, there was a "common national interest" that could be distinguished from particular interests and the ruler's private interest needed to least contradict the particular interests of all parties (*ibid*). But, Nedham had relocated the interests from sovereign princes to competing political factions and even individuals, and hence the interests were beginning to move from realm of authority to the public at large (Gunn 1968, 555).

Interests moved, then, from being primarily those of the ruler, to those of the groups amongst the ruled (which, of course, would manifest differently in different states, notably in England and France) (Hirschman 1997, 36). In England, the singular interest of the ruler was converted into the "national interest" and later the idea crossed over into the European continent (*ibid*). J.A.W. Gunn notes that "public interest" was the predominant term by the mid-seventeenth century, having replaced gradually scholasticism's "common good", and the *"salus populi"* of Roman Law (Gunn 1969, ix). But of course, it was a new challenge to try and define "self-interest" and "public interest" (Suttle 1987, 464). Bruce B. Suttle reports that "The most popular definition equated the two and took the form of "economic advantage," thus giving rise to the belief that the individual happiness and social good were intertwined with material wealth" (*ibid*, 464). The idea of the public good, traditionally, was the measure of all private interests and the ideal to which private ambition was forced to bow (Gunn 1969, xi). But in the seventeenth century "the established antithesis between private and public interest came to be weakened through the convergence of several factors," one being "the political situation where the crown had prejudiced private rights claiming necessity of state" (*ibid*). And this new definition of interest, in which it was no longer used to broadly indicate a general benefit but rather referred to individual economic advantage specifically and almost exclusively, became the dominant meaning of the term despite its later emergence (Hirschman 1997, 32).

In the case of England, it was after the civil wars (1651) that a more domestic orientation—as in, groups within the state—was given to the concept of interests (Hirschman 1997, 37). Before, King Charles had declared he was concerned with the common, but "beginning in September 1647, his offer became that of the 'satisfaction of all interests'" (Gunn 1969, 49). The literature followed, carrying the assumption no one would care for the public good were not their individual interests preserved or even more preferably fully advanced; "appeals were made to immediate personal gain in preference to the various dangerous 'humours' of political principle" (*ibid*). Not surprisingly, interests often pertained to the interests of religious groups (Catholics, Quakers, Presbyterians, etc.) at first, but once England became politically stable again, and the concept of religious tolerance was instituted, the term interests took on its new, specified meaning of pursuing economic benefits (Hirschman 1997, 37). Private rights became the substance of public good, and "fortified by the new respectability of proclaiming one's 'interest', people argued that each man's legitimate concern for his own safety and property was the proper starting-point for any search for the public good" (Gunn 1969, xi, 300). In the early seventeenth century, interest retained the connotation of abuse and wicked motivations of corrupt governors, but it acquired respectability (*ibid*, 36). The term popularised in England by the Duke of Rohan, again, generally regarding the interests of states (England, or the prince, most often), but also applied it to mean "the private and selfish designs of private men" (*ibid*).

In France, the conditions for private or group interests to dominate the concept were not quite there, but nevertheless *intérêt* follows much the same path as the English interests (Hirschman 1997, 38). From Machiavelli onward there had been an idea in political thought of interest of sorts—an idea "of a disciplined understanding of what it takes to advance one's power, influence, and wealth"—and this idea became common and frequently utilised by moralists and writers in the seventeenth century who strived to unravel and analyse individual human nature (*ibid*).[37] And though France lacked the English transition of interests to group interests—retaining with the King the more Machiavellian conception—gradually the term narrowed regardless, coming to mean the "pursuit of material, economic advantage," just like in England (*ibid*). The extent to which interests became synonymous with economic pursuits in France in the seventeenth century are clearly revealed in La Rochefoucauld's need to define the term against the presumably common usage in his 1666 *Maximes*: "by the word interest I understand not always an interest concerned with wealth (*un intérêt de bien*) but most frequently one that is concerned with honor or glory" (*ibid*, 38, 39). Honour and glory—the older model of the countervail, the older understanding of the passions to counter avarice and other dangerous desires (*ibid*, 10). Adam Smith quotes Cardinal de Retz in his *Moral Sentiments*, who argues great dangers "have their charms, because there is some glory to be got, even when we miscarry. But moderate dangers gave nothing but what is horrible, because the loss of reputation always attends the want of success" (Smith 2009, 73). But honour and glory, the passions of the public,

[37] It is worth mentioning that Machiavelli noted that prosperous societies were usually corrupt, and sloth and ambition were frequent companions (Brown 1988, 97). Material interests were not at all virtuous yet.

no longer reigned over the other passions, keeping them in check. Instead, things were to be reversed: it was avarice that would be a countervail. Machiavelli, though he may be credited with originating the discussion of countering politically risky passions, would have been astounded and outraged (with his particular understanding of the two distinct spheres) at “the promotion of avarice to the position of the privileged passion, given the job of taming the wild ones and of making in this fashion a crucial contribution to statecraft” (Hirschman 1997, 41).

As aforementioned when Herle defined the maxim “Interests will not Lie” so limitedly, as “the maxim made no claims about people’s capacity to grasp this interest. It was an analytical proposition that simply told one what interest meant. Interest could never lead one astray, since a failure established that the proposed course of action had not been one’s true interest” (Gunn 1969, 44). And yet, this maxim, popularised by Herle and Nedham, brought interest to the forefront of political discourse (*ibid*). Gunn reports that “by the time of the Restoration, self-interest had gained a measure of respectability” (*ibid*). Interest came to stand for both the polity, and the good of the polity (*ibid*). Private wealth had long been held in contrast to the commonwealth, to the public good (*ibid*, 206). But “as soon as the inevitability of self-interest in economic life came to be appreciated, the basis for individualism was laid. A recognition of its all-pervasive character did not necessarily constitute approval, but it did make it increasingly difficult for moralists to demand a degree of community spirit that was obviously absent in the real world” (*ibid*, 205). As important as noting this shift of commercial dominance, is the fight against it by political and moral thinkers of the period, including Adam Smith, and their efforts to challenge the erosion of the community will be discussed shortly.

But it was crucial that economic causation be shown in how the interest of one person might relate to that of another person (Gunn 1969, 210). In this rapidly commericialising era,

"…private interests could no longer be discredited by their selfish character and had to be judged by their consequences" (*ibid*, 211). As it was now, the merchant's care for their own profits was a good thing for the whole commonwealth; the nation benefited from the merchant doing their own part, following their own particular interests, so to speak (*ibid*). Seventeenth-century sources spoke in this manner: the merchant benefits themselves, but through that self-benefit they also benefit King, country, and fellow subjects (for instance, through state tariff charges on the merchant's imports) (*ibid*, 212). There was a harmony of interests (ibid) that was quite unlike the commonweal/national interest of before—rather than one interest for all, a plurality of interests was to benefit the whole. So through commerce, the "Interests Will Not Lie" changed meanings from its original political one, no longer meaning that "people would follow their interests as they saw them, or following their true interests would profit" (*ibid*, 215). Commerce gave the maxim much more than that, and now "held out the hope that men would see what their interests were" (*ibid*). Keeping the common good of the community in mind was still expected and at the heart of the discourse on the nature of the interests at this time (*ibid*, 267). Interest, becoming the new governing force of human affairs, was a central philosophical consideration of the period, and required detailed elaboration on public duty (*ibid*, 266-267). Over the next century, moral thinkers worked to categorise different forms of self-regard in order to weaken the claim of the maxim and the strength of the interests (Gunn 1968, 561). But something new had indeed emerged with this notion of interests. First, interests are borne of calculation, and passions of impulse (*ibid*, 558). The rational-emotional dichotomy is thus taking on its new shape in the calculating interests. And second, interest became the naturalistic, mechanistic "great wheel" moving all affairs (*ibid*, 559).[38]

Hirschman locates the first explicit opposition between interests and passions in the work of the Duke of Rohan, which is entirely focused on rulers and statesmen, with writers in later decades applying this new dichotomy to humanity in general (Hirschman 1997, 42). He observes:

> The occasion for the discussion was a phenomenon that is familiar in intellectual history: once the idea of self-interest had appeared, it became a real fad as well as a paradigm (à la Kuhn) and most of human action was suddenly explained by self-interest, sometimes to the point of tautology. La Rochefoucauld dissolved the passions *and* almost all virtues into self-interest, and in England Hobbes carried out a similar reductionist enterprise. (Hirschman 1997, 42).

"Interest Will Not Lie" became "Interest Governs the World"; the recommendation that in the consideration of interests lies the best course of action, became the belief that interests were the root of all human action, clear in Helvétius's pronouncement that "As the physical world is ruled by the laws of movement so is the moral universe ruled by laws of interest" (*ibid*, 42, 43). Human nature had seemingly been uncovered, and its core was self-interest, and thereby human behaviour could be predicted, controlled, and improved. Yet, as with many concepts, interest seemed self-evident, and so it went without being precisely defined (*ibid*, 43). Further, the notion of the interests was never defined in relation to the passions or to reason—the two categories which hitherto "had dominated the analysis of human motivation since Plato" (*ibid*). But, the wedging of interests in between the passions and reason, unreflectively as it was, was believed to

[38] The interests had taken such a hold that even interests of inanimate objects were referenced, completely naturalising the term interest, treating it as a natural law (Gunn 1969, 43).

partake in the best sides of each, “as the passion of self-love upgraded and contained by reason, and as reason given direction and force by that passion” (*ibid*). The interests took the form of the most reasonable passion, or the most passionate rational drive.

Just as Adam Smith was wary of the interests, many argued that the interests should not be celebrated, as the passions were not. Jacques-Bénigne Lignel Boussuet believed both the passions and the interests were corrupt, and there should be neither an “empire of interests” nor a “theater of passions” (Hirschman 1997, 44). His stance is a relatively strong one however, as most critics of the interests simply doubted that the interests, or “reasonable, deliberate “self-love”” could actually match the strength of the passions (*ibid*). Spinoza himself falls into this category, writing in the *Theological-Political Treatise* that “All men do, indeed, seek their own advantage, but by no means from the dictates of sound reason. For the most part the objectives they seek and judge to be beneficial are determined only by fleshly desire, and they are carried away by their emotions, which take no account of the future or of other considerations” (Spinoza 2001, 63). Or, others among the doubtful held that the interests were not so clearly perceptible, the Marquis of Halifax one of them, who sarcastically pointed out “If men must be supposed always to follow their true interest, it must be meant of a new manufactory of mankind by God Almighty; there must be some new clay, the old stuff never yet made any such infallible creature” (Hirschman 1997, 45). Indeed, if the interests are such a core determinant in human motivation and behaviour, why have we always had such troubles? Why must the interests, if they are so innate and tied to human nature, be discovered and manoeuvred into regulating the strife between the passions, and between passion and reason?

Many others also felt that the passions would be too strong for the interests. Cardinal de Retz warned that the passions should not be counted out, for they will always underlie human motivation, even if not so obviously (Hirschman 1997, 45). Shaftesbury and Bishop Butler concur with the passions being sometimes too strong for the interests (*ibid*, 46). And La Bruyère sees passions as far stronger forces than the interests, for “Nothing is easier for passion than to defeat reason: Its great triumph is to gain the upper hand over interest” (*ibid*). Two things here are especially noteworthy. La Bruyère, first, is not at all dismayed than the passions have such a strength that they can occasionally conquer the interests. Second, interest and reason are used almost synonymously.

Reason and the Rational Actor

Searching “reason” on Google (on July 20, 2020),[39] the first result after the automatically generated dictionary definition is for “Reason.com, Free minds and free markets,” the “libertarian” magazine. Though this feels like a severely reductive and butchered interpretation of reason or rationality, this is not a completely inaccurate picture of reason in modernity. But for such an understanding of reason to come about, reason had to enter into significant engagements with early modern science and a particular view of nature, the upheavals of the Reformation, and the overbearing concerns with predicting and controlling human nature in the context of monarchical rulership and burgeoning commercial society.

Remember d’Holbach’s definition of reason: “Reason…is nothing but the act of choosing the passions which we must follow for the sake of our happiness” (Hirschman 1997, 27). Reason

[39] https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-d&sxsrf=ALeKk01LBqalv-cwS11K2wcv7o6wjnd1Cg%3A1595298711963&ei=l1MWX_KQOoe1ggedh7vYBg&q=reason&oq=reason&gs_lcp=CgZwc3ktYWIQAzIHCAAQsQMQQzIECAAQQzIECAAQQzIECAAQQzIHCAAQsQMQQzIECAAQQzIFCAAQsQMyAggAMgUIABCxAzICCAA6BAgAEEc6CQgjECcQRhD5AToECCMQJzoECC4QJzoECC4QQzoICAAQsQMQgwE6CwguELEDEMcBEK8BUKZHWJxLYNZMaABwAXgAgAF8iAHLBJIBAzMuM5gBAKABAaoBB2d3cy13aXrAAQE&sclient=psy-ab&ved=0ahUKEwiyuKXopt3qAhWHmuAKHZ3DDmsQ4dUDCAs&uact=5 Accessed July 20, 2020. As of September 26, 2020, Reason.com appears before the definition, although on Bing the definition remains ahead. December 8, 2023, the definition comes before the magazine website. Screenshot available.

is thus making a calculated choice about how to achieve a desirable end. Gunn writes that according to this mode of rationality, “in the case of a private person the realization of an interest, or even the understanding of it, necessitates ranking one’s concerns, since they are not all equally and simultaneously attainable” (Gunn 1969, 323). Calculability and rationality are the qualifiers of turning a passion into an interest. But what is rationality? Why is it so consistently paired in these theories with constancy, calculability, and predictability?

Ellen Meiksins Wood and Neal Wood locate the development of a rationalistic and critical spirit in the Reformation, a time where the “new learning” or humanism was gaining traction, in addition to the revival of the classical (Wood and Wood 1997, 29). It was essentially the birth of a public sphere of religion. It is also of particular significance in this era that Luther—after the Reformation movement took hold and during the many following peasant revolts and wars—insisted that citizens have a duty to obey authority unless commanded by God’s law (*ibid*, 27, 29), indirectly signalling the intertwined relationship of Enlightenment reason and concerns of rule and authority. However, both Lutherans and Calvinists—in addition to other Reformation movements—have theories which allow for passive disobedience (or, active resistance by “lesser magistrates”) (*ibid*, 50). Humanist Protestant thinker, John Ponet, argued in his 1556 *A Short Treatise of Politike Power*, that there is an “unequivocal justification of violent resistance to government not just by ‘lesser magistrates’ but by private individuals” (*ibid*). And thus, the era of Reformation and contract theory put forth the duty that “Subjects as the children of God are morally obliged to determine whether government violates His laws and the laws of the realm—which are superior to any specific government” (*ibid*, 51-52). The choice a subject had to make was whether to leave a state in which the laws are not in accordance with God’s or the realm’s, or to act disobediently and then accept the consequences of disobedience (*ibid*, 52). It is further of note that in England and Scotland, the Protestants were far more secure than those in France, and thus proposed much more radical resistance theories than their French counterparts (*ibid*, 53). But all through the Reformation era, people of all classes and faiths/denominations were engaged in religious and political discourse in this new public sphere of religion, leaving deep and significant marks across social and political thought.

Habermas appears to place the privatization of religion in or closer to the eighteenth century (Habermas 1989 A, 232), though of course the Protestant discourses leading to this occurred far earlier, and we see a public sphere of a privatised religion in the seventeenth and even sixteenth centuries. Nevertheless, Habermas notes that "Historically, what is called the freedom of religion safe-guarded the first domain of private autonomy the church itself continued its existence as one corporate body under public law among others" (*ibid*, 233). A religious public sphere developed through popular discourse in Protestantism, cultivating much the same critical-rational practices of Habermas's world of letters, the bourgeois pre-empt to the public sphere (Zaret 1997, 221). Protestantism is also notable for its interiority, its reliance on individual faith and the idea of a relationship between God and the individual of faith, which justifies religion as a private matter (and this will apply further to reason itself, which is contemporarily viewed as an individual capacity, not a communal property) (*ibid*). So here, we have a parallel with the psychological-subjective interiority developed through the bourgeois consumption of novels in the literary public sphere, though in a far more public and socially intricate way, and occurring far earlier. "Faith and reason," writes Zaret, "were now held to be attributes of individuals, but they were defined, defended, and debated in arguments that appealed explicitly to public opinion" (*ibid*). Such an appeal to the judgement of lay people, with a "lay insurgency" demanding "democratic control by sectarian congregations over religious matters" breaking the monopolistic hold of the clergy on religious discourse, constituted a public sphere of religion (*ibid*, 221, 222). And this first public sphere of religion, according to Zaret, legitimated the reasonableness of public opinion, and the criticism and debate of private persons (*ibid*, 223). Not only was there a public sphere of religion prior to the bourgeois literary public sphere, but Zaret further argues that the liberal public sphere, the model that first emerged in England, was a response by the elite to the radicalism and sectarianism of the masses that abounded during the English Revolution (*ibid*, 224).

The emphasis on universality and the individual's faith in Reformation movements led to radical religious participation by people of all classes and social positions:

> Appeals to a universally valid reason legitimated popular participation that extended to the humblest social groups, the emphasis on inward faith precluded intersubjective controls on judgements of conscience, and the result was an explosion of sectarian activity in which the tenets and practices of any one group were seen by others as further instances of the worldliness that oppressed the saints. (Zaret 1997, 224).

Sectarianism led to radicalism, which prompted revolt against worldly institutions (such as the Church, law, universities, and the state) that were all impediments to a holy commonwealth (*ibid*). In England, in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, there was no clear economic divide between the aristocracy (defenders of the King) and the newly emerged bourgeoisie (overthrowers of the King), unlike the sharp divides that would later appear on the European continent—the English upper classes were unified in their economic interests[40] to the extent they were almost a homogenous landed class (Wood and Wood 1997, 71, 72). In contrast, the people, the masses, were being exposed to radical and subversive ideas through parish preachers and

[40] Though certainly not their political ones!

pamphlet literature (*ibid*, 73). The collective response by elites—and theologians who were reliant on elites—was to thus contain this threatening public sphere of religion, by replacing revelation with public reason, and insisting that nothing in religion can be incompatible with reason—a belief insisted upon by the Royal Society, Laditudinariann Churchmen, Cambridge neo-Platonists, and Whig ideologues (including Locke, Shaftesbury,[41] and Sidney) (Zaret 1997, 224, 225). Effectively, it was an insistence upon a particular form of natural religion shared by almost all the Whigs (*ibid*, 225). Most of these Whigs also ended up all attending Oxford or Cambridge, grew up in Puritan families, and rejected Calvinism and the "sectarian idea of a holy commonwealth" (*ibid*).

Protestant religious discourse after the Reformation emphasised minimising the "irrational" elements of religion (revelation), and simultaneously focused on the public dimensions of God's word (Zaret 1997, 223, 225). "Revelation's danger was that it legitimated irrationality in religion" (*ibid*, 225), which largely contradicted the interests and the secular state. Because the state was now to be viewed as secular, it was to be concerned with the bodies of human beings, not their souls (which was the proper domain of the Church) (Wood and Wood 1997, 50). A division between Church and state would require a division between body and soul, making the modern state incompatible with the older model of a unified and intertwined soul, mind, and body (with intertwined reason, will, and passions/affections). God may be an absolute power, but the state exists only for the "wealth and benefit" of its subjects (*ibid*, 51) or perhaps in other words, to satisfy the interests of the populace. Covenant theology in puritanism developed from such trajectories, with the view that God was a heavenly contractor (Zaret 1997, 223). This heavenly contractor, as Bacon put it: "condescends to the weakness of our capacity…,

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[41] In this case, the 1st Earl of Shaftesbury, grandfather to the 3rd, all delightfully named Anthony Ashley Cooper.

inoculating, as it were, his revelations into the notions and comprehensions of our reason" (*ibid*, 224). And so, because on earth, reason leads individuals to make contracts with one another, "God instituted a heavenly contract of salvation whose terms are publicly announced in the covenant of grace" (*ibid*). Further along in an insistence upon the rational was the aforementioned deism and natural religion, which argued that the corruption of human nature was not a burden for rationality that arises from public opinion, and from which many ideas that mark the beginning of liberalism developed (*ibid*). Public reason was derived from experience (and not revelation, of course), and reason was vested in individuals by nature, not by grace, "Hence the pessimistic doctrines about innate sin and the corruption of reason went out the window. Natural reason was sufficient in itself to reveal the existence of Providence and its design in the universe" (*ibid*, 225).

There were immediate and important consequences for the formation of the political public sphere from the appeal to public reason in natural religion, firstly that divinity became totally irrelevant to political discourse by the abandonment of revelation in religion (Zaret 1997, 225-226). Further the appeal to reason leads to the rejection of important Puritan tenets, like covenant theology and predestination (*ibid*, 226). However, it also neglects the central tenet of Christianity, the requirement of Jesus as the mediator of redemption (*ibid*). Instead, natural religion provided "a code of social conduct" (*ibid*). Archbishop Tillotson (1630 – 1694) stated that "The laws of God…are reasonable, that is, suitable to our nature and advantageous to our interest" (*ibid*). Bishop Wilkins (1614 – 1672) deemed it "not possible for us to contrive any rules more advantageous to our own interest than those which religion does propose" (*ibid*). This encapsulates the outlook of the Enlightenment, "where the union of morality and utility creates this best of all possible worlds." (*ibid*).

Often it was cited that "the rule of reason over opinion in the kingdom of science" should be a model for religious and political discourse (Zaret 1997, 229). This was linked with the idea that "the proper study of nature bridges religious and political divisions among men", another source of the confidence in the idea of the public use of reason, expressed by the early Whig proponents of the liberal model of the political public sphere (*ibid*). This era also features the dawn of the printing press, and this technological communications revolution allowed for the printing of progress of experimental science (*ibid*, 227). With the witnessing of this published/public scientific progress, the confidence in the notion of advancing reason through critical and open debate in a public forum makes a lot of sense (*ibid*), and the idea that the public use of reason achieved good ends "derived principally from well-publicized triumphs in experimental science, which emerged in a public sphere that was self-reflectively understood by its participants as a model for rational discourse in both religion and politics" (*ibid*). This would be exemplified in the eighteenth century, when the "Aristotelian tradition of a philosophy of politics was reduced in a telling manner to moral philosophy, whereby the "moral" (in any event thought as one with "nature" and "reason") also encompassed the emerging sphere of the "social"" (Habermas 1989, 103). Many thinkers, including and especially Physiocrats, sought to discover and establish a "natural order" of politics and society (Hirschman 1997, 98).[42] It is worth the reminder here that Adam Smith studied moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow, and eventually became its chair of Moral Philosophy (Habermas 1989, 103). Science, nature, and social and moral thought was presumed to be observable and analysed through the

[42] Pierre-Paul LeMercier de la Rivière, for instance, in his *Ordre naturel et essential des sociétés politiques* (1767) (Hirschman 1997, 98).

same scientific empirical means, publicly demonstrated and even critiqued in a public sphere of science.

Opinion was given added authority through the rise of its presumed opposite, the insistence on the importance of scepticism and the increased reliance upon statistics (Zaret 1997, 229). Prior to the mid-seventeenth century in England, "'knowledge' and 'science' were rigidly distinguished from the category 'opinion'…English experimentalists of the mid seventeenth century and afterwards took the view that all that could be expected of physical knowledge was 'probability,' thus breaking down the radical distinction between 'knowledge' and 'opinion'" (*ibid*, 230). Thus, with increased access via new technologies, and a reliance on scepticism and criticism, science (and all that which was supposed to emulate what was generally natural science) was seen as properly being a public process, with experiments, analyses, and conclusions all put forth in the published public sphere to discover the most rational conclusions.

Machiavelli showed the world that powerful political presuppositions could be extracted from the assumption of a uniform human nature, although his assessment of a predictable human actor was too pessimistic for general acceptance (Hirschman 1997, 49). But the appeal of predictability stuck. As Hirschman wrote, "the idea of men being invariably guided by their interests could command much wider acceptance, and whatever slight distaste the thought left behind was then dispelled by the comforting thought that in this manner the world became a more predictable place (*ibid*). The pamphlet "Interest Will Not Lie" suggests "If you can apprehend wherein a man's interest to any particular game on foot doth consist you may surely know, if the man be prudent, whereabout to have him, that is, how to judge of his design" (*ibid*). To predict a person's behaviour or intentions, ascertain their interests, and in all likelihood their subsequent actions should be deduced. Gunn argues "when the seventeenth-century writers began to treat economic life in terms of causal relationships, few assumed any other mode of behaviour than that of the economic man. That model alone provided some degree of predictability" (Gunn 1969, 206).

A predictable human actor made for a more predictable and therefore stable and controllable world. This led Sir James Steuart to value self-interest, and the behaviours governed by it, over both the rule of the passions over human action and virtuous behaviour as well,[43] for the rule of the interests allows for people to be governable (Hirschman 1997, 49). Steuart wrote: "…were a people to become quite disinterested: there would be no possibility of governing them. Everyone might consider the interest of his country in a different light, and many might join in the ruin of it, by endeavouring to promote its advantages" (*ibid*, 50). So not only does the pursuit of interest benefit individuals, for interests will never lie or deceive, but others benefit from the pursuit of self-interest as well, as all of a person's actions become transparent and predictable (*ibid*). Passions may lead anywhere, but interests have a traceable and predictable trajectory. It would be as if all people were perfectly virtuous, without actually needing to have people behave virtuously (*ibid*). Thus, the *predictability* of the interests results in mutual gain socially, in both politics and economics (*ibid*).

The rational pursuit of interests implies the elimination of passionate behaviour, and this elimination was the core of mutual benefit (Hirschman 1997, 51). The passions are now viewed as dangerous less so for the potential harms they might cause in themselves, and more because they lead to less predictable behaviour. The passions certainly make the world far less orderly than a world that run by interests alone (*ibid*, 46). The interests, by contrast, are said to be

[43] It has been a while now since morality and the salvation of the soul were the chief concerns in staving off dangerous passions!

predictable, and therein lies their rational power. Hirschman writes, “Predictability in its most elementary form is constancy,” and it was constancy that made an interests-governed world so appealing (*ibid*, 52). Each passion may have its harmful consequences, but as a whole, the greatest danger of the passions is that they seem erratic and fluctuating (*ibid*, 57). Passions are capricious, “easily exhausted and suddenly renewed again” (*ibid*, 52), and Spinoza suggests that “Men can disagree in nature insofar as they are torn by affects which are passions; and to that extent also one and the same man is changeable and inconsistent” (Spinoza 1996, 131)—essentially, people have varying emotional reactions to the same objects and phenomena. This is far from consistent and predictable. “Uncertainty in general and man’s inconstancy in particular therefore become the arch-enemy that needs to be exorcised” asserts Hirschman (Hirschman 1997, 53). Now, instead of operating on the basis of countering one harmful passion with a less harmful one, the whole of the unpredictable and inconsistent passions must be countered with the constant and predictable rational interests.

Hirschman writes: “*Inconstancy* actually came to the fore as a central difficulty in creating a viable social order after Machiavelli’s and Hobbes’s extreme pessimism about human nature (and about the resulting “state of nature”) gave way to more moderate views in the second half of the seventeenth century” (Hirschman 1997, 53). This is characteristic of social contracts doctrines, such as that of Pufendorf, citing the “insatiable desire and ambition” as well as the inconstancy and untrustworthiness of humankind (“the typical relationship of one man to another was that of ‘an inconstant friend’”) as the reason we require a contract (*ibid*). Thus, social contract theory is arguably an offshoot of the strategy of the countervailing passion (*ibid*, 31). The Hobbesian Covenant rest upon an assignment of certain passions to the task of keeping others in check, as the “Desires, and other Passions of men” such as the pursuit of wealth, glory, and domination, are challenged and overcome by the “passions that incline men to Peace”, such as “Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them” (*ibid*). Hobbes only needed to appeal once to this countervailing of passions to establish his state, but many of his contemporaries argued that the countervailing of passions must be employed continuously, day-to-day (*ibid*, 31, 32). These people then pushed for the use of the much more constant interests to do this regularly (*ibid*, 32). C. B. Macpherson observes that “Locke’s rudimentary sketch of human motivation is remarkably like Hobbes’s more precise theory. Appetites and aversions are the mainspring. Unless they are checked by a law armed with rewards and punishments they will override all moral behaviour (Macpherson 1980 xi). Locke embraced this doctrine in order to preserve the features he sought to naturalise (such as property) in his own state of nature, but otherwise remove the “inconveniences, that [men] are exposed to [in the state of nature], by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the Power every Man has of punishing the transgression of others….” (Hirschman 1997, 53). For Locke, the “Freedom of Men under Government” is “not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of another man” (*ibid*). Locke writes that “the *freedom* then of man, and liberty of acting according to his own will, is *grounded on* his having *reason*, which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will” (Locke 1980, 35). But at the same time, “an *established*, settled, known *law*” is vital, “for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases” (*ibid*, 66).

The rationality characterising these early modern ideas very directly connects to the predictability that was valued in the scientific model. Using the principles of physics, its laws of motion, Hobbes "tries to reduce human motivations to their most basic, as it were atomic, components, treating human passions—notably, of course, the impulse to avoid pain, the instinct for self-preservation and the instinct for self-preservation and the fear of death—as instances of matter in motion, the principles of attraction and repulsion" (Wood and Wood 1997, 105-106). And Locke strived for his thought to draw from sense empiricism and empiricist theories of knowledge (*ibid*, 114). His language of improvement echoes the scientific literature of the period, which focused on agricultural techniques, as seen amongst those in the Royal Society—it was pro-enclosure, and saw common land referred to as waste (*ibid*, 133). Zaret points out that "Increasing mastery over the physical environment produced a flood of proposals for reforming England's agrarian and economic life" (Zaret 1997, 227), uniting the desires of natural sciences, the state, and both landowners and the bourgeoisie, and becoming a perfect case of the rational interests. The division of labour was also considered a crucial element of "civilised" nations, and this neat division of labour existed in production, but also consisted of a neat division of labour between autonomous 'sciences' (Wood 2012, 310, 317).

The public sphere also provided a forum in which scientific experimentation could be produced, evaluated, and validated, "The printing revolution created the experimental laboratory as a public space" (Zaret 1997, 228). Printing linked laboratories, and enabled the constitution of a public sphere of science through these communications and interactions, and this certainly would be a sphere where reason would completely dominate over opinion (*ibid*). Thomas Sprat, along with other proponents of the Royal Society, "regarded knowledge produced by experimental science to be "public knowledge" and they so represented it to the world" (*ibid*).

And for Sprat, this was reason and public knowledge of the highest degree, as he believed that other intellectual communities were constrained by social restrictions placed upon free thought, of which there were no such restrictions in the experimental laboratory (*ibid*). Clearly, it is not so much the scientific inquiry itself that was significant, but instead the public use of reason (whether the product is recognised as "opinion" or not) (*ibid*, 229). However, also significant is that the opinion, the outcome, of critical reasoning in the scientific public sphere was not seen as infallible, with Joseph Glanvill insisting scepticism must always qualify opinion; his notion was reinforced by the increasing reliance on statistics and actuarial calculations within experimental science (*ibid*). Zaret observes:

> Paradoxically, this development provided "opinion" with added authority. In England before the mid seventeenth century, "'knowledge' and 'science' were rigidly distinguished from the category 'opinion'…English experimentalists of the mid seventeenth century and afterwards took the view that all that could be expected of physical knowledge was 'probability,' thus breaking down the radical distinction between 'knowledge' and 'opinion'." (Zaret 1997, 229-230).

This very particular version of reason, constant and predictable, just like the interests, but also tied deeply with economic interests, is very directly linked to early commercial society in England and the unified class interests of the landed and monied classes. In France, for contrast, Condorcet believed improvement consisted of the increase of rationality counter to superstition, the rise of equality against inequality; but for Locke, improvement is profit counter to waste (Wood 2012, 309). Both see rationality to be a superior condition, but for Condorcet, rationality is bound up with the advancement of equality, while for Locke rationality is increasing industriousness, almost inseparable from profitability and productivity (*ibid*). Condorcet aimed for rationality to further a goal of advancing humanity, while Locke's rationality aimed to advance and develop property (*ibid*). In the *Second Treatise*, Locke argues that property originates in labour—one's own or the labour of one's servant that Locke simply naturalises metaphysically without any real origin for the existence of servitude—and that using one's labour to make the earth more productive and thus claiming that worked-land as property, to which no one else has a right, is obeying God's commands and plans for humanity (Locke 1980, 19-21). God may have given the earth to all in common, but that does not mean it should always remain in common and necessarily uncultivated, and thus God in actuality gave the earth to "the use of the industrious and rational" with labour being the act of removing that land from the common, and the title to it as property (*ibid*, 21). Land appropriation via labour and property, Locke insists, increases the common stock for all mankind through cultivation, and thus is in the interests of propertied and unpropertied alike (*ibid*, 23). Ultimately Locke sees humanity's progress as subordinate or subsumed under the development of profit and productivity (Wood 2012, 309). Even when Locke begins from the premise that all men are equal by nature, he uses his principles of productivity and profitability "into a new and historically unprecedented kind of validation of inequality" (*ibid*). Macpherson also makes note of this motion, for while Locke begins with an initial stage of society of the realisation of ultimate human equality in natural law, which is the foundation for the premise that no one should harm another's life, liberty, or possessions, he also describes an inevitable second stage of society in which inequality is the foundation, and reason "becomes not a moral law but an ability to calculate what course of action is required to safeguard unequal property; and this kind of reason is to be found only in those who have accumulated some property" (Macpherson 1980, xix). Political power and governance for Locke inherently mean the propertied must be protected from non-propertied as well as against arbitrary government (*ibid*, xix, xx). This rationality that so directly ties into economic interests is the one that would come to dominate.

Montesquieu writes in Book XXI, section 20, of *The Spirit of the Laws*: "Happy is it for men that they are in a situation in which, though their passions prompt them to be wicked, it is, nevertheless, to their interests to be humane and virtuous" (Montesquieu 2002, 366). On this, Hirschman writes "Here is a truly magnificent generalization built on the expectation that the interests—that is, commerce and its corollaries, such as the bill of exchange—would inhibit the passions and the passion-induced "wicked" actions of the powerful" (Hirschman 1997, 73). Prior to Montesquieu's declaration of the beneficial and mollifying nature of commerce, he details the history of bigoted and contradictory laws in Europe, and specifically England, that expropriated Jews of their wealth—confiscation of wealth for converting to Christianity, or for not converting, depending on the place and time (Montesquieu 2002, 364-365). But then Montesquieu describes that this wealth, and the avarice of the princes, prompted alterations in these laws to increase this wealth through commerce that Montesquieu himself ascribes to persecuted Jews, as wealth only increased through leniency of the law (*ibid*, 365-366). Commerce, for Montesquieu, represents constancy against arbitrary power. Montesquieu uses an example to illustrate this argument: commerce in coins, or the exchange of coins, prevents the debasement of currency—debasement being arbitrary, often the action of a sovereign, and inconstant, compared to the constancy and predictability that commerce imposes on these coins (Hirschman 1997, 74). Much more directly however, in Book XX, Montesquieu calls commerce the "cure for the most destructive prejudices" (Montesquieu 2002, 316). Tautologically, good manners and commerce go hand-in-hand across the globe (*ibid*). Spinoza also holds commerce in high regard, paired with the interests as it is, because it requires interdependence and thus binds a society together, versus fixed capital such as real estate in which one individual's ownership is at the loss of others (and thus, Spinoza argued for state property) (Hirschman 1997, 74).[44]

In the pursuit of interests, it was expected that individuals would be "steadfast, single-minded, and methodical," a constitution that wholly contrasted the stereotypical mercurial behaviour of those who were "buffeted and blinded by their passions" (Hirschman 1997, 54). Formerly, the insatiability of avarice had been deemed its most dangerous and reprehensible quality (*ibid*, 56). But transformed into the interests, in the context of the post-Hobbesian obsession with (in)constancy, the insatiability of avarice becomes a virtue for its implied constancy (*ibid*). Hobbes' view of human nature, though deeply criticised by thinkers like Smith, was absorbed by his contemporaries and remained thereafter, with an increasing number of "respectable men" agreeing that "intelligent self-interest was an adequate guide to the citizen and to the Christian" (Gunn 1969, 267). But further, interest came to be removed from the sense of a right possessed by an individual, sovereign or private, and quite unrelated to any foreign policy motivations, and instead came to be treated as a social force (*ibid*, 43). The impacts of such a transformation are heavy upon the theories of the passions and on the idea of reason, quite obviously. With the passions and interests opposed, and interests conceived to be distinguished by rationality, the dichotomy of reason and passion comes into being and replaces the complex interactions of passions, will, and reason in the theories of the prior era.

***Doux Commerce* and the Benefits of Interests**

[44] Obviously this neglects proper consideration of the origin of the wealth used in commerce. The elevation of commerce and the market is aptly described by E. Meiksins Wood as a world "made in which the 'economic' forms of power and coercion are not recognised for what they are—as forms of power and coercion" (Wood 2012, 317).

For the transformation of the passion of avarice into the interests to be long-lasting, for this drastic shift in valuation to carry on through the years, the virtue of constancy would not be sufficient (Hirschman 1997, 56). The interests would also need to be shown to be harmless (*ibid*). Hence, the love of gain in England and France was turned into a positively appraised thing, even if it was also somewhat disdainful (*ibid*, 57). Significantly, this move would bring about a major new belief in western European thought—in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was now not only acceptable but encouraged to engage in private acquisitive pursuits (*ibid*, 69).

The development of the notion of *le doux commerce* demonstrated that commerce would come to be conceived of very differently in modernity in both theory and practice (Wood 2012, 25). Montchrétien put forth the notion that commerce might be used to harness private interests and passions for the benefit of the public, so that civic virtue need not be relied upon in the pursuit of the common good (*ibid*, 24). In his 1615 work *Traité de l'économie politique*, he argued that selfish passions and desire for economic gain can provide the foundation for the common good, without any need for virtuous behaviours (*ibid*). However, in France, those espousing the benefits of commerce—*le doux commerce*—for the common good presupposed that a sovereign monarch would be there to facilitate the transformation of the private interests into public benefits, a belief also echoed by Montesquieu (*ibid*, 24-25).

The Anglo-Scottish development of *doux commerce* in the eighteenth century puts more emphasis on the market competition, as opposed to a monarch, in its harmonising of private interests with a public good (Wood 2012, 25). This is not to say the state would have no role, but, as Ellen Meiksins Wood describes, " The state…plays a critical role in producing and maintaining the conditions for commercial development, but the purpose of the state is not to impose harmony on competing private interests…[rather] its role is to facilitate the operations of the market, which has that integration as its primary object" (*ibid*). The state was essential for the market to operate properly, as a force which sustains market competition (not the market itself) and prevents monopolies (*ibid*, 26). The early view holds that the state is not opposed to the market, or an entity that balances out the market, rather it is fully integral to the operation of the market. But, at the core of both the French and Anglo-Scottish conceptions of *doux commerce* is the notion that private interests can be the source of public benefits (*ibid*, 25). Commerce harnesses and activates the interests, allowing for their pursuit to bring about broad social gains. Even market problems were not to be addressed with a different counterweight—the solutions to problems of commerce were to be found also in commerce (*ibid*, 26).

Samuel Johnson avowed that "There are few ways in which a man can be more innocently employed than in getting money" (Hirschman 1997, 58). Unlike the wild and unruly passions with their dangerous consequences, merely following material interests was innocent or innocuous, making following the interests the superior choice (*ibid*). "Innocent" was a frequent descriptor of commercial activities of early modern England and France (*ibid*, 59). In France, it was the *douceur* of commerce—*douceur* conveying sweetness, softness, calmness, and gentleness; the antonym of violence (*ibid*).[45] This softness of commerce was articulated in a passage of Jacques Savary's *Le parfait négotiant* (a seventeenth century book for businessmen):

> [Divine Providence] has not willed for everything that is needed for life to be found in the same spot. It has dispersed its gifts so that men would trade together and so that the mutual need which they have to help one another would establish ties of friendship among them. This continuous exchange of all the comforts of

[45] The *doux* of commerce possibly originates in the pre/non-commercial meaning of commerce—"animated and repeated conversation and other forms of polite social intercourse and dealings among persons" (Hirschman 1997, 61).

> life constitutes commerce and this commerce makes for all the gentleness (*douceur*) of life….” (Hirschman 1997, 59-60).

It is noteworthy that the conclusion of this necessity of trade is not some sort of mutual aid system, or gifting system, but instead, commerce—creating these “friendships” which are actually relationships based on supposedly mutual profit. William Robertson, a Scottish historian, wrote in his work *View of the Progress of Society in Europe* (1769) that “Commerce tends to wear off those prejudices which maintain distinctions and animosity between nations. It softens and polishes the manners of men” (*ibid*, 61).

An amusing irony it is, *doux commerce*, for occurring at the heights of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, and when trade more generally was a precarious and hazardous occupation (Hirschman 1997, 62). This irony extends to the general categorisation of the business man—an individual who is not of the nobility, and by no means heroic, lacking any of the “heroic virtues or violent passions” and instead only the calm passion for moneymaking (*ibid*, 63). The typical businessman “had only interests and not glory to pursue, and everybody *knew* that this pursuit was bound to be *doux* in comparison to the passionate pastimes and savage exploits of the aristocracy” (*ibid*). Firstly, of note is that the gentle businessman here must be contrasted with the armies and pirates that were his contemporaries (*ibid*), and one would assume the privateers too. Secondly, here is that old problem still embedded: the capricious, violent, passionate nobles. The heroic expectations of princes and nobles in this form, however, seems to be without much hope for reform. And so, rather than waiting for more consistent, less passionate princes, instead, the problem shall be solved by turning to the emerging private sphere, to non-noble business men who have none of the capacities for the heavenly highs and hellish lows that nobles inflict upon themselves and their people, but who instead mild-manneredly go about their self-interested pursuits of material accumulation, making “peace” with other self-interested individuals along the way.

Economics was the domain in which the predictability of human conduct through the interests was believed to be the strongest and most thorough (Hirschman 1997, 51), the most rational sphere of life. Moreover, it was in economics that the greatest benefits from the pursuit of self-interest were expected to be found. For instance, the expectation was that expanded domestic trade would produce more cohesive communities, and that expanded foreign trade would produce peace in encouraging countries to avoid wars (*ibid*, 52). This was a departure from the preceding view of trade as a zero-sum game (*ibid*, 52). Montesquieu asserts that “peace is the natural effect of trade” (Montesquieu 2002, 316). Taking this farther and demonstrating the new contrast between unruly avarice and the rational interests, Montesquieu argues for commerce as virtuous (Hirschman 1997, 70). For instance, Montesquieu believed that too much wealth or too unequally distributed wealth in a society would make democracy impossible—unless it is a democracy that is based on commerce (*ibid*, 71). Montesquieu argues that wealth only becomes a problem when it hinders the spirit of commerce (Montesquieu 2002, 46). He describes strict laws in Athens and Rome around property and inheritance which prevented concentrations of wealth and any inequality too vast, specifically declaring not only ought the division of land in a democracy be equal, but each portion of land be small, just sufficient for the maintenance of that citizen’s life (*ibid*, 43, 45). However, these worries over inequality of land are contrasted with inequalities that come about through commerce—these do not worry Montesquieu. He writes: “True is it that when a democracy is founded on commerce, private people may acquire vast riches without a corruption of morals. This is because the spirit of commerce is naturally attended with that of frugality, economy, moderation, labor, prudence, tranquility, order, and rule. So long as this spirit subsists, the riches it produces have no bad effect" (*ibid*, 46). Commerce for Montesquieu "is a profession of people who are upon an equality," and thus not only poses no harm to democracy, but cannot be properly carried out in despotic societies and thus he prescribes that nobles must be forbidden from commercial activity, preventing monopolisation and immense inequality, and preserving that "spirit of commerce" (*ibid*, 51, 327). Self-proclaimed admirer and follow of Montesquieu, Joseph Barnave proclaimed that "commerce gives rise to a large class, disposed to external peace, internal tranquility, and attached to the established government" (Hirschman 1997, 118). Commerce is a bringer of virtues and benefits, and these thinkers not only frame it now as not merely a less-harmful counter, but as a rational and beneficial activity. It is not like the evil and hoarding accumulative tendency of real avarice, the passion; it is a noble, helpful, calculated, and righteous exercise of self-interest that ultimately enriches all (rather than only blocking greater harm to all).

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there was increasing concern regarding international relations, given the seemingly permanent state of war amongst the European powers (Hirschman 1997, 79). War was believed to be caused by "the passionate and willful excesses of the rulers," and so any political or economic means of curbing these dangerous passions would lead to a more harmonious state of international affairs, and even bring about peace (*ibid*). The interests, specifically realised through commerce, can tame and overcome the passion for conquest (*ibid*). This view of commerce as a peacemaker is increasingly predominant in the seventeenth century, but it had to be developed and took time to claim this status. Montesquieu's friend Jean-François Melon wrote in 1734 that "The spirit of conquest and the spirit of commerce are mutually exclusive in a nation" (*ibid*, 80). This eighteenth century view directly opposed the dominant view of the seventeenth century, in which Jean-Baptiste Colbert characterised commerce as "perpetual combat" and Sir Josiah Child considered it "a kind of warfare" (*ibid*, 79).[46] According to Montesquieu, "peace is the natural effect of trade. Two nations who traffic with each other become reciprocally dependent; for if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling; and thus their union is founded on their mutual necessities" (Montesquieu 2002, 316). Later, liberal philosopher T.H. Green argued that increased international trade would strengthen "the sense of common interests" between the citizenry of different nation-states, thus reducing the likelihood of war by its imperilment of these shared economic interests (Bell 2016, 247).

The interests are held up as truly beneficial socially and politically, with commerce improving the lives of individuals and their moral conditions, but also acting as a force for peace and stability in the world and society at large. So while the state was held to be necessary in the mercantilist system of these early commercial societies, and in the emerging capitalist systems, the notion remained that the rulers, the state, and the political was rife with unstable, unpredictable, and perilous passions. The treachery of the arbitrary political realm would have to be countered with the rational, predictable, stable interests of the private realm, specifically, with commercial society and its private participants.

The Rationality of the Market, and Market Rationality

Market mechanisms being elevated into moral imperatives was a hugely significant development in western social thought (Wood 2012, 312), emerging particularly from the moral philosophes of Scotland. The Scottish Enlightenment, the period after the Jacobite rebellion of 1745, was a watershed for moral, social, and political thought, particularly when it comes to the

[46] An interesting view to consider given the popularity of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* in business and economics education and literature.

passions (emotions) and commerce. The big question of the Scottish Enlightenment, prompted by worries of addressing and countering Scottish "backwardness," was "how was ethical life to be preserved in the age of industry and refinement" (McNally 1988, 163)? The Scottish social philosophers were very concerned with the dangers they saw accompanying commercial activity, and as such their main goal was to address the problem of a preservation of moral behaviour in the midst of this new economics (*ibid*, 158). Scottish Enlightenment figures such as Adam Smith, Adhamh MacFhearghais/Adam Ferguson,[47] John Millar, and others held that "economic changes are the basic determinants of social and political transformation" (Hirschman 1997, 81). McNally argues that "for Scottish landowners, raising the productivity of their estates was especially critical to participation in political life in London" (McNally 1988, 155-156). For Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and David Hume, it was "commercial mechanisms and the enhancement of productivity for profit that set in motion progress as a self-sustaining process" (Wood 2012, 310). Note however, that Ferguson was more sceptical of the "progress" of commercial society, in contrast with his contemporaries. Ferguson conceded that "private interest is a better patron of commerce and plenty, than the refinements of the state," but there were distinct adverse social effects, namely for society's moral make-up (McNally 1988, 171). Commercial society had transformed social relations such that economic competition and profit-seeking, entailing the treatment of others as economic means, "became the model for all human intercourse," and against such corrupting tendencies Ferguson argued there must be safeguards (*ibid*, 172). And he lamented that "in too many nations of Europe, the individual us everything, and the public is nothing" (*ibid*, 173). He saw the characteristics of commercial society to be perilous to civic virtue, but ultimately agreed it was still market competition that would drive

[47] Adhamh MacFhearghais, Scottish Gaelic version of Adam Ferguson. Is fheàrr Gàidhlig bhriste na Gàidhlig sa chiste/better to have broken Gaelic than Gaelic "in the chest"/dead Gaelic.

self-sustaining progress, and it was private property which constituted the distinction between the civilised and the barbaric nations (Wood 2012, 310).

Since the end of the Middle Ages, in a period of ever increasing war (the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), "the search was on for a behavioral equivalent for religious precept, for new rules of conduct and devices that would impose much needed discipline and constraints on both rulers and ruled, and the expansion of commerce and industry was thought to hold much promise in this regard" (Hirschman 1997, 129). This was solved in the discovery and the elevation of the interests, which allowed for self-interest to become as good as a moral imperative. Moreover, self-interest was also rational, and this would consequentially elevate the domain of self-interest as moral and rational territory. As Bruce B. Suttle writes, "The rational, self-interested individual had emerged as Economic Man and, as such, was conceived as living most naturally in the conditions of a competitive market in which trade and exchange would replace traditional ranks and loyalties as the coordinating mechanism of social life" (Suttle 1987, 464). The market mechanisms, determined as they are by the amalgamation of actions carried out by individuals following their interests, were thus rational and reliable.

Classical economics conceives of a system in which there are laws which provide an individual with a certain means for rationally calculating economic activity, according to the standard principle of profit maximisation (Habermas 1989, 86). There are two key presuppositions in classical economics: first, a guarantee of free competition, and second, that all commodities will be exchanged according to their value (which was to be determined according to the quantity of labour required in its production) (*ibid*). These dynamics encapsulate the social model of petty commodity producers, or at least the desired social model (*ibid*). The market flawlessly operating along these lines, through the self-interested actions of the *citoyen homme*, the commodity-producer citizen, and the public private distinction that would arise with these conditions, was to be the base of liberal bourgeois constitutional society, a rational and non-arbitrary system in which domination exists only rationally so as to not even be real domination at all. These conditions were not at all fulfilled, however, until at least half-way through the nineteenth century (*ibid*, 87). But Habermas writes:

> Nevertheless, the liberal model sufficiently approximated reality so that the interest of the bourgeois class could be identified with the general interest and the third estate could be set up as the nation—during that phase of capitalism, the public sphere as the organizational principle of the bourgeois constitutional state had credibility. If everyone, as it might appear, had the chance to become a "citizen," then only citizens should be allowed into the political public sphere, without this restriction amounting to an abandonment of the principle of publicity. On the contrary, only property owners were in a position to form a public that could legislatively protect the foundations of the existing property order; only they had private interests—each his own—which automatically converged into the common interest in the preservation of a civil society as a private sphere. (Habermas 1989, 87).

Free market society, or a society which believes itself to be "solely governed by the laws of the free market", presents itself as a society free from domination, and even a society free from any and all coercion (*ibid*, 79). It runs by the reasonable self-interest of its impersonal bourgeois participants, not through the arbitrary and whimsical degrees of a passionate and personal sovereign. Steuart's "modern oeconomy" operates akin to the "delicacy of a watch", and John Millar saw the mercantile participants of the economy (and their allies) as operating "with the uniformity of a machine" (Hirschman 1997, 93). These mechanical market mechanisms would ensure the passions of rulers would be kept in check against the public interest and the needs of the ever-expanding commercial economies (*ibid*). Money-making activities, and societies increasingly oriented around these activities, would restrain princely caprice, arbitrary governments, and risky foreign policies (*ibid*, 130). This bourgeois vision of a society posited being only subordinate to the non-violent decisions and mechanics of the market, as they would be the supposedly anonymous and autonomous outcomes of market exchange (Habermas 1989, 79).

As indicated in the arguments of the early modern thinkers of politics and economics, rulers and state interventions came to be increasingly seen as unpredictable, and "thus would preclude exactly the kind and measure of rationality that was in the interests of private persons functioning in a capitalist fashion" (Habermas 1989, 80). Such unpredictable interventions opposed the calculability and rational nature that the market (and capitalism specifically as it developed) was believed to have—the calculation of profit depended upon a system in which exchange and transaction proceeded according to calculable expectations (*ibid*). For this reason, Steuart proclaimed that "A modern economy, therefore, is the most effectual bridle ever was invented against the folly of despotism…", a new formulation of Montesquieu's notion "that owing to the "complicated system of modern economy" the interests would win out over arbitrary government, over the "folly of despotism," and in short, over the passions of the rulers" (Hirschman 1997, 85). Such an understanding is based on the implicit distinction in Steuart which differentiates "arbitrary" abuses of power—which originate in the ruler's vices and passions (akin to Montesquieu's *grand coups d'autorité*)—and the "fine-tuning" of the common-good motivated (and thus self-interests minded) statesman (*ibid*, 86). Montesquieu sought to design a political and economic system of institutions that would be able to "effectively restrain the passionate excesses of the sovereign"; the Physiocrats desired a system that would compel the ruler to act "correctly" (as in, according to the doctrine of the Physiocrats) of their own volition—"they were looking for a political order in which the power holders are impelled, *for reasons of self-interest*, to promote the general interest" (*ibid*, 97). While this is a significant difference in interpreting how to deal with the perils of the passionate ruler, both interpretations rely upon self-interests to benefit society.

If individuals within a market are following their self-interests, they are acting and calculating their behaviours to maximise profit. However, the advocates of the interests tend to speak in terms of common-good, progress, productivity, and especially improvement, when they describe the pursuit of self-interests and its consequences. Gunn writes that “he who improved his land might very well portray himself as enriching the nation though his enterprise” (Gunn 1969, 218). This notion was certainly a strong presence in the memorandum of 1607 that said in land enclosures “the good individual is the good general”, and any discussion of enclosure was imperceptible and inevitably fused with the recommendations and arguments for land improvement (*ibid*, 218, 222). Yet explicitly John Locke’s understanding of ‘improvement’ or ‘productivity’ *is* profit, as in commercial gain or exchange value (rather than the older meaning of advantage) (Wood 2012, 308). And for Locke, as well as the fellows of his class, “‘Improvement’, in the sense of productivity for profit, trumped all other goods. It would increasingly be cited in favour of exclusive private property: that is, property that excluded not only other individuals’ rights to use it, but also communal regulation of production of a kind that would prevail for much longer in France” (*ibid*, 307). Early capitalist landlords “had to establish a certain kind of right to property, a historically unprecedented kind of right, which excluded and extinguished all other use rights, customary and common. They had to establish the primacy of profit and the market over rights of subsistence” (*ibid*).

Locke argued that the earth is here to be made more productive, meaning turning land into private property, and this more productive private property therefore should overtake common possession (Wood and Wood 1997, 131). “Unimproved land is *waste*, so that a man who takes it out of common ownership and appropriates it to himself—he who removes land from the common and encloses it—in order to improve it has *given* something to humanity, not taken it away" (*ibid*). Labour is what improves land and creates productivity, but for Locke, it is not the activity of labour itself, but the potential for profitable use that makes the difference (*ibid*). Labour, for Locke, may be the creator of value, but it only matters inasmuch as it is profitable. Improvement is increased profit.

Locke's conception of property is not just a novel conception of property in western political thought—it also contributes to a redefinition of the political sphere (Wood 2012, 315). Locke argues that God gave the earth to men to use, not to waste, thus it was given for the "industrious and rational" to use for the sake of improvement (Locke 1980, 21). The earth must have its value added to, improving its usefulness and productivity by means of labour (Wood and Wood 1997, 124), a notion that allows Locke to promote colonial land theft. Locke, following such a depiction of property and improvement, decides that an accumulator of large amounts of land, if this land is "improved", enhances the well-being of all, rather than violating the rights of others (others who would be losing access to the commons) (*ibid*, 125). Here is that common-good of self-interest. Locke further argues that people, through exchanging labour for wages, can live without property, which means that "the labour which gives a man a right to property may be someone else's labour" (*ibid*). This should not be surprising, since Locke's own state of nature includes (and hence, naturalises) servitude, which as stated before has unclear origins. Locke equates "the turfs my servant has cut" with "the ore I have digged in any place", meaning that not only has the labour of the servant been appropriated, "but that this appropriation is in principle no different from the servant's labouring activity itself" (Locke 1980, 19-20; Wood and Wood 1997, 131-132). This appropriation is not passive, either—"The point is rather that the landlord who puts his land to productive use, who improves it, even if it is by means of someone else's labour, is being *industrious*, no less—perhaps more than the labouring servant" (Wood and Wood 1997, 132). And this returns us to the propertied and educated bourgeois individual as the rational participant of the public sphere. For Locke, "the chief end of civil society 'is the preservation of Property'"—Life, Liberty, and Estates, each of equal importance (*ibid*, 126). Locke writes, "here-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one society, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a *political*, or *civil society*" (Locke 1980, 47). Man willingly exits the state of nature because, "however free, it is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual *preservation* of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, *property*" (*ibid*, 66). Thus, "the great and *chief end*, therefore, of men's uniting into common-wealths, and putting themselves under a government, *is the preservation of their property*" (*ibid*). The aims of the bourgeois public sphere are the protection of propertied interests.

The 1830s featured the emancipation of commodity exchange and social labour from governmental directives in England (Habermas 1989, 74). With the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, this period of *laissez-faire* was the only time that "civil society as the private sphere emancipated from the directives of public authority to such an extent that at that time the political public sphere could attain its full development in the bourgeois constitutional state" (*ibid*, 78, 79). A new idea took hold—that of full market self-regulation. The new vision of civil society, its idea of itself, held that free competition was a rational self-regulating system, and civil society and the market now apparently could not function with any extra-economic agency (*ibid*, 79). Habermas observed: "With the expansion and liberation of this sphere of the market, commodity owners gained private autonomy; the positive meaning of "private" emerged precisely in reference to the concept of free power of control over property that functioned in capitalist fashion" (*ibid*, 74). The law, too, took the form of commodity exchange, with the development of private law (*ibid*, 75).[48]

Wendy Brown writes: "neoliberal rationality disseminates the *model of the market* to all domains and activities—even where money is not at issue—and configures human beings exclusively as market actors, always, only, and everywhere as *homo oeconomicus*" (Asen 2017, 330). Robin May Schott articulates this market model as applied to human subjective experience, writing "instead of seeing their own activity and their relation with other individuals as primary and the products of human labour as secondary, mediating agents, the primary relation appears to be this exchange of products" (Schott 1988, 117). Significantly, as Habermas notes, it was already in the early nineteenth century that the relationships of private people were given an exchange relationship (Habermas 1989, 75). And it was even earlier that reason, rationality, was embodied in market exchange. Ellen Meiksins Wood observes that "The advance of scientific knowledge as the engine of progress seems, then, to be displaced by a different kind of historical mechanism, a self-sustaining economic growth that, in historical reality, existed at that time only in England" (Wood 2012, 311). The rationality of the early public spheres of science and religion were linked to and taken over by the rationality of the market and its self-interests, and this market rationality is the one that rules the bourgeois public sphere.

The Rise of the Reason-Passion Dichotomy and the Bourgeois Constitutional State

[48] This transformation of the law, it must be remembered, was hardly a natural process and instead was deliberate and planned, as Polanyi argues in *The Great Transformation*.

The public sphere, again, is a mediating sphere in between the public and the private, state and society (Habermas 1989 A, 231). It represents a publicness that challenges the secret politics of the monarchs, opening the potential for democratic influence on the state (*ibid*). In the contemporary mind (and much scholarship) the public sphere constitutes "a contestable communicative space, with the widest possible social coverage, articulated around fluid yet situated networks of discursive practices, in which different communication styles compete and are used to influence perceptions so as to contribute to the resolution of political conflicts of interest" (Verhoest 2019, 59). But for Habermas, the public sphere (which has a particularly bourgeois character) is a particular historical formation, one that is directly tied to the self-consciousness of the bourgeoisie and the liberal political philosophy it spawns, as well as the early commercial market.[49] Habermas writes:

> The public sphere as a functional element in the political realm was given the normative status of an organ for the self-articulation of civil society with a state authority corresponding to its needs. The social precondition for this "developed" bourgeois public sphere was a market that, tending to be liberalized, made affairs in the sphere of social reproduction as much as possible a matter of private people left to themselves and so finally completed the privatization of civil society. (Habermas 1989, 74).

According to the liberal view of the public sphere, society is guaranteed to be a sphere of private autonomy opposed to a limited public power (the state), and in-between is the domain of the private persons who have come to form the public sphere in which they mediate the needs of bourgeois society with the state, thus converting political authority and domination into "rational" authority (Habermas 1989 A, 234).

[49] In Chapter 3, other views of the public sphere will be explored, along with Habermas's view that the public sphere declined and disappeared.

Reason is the common ground for opposing parties, or opposing interests, in the public sphere (Verhoest 2019, 60). As Pascal Verhoest argues, the public sphere grew historically “as a communicative space for non-violent conflict resolution, in an environment that was characterized by sharp religious and political divisions,” in which the conquering word wins over the conquering sword (*ibid*). Verhoest opposes reason to violence, the pen to the sword, but as has been demonstrated, reason is opposed to the passions through the interests. Violence is arbitrary, inconstant, and arises from the passions; reason is constant, calculating, and can by sought in the interests. Mary Wollstonecraft declared that reason is the “simple power of improvement…More or less may be conspicuous in one being or another” (Baker 1997, 206). Locke believed that ordinary, *literate,* people could become industrious and rational, becoming in his ideal autonomous, self-directed individuals (Wood and Wood 1997, 114). Yet for both thinkers, while all humans might be reasonable, reason is something that might be developed in a person, might be cultivated, but ultimately and practically some people are more rational. Princes are the heroes and victims of passions, and the unpropertied and uneducated poor are too constrained by their immediate bodily needs. But due to their particular conditions of property and education, it is the bourgeois citizen that is the bearer of economic, political, and cultural rationalisation (Wood 2012, 293). The bourgeoisie are driven by rational interests.

The bourgeoisie believed they were fit to take on the universal vantage point of humanity because of their perceived autonomy given to them by their wealth (Asen 2017, 336). Unlike a capricious prince bound by honour, glory, and privilege, and unlike a peasant or industrial worker bound by their poverty, a bourgeois citizen had the means—material and educational—to engage in that self-interested rationality. Together, these self-interested individuals come to create a bourgeois public sphere and a bourgeois constitutional state that is defined by its bourgeois rationality. The individual interests of each citizen, taken together in this public sphere, reveal themselves to be the class interests of the bourgeoisie. Rational political discourse in the public sphere does not only refer to quality of intellect in the discussion. It additionally implies “the conditions of a situation in which the outcome of political debate is not structurally predetermined, for example by unequal relations of power. It points to the necessity of elucidating those conditions and, as such, has a structural moment whatever its problematic aspects, such a conception of rational politics does not refer to learned discourse” (Postone 1997, 167). In principle, public opinion was opposed to arbitrariness, and was “subject to the laws immanent in a public composed of critically debating private persons in such a way that the property of being the supreme will, superior to all laws, which is to say sovereignty, could strictly speaking not be attributed to it at all” (Habermas 1989, 82).

The purpose of the state, according to Smith, is the “common profit” of this multitude, in contrast to the “private profit” of the ruler—and notably Smith sometimes replaces “common wealth” with “civill societie” (*societie civill*), the Latin translation of a Greek phrase meaning “political community” (Wood and Wood 1997, 48, 49). Civil society, of course, would become the term for the domain of the private bourgeois individuals, though Smith may have been the first to introduce the term into English political thought (*ibid*, 49). But Smith entirely takes for granted a *restricted* parliamentary franchise, in which the propertied classes represent the entire population (*ibid*). Wood and Wood write:

> In the English context, and in the specific context of Smith’s political theory, the citizen-body is a collection of self-interested individuals whose unity is not just politically but economically constituted, bound together both by the sovereign coercive power of the state and by the interdependence deriving from the production and exchange of an ever-increasing number and range of goods and services. (Wood and Wood 1997, 49).

Prior to Smith, Locke also never intended for anyone but the propertied to be full members of society with suffrage, as evidenced by his social contract, and further believed that representatives ought to be allocated to counties and cities by tax contribution and therefore, more representation for those with estates (Macpherson 1980, xix). Locke's *Second Treatise* is essentially an expression of the alliance between Whig aristocracy and London radicals, "a mobilization of radical ideas in order to advance the interests of the propertied classes" (Wood and Wood 1997, 119). Ellen Meiksins Wood and Neal Wood argue that Locke "is indeed a theorist of a 'rising' capitalism and that the argument of the *Two Treatises* was ideally suited to the class interests of a 'progressive' landed aristocracy engaged in a capitalist agriculture and colonial trade: in short, to the interests of men like Shaftesbury", in whose political activities Locke was heavily involved (*ibid*, 116). And it was the landed aristocracy and propertied bourgeoisie who were the rational and educated participants of the bourgeois public sphere, who used their influence to craft their bourgeois constitutional societies. As seen very clearly with John Locke, "Privileged access to the political domain gave propertied classes in England huge advantages in shaping the law to their requirements" (Wood 2012, 315). The property-basis of participation in the bourgeois public sphere becomes absolutely concrete in the English constitutional state, as it was asserted that "Only those who have a 'fixed' and 'permanent interest' in society, in the form of landed property or the so-called 'freedom' of a corporation, an officially licensed right to conduct trade—only men such as these have a real stake in the state; and so the fate of the community should be in their hands" (Wood and Wood 1997, 86-87). Even those focused more on the curtailing of superstition, on the "'steps taken by the human mind' in the progress 'from barbarism to refinement,' from ignorance to knowledge, from superstition to reason and enlightenment" such as the Physiocrat Turgot, reduced the proper members of this rational sphere to the educated and therefore propertied: for these thinkers, "The principal agents of history are learned men and scholars, even academicians, the kind of people who constitute the Republic of Letters" (Wood 2012, 310).

Habermas noted that in the bourgeois public sphere, "Although the truth was discovered in public discussion among critical minds, the realm of reason nevertheless remained an inward one, opposed to the public one of the state" (Habermas 1989, 92). Habermas writes that the public sphere is where "civil society reflected on and expounded its interests" (*ibid*, 69). According to Habermas:

> With the great codifications of civil law a system of norms was developed securing a private sphere in the strict sense, a sphere in which private people pursued their affairs with one another free from impositions by estate and state, at least in tendency. These codifications guaranteed the institution of private property and, in connection with it, the basic freedoms of contract, of trade, and of inheritance. (Habermas 1989, 75).

The basic rights enshrined in the bourgeois constitutions were meant to protect citizens, citizens in what was supposed to be a "society of small commodity traders." The institutionalisation of bourgeois rights were intended to protect the private sphere, and its participants who followed the rules of the legal system, from state interference (*ibid*, 223). Additionally for the constitutional framers, these rights were not only for preventing state encroachment on the private sphere, but were also intended to act as "guarantees of equal opportunity participation in the process of generating both societal wealth and public opinion" (*ibid*). The first modern constitutions, which established these basic rights, in addition to providing the first formal model of the public sphere "guaranteed society as a sphere of private autonomy" (*ibid*, 222). As Habermas describes, confronting this private sphere "stood a public authority limited to a few factions, and between the two, as it were, was the realm of private people assembled into a public who, as the citizenry, linked up the state with the needs of civil society according to the idea that in the medium of this public sphere political authority would be transformed into rational authority" (*ibid*). The public sphere of private and propertied citizens, citizens who pursue their interests and by and large live by the constant mechanisms of the market, make public authority, political domination, into *rational* authority.

Ellen Meiksins Wood notes that prior to the ancient Greek civic sphere and the new citizenship identity, "it had always been clear that the state represented domination, even, or especially, where men were assumed to be naturally equal" (Wood 2012, 312-313). But the bourgeois in their public sphere worked to create a state in which "the state itself—in fact, the state above all—represented equality. Equality, in other words, was not a simple fact of nature that had no bearing on the right to rule. Equality resided in the political sphere itself, expressed in the political identity of citizenship" (*ibid*, 313). In the framework of a philosophy of history, the consciousness of the eighteenth-century bourgeoisie conceived of the idea of making political domination rational (Habermas 1989, 130). Hegel defines the function of the public sphere, in accordance with the eighteenth-century model, as the "subjection of domination to reason" (Habermas 1989, 117). Carl Schmitt's definition of law illuminates this endeavour and principle: "Law is not the will of one or of many people, but something rational-universal, not *voluntas*, but *ratio*" (*ibid*, 81). Habermas elaborates:

> The model of a public sphere in the political realm that claimed the convergence of public opinion with reason supposed it to be objectively possible (through reliance on an order of nature or, what amounted to the same, an organization of society strictly oriented to the general interest) to keep conflicts of interest and bureaucratic decisions to a minimum and in so far as these could not be completely avoided, to subject them to reliable criteria of public evaluation. (Habermas 1989, 130-131).

In the bourgeois public sphere "Public debate was supposed to transform *voluntas* into a *ratio* that in the public competition of private arguments came into being as the consensus about what was practically necessary in the interest of all" (*ibid*, 83). This was possible "Since the critical public debate of private people convincingly claimed to be in the nature of a non-coercive inquiry into what was at the same time correct and right, a legislation that had recourse to public opinion thus could not be explicitly considered as domination" (*ibid*, 82). Obviously, though, it would have coercive power, and that was recognised (*ibid*). Locke referred to this power as "legislative power", Montesquieu called it "*pouvoir*", though for both thinkers it was only the administration of justice that was without power as it merely "applied" laws (*ibid*). Again, legislation is not supposed to come from a political will, but instead come out of a rational agreement (*ibid*).

The rational, law-based state, to the bourgeois citizen, particularly "the binding of all state activity to a system of norms legitimated by public opinion," would abolish the state as an instrument of domination (Habermas 1989, 82). The aim of the rule of law was to completely eradicate domination, "a typically bourgeois idea insofar as not even the political safeguarding of the private sphere emancipating itself from political domination was to assume the form of domination" (*ibid*, 81). Law was supposed to be equally binding, with none of the privileges as there had been in the feudal system, for a "rational" administration and an "independent" judiciary would make the laws of state operate like those of the market (*ibid*, 80). Neither the market nor the law were to "allow exceptions for citizens and private persons; both were objective, which is to say, not manipulable by the individual;" just as "the individual owner of goods had no influence on the market price, and they were not directed at individuals (the free market prohibited collusion)" (*ibid*). The laws of the market appeared intrinsic, an *ordre naturel*; whereas the laws of a state must be "explicitly enacted" (*ibid*).

According to the Physiocrats, "The function of the monarch was to watch over the *ordre naturel*; he received his insight into the laws of the natural order through the *public éclairé*" (Habermas 1989, 95). Public opinion, which was again "the enlightened outcome of common and public reflection on the foundations of social order", was believed to encapsulate the natural laws of the social order, meaning that though it did not rule, an enlightened ruler would have to follow the insights it offered—it was natural and rational, after all (*ibid*, 96). This French interpretation kept the critical function of *opinion publique* separated from legislative function, and thus was a rationalisation of sovereignty (*ibid*). From 1820 on, François Guizot held lectures on the history and origins of the constitutional state, which he saw as the "rule of public opinion," in which reason, justice, and truth regulate the actual power of the state (*ibid*, 101). The representative system would do this through: discussion, "which compels existing powers to seek after truth in common"; publicity, "which places these powers when occupied in this search under the eyes of the citizens"; and liberty of the press, "which stimulates the citizens themselves to seek after truth, and to tell it to power" (*ibid*). The bourgeois view that political domination could be rationalised meant that "even the social preconditions of a public sphere as an element in the political realm could be viewed as a kind of "natural order," for there was to be a natural basis for the public sphere that would in principle guarantee an autonomous and basically harmonious course of social reproduction" (*ibid*, 130). And so in order to rationalise authority, arbitrary state and law must come to work like the apparently natural forces of the market.

John Locke's opposition to the Licensing Act reveals the extent to which economic interests were prioritised and rationalised by influential persons of this epoch. Certainly Locke did care about freedom of expression, but his arguments against the censorship of the Act did not centre as much on free speech and freedom of the press, but rather on market advantage and property rights (and these are representative of the issues focused upon by those in Parliament as well) (Astbury 1978, 315). Locke wrote to his Whig friend Edward Clarke in an appeal to influence the Commons towards reforming the Act in 1693, complaining as a buyer of books, a consumer in the market, rather than on the grounds of censorship (*ibid*, 304). The commercial impacts of the Licensing Act were more important, or deemed to be a more pressing and convincing route of argument, for Locke than were the ideals of liberty of speech and the press (*ibid*, 307). While "concern for the intellectual, economic, and social freedoms of the individual" are present in Locke's criticisms of the Act—he did argue the language of the act was too broad, causing books to be approved arbitrarily and by whim—his two bigger complaints were: first, that the English Stationers' Company produced poor quality, expensive, and inaccurate books, while the Dutch free market competition system created higher quality products and even brought about an increase of national wealth through book exports; and second, houses that do not trade in books were supposed to be exempt from search warrants for illegal presses and publications, and peers of the realm were specifically supposed to be exempt, but Locke argued that this still happened (and was outraged that aristocrats and gentry would subject themselves to this—a "mark of slavery" he decried, ironically as he invested in the transatlantic slave trade) (*ibid*, 296-297, 308-309; Losurdo 2011, 4, 15).

Connecting the rationality of the bourgeois constitutional state directly to the countering and opposing of emotions, the theory of the countervailing passion (a staple in England and France) would come to be a significant force in shaping the constitution of the United States (Hirschman 1997, 28). From Alexander Hamilton drawing from the pitting of avarice against avarice in the principle of re-election of the president, to the division of powers amongst the different branches of government—with the ambition of each branch counteracting the ambition of the others—these constitutional features were persuasive "by being presented as an application of the widely accepted and thoroughly familiar principle of countervailing passion" (*ibid*, 29, 30). James Madison wrote:

> Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government….In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. (Suttle 1987, 465-466).

Hirschman argues that "It looks therefore as though by writing the lapidary sentence "ambition must be made to counteract ambition" its author persuaded himself that the principle of countervailing passion, rather than that of checks and balances, was the foundation of the new state" (Hirschman 1997, 30). The constitutional states that emerged from the sphere of private bourgeois citizens, such as those of France, the United States, Great Britain, and the vast numbers of others whose systems are designed in replication of these ones, are founded with the dichotomy of reason and passions at their core.

Conclusion

Robert Asen attests that both the bourgeois public sphere and neoliberalism assert singularity—the bourgeois public sphere through its insistence that the bourgeois individual is uniquely (and thus contradictingly) the universal representative of humanity in pursuing the common good, and neoliberalism in its rejection of the common, its disaggregation of the common into atomist individuals who pursue their universal-market common goods (Asen 2017, 331). However, it is incorrect to assume that the way in which, for Asen, neoliberalism's singularity is novel or not to be found in the form of the bourgeois public sphere's insistence on the bourgeois individual. As demonstrated in this chapter, the bourgeois public sphere and its participants are also completely founded on the notion of the pursuit of market interests deemed rational.

The creation of the bourgeois public sphere revived the lost distinction between the public and private in western European society, which would then spread through colonialism, imperialism, and liberal hegemony. But a new dichotomy was overlaid on the restored divide of the public and private: the interest-passion dichotomy, which became, as the rationalised pursuit of self-interests became increasingly synonymous with reason itself, the reason-emotion or reason-passion dichotomy. Rulers, the nobility, and the political in general, were seen as dangerous for its inconstancy and arbitrariness, swayed as its actors were by the passions. After much debate in moral philosophy, the interest arose to counteract the passions—the interests being constant and predictable, and therefore rational. Reason, as demonstrated through the Enlightenment emphasis on the scientific examination of the "natural", and emphasis on studying everything according to this method, was that which was constant, predictable, and calculable. For the thinkers of early modern and increasingly commercial society, what could be more rational then, than pursuit of interests in commerce? The private and economic sphere was thus imbued with rationality.

While the public spheres of religion and science certainly made enormous contribution to the formation of a political sphere quite early, and linked reason to public opinion, it was through the private and economic sphere of bourgeois civil society that the public sphere that confronts the political realm would come to exist. And with that, the rationality that would dominate a sphere based on the bourgeois citizen would be linked to the rationality of the “natural” market. So reason via the interests would be rationality that would confront the state, and eventually reform the state along the lines of bourgeois interests as rational. The reason of the bourgeois citizens, contained in their private property and pursuit of economic gain, was established politically to counter the arbitrariness and the instability that was birthed from the passions of a non-bourgeois regime. The bourgeois private sphere, the state and society that emerged from this, and the new divide of the public and private, are all predicated upon a dichotomy of reason and emotions.

Chapter 3: The Liberal Sphere Model: A Unity of Two Dichotomies

"Only the neutral is free. The characteristic is never free, it is stamped, determined, bound." – *Doktor Faustus*, Thomas Mann

The historical bourgeois public sphere that Habermas attempts to locate, in addition to the contemporary, more abstract concept of the public sphere, is based upon a fractured model of society—the sphere model—which is predicated upon a dichotomy between the public and the private, a dichotomy that has been manifest in different ways. The bourgeois public sphere (and its successor, the abstract contemporary public sphere) is based on rational discourse, and this reason is predicated on an Enlightenment-developed dichotomy of the passions and interests (and later rationality itself). The public sphere is the space of publicity within privacy, the space in which citizens confront the state on their own terms (McKeon 2004, 274). As discussed in Chapter 1, the exact time and place at which the public sphere can be said to have come into existence is contested—did it actually first emerge with the circulation of pamphlets during the Reformation and English Civil War, and not in Habermas's Republic of Letters (Zaret 1997; Verhoest 2019)? There are disputes over the conflation of England, France, and Germany as Habermas has done in *The Structural Transformation*, and the significance of the public sphere and publicity in those countries (Bell 1992). But after the task of establishing the existence of the historical public sphere, it must be determined whether or not a public sphere still exists, bourgeois or otherwise. Contemporary democratic theory, and theories of the public, must take into account the historical changes that allegedly undermined the liberal public sphere (Postone 1997, 166). Whether it does exist in some form in actuality, or only exists in its significant role in political thought, it is imperative to recognise how regardless of the efforts to expand or make more inclusive the public sphere, it remains embedded in the dichotomy that spawned it.

Habermas's Decline of the Public Sphere

It is commonly argued that Habermas's public sphere[50] is an essential condition for democracy in industrial capitalist societies (Postone 1997, 164). Such a public sphere exists at the intersection of political and social life as a place where citizens engage in public debates outside of the state apparatus, and not identical with civil society (*ibid*). Crucially, such a sphere is founded upon a division of the public and the private, contained in the opposition of the privacy of civil society and state publicity (McKeon 2004, 274). The concept of the public sphere is very much taken for granted in democratic, and particularly liberal, theory, abstracted from the more or less historical bourgeois public sphere outlined in Habermas's *Structural Transformation*. However, within that very work, Habermas has further argued that industrial capitalism has *refeudalised* society and all but dissolved the public sphere.

The bourgeois public sphere emerged in the space between state and society, resting upon the separation of the realm of social production and the realm of political power (Habermas 1989, 141). But as the market economy grew, and industrialisation expanded, so did the sphere of the "social," breaking the domination of the landed estates and necessitating new administrative bodies invested with state authority (*ibid*). As Habermas remarks:

> This private sphere evolved into a sphere of private autonomy only to the degree to which it became emancipated from mercantilist regulation. For this reason even the reversal of this tendency, that is, the increasing state intervention very noticeable from the last quarter of the nineteenth century onward, did not per se lead to an interlocking of the public sphere with the public realm. (Habermas 1989, 141-142).

[50] Hohendahl argues that Habermas's *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* can be situated in the *Sonderwegdebatte* (Hohendahl 1995, 32), or the debates attempting to clarify Germany's place in modernity and its particular development. Habermas, according to Hohendahl, required a normative concept of the public sphere not only for democratic theory, but to challenge the particular social and political structure of West Germany (*ibid*, 35). See Robbie Schilliam's *German Thought and International Relations: The Rise and Fall of a Liberal Project* for an interesting examination of this longstanding Germany question.

It was only when society assumed the functions of public authority that it was questioned as a wholly private sphere (*ibid*, 142). But as the state and industry became more firmly interlocked, new forms of interaction markedly altered the ability of private individuals, come together in the public sphere, to influence public authority.

Social organisations are now the actors which act in relation to the state, according to Habermas, in the political public sphere, either acting with the mediation of political parties or directly with public administration (Habermas 1989A, 235). Private persons no longer enter into discourse as private persons, instead they must join or form groups which argue for particular interests. The participation of private persons in the political realm is reduced to a few formal acts as administrative and representative organisations (*Berufsverbände*) become the primary actors in the legislative process (Hohendahl 1995, 33). Apart from such group formations, Habermas argues most of the influencing of public authority is now carried out by experts—there no longer exists the public use of reason by an educated stratum of private people, rather "the public is split apart into minorities of specialists who put their reason to use non-publicly and the great mass of consumers whose receptiveness is public but uncritical. Consequently, it completely lacks the form of communication specific to a public" (Habermas 1989, 175).

A paradox of modern capitalist development has been that the "increased formal political inclusion of previously excluded segments of the population has not necessarily led to greater democracy" (Postone 1997, 165). The lack of participation by citizens, by private individuals, has reduced the democracy of the public sphere to mere procedures (Hohendahl 1995, 33), and diminished meaningful political participation immensely. In light of such arguments, Habermas is very frequently accused of lamenting the loss of the bourgeois character of the public sphere and for advocating for a universally accessible-only-by-name, exclusionary public sphere. He does argue that the inclusion of segments outside of the original *bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*/bourgeois society has not in fact expanded the public sphere, but instead the conditions by which the inclusion has been brought about have all but disintegrated the sphere of critical reason. And such a criticism of Habermas is immediately difficult to deny, as Habermas writes “with the spread of the press and propaganda, the public expanded beyond the confines of the bourgeoisie. Along with its social exclusivity the public lost the cohesion given it by institutes of convivial social intercourse and by a relatively high standard of education” (Habermas 1989A, 235). However, it is important to acknowledge that Habermas is not necessarily lamenting the loss of the bourgeois character—rather that the bourgeois character, and the development of capitalism which bourgeois interests spurred on, disintegrated the qualities that allowed for the public sphere to exist in the first place.

Elaborating, Habermas describes how the mechanisms of the market infiltrated the public sphere, killing off rational-critical debate and replacing it with the tendencies of consumption, and with that transforming of communication “into acts of individuated reception” (Habermas 1989, 161). Discussion takes the form of a consumer item, carefully cultivated and with no barriers to its proliferation (*ibid*, 164). A private bourgeois person may have had to pay for the books, the theatre tickets, or the concert in the days of the early public sphere, and though it was in virtue of class (education and property) that their access to the public sphere was secured (albeit excluding the broader reach of the pamphlet based and religious public sphere, as Habermas does), they still took part in the discussion as *homme*, as a mere human being (*ibid*). “Bourgeois culture was not mere ideology,” Habermas writes, “the rational-critical debate of private people in the *salons*, clubs, and reading societies was not directly subject to the cycle of production and consumption, that is, to the dictates of life’s necessities” (*ibid*, 160). There was still a degree of autonomy from the productive cycle in this bourgeois sphere. In the twentieth century, the discussion itself is a consumer product: "the conversation itself is administered” as professional dialogues, panel discussions, and round table shows (*ibid,* 164). The public sphere becomes privatised in the consciousness of the consuming public, a sphere for publicising private biographies “while publicly relevant developments and decisions are garbed in private dress and through personalization distorted to the point of unrecognizability” (*ibid,* 171-172). However, Michael McKeon argues that Habermas’s choice to use the term bourgeois might lead readers to presume an “overly stabilized conception of the emergent public sphere as already bourgeois in a historically more developed sense of the term” (McKeon 2004, 274).

Instead of a reading public, engaged in dialogue and reading and writing in response to each other, there only exists a market of books to be purchased and individually consumed by “the mass public of culture consumers” that capitalism has created (Habermas 1989, 168). As Habermas articulates, “The public sphere in the world of letters was replaced by the pseudo-public or sham-private world of culture consumption” (*ibid,* 160). Thus Habermas argues that the bourgeois public sphere has transformed into a sphere of consumption. As Seyla Benhabib articulates it, “The autonomous citizen, whose reasoned judgment and participation was the *sine qua non* of the public sphere, has been transformed into the “citizen consumer” of packaged images and messages or the “electronic mail target” of large lobbying groups and organizations” (Benhabib 1997, 93). As a decayed form of the bourgeois public sphere, it is “temporarily manufactured” and integrated into the realm of consumption (Habermas 1989, 216). Rational public debate has become a mere consumer good. On television, or radio, or even conferences, debate has assumed a commodity form (*ibid,* 164). More contemporarily, the internet has brought about new notions of potential sites of rational-public debate—however, at this point they are all for the most part privately owned sites for profit. The dialogues in these spaces do feature the participation of private individuals engaging in debate over literature, art, and most importantly public authority. However, these debates are commodified, and shaped by algorithms intended to maximise profitability.

Advertising has taken over the publicist organs (Habermas 1989, 191). Unlike the Republic of Letters as Habermas describes it, in industrial capitalist society "The sender of the message hides his business intentions in the role of someone interested in the public welfare" (*ibid*, 193). Though the early public sphere's bourgeois participants may have been bearers of particular business interests, their circumstances meant that their engagement in the public sphere was motivated by a genuine will to push public authority towards what they viewed to be the common good (again, even if it was *their* common good, the good of their class). The present degenerated public sphere, the sphere of consumption, appropriates the appearance "of a public of private people putting their reason to use" merely to advance private interests (*ibid*, 193).

The public sphere further disintegrated as it became infiltrated with competition between organised private interests (Habermas 1989, 179). The competition of these organised private interests has completely supplanted discussion, and any consensus emerging from rational-critical debate has been replaced by compromises determined non-publicly (*ibid*). Essentially, the secrecy of public authority has returned, with different organisations vying for approval.

In the twentieth century, the public sphere could no longer maintain the pretense of being a space in which power and domination had no influence (Habermas 1989, 144). The liberal understanding of the public sphere of rational debate was predicated upon a society composed of the relationships of petty commodity producers, relationships that were entirely horizontal in their basis upon commodity exchange in a market of free competition and independent prices and as such, no one individual could attain a position from which they could exert control over another (*ibid*). Such a market never really existed, and particularly in the twentieth century, it was "under conditions of imperfect competition and dependent prices [that] social power became concentrated in private hands" (*ibid*). Thus, the public sphere became laden with relationships of dominance and an intense competition of private interests with an uneven capability to influence public authority. The interests of those with the most influence take on the appearance of "a sham public interest," though they entirely lack the criteria of rationality that the interests of the bourgeois public sphere were supposed to, according to Habermas (*ibid*, 195). No longer did the public sphere represent and embody the dissolution of power, instead public opinion would be a mere limit on power as the public sphere only served the division of power (*ibid*, 136).

The state ultimately ends up addressing citizens like consumers, just as "private enterprises evoke in their customers the idea that in their consumption decisions they act in their capacity as citizens" (Habermas 1989, 195). It is certainly far from uncommon for contemporary politics to take place entirely within the private, economic realm. Boycotting, "voting with your dollar," and fundraising are all considered political activities, essential ones at that. And the public authority of the state does not disagree. The state adopts the interests of civil society (or, those interests which are able to dominate civil society) as its own interests (*ibid*, 142). Thus any distinction between the public and the private becomes mere appearance. The interventions in the realm of private people, made by public power, are merely the impulses of the private sphere brought to and taken up by the public (*ibid*). It was through this dialectic of "a progressive 'socialization' of the state simultaneously with an increasing 'stratification' of society" that society undermined and eroded the separation of state and society that was the basis of the bourgeois public sphere (*ibid*). Particularly true of social-welfare states, a person's contact with the state occurs through bureaucracies—demanding, unpolitical, indifferent (Habermas 1989, 211). Such states administer, distribute, and provide, and so the (so-called political) interests of citizens are reduced to specific claims based on occupational branch to be solved through administrative acts (*ibid*). Further, the welfare state shifted the content of the public sphere from rights to needs, but also shifted the very foundation of the public sphere:

> Whereas the public sphere of the nineteenth century presupposed independent (male) property owners who would congregate for public debate, in the late twentieth century the welfare state itself has to guarantee equal access to all citizens without regard for their status as property owners. For this reason, it is not enough to guarantee rights that limit the intervention of the state; one also needs positive rights that legislate the unhindered and equal participation of the citizens. (Hohendahl 1995, 34).

Capitalist society features domination from above and (mostly) below, from the 'private' sphere of the economy and the market, and "thus on the basis of market economy, political domination can be legitimated henceforth "from below" rather than "from above" (through invocation of cultural tradition)" (Habermas 1989A, 247, 248). For this reason, Habermas maintains that "…the task of providing a rational justification for political domination can no longer be expected from the principle of publicity" (Habermas 1989, 180). The state itself was required to guarantee the independence of institutions and avenues of the public sphere of the private—the press, under ever-increasing commodification—and thus the public sphere could no longer be said to exist as a part of the private sphere (*ibid*, 181).

In the later chapters of his work, Habermas discusses the "refeudalisation" of the spheres of society, in which we see the emergence of a "repoliticized social sphere…to which the distinction between 'public' and 'private' could not be usefully applied" (Habermas 1989, 142, 195). As in feudal Europe, nothing can be placed entirely into a distinct public or private realm; the spheres can be said to have blended together. It is in this that we have the downfall of the public sphere, which at its root is caused by "the structural transformation of the relationship between the public sphere and the private realm in general" (*ibid*, 142-143). With the increase in the interdependence of political events, the public sphere and its communal base lost its place (*ibid*, 203). Even parliament itself has become less a debating body, and more so a body of "rubber-stamping…resolutions haggled out behind closed doors" and a demonstration of party consensus (*ibid*, 205).

Refeudalisation can be described in such a way: "The public sphere becomes the court before [which] public prestige can be displayed—rather than *in* which public critical debate is carried on" (Warner 1997, 388). The public sphere in the welfare state has weakened the original critical functions of the public sphere, and Habermas writes:

> Whereas at one time publicness was intended to subject persons or things to the public use of reason and to make political decisions susceptible to revision before the tribunal of public opinion, today it has often enough already been enlisted in the aid of the secret policies of interest groups; in the form of "publicity" it now acquirees public prestige for persons or things and renders them capable of acclamation in a climate of nonpublic opinion. (Habermas 1989A, 236).

And:

> At one time publicity had to be gained in opposition to the secret politics of the monarchs; it sought to subject person or issue to rational-critical public debate to render political decisions subject to review before the court of public opinion. Today, on the contrary, publicity is achieved with the help of the secret politics of interest groups, it earns public prestige for a person or issue and thereby renders it ready for acclamatory assent in a climate of nonpublic opinion. (Habermas 1989, 201).

Habermas essentially observes a return to the secrets of the state with this development of a sham publicity. Instead of a sphere of private persons come together to pose a challenge to public authority borne of rational-critical debate, large organisations with influence "strive for political compromises with the state" and with each other, largely behind closed doors (Habermas 1989A, 236). However, "a staged form of publicity" remains necessary, a staged and representative illusion of approval from the public (*ibid*). In refeudalised society, the linking of public and private realms in which the public authorities are concerned with commerce and social labour and political functions are dealt with by societal powers, "organizations strive for political compromises with the state and with one another, as much as possible to the exclusion of the public" (Habermas 1989, 232). From civil society a repoliticised social sphere was formed, one which saw the fusing of state and societal institutions into a single complex, not distinguishable in terms of public and private (*ibid*, 148). The new interdependence of these formerly separate spheres could be found expressed in the breakdown of the boundaries of private law (*ibid).* This refeudalised, new sphere "emerged from the reciprocal permeation of the state by society and of society by the state", in which there was neither public nor private, in law or otherwise (*ibid,* 151).

When Habermas details the decline of the bourgeois public sphere, it is not in mourning of the passing of a golden age (as Arendt mourns the loss of a sharp public-private distinction), for Habermas is keenly cognizant of the "exclusionary and ideological character of the bourgeois public sphere" (Postone 1997, 167; Brown 1988, 29). Rather, the aim is to try and understand why it is that the inclusion of the broader masses and the growth of formal democracy in the latter half of the nineteenth century did not bring about a more expansive public sphere (Postone 1997, 167). Habermas does argue though that present Western democratic institutions rely upon “the liberal fictions of a public sphere in civil society” (Habermas 1989, 211). The periodic staging of a political public sphere comes with each election time (*ibid*, 215). For Habermas, we have lost a genuine public sphere of civil society, and it is a problem that we retain a fictitious one. And so, how might we understand the process of the decline of the public sphere, in order to develop a proper and genuine venue for rational-critical debate and democratic participation? As Postone describes, “Habermas, then, is not simply concerned with treating the liberal public sphere as a normative standard by which to judge contemporary public life but seeks to elucidate the social, economic, and cultural conditions for an effective public sphere and hence democracy.” (Postone 1997, 167).

Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge maintain a more economically and politically critical view of the bourgeois public sphere, both regarding this sphere at what would be its height, and in the stage of contemporary decline Habermas describes. Rather than Habermas’s interpretation of a decline and refeudalisation of political society, though, Negt and Kluge see the political stagnation of the bourgeois public sphere as a constant and inevitable outcome of bourgeois interests and abstract universalist self-understanding. These authors view the public sphere as “the organisational form of the ‘dictatorship of the bourgeoisie,’” a “network of norms, legitimations, delimitations, procedural rules, and separation of powers that prevents the political public sphere, once established, from making decisions that disturb or nullify the order of bourgeois production. It is the organized obstacle to the material public sphere and politics—the opposite of the constitutive public sphere” (Negt and Kluge 2016, 55). Negt and Kluge state that in actuality, the public sphere is not needed by bourgeois society, as “competition and the law determining value create a centripetal tendency that holds the social totality together, even if it isolates individuals” (*ibid,* 73). In fact, the bourgeois public sphere serves a very different function—it is maintained with the aim of preventing a political public sphere from existing, separating "the producers of use-values and social experiences, in other words the bearers of the collective will, from the tools with which this collective will can be created" (*ibid*). It cannot permit a functioning political public sphere that would challenge bourgeois interests, and so it takes on the "illusory synthesis of the totality of society," it holds the common good and general will as a mask of bourgeois particulars (*ibid*, 56). But no common good can ever be permitted which requires the bourgeoisie to sacrifice their private interests (*ibid*, 11-12). This means not only are challenges to bourgeois interests met with obstacles, but the actual realisation of authentic humanity through the citizen stagnates. Habermas viewed the bourgeois reading public and public sphere as an embodiment of the unified bourgeois and *homme citoyen*, only decaying later, but Negt and Kluge describe how the bourgeois character itself stalls the development of the *citoyen*. They argue:

> In bourgeois society, the interests of the bourgeois block the development of those of the *citoyen*, the *volonté générale*, even if only in an abstruse form. The interest of the bourgeois in privatization—"the longing for the island that belongs to me alone," for a house, a factory of one's own, for private education, uniqueness, individual immortalization—allows the interests of the *citoyen* to be realized only in atrophied form. (Negt and Kluge 2016, 258).

The only form of the *citoyen* actually available to the bourgeois individual is through a model of "multiple individualism" in which as individuals, one might join one or more associations in the effort to experience a temporary freedom away from the pressures of commercial society (*ibid*). But the bourgeois public sphere is not a realm of true citizenship, it is a realm embodying the expression of bourgeois interests configurated in and with a state that can actualise them against a broader society. Negt and Kluge write that the "bourgeois public sphere is overlaid by the tendencies of capitalism…to subsume society and the public sphere, to exploit them as raw material, but simultaneously to exclude the social and political content of these efforts from society…" (*ibid*, 292). The bourgeois public sphere was a product of, and cannot escape its existence as, a mechanism of capitalist production. And capital, in its materialist instinct, "follows a path of increasing abstraction," separating itself from any and all human qualities that might inhibit its organisation of the valorisation process—whether use-values, workers, or even the bourgeoisie itself (*ibid*, 185-186). Thus, there can be no recovery of a now lost but genuine public sphere of bourgeois character, for it inherently is a manifestation of, and inseparable from, the contradictory and vicious cycle of capitalism.

A Bourgeois or Post-Bourgeois Public Sphere? Current Public Sphere Theory

The public sphere has become a rather essential component of liberal democratic theory and ideology. As McKeon states, "ongoing debate over the early history of the public sphere provides a good index of the fruitfulness of the category" (McKeon 2004, 273). Though Habermas initially postulated the decline and possible collapse of the public sphere, much of his later work focused on the possibilities of a contemporary public sphere. Christina Fiig contends that in the 1990s, Habermas conceptualised the public sphere "as complex, multi-level networks of communication processes" which "work as arenas for the recognition of new societal problems" (Fiig 2011, 291). Habermas's own work thus reveals the depth of the embedding of liberal thought in the notion of the public sphere, and the significance of the public sphere in the hegemonic liberal discourse. And beyond the work of Habermas himself, this problem is one that is inextricable from the discussion of the public sphere in contemporary thought.[51] Whether it is

[51] One such example is Marcel Gauchet's *Le Nouveau Monde* (2017). A section of particular interest is "Le dégagement de la société civile" in Part VII "Le politique instituant et médiateur" in which Gauchet examines the

taken for granted or problematised, the public sphere has become a given in discussions of democracy and civic engagement.

So in contemporary thought, how is the public sphere envisaged and discussed? As discussed in the prior chapters, there is an always shifting polarity regarding the nature of the public sphere: is it an historical entity, one we might find inspiration in and might build models and theories from, but nevertheless an historical phenomenon? Or is it a normative ideal, that we might see appearing or manifest in historical moments, but still a conceptual normative democratic ideal? Habermas himself, as aforementioned in the previous paragraph, has shifted between these two possibilities himself, not constituting these positions as an either/or dilemma. And modern liberal democratic theory is greatly invested in the notion that there is an existing public sphere, ideal or concrete. McKeon believes that Habermas's public sphere was purely metaphorical, referencing a virtual space completely unlike the ancient *agora* (McKeon 2004, 275-276). Hohendahl argues similarly. While he recognises the historical foundation of the concept, he argues the public sphere is a powerful normative ideal, first in its conceptual neutrality which allows for its accessibility (Hohendahl 1995, 31). While in actuality groups and persons were excluded from participating in the public, the idea of the public sphere "defines a norm that regulates public communication between citizens about cultural as well as political questions," a norm which reminds people "of what could or should be" (*ibid*, 31-32). In contrast, insisting upon a continuity from the historic bourgeois public sphere, David Randall argues that

privatisation of civil society in the later twentieth century, the 1970s and after, commenting in particular upon the pervasive marketising forces, seen in the central role of social movements and NGOs, that have accompanied the transformation of the public sphere and the social spheres (public, private, and intimate) more broadly. In the following two sections of Part VII, especially "Un État postmoderne?" he returns to an examination of the public sphere itself, of public authority, and concludes that the economic-managerial bleed into the public has instituted a crisis of public power itself, a privatisation of the public, in which public governance is actually public powerlessness ("La «gouvernance publique» es ten réalité l'autre nom, pudique et noble, de l'impuissance publique" (Gauchet 2017, "Un État postmoderne?")), necessitating a reassessment of the state as a whole.

the contemporary public sphere “should be seen as the legitimate continuation of the Madisonian,[52] prudential public sphere” (Randall 2011, 223).

Moishe Postone describes the public sphere as an extrainstitutional institution (Postone 1997, 166). As a very general starting assumption, public sphere theory generally presumes a Westphalian nation state will be the entity in which a public sphere is contained, and will feature the accompanying communication infrastructure of modern industrial society (Allen 2012, 825; Fiig 2011, 295). Peter Uwe Hohendahl writes that political discussion is meant to take place within a framework of generally accepted procedures that guarantee the public nature of these debates, as well as providing equal access to this space and equal opportunity to participate (Hoheldahl 1997, 102). Nancy Fraser observes (but does not advocate) four assumptions that underlie the bourgeois public sphere: first, the assumption that the bracketing of status in order to participate as peers in public discussion is indeed possible; second, that there exists a “single overarching public sphere”; third, public discourse is restricted to “matters of common concern”; and fourth, the public sphere depends on a separation of civil society and the state (Allen 2012, 823-824). Habermas understood the coming into being of civil society as “corollary of a depersonalized state authority” (Verhoest 2019, 57). Accordingly, “the public sphere thus becomes ‘a sphere that mediates between society and state, in which the public organizes itself as the bearer of public opinion’” (*ibid*). Public opinion, further, belongs to the public constituted as a whole which is composed of private person, but is not something which belongs to individuals or separate persons, and thus the public conceptually opposes the individual (Warner 1997, 379). The value of public opinion rests on its anonymity, on its disinterest, on its existence as an

[52] Randall defines the Madisonian early modern public sphere as “a descriptor rather than a normative ideal…a universally public exercise and an institution within government of prudence’s practical reasoning” (Randall 2011, 222).

abstraction (*ibid*, 380). Public discourse is a "routine form of self-abstraction" according to Michael Warner (*ibid*, 381).

Echoing Habermas, Nicholas Garnham considers the public sphere to be a "site within which the formation of public opinion, and the political will stemming from and legitimized by such opinion, is subject to the disciplines of a discourse, or communicative ethics, by which all views are subject to the critical reasoning of others" (Verhoest 2019, 50). McKeon argues that the ideal of inclusivity in the public sphere is not the mere ideology of the bourgeois class pursuing its own interests, but is actually "the discovery in a society stratified by status that the idea of the public interest (or the national interest, or the commonwealth) has meaning only if it is premised on the conviction that interests are multiple and that no single interest—not even that of the monarch—is universal or absolute" (McKeon 2004, 275). Contemporary scholars like Robert Asen have argued that publics are not associations which come about naturally, but instead are relationships that must be constituted (Asen 2017, 332). Importantly, publics must recognise themselves as such (*ibid*). Michael Evans cautiously argues that theorists agree a public sphere ought to be deliberative, and such a deliberative public sphere "is inclusive of the widest possible range of perspectives and participants" even if that leads to "repressive and exclusionary effects of unequally distributed social power" (Evans 2012, 874). Moreover, the public sphere requires arguments be justified through the giving of reasons, "both to avoid domination by one kind of external authority and to reinforce a shared sense of legitimacy," and further this public sphere requires then that "participants remain open to persuasion," even to the extent of requiring "complementary learning processes" to understand the reasons of others' on their own terms (*ibid*).

Asen recounts that the scholar Nancy Fraser "observes that counterpublics often direct their public engagement to 'the appropriate boundaries of the public sphere,' namely shared perceptions of what constitutes public and private issues" (Asen 2017, 332). Seyla Benhabib describes the phenomenon, writing: "the emancipation of workers made property relations into a public political issue; the emancipation of women has meant that the family and the so-called private sphere became political issue; the attainment of rights by non-white and non-Christian peoples has put cultural questions of collective self and other representations on the public agenda" (Benhabib 1997, 79).

Benhabib argues that:

> The public sphere comes into existence whenever and wherever all affected by general social and political norms of action engage in practical discourse, evaluating their validity. In effect, there may be as many publics as there are controversial general debates about the validity of norms. Democratization in contemporary societies can be viewed as the increase and growth of autonomous public spheres among participants. (Benhabib 1997, 87).

The public sphere is not the agonistic space for acclaim and immortality that Hannah Arendt ascribes to the ancient Greeks, rather it is a democratic space of "…the creation of procedures whereby those affected by general societal norms and collective political decisions can have a say in their formation, stipulation, and adoption" (*ibid*). Asen also remarks that the public sphere is not about forming a consensus, but instead the public good, and Asen's "public good constitutes a practice of articulating mutual standing and connection, recognizing that people can solve problems and achieve goals—and struggle for justice—through coordinated action" (Asen 2017, 331).

Benhabib describes the modern public sphere as porous, with nothing possibly being predefined, and no agenda pre-setting the public conversation (Benhabib 1997, 79). Indeed, "the struggle over what gets included in the public agenda is itself a struggle for justice and freedom" Benhabib says (*ibid*). And challenging those thinkers, like Arendt, who lament the decline of the public and the political, Benhabib argues that holding such a distinction between the private and the political is nonsensical in modernity, "not because all politics has become administration and because the economy has become the quintessential public…but primarily because the struggle to make something public is a struggle for justice" (*ibid*). Citizens must feel free to introduce, according to Bruce Ackerman, "any and all moral arguments into the conversational field" (*ibid*, 83). Mutually acceptable decisions and definitions can be produced only in the circumstances of an open dialogue (*ibid*).

A significant move from Habermas's singular historical sphere, or normative concept, has been the emergence of the theorisation of multiple coexisting public spheres. Robert Asen refers to such a multiplicity of public spheres: "Networks of publics and counterpublics arising asynchronously and exhibiting diverse and changing relationships form the basis of contemporary models of publicity" (Asen 2017, 329). Gerard Hauser describes the contemporary public sphere as "a web of discursive arenas, spread across society and even in some cases across national borders" (*ibid*). And Benhabib describes multiple networks, associations, and organisations through which "anonymous 'public conversation' results" (*ibid*). Modern sphere theory thus encompasses a range of publics, in and involving different places and spaces (*ibid*). These publics can have indirect or direct, distant or near, relations amongst themselves (*ibid*). Often, there is posited a "main" public sphere, around which form many "counterpublics." A counterpublic, for instance, could be a queer/LGBT+ space (*ibid*), certainly a public but separate in a significant way from a general public sphere. However, not all theorists see counterpublics, or a theory of a multiplicity of public spheres, as viable. McKeon cautions against the notion of such counterpublics to supplement the public sphere, arguing that to do so misunderstands the “rationality” of the Habermasian public sphere (McKeon 2004, 275). But, even Habermas, particularly following the critique of Fraser, adopts the idea of “alternative publics” (Allen 2012, 824).

The multiple public sphere model arose as a response to the “unitary model drawn from the bourgeois public sphere” and from the attention and practices of those excluded from it; further, according to Daniel Brouwer, “a multiple public sphere recognises the complexity of people’s lives by ‘forcing recognition that human actors participate in multiple publics’” (Asen 2017, 330). According to Catherine Squire, departing from the ideal concept of a single public sphere is important as it allows for “recognition of the public struggles and political innovations of marginalized groups outside traditional or state-sanctioned public spaces and mainstream discourses dominated by white bourgeois males” (*ibid*). The notion that *multiple* public spheres is a remedy for the faults of a singular real or conceptual public sphere is illuminating, putting on display that theorists and scholars have posited expanding, or increasing, the present model of public and private interaction, rather than challenging and overcoming the dichotomies and contradictions upon which this model rests.

Returning to the perpetual question of public sphere theory, is the public sphere as a “public of private people making use of their reason” a discursive category expressing a normative ideal, or an actually existing social reality (Baker 1997, 183)? Certainly, the bourgeois public sphere signifies the emergence of a normative ideal of rational public discussion within a distinctly bourgeois social formation (*ibid*). This ideal, the concept of the public as the expression of “the ideal of communicative rationality among free and equal human beings” was partially realised in the historical bourgeois public sphere (*ibid*). Of course, it needs be repeated that the bourgeois public sphere is a particular development in western European civil society, and thus requires historic specificity (*ibid*, 181), and this is true regardless of where the public sphere falls between historical/specific or normative/conceptual.

There is a tendency in contemporary liberal democratic theory, contrary to Habermas's *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* in actuality, to make the public sphere abstract or an ideal (Hohendahl 1997, 101; Zaret 1997, 212). An ideal that is even naturalised, taken for granted to the extent of becoming an ahistorical per-existing entity. It becomes a purely abstract, conceptual place, a space posited to imagine the negotiating and deciding of questions of the common good in a general sense (Hohendahl 1997, 101). Historical references, arguments, and circumstances, however pertinent they might be in illustrating this conceptual sphere, do not hold general validity or applicability (*ibid*), and yet according to Habermas initially, the bourgeois public sphere—and any public sphere—is a result of particular historical circumstances. According to Andreas Gestrich, Habermas's inquiry into the origins of the bourgeois public sphere (and its structural transformation) is part of an exploration of the pre-requisites for democracy, "linked to the implementation of reason, truth, morals, and justice in political life" (Gestrich 2006, 415). Moreover, Gestrich argues Habermas intended to show the perils that late capitalism is throwing democracy into by its erasure of the public sphere (*ibid*), highlighting the historical specificity Habermas intended to argue for in the bourgeois public sphere.

Craig Calhoun writes, "What are the social conditions, [Habermas] asks, for a rational-critical debate about public issues conducted by private-persons willing to let arguments and not statuses determine decisions" (Calhoun 1997, 1). Except, Habermas in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* is rather describing the social conditions of a specific time and place for a specific kind of public sphere. In other words, Habermas starts with a specific, not a general, inquiry—*An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Calhoun, however, does further argue that while Habermas's aforementioned work is an analysis of eighteenth century to twentieth century history, something can be found within it to recover a public sphere and push it beyond its origins (*ibid*). That something would be "…an institutional location for practical reason in public affairs and for accompanying valid, if often deceptive, claims of formal democracy" (*ibid*). Habermas does this by showing first, the internal tensions within the bourgeois public sphere that leads to its transformation and partial decline, and then "the element of truth and emancipatory potential that it contained despite its ideological misrepresentation and contradictions" (*ibid*, 2). But along these lines, Peter Uwe Hohendahl argues that Habermas's public sphere has always been the Western European public sphere, and that "a theory of a public sphere must not lose [the] historical element as it defines and shapes the public space" (Hohendahl 1997, 105). Habermas does very clearly admit in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* that he refers specifically to the bourgeois public sphere that developed out of English, French, and German societies—any criticism is more appropriately directed to his narrow focus and narrow claims, rather than mistakenly attributing a claim of universality to his bourgeois public sphere.

Zaret emphasises that when assessing Habermas's work, it is crucial to not be hypersensitive to anachronisms, or diminish its novelty (Zaret 1997, 212)—it was a thirty-year-old work when Zaret was writing, and is now sixty years old as of 2022. However, Habermas does omit the public spheres of religion and science that preceded the literary bourgeois public sphere, and under-emphasises the significance of printing and the press in the early public spheres (which Habermas describes as a mere means, and not an independent factor which shaped new modes of thought) (*ibid*, 213, 214). Moreover, the seventeenth century is practically absent from Habermas's *Structural Transformation*, thus missing the English Revolution and its Civil Wars (King Charles against Parliament) from 1642-1648, the Regicide in 1649, the creation of the Republic from 1649-1653, Cromwell's Protectorate from 1653-1658, and the Restoration in 1660 (*ibid*, 216). This period in England is undoubtedly crucial for understanding any politics of the era and any politics since,[53] and no less crucial for, specifically, the public sphere. However, Habermas does emphasise the significance of the tendencies of commercial society and early capitalism, focusing on the later eighteenth century, and does recognise the significance of the material forces in shaping the public sphere. And thus, the shifts in capitalism would necessitate reformulations of any public sphere that might survive these changes.

Contemporary critiques and approaches tend to remain fixed in the era of "twentieth-century state interventionist capitalism," what Moishe Postone argues was merely one more phase of capitalist development (Postone 1997, 176). Postone writes:

> One of the central tenets of Habermas's *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* is that liberal capitalism proved to be a historical phase of developed capitalist society that ended about 1873, and that an adequate contemporary democratic theory must take cognizance of the enormous social, economic, political, and cultural changes involved in the transformation of that society into a state-interventionist, or organized, form. (Postone 1997, 175).

And yet, contemporary public sphere theory tends towards expanding the public sphere, rather than reformulating it or questioning its late-capitalist existence. Mid-twentieth century so-called state-interventionist capitalism was a phase, which came to an end in 1973 (*ibid*). Undoubtedly,

[53] This period is also notably absent in the political consciousness of (at least my generation of) Canadians, who are left with a peculiar impression that while the French and American Revolutions were thoroughly significant and transformative, England merely developed its more democratic institutions through parliamentary reforms and rational public discourse.

the changing role of the state and the market would necessitate a changing understanding and role of a public sphere. The latest, present neoliberal era of capitalism features "weakening and partial dissolution of the institutions and centers of power that had been at the heart of the state-interventionist mode: national state bureaucracies, industrial labour unions, and physically centralized, state-dependent capitalist firms" (*ibid*). On the other hand, the proponents of neoliberalism "expressly sought to transcend the 'naïve ideology' of laissez-faire, in favor of a 'positive' conception of the state as the guarantor of a competitive order" (Asen 2017, 340). The state itself imposes market behaviour, by eliminating social safety nets, new trade agreements, and privatisation (*ibid*). Thus any new theories of democracy or public space cannot rest on any assumptions of the prior welfare-state period, particularly the assumption that state intervention can effectively regulate capitalism (Postone 1997, 176), or that the state rather desires to restrain capitalism. Indeed, the assumption that state authority or regulation is inherently counter to capitalist interests is one such dangerously lingering assumption.

The Two Private Spheres: Reason in the Market and Emotion in the Home, and the Inward Breakdown of the Rational-Critical Public

A rather interesting shift can be perceived in the make up and allocation of qualities amongst the different separate spheres throughout early modernity. With the theory of the countervailing passion/interests coming into force in early modernity at the dawn of an increasingly capitalising commercial society, the rationality of the private economic sphere would foster a divide within that private realm. This divide distinguished the male bourgeois *homme-citoyen* pursuing rational interests, in the economy and through rational-critical debate in the public sphere, from those (and the activities of those) under this effective *pater familias* in the bourgeois conjugal household. Habermas noted, "The sphere of the public arose in the broader strata of the bourgeoisie as an expansion and at the same time completion of the intimate sphere of the conjugal family" (Habermas 1989, 50). McKeon observes:

> "The abolition of feudal tenures [in England] in 1646 officially sanctioned the past century of socioeconomic development whereby the consolidation of landowners' absolute private property contributed to an epochal separation out of politics from the economy. And this separation of the public activities of the state from private ownership was the precondition both for the modern division between public and private and for the mediatory function of the public sphere" (McKeon 2004, 276).

And according to Roger Chartier's interpretation of Habermas, the bourgeois revolution in France was "…a Revolution waged in the name of the new "private" virtues of the domestic household and civil society against the public corruption of the court and aristocracy" (Bell 1992, 915), or, the values of the intimate sphere.

So, out of particular socio-economic conditions the emergent public "judged all matters according to the moral standards of the intimate domestic sphere" (Bell 1992, 925). And this significantly includes the prescriptions (and the language of the prescriptions) for family structure and gender relations (*ibid*, 926). David A. Bell particularly emphasises the role of the French courts in shaping how the "public" formed conceptually, noting their development into an exclusively masculine entity (*ibid*, 928). Of course, this is a discovery of feminist scholars, who have observed the misogynistic assumption and language in the French political writings of the eighteenth-century, writings which so often "condemned the politics of the court and high aristocracy not only for its corruption and despotism but for its effeminacy" (*ibid*). This decadent, "feminine" court was contrasted with "a model 'public' made up of virtuous, masculine men who took part in rational conversation and relegated their wives to the management of the household and the upbringing of children" (*ibid*). According to Sarah Hanley, it was the jurists who “led the way in constructing a ‘male model of authority’ in France,” as from the late sixteenth century onward they fostered a movement that sought to “limit women’s rights within the family as a means of protecting the transmission of their venal offices” (*ibid*, 929). She cites Montesquieu, who wrote in his *Persian Letters*, “that women secretly controlled the levers of power in France” (*ibid*). Even for Rousseau, Keith Baker argues, the rational and natural order of things necessitated a return to and containment within the domestic realm for women, as the “natures” of men and women were so distinct in his philosophy that each would have equally distinct social and political roles (Baker 1997, 199-200). Beyond the conceptual, Landes argues that “the construction of a “civic public sphere” entailed the physical exclusion of women from positions they had once held in French public life” (Bell 1992, 928). As Mary Wollestonecraft argued centuries prior, Amy Allen argues that the public sphere is constitutively founded upon the exclusion of women—the exclusion is not accidental (Allen 2012, 822, 823).

Whether argued by design or by consequence, the exclusion of women and the gendered nature of the public sphere is by no means seen to be a purely historical phenomenon.[54] Any public sphere, or theory of the public or publicity, inherently presupposes a public-private distinction—the terms of binary opposition (Benhabib 1997, 93). Feminist theorists and the women’s movement have shown that the traditional and lingering means of differentiating the public from the private are a “part of a discourse of domination that legitimizes women’s oppression and exploitation in the private realm”, something further accomplished through the

[54] Arendt insists that to be in the private realm for the ancient Greeks, to be a subject of privacy, was to be deprived: like a slave, who exists only to labour, or a barbarian who has no polis (Brown 1988, 24). Arendt here avoids revealing too much of the masculinist notions that inevitably come with the veneration of the Greeks, as women certainly were confined to the private (*ibid*, 23). Further, women were “enslaved” to their bodies, inherently and inevitably tied to necessity (in this line of thought), which contrasts the freedom from necessity which distinguishes the Greek citizen (*ibid*, 25). And in trying to be freed from all ties to nature and necessity “by escaping and denigrating involvement with productive and reproductive work that is an essential part of our species life”, the ancient citizens had to develop a new site in which to anchor their existence and identity (*ibid*, 26).

idealising of the intimate within the private which obscures that the work of women in the household is and has been unremunerated (*ibid*, 92, 93). But it is of importance to recognise that understandings of the public and private, and the way people are able to participate in these spheres, has been thoroughly shaped by its foundations in the split private realm of economy, and bourgeois conjugal family and its rather rigid gendered divide where women, children, and servants are to be dependent upon and represented by the male head of the household.[55]

Even the non-productive early bourgeoisie still functioned on family property (Habermas 1989, 155). Habermas writes:

> The bourgeoisie of the liberal era spent their private lives prototypically in occupation and family; the realm of commodity exchange and of social labor belonged to the private sphere as much as the "household" relieved of any directly economic functions. These two realms, at that time, structured in concordance, now began to develop into different directions: "And indeed one can say that the family became ever more private and the world of work and organization ever more 'public'". (Habermas 1989, 152).

Maintaining, increasing, and passing down private property was an essential task of the private person as the head of a bourgeois family and the owner of commodities (*ibid*, 155). The personal relations between family members were further profoundly influenced by the exchange relationships of bourgeois society (*ibid*). But Habermas observed that "in the intimate sphere of the conjugal family privatized individuals viewed themselves as independent even from the private sphere of economic activity—as persons capable of entering into "purely human" relations with one another" (*ibid*, 48). Of course, in the *Philosophy of Right*, in Habermas's words, Hegel pointed out the "conflict of interests that discredited the common and allegedly

[55] Locke takes gendered and hierarchical imbalances in the private to be completely natural, contrasting the power of the magistrate—political power—with that of the power of a father/master/husband/lord *over* a child/servant/wife/slave (Locke 1980, 7).

universal interest of property-owing private people engaged in political debate by demonstrating its plainly particularist nature” (*ibid*, 119). Taking from Marx’s early writings, Habermas writes:

> To the separation of state and society corresponded “the division of man into the public person and the private person.” But as bourgeois the private person was so far from being an *homme* in general that, to actually be able to engage in his interests as a citizen, he had to “abandon his civil reality, abstract from it and withdraw from the whole organization into his individuality. (Habermas 1989, 125).

The bourgeois *homme-citoyen* was a thorough abstraction, that the bourgeois subject themselves (or rather, himself) was unable to even recognise.

Michael Warner argues that in Western political thought, publicity is seen as distorting, corrupting, and/or alienating the individual (Warner 1997, 378). In contrast, the Republican virtue of the bourgeois order insisted on avoiding any rupture between your regular, private life and the public one; you should be the same as a citizen and as a private individual (*ibid*). The individual-citizen, *homme-citoyen*, “was to maintain continuity of value, judgement, and reputation from a domestic economy to affairs of a public nature” (*ibid*). In the public sphere, “what you say will carry force not because of who you are but despite who you are” (*ibid*, 382). Public discourse turns persons into a public, an abstraction allowing for a utopian universality so persons might “transcend the given realities of their bodies and their status,” and creating a disembodied public subject that exists parallel to the private person (*ibid*, 381, 382). However, the activities of the public sphere are activities separate from everyday life (Zaret 1997, 214). It was only the denied particularities via such abstraction of the bourgeois subject that made it appear as if there was no discontinuity.

But it must be acknowledged, as Hegel and Marx clearly saw, that the abstract, rational *homme-citoyen* was illusory, contradictory, and hypocritical. The actual participants were very particular subjects—white, male, literate, propertied subjects (Warner 1997, 382). For these participants, their traits went unmarked, linguistically and practically, while the traits of all others "could only be acknowledged in discourse as the humiliating positivity of the particular" (*ibid*). In regards to gender, self-abstraction from the masculine is a confirmation of masculinity, but self-abstraction from the feminine is a denial of femininity (*ibid*, 383). Warner elaborates:

> The bourgeois public sphere claimed to have no relation to the body image at all. Public issues were depersonalized so that, in theory, any person would have the ability to offer an opinion about them and submit that opinion to the impersonal test of public debate without personal hazard. Yet the bourgeois public sphere continued to rely on features of certain bodies. Access to the public came in the whiteness and maleness that was then denied as forms of positivity, since that white male *qua* public person was only abstract rather than white and male. The contradiction is that even while particular bodies and dispositions enabled the liberating abstraction of public discourse; those bodies also summarized the constraints of positivity…from which self-abstraction can be liberating. (Warner 1997, 383).

A white, literate, propertied male may be able to freely navigate the public sphere of private persons, the economic realm of commodity traders, and the intimate realm in which he is the head of the bourgeois family, and see themselves as simultaneously whole and abstractable in the public, for anyone else the recognition of barriers and the denial of traits and lived experiences would be utterly persistent.

Another particularity made abstract, through the countervailing theory and elsewhere, was the economic interests of the commercial class participants in the public sphere. The political philosophy of John Locke demonstrates the rationalising of the private interests in the political realm. In John Locke's version of the state of nature, for instance, private property already exists (and thus there already exists, too, a greater capacity for conflict) (Wood and Wood 1997, 117). In the *Second Treatise*, he wishes to show "how men might come to have a *property* in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that without any express compact of all the commoners" (Locke 1980, 18). Troublingly, Locke's naturalising of private property and inequality in his state of nature and his social contract meant that no government should be able to seek to eliminate private property or inequality, for that would then override that original agreement—Locke's contract—and the conditions of inequality to which society allegedly agreed (Wood and Wood 1997, 125). But Locke, being hesitant of passions and private interests, had to find a way to make property—a private interest—rational. So, Locke makes the aim of government the protection and preservation of property while redefining it as a rationally based universal right (Randall 2011, 215). In early modernity, "a new, capitalist definition of property was in the process of establishing itself, challenging traditional forms not just in theory but in practice", that of the exclusive ownership of property, and "enhancing productivity itself became a reason for excluding other rights" (Wood and Wood 1997, 133). Locke's ideas would easily mobilise in defence of colonial expansion and the expropriation of indigenous peoples (*ibid*, 134), and indeed Locke was actively engaged in this defense.[56] And rationality would finally be bound to property and the interests, not simply a mere counter to more aggressive passions.

This also had significant consequences on the success of the challenge to domination that reason was supposed to provide, and the end to domination that the public sphere was meant to promise. While political domination was argued to have ceased, the domination and coercion that clearly remained was relegated to the private, economic sphere, and thus was not domination

[56] As mentioned in Chapter 2, Locke personally benefited from these philosophical and political justifications, for as he dramatically condemned the "slavery" brought about by a monarch's censorship of the press he was ensuring the literal and hereditary enslavement of others: he had acquired substantial wealth by the 1670s from substantial investments in the raw silk trade, the slave trade (Royal Africa Company), and the Bahama Adventurers (a merchant company founded by the 1st Earl of Shaftesbury) (Macpherson 1980, x).

at all. As Wood writes, "in the 'Age of Enlightenment' intellectual elites, and not only popular forces, had just begun to challenge the long Western tradition of transforming ideas of natural equality into justifications of inequality and domination, capitalism neatly circumvented that challenge by abstracting the political sphere from economic hierarchies and coercion" (Wood 2012, 316-317). Domination becomes rational and disappears—really becoming invisible but functioning as domination all the same.

M.L. Goldschmidt observed "two disturbing tendencies" that came about as a consequence to the bifurcation of the private: the first being "a tendency toward too much publicity with a consequent disregard of the individual's right of privacy," and the second being "a tendency toward too little publicity, with a consequent increase of secrecy in areas hitherto considered public" (Habermas 1989, 140). Thus, "the *principle* of the public sphere, that is, critical publicity, seemed to lose its strength in the measure that it expanded as a *sphere* and even undermined the private realm" (*ibid*). Habermas even traced the decline of the public sphere itself to the splitting of the private sphere and then its reversal with the public. He writes:

> …the more the original relationship between the intimate sphere and the public sphere in the world of letters is reversed and permits an undermining of the private sphere through publicity, the more decisions within this latitude can be influenced. In this fashion the consumption of culture also enters the service of economic and political propaganda. (Habermas 1989, 177).

The interlocking of state and society, Habermas argues, removed the foundational basis of the public sphere without supplying it a new one (*ibid*). Now, we have the "peculiar ambivalence of a domination exercised through the domination of nonpublic opinion: it serves the manipulation *of* the public as much as legitimation *before* it. Critical publicity is supplanted by manipulative publicity" (*ibid*, 178). Publicity, once again, is generated from above (*ibid*, 177), this refeudalisation bringing forth a return to the secrecy of state, albeit in a new form with consumer publicity.

With the decline of the public sphere, Habermas's refeudalisation process, the "conjugal family became dissociated from its connection with processes of social reproduction", moving the intimate sphere to the periphery and de-privatising the private sphere (Habermas 1989, 151-152). And yet as Habermas identifies, the economic segment of commodity exchange in the private sphere took on a more and more public orientation, and the segment of the family retreated more and more deeply into the private, becoming the privately entrenched intimate sphere. The family further lost its productive functions, and took on consumptive functions (*ibid*, 154). Nowadays, "private" life is to be not on the job, not at work (the intimate); an occupational activity is no longer deemed totally private (*ibid*, 154). Personal freedom in the public sphere has been reduced to family and to leisure time, which requires a publicly guaranteed status through democratic participation, rather than a basis in private property as with the bourgeois public sphere (*ibid*, 229).

An Inclusive Model?

The public sphere, regardless of its claims to universality, was built inextricably from exclusion, whether this is exclusion of certain participants, or the exclusion of specificity conceptually, or the exclusion of the non-rational. Much of contemporary democratic and public sphere theory aims to expand and make more inclusive the public sphere, but the presence of an exclusionary limitation remains, bound as it is to the notion of a bifurcated sphere model. Michael Schudson argues that for a debate to be rational, there must be ways "of limiting debate, defining issues, and restricting alternatives" (Schudson 1997, 156). John Rawls, a contributor of course to social contract theory, demarcates the boundary of public and private through the promotion of “public reason as a means of mediating difference in a pluralistic society” (Asen 2017, 334).

The liberalism of John Stuart Mill and his predecessors, Jeremy Bentham and his father James Mill, make clear the very specific criteria of how people are excluded from the public sphere, and how these exclusions were contradictorily justified as possible and even necessary for universality and democracy, and C. B. Macpherson illuminates this excellently in his work *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*. Liberal democracy, Macpherson argues, begins with assumptions of a capitalist market society, and particularly a model of man (a “maximiser of utilities”)[57] and a model of society (“a collection of individuals with conflicting interests”) (Macpherson 2012, 24). Essentially, it models society in terms of the independent commodity producer in a market community of fellow commodity producers. And this liberal democratic government was to protect citizens, as possessive individuals, from tyrannical arbitrary government, as well as fostering a market society (*ibid*, 34).

Bentham transformed the equality that was to characterise the public sphere and democratic society into *security*, security of property and profit (Macpherson 2012, 30). Throughout his writings on the franchise, Bentham expressed that while “he had become convinced of the safeness of the principle of universal suffrage,” he decided that “for the sake of *union* and *concord*” any number of exclusions might be necessary (As quoted by Macpherson 2012, 35). James Mill thought it legitimate that, Macpherson quotes, “all those individuals whose interests are indisputably included in those of other individuals may struck off [the franchise] without inconvenience” (*ibid*, 38). Thus, for the elder Mill, women were fairly excluded, as well

[57] Wealth, for early liberal thinkers like Bentham, could be equated with general happiness or utility; and, this wealth is attained by employing “the services of [one’s] fellows in multiplying his own comforts” (Macpherson 2012, 25, 26).

as the young—in fact, he ends up designing a franchise (which he argues is not of his own advocation, but rather a result of the pursuit of discovering the absolute limit of franchise restriction) in which only men over the age of 40 might vote, and with his property requirement, one third of those men would likely be further excluded (*ibid*, 38, 39, 41). Those excluded were deemed by Mill to not have interests identical with those of the community (*ibid*, 38-39).

Though John Stuart Mill rejected the idea of human beings as primarily consumers, but instead saw exerters and developers of capacities (Macpherson 2012, 48), he was no stranger to exclusion from politics and was perhaps the paragon of this paradox of liberalism. For Mill, liberty and the capacity to reason were not universally distributed, some people(s) still required development to attain them. So while it was possible for people to become capable of pursuing more than self-interest, "It would be foolish…to expect the average man, if given the power to vote, to use it with 'disinterested regard for others, and especially for what comes after them, for the idea of posterity, of their country, or of mankind'" (As quoted by Macpherson 2012, 56). These included those, for Mill, who required others to care for them, and protect them not only from external injury but from their own actions (Mill 1978, 9). Specifically, this meant "children or…young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood" as well as those with (mental) disabilities (*ibid*). But it also applied to those in countries and societies that Mill deems undeveloped, or in his words, "we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage" (*ibid*, 10). For Mill, such societies require despotism (*ibid*). These "barbarians" might be able to eventually become "civilized," and then they can enter into the free society of a bourgeois republic governed by law and rights, but until then must remain excluded (Bell 2016, 301-302). Mill therefore did not believe one-person-one-vote would be beneficial to society (which would mean the interests of the working-class would always be the majority), and instead proposed a plural voting system where those who were educated and propertied would get more votes (Macpherson 2012, 56, 57).

The free and equal discussion that is necessary for Mill's liberty and democracy, is only applicable to those he considers free and equal—there are non-equals and unfree persons who must be excluded, and liberty simply does not apply to them (Bell 2016, 301). But Mill takes these exclusions even further. Some arguments and ideas may be tolerated in the press for Mill—after all, for Mill "liberty of the press" is fundamental against tyranny and corruption (Mill 1978, 15)—but not permissible and indeed worthy of punishment if done in a way to incite action. Mill writes that no one should pretend "that actions should be as free as opinions" and provides as his example that : "An opinion that corn dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated though the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard" (*ibid*, 53). For Mill, you may speak or write against private property or the pursuit of profits (private interests), until there might be political or social consequences. The "self-interests" of the working class are not in the interests of the public, according to Mill, but the interests of the upper classes certainly are.

Ellen Meiksins Wood succinctly summarises this phenomenon of the liberal public sphere, writing "in the political domain, it may be necessary to limit excesses of power or to safeguard democratic liberties; but the political principles of liberty and checks on power do not belong in the 'economy'. Indeed, a free economy is one in which economic imperatives are given free rein" (Wood 2012, 317). The domination that was to be ended through the participation of private people in the public sphere could only end the domination a state would impose politically, and, on those citizens in particular. The interests of the propertied classes were effectively neutralised into general public opinion, the interests of all, and those whose interests did not align (for instance, as Mill admitted, the majority of the nineteenth century British population) simply did not have the general public good in mind or were not even capable of realising it. Thus, their interests—interests which challenged the ideology of the capitalist market—were a threat to society, a threat that had to be subdued. Thus, as Warner writes, "the very mechanism designed to end domination is a form of domination" (Warner 1997, 384). The public sphere, and the liberal sphere model, came to become a form of domination for the unpropertied, the non-white, the non-male. Even further, Allen questions "whether public sphere theory itself is too bound to its European Enlightenment context—and thus too entangled with the legacies of colonialism and imperialism—ever to be fully attentive to these power dynamics" (Allen 2012, 826). C.B. Macpherson remarks that Locke's *Second Treatise* "is a case not only for the liberal state but also for liberal property institutions. Locke's case for the limited constitutional state is largely designed to support his argument for an individual natural right to unlimited private property" (Macpherson 1980, vii, xxi). But liberal property institutions were not limited to only land, but also people. Quoting David B. Davis, Losurdo notes that Locke was "the last major philosopher to seek a justification for absolute and perpetual slavery", while also challenging and decrying the "slavery" of absolute monarchy (Losurdo 2011, 3). Locke "regarded slavery in the colonies as self-evident and indisputable, and personally contributed to the legal formulization of the institution in Carolina" drafting the constitution provision which stated that "every freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his Negro slaves, of what opinion or religion soever" (*ibid*). While theorists may attempt to expand and make more inclusive the public sphere, its foundations are in exclusion and depend on domination of someone.

What is good and rational came to be essentially fully synonymous with market interests in the nineteenth century. As Randall articulates, "…the modern public sphere is an unstable equilibrium devoid of rationality by the standard of universal interest. But that is no more than to say that the public sphere is a creation of private interest." (Randall 2011, 223). Despite the aims and claims of universality, the bourgeois public sphere was created by persons of upper classes who had varying political aspirations, but very synchronous economic interests. Challenges to these economic interests have existed throughout the history of the early modern public sphere, but the model of the bourgeois liberal democratic public sphere successfully mobilised a new conception of rationality, one that was thoroughly rooted in economic interests and their lineage as a countervail to passions and arbitrariness, to keep those challenges outside the public sphere proper. Wood further elaborates that whether a particular (national) enlightenment, or a broader Enlightenment are examined, "…both presuppose a common denominator, a culture of 'reason'" and no matter whether England, Russia, France, Germany, Italy, or Romania are examined, "they are likely—when not explicitly, then often by default—to leave intact a model of modernity that lumps together scientific, political, and economic 'rationality', or liberal democracy and the capitalist market" (Wood 2012, 293).

The contradictions of liberal sphere society are and have been keenly felt, if not always accurately perceived. As Wendy Brown describes in relation to the thought of Max Weber, "the complete realization of rationalized economic and political life, with its qualities of disciplined obedience and conformity, creates men who are calculable and predictable, models of behaviour analysis, fully conditioned into automatons" (Brown 1988, 162). While Benhabib remarks that for Arendt and her tradition of the republican/civic virtue of an agonistic polis, the public space of the political has been transformed "into a pseudospace of interaction in which individuals no longer 'act' but 'merely behave' as economic producers, consumers, and urban city dwellers" (Benhabib 1997, 73, 75). And Habermas of course felt that the understanding of persons as consumers and the shift towards a consumptive public had undermined the public sphere into near non-existence. Not all mourn this model of man, nor the lack of genuine public participation however—contra thinkers like Arendt who see collective political action, the power in acting together, as the only genuine form of action, Milton Friedman in his 1962 work *Capitalism and Freedom* insists that society is a mere collection of individuals and nothing more, and that collective action in an unnatural infringement of the neoliberal atomised subject (Asen 2017, 337).[58] As has been obvious since the late twentieth century, such an attitude has had significant force in politics, economics, and society.

Negt and Kluge theorise that an authentic public sphere, that would be a genuine site of political participation and action free from the disguised domination of bourgeois interests, would be a proletarian public sphere. "As with most of the bourgeoisie's revolutionary demands," they write, "the task of implementing the demand for freedom from censorship falls to the proletariat" (Negt and Kluge 2016, 264). Unlike most contemporary public sphere theory, Negt and Kluge do not argue that the proletarian public sphere is ever-existing alongside of the bourgeois public sphere, as a multi-public or counter-public presence. Rather the proletarian public sphere has existed historically (for instance as a counter-public in the Chartist movement in England (*ibid*, 196, 197)), and *can* exist, but presently does not exist as a stably institutionalised political realm or counter-public. Günther Lottes writes that for Negt and Kluge,

[58] There is also Margaret Thatcher's "There is no such thing as society."

the public constitutes a form of organised social experience, and the proletarian public sphere is a completely different conception of a social context where the real experiences of a worker can be developed (Lottes 1979, 111).[59]

Negt and Kluge argue that "the proletarian public sphere is…an index of the degree of emancipation of the working class at any given moment; it has as many faces as there are levels of development within the working class" (Negt and Kluge 2016, 32). If the proletariat organises to work within the bourgeois public sphere, it will end up reproducing the mechanisms of that sphere: "exclusion, pseudopublicity, and dictatorship of procedural rules" (*ibid*, 62-63). As such, a proletarian public sphere cannot be either found within the bourgeois public sphere, and neither should the proletarian public sphere aim to replicate the bourgeois public sphere. In order to be a site of genuine political freedom, the proletarian public sphere must be fully socially inclusive, leaving out no part of the population (whether or not they are defined by capitalism as productive), no sector of life (even the realm of children) (*ibid*, 284, 283). While much discussion has been made about changes to the form and contents of the working-class over the past two hundred years, Negt and Kluge argue that the working class "continues to be the material bearer of the production of wealth in society and therefore subject of a new, humane social order" (*ibid*, 94).[60] The proletariat must take on the task of social liberation, and as such "the proletarian public sphere can leave out nothing whatever for it derives its energy from its grasp of this total context" (*ibid*, 213). Not bourgeois universality with actual caveats and

[59] „Für Negt und Kluge ist ‚Öffentlichkeit" im besonderen eine ‚völlig andere Auffassung des gesamtgesellschaftlichen Zusammenhangs", in der allein die Erfahrungen wirklich zur Entfaltung kommen können, die der Arbeiter in dem ihm eigentümlichen Lebenszusammenhang macht" (Lottes 1979, 111).
[60] They further argue that it is crucial "to distinguish between those social forces that are in a position to accomplish a full-scale reorganization of society in the future and those that, under specific conditions are primarily directed at overthrowing obsolete structures of authority", with this being the proletariat, and then categories like the intelligentsia, respectively (Negt and Kluge 2016, 94).

exclusions, but a true encompassing of the social whole. For Negt and Kluge, the freedom that can be realised only through a proletarian public sphere is freedom “understood as a material redemption of the emphatic concept of freedom, a concept that the bourgeoisie coined but never put into practice; it embraces autonomy, identity, and production governed by the producers themselves,” which is also “the medium of sociality, which entails a wholly different quality of modes of interaction and of regulation of interests than those of existing society” (*ibid*, 83).

The constitution of a proletarian public sphere is dependent on a fully developed historical awareness, a historical consciousness of society that bourgeois society has shunned (Negt and Kluge 2016, 81). Historical progress is not to be neglected, forgotten, regarded as merely in the past and outdated, but always recognised as belonging to the creation of the present and future. With such historical consciousness, “…the proletarian public sphere transforms the dialectic between living and dead labor—between living generations and all past generations in the history of the human race—into social forms of expression that can be understood by everyone” (*ibid*, 82). As with any public sphere, coming together is vital, and in the proletarian case it first, confirms for all their own reality—“who else but the other workers can confirm that their struggle is not a mere illusion?”—and from that confirmation, “workers begin to talk, make suggestions, and become active” in an atmosphere of collective revolt (*ibid*, 39). Collective action becomes tenable through the coming together into a public.

As mentioned, Negt and Kluge do not hold that there is a presently existing proletarian public sphere. Such a public sphere, or even a preliminary counter-public form of one, must come about, they argue, through important and complimentary factors. First, proletarian interests must be the driving force of this public sphere; second, a medium of intercourse must be created to relate and inter-relate these particular interests of society’s productive sector to society as a whole; and third, the inhibitory and destructive influences of the bourgeois public sphere cannot overpower the proletarian public sphere as it develops (Negt and Kluge 2016, 91-92). The authors argue, however, that these factors have not simultaneously appeared, in any Western counties in the past hundred years (*ibid*, 92). But, essentially, regarding these three factors "the proletarian public sphere is none other than the form in which the interests of the working class develop themselves" (*ibid*). Negt and Kluge provide further specification for their proletarian public sphere. They write:

> …the category of proletarian public sphere can be defined as follows: it does not denote specific forms and contents but applies the Marxist method such that no raw material of social revolution, no concrete interest remains excluded and unresolved. It thereby ensures that the medium of this resolution and transformation of interests is the real context of production and socialization as a whole. This also entails that the categories through which needs and interests can be grasped as particular as do not transpose themselves onto the categories that denote the totality of society, which is not identical with these interests but the medium in which they can move. The proletarian public sphere is the correct application of the various categories by means of which living interests generalize themselves without destroying, as dead interests and norms, the whole living substance that they wish to organize. (Negt and Kluge 2016, 208).

There is no one specific procedure, form, or debate that makes the proletarian public sphere, rather it is the process in which political discussion and action take place through the articulation of the interests of the productive class in a manner that incorporates the whole of society concretely, towards transformative and liberating social organisation. This is in stark contrast to the bourgeois public sphere that presently rules abstractly and through exclusion. The working class needs a public sphere that will organise the experiences that are left out of and do not fit into the existing bourgeois social context, for the sake of its own goals, and this sphere will be a constitutive element of the proletariat itself (*ibid*, 290). However, as aforementioned, Negt and Kluge argue there is presently no proletarian public sphere, no "medium anchored in ongoing collective experience," and as a consequence this has prevented "individual campaigns and slogans from changing the consciousness of the workers" (*ibid*, 92).

Conclusion

The public sphere that Habermas describes, and its decline, reveal the precarious and untenable principles upon which it was founded. The public sphere of private people coming together in rational-critical thought rests on principles conditioned by class interests, thus such a sphere was flexible enough to suit the needs of that class. Consequentially, the institutions of constitutional societies and the vast majority of democratic and liberal thought are based around this sphere model which itself is founded upon the twin dichotomies of reason versus emotion/passion and public versus private. Though the rational interests emerged from the private economic sphere, the bifurcation of the private into the "private" and "intimate" meant that the rationality of the public was to be the rationality of the market and the self-interested economic individual, while all other facets of human existence were deemed unruly, non-rational, and exiled into the realm of intimacy.

For the bourgeois *homme-citoyen*, the universal and neutral subject of the public sphere, and model of man for society in general, these dichotomies were easily traversed. Calculable human nature was manifest in their pursuing their economic interests. These were the interests which they brought with them for rational critical discussion in the public sphere, with the aim of influencing the state, and deemed universally representative of society. That which was not a part of the rational propertied male was a particularity—not universal, not rational, and something that had to be left behind or excluded from public participation. The particular, the personal, the intimate, and the emotive were characteristics of that which was not political, and of persons who could only enter the public if they were to hide, ignore, or shed those particularities that marked them.

Whether or not a functioning public sphere exists now, or ever did, or if it merely exists as a concept, model, or norm, the ways in which this sphere model and its basis in Enlightenment rationality thoroughly characterise how politics and society is understood and theorised. The two foundational dichotomies influence the orientation of political thought. So, with all the lamentations of the decline of the political, with all the alienation and exclusion that certainly characterises modern societies, how might those particularities, that which has been excluded for centuries, be returned? Is it possible to unify the self and society in politics? And very specifically, can the emotions/passions be added back in?

Chapter 4: Re-Enter the Emotions

"To our strongest drive, the tyrant in us, not only our reason but also our conscience submits." – Nietzsche , *Beyond Good and Evil*

The affective turn, springing forth three decades ago and remaining strong throughout, promised to finally take seriously that which had been left out of most scholarship in the social sciences: the emotions. The conventional narrative tells of the demonization and exclusion of emotions from public and philosophical, or broadly "rational" life, and thus they must be rescued to be properly examined, evaluated, and assessed in terms of their relevancy in rational thought. Rebecca Kingston and Leonard Ferry encapsulate this narrative of saving the emotions from their hitherto neglect perfectly when they write:

> While there is no clear consensus on how to understand and explain emotion, there is an acknowledgement that emotional capacities are more complex than previously thought and depend largely, if not wholly, on our cognitive abilities. Furthermore, our capacity for emotion is an essential and positive feature of humanity; our emotional lives, however intense, provide a necessary foundation for the possibility of meaning and human happiness. This recognition also raises the possibility of what we might call "rational emotion." (Ferry and Kingston 2008, 4).

Despite this affective turn, this "revolution of the emotions" from the 1970s into the 1990s, the emotions, what they *are*, remains unknown (Reddy 2001, xi). While the theories of emotion range from cognitivist and non-cognitivist, universal to constructed, generally it is agreed that emotions exist as some sort of identifiable entity, and that they *do* something for human beings, and that this something that they do is incredibly politically and socially relevant. Emotions are not mere objects that might be analysed, but are instead both constative and performative entities, describing the world as well as changing it or acting upon it (Plamper 2015, 252). However, as theorists work to determine what emotions are as entities, politically what has been consistently overlooked is what the emotions are as a category, a category that has been historically formed.

Naming, labelling, and categorising emotions is a task of creating meaning: meanings being made through the process of defining and evaluating emotions against each other, and the process of demarcating these emotions is in the naming of them (Plamper 2015, 267). In defining emotions as a category, specific, named entities tend to be measured up and ruled to be in or out of that category. Jan Plamper cautions, however, "emotion is not simply whatever doesn't fit into the anachronistic common-sense model of historical explanation. In other words, one should avoid invoking 'emotion' to label all human action that cannot be explained through 'interests' and 'rationality'" (*ibid*, 277). In other words, emotion should not be a catch all term for everything that is not seen as a rational interest, and this erroneous tendency is where much of the discrepancy in public discourse around emotion might be sourced (particularly with the use of "emotion" as a discrediting label).

Whether a strong cognitivist (emotions-are-mental-judgements) position is held (like that of Chrysippus), or a physicalist (emotions-are-sensations) approach (William James), there are extensive debates about the emotions within these theoretical positions (Ferry and Kingston 2008, 4). And it certainly does not help that the language of emotions is highly metaphorical, often clouded in a classical Greek[61] notion that emotions are external entities which affect us: emotions seize, strike, overcome (Plamper 2015, 14). Yet, emotions are also perhaps more intimately personal and internal than anything else. And further, it can be argued that "…emotions are the primary means by which human relationships are structured" (Oatley 2004,

[61] However Greek philosophers did not view even such "external emotions" affecting people in "a unidirectional schema of stimulus and response that left no room for considerations of judgement and calculation" (Plamper 2015, 15).

81), that human interactions and relationships are only possible through emotions. William Reddy captures this paradox when he writes “the involuntary character of emotions is the basis of their polyvalent quality, their mystery. From one vantage point, our emotions are that which we most deeply espouse as our own; yet at times they appear to be external forces that rob us of our capacity for reflection or action” (Reddy 2001, 316).

Emotions are evasive, ill-suited to definition regardless of which position or blend of positions one holds. Part of this issue is that the language used to describe emotions is elusive. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty observes that the language and distinctions embedded in the philosophy of mind have prevented good descriptions of the phenomenon of emotions, writing that “we have inherited distinctions between being active and being passive; between psychological states not reducible to nor adequately explained by physical processes; between states that are primarily nonrational and those that are either rational or irrational; between voluntary and nonvoluntary states” (Rorty 2008, 20). But emotions themselves are equally elusive. The emotions appear distinct though related to moods (perhaps best thought of as an emotional climate or atmosphere), and similarly distinct though related to dispositions; dispositions referring to “propensities to have occurrent emotions,” such as “irritable” for a person quick to anger, or “irascible” for a person whose anger is markedly strong, “cheerful” for someone tending towards happiness or joy (Tarnopolsky 2008, 51). How can emotions be defined apart from moods, or dispositions? For Keith Oatley, these are determined by duration: moods are long lasting, unlike “reactive emotions” based on immediate things and events (Oatley 2004, 4). Sentiments last even longer than moods (*ibid*). However, as will be shown, this is not a definitive differentiation by any means. Philip Walsh suggests there must be “at least some boundaries as to what should count as emotions, by hardening up the distinction between emotions and sentiments. Moods, feelings, affect and passions are also terms often treated as close to synonymous with emotions, but I would argue that at least some of these refer to clearly distinct phenomena" (Walsh 2021, 376). But the question remains: what do the boundaries consist of or in that allow for differentiation and categorisation?

A further complication: people can have emotions about their emotions (Oatley 2004, 11), or even about the emotions of others. Those emotions are then usually judged and evaluated, praised and blamed, and here the external-internal paradox takes full force—emotions characterise people, determine what kind of person they are, as though they are internally made decisions, controllable and thus worthy of evaluation; and yet emotions also can pardon a person from such judgement, with emotions acting as external and uncontrollable forces that should not bear on a person's character or culpability (for instance, legally) (Ferry 2008, 78-79). This reveals much about emotions and the commonplace understanding of them. Emotions are seen as nearly primordial forces, so strong they have the capacity to override human will or reason, and only those of the strongest character are able to hold steady in their midst. This is sometimes biologically argued, that emotions are evolutionary responses as instinctual as breathing and thus they override our thinking selves as long-programmed mechanisms of self-preservation; other times it is argued along religious lines, that they are inherent and unchangeable in humans and beyond consciousness (Reddy 2001, 316). Elements of Freud's theories[62] also made this into the common sense view of emotion—entities from within that can never fully be repressed, that are so powerful they can transform the whole personality. The hydraulic model of emotions, post-Freud, imagines emotions as mostly destructive entities we must "get out" as supressing them

[62] More specifically, a misappropriation of Freud's theories which in actuality hold emotions as in between instinct and conscious repression/control over these instincts, not as the instincts themselves or powerful independent agents that take a person over.

threatens damage to the self (Alberti 2006, xix). Whether from divinity or biology, emotions are conventionally held as universal—more or less, as I will discussed later—across humanity, and the purest arena of subjectivity, autonomy, and intimacy (Plamper 2015, 25). And yet, emotions are associated with being *animal*, associated with the bodily, contrasted with the mind and reason of humanity—as will be shown, this paradox of being so intimately and uniquely human, and yet base and animal, comes from the very contemporary emergence of the emotions as a category (*ibid*, 26). In this view it is feelings and affects that are uniquely human—emotions are more sensory (*ibid*). Given these paradoxical tendencies clouding the emotions, it is important to trace the different theories of the emotions—what they are and how they work—and illuminate the significances and influences of those theories.

Modern Theories of Emotions: What Are They, and Do They Matter?

Before addressing the place of the emotions in history and thought, the emotions must be defined and understood. What *are* the emotions? And how do we know what they are? Broadly in contemporary theorising, and with retrospective applicability, there are two general camps for theories of the emotions: cognitivist and non-cognitivist theories. Further, within these frameworks there are universalist/essentialist, and constructivist/cultural positions. As Jan Plamper argues, there are two basic and contrary positions present in today's research in the history of the emotions, one being that emotions are universal and have been unchanged for millennia (though the modes of their expression may have changed), the other being that emotions are historical entities that shift. Plamper writes "since the mid-nineteenth century at the very latest, academic discussion of emotion has revolved around these two polarities: hard and soft, essentialist and anti-essentialist, determinist and anti-determinist, universal and culturally conditioned" (Plamper 2012, 5).

Purely non-cognitivist theories are less seriously taken and held in political, historical, and more broadly social accounts of emotion, but nevertheless have made a serious impact upon the category of emotions itself, and with the enlarging emphasis placed on the "life sciences" post-9/11 in a quest for authentic, objective reality (Plamper 2015, 297), these theories have made themselves present in political discourse. Presently the non-cognitive theory of emotion soundly rests in neuroscience, but its origins lie in the earliest projects of psychology. The non-cognitive model could be said to have been pioneered and founded by William James. Charles Darwin of course is well known for his work on expressions and their connection to the emotions, for Darwin's[63] "expression" was a behaviour or visible bodily change due to emotion (Oatley 2004, 23). But in terms of an attempt to undertake a coherent study of the emotions themselves, uncover what they might be, it was William James. In James's 1884 essay, "What is an Emotion?" he argues that emotions (emotional brain-processes) are the same as, simply *are*, sensorial brain-processes (James 1983, 169). For James, emotions were the perceptions of bodily changes, for instance, a blush or a smile (Oatley 2004, 3). What is conventionally referred to as a manifestation of or an expression of an emotion is actually the emotion itself (James 1983, 170). James however was not consistent or persuasive in his attempts to answer his titular question of "What is an Emotion?", and from the outset unabashedly restricts his inquiry to only the emotions that fit his theory, (Dixon 2003, 126; James 1983, 169). Nevertheless, he solidified the perspective that emotions were bodily and sensory. The account of the emotions he outlined in this 1884 article was materialist and reductionist (Dixon 2003, 206). Though James offered a disclaimer that he was only dealing with emotions that provided a "distinct bodily expression",

[63] Darwin was not interested in emotions per se, but emotional expression in so far as they may be able to indicate evolution of the human species (Oatley and Jenkins 1996, 3). Darwin further argued that emotional expressions, again for him being evolutionary habits, are of the "least use" to us (*ibid*).

in his article, bodily changes were seen as the constituent *cause* of the emotion rather than simply expressions of emotions (*ibid*, 207; James 1983, 169). Not even exclusively the cause, but the cause and end of emotions themselves. His argument is that emotion "begins and ends" with its manifestations or effects (James 1983, 177). James argues that though it is conventionally believed a person runs from a bear because they are afraid, it is actually the reverse; the fear *is*, consists in, running from the bear, a person is afraid *because they run* from the bear (Dixon 2003, 207). As James wrote, "*the bodily changes follow directly the* PERCEPTION *of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur* IS *the emotion*" (James 1983, 170). The emotions are directly tied to bodily actions, they are not a psychic or mental act that influences the body, the bodily state *is* the emotion itself (Dixon 2003, 207). In this, for James, emotions are feelings very literally, not voluntary acts or judgements (*ibid*). In fact James disqualifies any judgement or cognitive component from emotion wholly, arguing that without the physical demonstrations or responses there would merely be "purely cognitive responses" which to him are by definition not emotions (James 1983, 170). His definition of emotion not only is restrictive as mentioned, but tautological, as he argues pure judgements, or purely cerebral responses, are "pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth" and thus are not emotions (*ibid*). Some emotions, however, do not have bodily expressions, and James only dismissed these disembodied emotions as non-entities (Dixon 2003, 208). Instead they are non-descript, cold, neutral intellectual perceptions, and this "mind-stuff" cannot constitute an emotion (James 1983, 173). James' theory is "simplistic, reductionist, and clearly philosophically and empirically flawed" (Dixon 2003, 211). In his own time his theories were extensively argued against (*ibid*, 214). Dixon points out that overall, James' psychological writings were heterogenous to the point of arguable internal irreconcilability (*ibid*, 205). His proofs consisted of statements of presumed obvious experience: of course emotions are purely physical reactions, for people shiver when hearing good poetry or music or at seeing a dark figure in the woods; and performing the opposite physical action can prevent a particular emotion from arising such as whistling to stave off fear and maintain courage (James 1983, 176; 178). Yet "James' theory of emotion was the fundamental emotion theory of the new professional science of psychology" (Dixon 2003, 212), and despite its inconsistency and lack of contemporaneous persuasiveness, came to be viewed as the original theory of the emotions, and the dawn of the study of emotions.

Though James' theory ought to have been dismissed soon after its creation by logical and empirical criteria, its persistence in both psychology and its histories is an example of how the history of psychology and other sciences is not a straightforward, linear, logical process (Dixon 2003, 216-217). And because contemporary theories of emotion draw heavily—and perhaps overly rely upon—psychology, the legacy of James' interpretation has spilled over and into other disciplines. The main emotions theorists, whether in psychology, or philosophy, or elsewhere, in at least the past two decades, including William Lyons, Rom Harré, Patricia Greenspan, Keith Oatley, Robert Solomon, Jon Elster and Peter Goldie, all relate their concepts of the emotions to the theory of William James (*ibid*, 231).

Neurosciences have taken the lead in justifying the contemporary physicalist theories of emotion. Instead of the Darwinian analyses of facial expressions, brain scans have become the hard evidence for natural, bodily emotions, rooted in not thought or judgement or will, but neural chemistry. Plamper dismissively muses, "the rise of fMRI scanning was quite fabulous. On the basis of yellow spots in a grey brain scan, bold hypotheses were put forward about love, free will, the human capacity for empathy, the way in which children acquired language, the feel for rhythm, and truthfulness" (Plamper 2015, 207).[64] Criticised as a "new phrenology" (*ibid*),[65] brain scan evidence for emotional explanations is unconvincing, and has just as much trouble with not being able to explain emotions, causally or otherwise, as the physicalist emotions theory of William James.[66] The physicalist account of emotions is highly biologically reductivist (lending itself quite easily to racist doctrines),[67] and is of course thus a highly essentialist and universalist perspective on the emotions.

Schachter and Singer further problematise the physical theory of emotions, noting that no physical signal corresponds exclusively to one emotion, but instead "general physical signals find an emotional nomenclature only after an evaluation procedure has taken place. Anger, envy, or pleasure are therefore not states of the body, but learned ascriptions, applied based on situation" (Plamper 2015, 202). Running does not constitute fear of a bear—one may run away from a bear, or one may run towards a loved one. People flush red with embarrassment, or with rage. But Schachter and Singer do not reject the physical element of emotions. Their model, the Two-Factor Model, or the Cognitive-Physiological Model or Schachter-Singer Model, views

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[64] "Magnetic resonance imaging measures changes in the oxygen content of blood in the brain, and from that draws conclusions about neuronal activity. The procedure is based on knowledge that red blood cells have differing magnetic properties according to their oxygen content. The difference between greater or less oxygen content in the blood is called the BOLD contrast (blood-oxygen-level dependent contrast). During the simplest kind of activity in nerve cells, the transmission of an electrical impulse (the 'firing' of nerve cells or neurons that we hear so much about), oxygen is used, changing the oxygen content in the blood. Of course, this happens with a delay which varies, and which is either given a fixed value by the measuring software or estimated using mathematical models. This means that an fMRI scanner has to measure neuronal activity indirectly, and with a time lag" (Plamper 2015, 207).

[65] Keep this in mind when reading Chapter 5, section three: <u>Capitalism: Emotions and the Interests, Again</u>.

[66] In the fMRI brain scan, "no direct measurements are made, not even any causal relationship between the oxygen content of the blood and neuronal activity; instead a correlation is established" (Plamper 2015, 210). "The fMRI signal cannot easily differentiate between function-specific processing and neuromodulation, between bottom-up and top-down signals, and it may potentially confuse excitation and inhibition" (*ibid*). Further, "…the spatial recognition of the blobs, the coloured representations of the oxygen content of the blood, is too poor to map them precisely to the supposed spatial extensions of individual regions of the brain" and the "conglomerated nerve cells that are called 'the amygdala' are very difficult to distinguish from those that border on it, the transition is blurred and not precise" (*ibid*). Further, statistical and software problems plague fMRI scanning (*ibid*).

[67] Winston, Andrew S. 2020. "Why Mainstream Research Will Not End Scientific Racism in Psychology." *Theory and Psychology* 30 (3): 425-430.

emotions and physical expressions as intertwined (*ibid*, 203). There must be a body for there to be emotions, and yet emotions are interpreted, specified, and understood through learned cognitions (*ibid*).

A physicalist, biological, evolutionary origin and explanation of emotions almost inevitably is a universalist theory of emotions—emotions are an innate, physical feature of being *homo sapiens* and thus they are the same across geography and time, culture and epoch. Where emotional differences are discussed, historically it has usually been in order to make a claim for an allegedly "natural" hierarchy rooted in "natural" difference—of race or sex, most often—and often placed on a scale that includes and tiers animals within this hierarchy (Plamper 2015, 180).[68] But as the neurosciences have taken over for the physicalist side, the essentialities of emotions have "shrunk." They are not immediately discernable in the ways they had once been deemed to physically, and thus any differences across human beings can be deemed the superficial manifestations of universal emotions. Nevertheless, those differences are important, and even if the argument holds that at the fundamental level emotions are universal-physical entities, understanding the differences of displaying and interpreting emotions across time and culture is imperative, it cannot be ignored. Universalist theories dismiss or flatten these differences.

The notion of an unchanging human identity has been swept away, "the individual subject has turned out to be historically constructed and contingent too and has thus dissolved" writes Stuart Airlie (Airlie 2001, 235). In the twentieth century, "language was to be understood as a master that constructed reality, not merely the medium through which it could be perceived"

[68] Perhaps not so differently from Plato's hierarchy of being.

and that presented a two-sided situation for historians: historical approaches are necessary and appropriate for all social experiences and situations, and yet these experiences and situations cannot so easily be recaptured and are rife with problems of representation (*ibid*). Thus, most interpretations of emotions nowadays concede to at least a degree of constructivism. Constructivist theories of emotions hold that emotions are socially created and cultivated, that while their roots may be hidden mysteriously within human nature and are indeed also innately human, what is seen, experienced, labeled are not "natural" entities but socially shaped and created ones. Rorty states that emotions form no natural class, and consequentially the "list of emotions has expanded" as attempts are made to classify and reclassify psychological activities (Rorty 2008, 20). Keith Oatley, a scholar who does place himself in the lineage of James, writes "…emotions are not fixed. They are made in part from what we know culturally, and from what we believe to be socially appropriate" (Oatley 2004, 9). He writes that "all cultures shape social behavior, and to a large extent they shape it by means of emotions" (*ibid*, 33). Clifford Geertz emphasised that emotions are malleable and culturally constituted (Reddy 2001, 317). Linguist-anthropologist Benedicte Grima wrote bluntly "emotion is culture'" (Plamper 2015, 251). Emotional ethnographies of the 1980s argued that emotions not only were expressed differently by different cultures, "but that people from different cultures had radically different feelings" and Catherine A. Lutz argued that "emotional experience is not precultural but pre*eminently* cultural" (*ibid*, 98-99). Drawing from Foucault, anthropologists Rom Harré, Lila Abu-Lughod, Lutz, and others, have argued "like everything else about the Western self, emotions…were merely discursive in origin and constituted yet another site where power was surreptitiously exercised over us" (Reddy 2001, 318). Plamper argues that "the shift of emotion from one place to another in the body is always a question of historical knowledge. It would be quite wrong to think of the body as something timeless and pancultural" (Plamper 2015, 31). Philip Walsh further complicates the universalist-constructivist dispute on the essence of emotions, remarking that "…emotions constitute bridges between what happens in the world and how it is experienced" and that "emotions are less internal to the 'self' than lay or individualist psychology has typically deemed them. This also implies that introspective approaches to understanding them are potentially misleading" (Walsh 2021, 374). How can an answer to this question be settled if emotions are something not clearly accessible?

Reddy remarks on one of the particularly significant features of the constructivist view of emotions: the long-held reductionist association of women and emotion, and exclusion of women (and their emotions) from historical analysis. Reddy writes, "demonstrating the cultural origin of emotion made possible a critique of the prevalent Western common sense that women were inherently more emotional than men—historically one of the most important justifications for the exclusion of women from public life and for their domination by men within the family" (Reddy 2001, 318). As reductionist physicalism lent itself to stark and discriminatory positions on the innate biological characteristics of different persons based on sex/gender or racial categories (which were pre-constructed and mapped onto the persons and peoples being analysed), constructivism countered this by arguing that emotional tendencies are not produced from some innate biological trait, but socialised, adapted and learned.

Barbara Rosenwein, who created the concept of emotional communities, advocates a strong constructivist position, to the degree that a degree of scepticism must be held about ever accessing "true" essential emotions, as opposed to various conditioned and constructed expressions of emotion, even when applied to the self. She says:

> It is not as though we can ever see emotions and capture them in their essence. They are always embedded in gestures and words, and they must always be expressed in some way—written out, uttered, marked by cries, demonstrated via bodily writhings or stiff upper lips, and so on. If you could distinguish between a "real emotion" and an "emotion as expressed in a certain way" (that is via a style and a norm) then I would agree that we should reserve the idea of "emotional community" for the first instance and use some other term for what I am talking about. (Plamper 2010, 258).

We have access to how people *think* they feel, but is that *really* how they feel (*ibid*)? Are there pure emotional entities within the person that get expressed in culturally-shaped ways, or are the expressions themselves all that is of emotions?

An important question for historians, or anyone engaged in emotions research, is "how far emotions can be perceived as stable entities, traceable and comparable between ages and cultures" (Alberti 2006, xv)? Fay Bound Alberti remarks upon the predominant trope that people of the past were more "emotional," particularly medieval Europeans when examining the West (the Mediterranean ancients are of course the epitome of reason), particularly noting how modern misunderstandings of how emotions were communicated and expressed leads to such false historical narratives. She writes:

> One standard position has been the identification of medieval and early modern societies as angrier and more aggressive, prone to sudden emotions and more 'childish' than our own; an evolutionary model influenced by the work of the German sociologist Norbert Elias. The late seventeenth century in England is particularly associated as a turning point for emotional change; evidence for which has been found in a growth of individualistic cultural enterprises (including the rise of the novel) that have been linked to changes in individual and social patterns of affect. Despite the rhetorical and structural convenience of these approaches, they fail to address the cognitive basis of emotions and the influence of culture in generating rather than supressing or reflecting emotional experiences. (Alberti 2006, xv).

If emotions are understood as purely inner entities that are either repressed or controlled, or dominate and lash out, the nuances of emotional communication in different eras, cultures, and communities will be lost, as will those of today which are taken for granted.

This does not mean that constructivism has not fallen into essentializing traps—in fact, its general historico-socio-cultural relativism has sometimes produced a different form of essentialism, that of primitivism. The notion that the "further" you get from Eurocentric modernity, the more "natural" or essential things are. Plamper particularly warns against a colonial, naturalising, and primitivising tendency in intellectual quests for a source or essence of emotions (or anything else), writing "…one should not treat that which is non-European as timeless" (Plamper 2015, 31). Cultural constructivism must also be cautious of imagining different peoples, cultures, and societies are so diverse and so unique that cross-cultural understandings or relatability is impossible.

Complimenting a constructivist stance on emotions is the cognitivist theory of emotions. Rather than emotions as physical entities, they are seen as entities of cognition. A workable definition of cognitivist emotions might be "emotion is activated cognitive material which is always directed towards a particular end, and which also has to be 'translated' at such high speed that it remains below the threshold of 'attention'" (Plamper 2015, 257). The cognitive model of emotions generally holds that from perceptions, appraisals are formed and these constitute our emotions—the idea that the perceived object affects the perceiver (*ibid*, 204). Cognitivists are thus less concerned with finding the essential nature of emotions or placing their origin in a part of the brain or body, and emphasise instead what emotions do in the world and for experiencers of emotion. For Robert Solomon "pure emotions do not exist" tainted as they are by "habituation, power dynamics, culture, gender, and the very structure of the human psyche" and so the problem comes down to understanding (Bradshaw 2008, 179). Emotions take on a communicative role for cognitivists. An emotion is not a mere feeling, as pain is a feeling—"it is also an outlook, an attitude, a reaching out to the world" (Solomon 2008, 195). As such, "…emotions are tied to action, whether the cool and protracted strategies of revenge that sometimes flow from anger or the spontaneous and momentary expression of delight or surprise on someone's face (*ibid*, 196).

William Reddy was at the very forefront of developing a historical theory of emotions, and in particular with crafting the cognitivist view of the emotions. Reddy felt, up until his 1995 work, that "emotion" was being used in an uncritical, common-sense way (Plamper 2010, 238). Drawing from cognitive sciences in a novel way, Reddy believed the research had shown "that emotions are virtually indistinguishable from cognition itself" (Reddy 2001, 321). The cognitive approaches to emotions tend to all recognise a physical element to emotional experience, in Oatley's terms emotions involve both mind and body (Oatley 2004, 3). Rorty writes that "some—but not all—emotions can also be described as feelings, associated with proprioceptive states" (Rorty 2008, 20). However, the physical aspects of emotions are deemed secondary to the essence of emotions themselves in a cognitivist view. This is likely why cognitive takes on emotion are far more popular and convincing than non-cognitive approaches, in that they allow for the nuances of physical emotional responses (blushing, running, trembling, etc.) while also providing a compelling answer for what emotions are, and why emotions vary despite often having overlapping physical reactions, and vary between cultures and time periods. Cognitive theories fall along a wide range with respect to the degree of "cognition" in emotions. But at their root, emotions according to cognitive theories are mental evaluations, or appraisals. Some cognitivists argue that emotions are socially constructed, in part or entirely: "If emotions are largely the product of our beliefs and evaluations, and if our beliefs and evaluations are in general acquired through cultural transmission, then our emotional experiences can be regarded as a direct legacy of our social experiences and education" (Ferry and Kingston 2008, 13).

Judgement and Intentionality

Often introduced with the epitaph "The Philosopher of Feelings," Martha Nussbaum has risen to the forefront of theories of political emotions, with special prominence in public discourse. For Nussbaum, who calls herself a Neo-Stoic, emotions "involve judgements about important things" (Nussbaum 2001, 19). In fact, according to Nussbaum, judgements are necessary for emotions, as emotions involve an appraisal of an external object in regard to the well-being of the self (*ibid*, 56, 19). This, significantly, involves an acknowledgement that one is needy and incomplete (*ibid*, 19), that human beings are incontrovertibly and essentially vulnerable. Further, Nussbaum articulates this particular well-being humans seek as eudaimonistic, which she defines (differently from the ancient understanding) as pertaining to one's own flourishing (*ibid*, 30, 50). Such eudaimonistic objects are not given mere instrumental value in one's life but are benefitted for their own sake as they contribute to a complete human life (*ibid*, 32). Robert C. Solomon[69]—another at the forefront of developing the cognitive theory of emotions—argued in "Emotions and Choice" that emotions are judgements, and further, that the bodily experiences of emotion are not necessary components (Ferry 2008, 101). As an answer for why emotions often prompt regrettable actions, Solomon states that emotions are "rash judgments that are summoned in times of 'urgency'" and thus do not tend to produce the most satisfactory or lasting results, which makes them limited, not irrational or bodily (*ibid*).

[69] Interestingly in light of Chapter 2, Solomon had an expertise in business ethics.

Noncognitive theories of emotion see emotions and/or passions as simply waves of some force, a drive, but Nussbaum's cognitive approach, she argues, can demonstrate that emotions are indeed different, not simply manifestations of one same force, and not all necessarily equal (Nussbaum 2001, 453).

If emotions are judgements, it entails a degree of individual responsibility for them. A normative judgement can be changed and influenced by argument and evidence, and given human capacity to search, act, and choose, people are therefore responsible for the judgements they end up making (Ferry 2008, 101-102). For Oatley and Jenkins, "an emotion…is based on something like a built-in inference about what has happened and what to do next" (Oatley and Jenkins 1996, 258), it is an assessment of a thing or a situation, and following that judgement we further judge or determine what to believe or do. Emotions allow us to make predictions (*ibid*), and thus in their capacity as judgements or elements of evaluation, they are no less rational than any other part of human consciousness which allows for assessment and determination in order to pursue the best course of action (a eudaimonistic course, as Nussbaum would argue).

Though the goal for the Stoics was a calm apathy (*apatheia*) that would lead to an even further apathetic calm (*ataraxia*), rejecting all emotions as erroneous appraisals, those such as Nussbaum who describe themselves as neo-Stoics see emotions as genuine appraisals, some which may be erroneous but not constitutively (Plamper 2015, 15). Oatley remarks that appraisals, or evaluations, are not only the most common view of the emotions, but the general cause of the emotions themselves, when he writes "…emotions are most typically caused by evaluations—psychologists call them appraisals—of events in relation to what is important to us: our goals, our concerns, our aspirations" (Oatley 2004, 3). Emotions are evaluations at many different levels: the past and the future, about what is harmful or beneficial, and how to act in light of those considerations. Oatley writes, “emotions are based on what we know, and they include thoughts…about what has happened or what might happen next” and also often create an urge “to act in an emotional way” such as to give a hug or stomp one’s feet (*ibid*, 3-4). So more than simply being assessments, emotions are judgements that compel action. Emotions are “states of immediate readiness to act” in the words of Nico Frijda (*ibid*, 4).

Emotions thus are also thought of as motivations since they exist as judgements/evaluations/appraisals. Oatley and Jenkins write that “what is implied in research on appraisal is that emotions are typically caused by events and are (in the philosophical sense) intentional—they have an object of some sort (Oatley and Jenkins 1996, 101). Rorty states that “when we focus on their consequences on behaviour, most emotions can also be described as motives” (Rorty 2008, 20). Reddy writes that “the concept of emotions as used in the West is closely associated with the individual’s most deeply espoused goals; to feel love for one’s spouse or fear of one’s opponent, presumably, is to be moved by those things one most authentically wants” (Reddy 2001, 114). But they do not appear or act as clear, distinct motivations an agent might particularly call upon or explain to others. Reddy elaborates further, writing “…emotions are a kind of precondition of volitions and motivation; they convey the weight of hundreds of past volitions and motivations into the present.” (*ibid*, 120). Emotions as articulated by Reddy are more like a backdrop compilation of motivation, or the metaphorical soil from which motivation-seedlings might sprout. This is akin to the way emotions relate to goals as well—they are not necessarily direct, articulate goals, but a base from which goals are created, and through which they are filtered. Specific activities almost always represent combinations and compromises among many goals (*ibid*), and these goals are blended and layered, with articulable goals standing upon more primary and often less immediately registered, but perhaps even more fundamental, goals. For instance, “I want to publish a paper in this well known journal” would rest upon “I want to advance my academic career,” resting upon “I want to be able to engage in fulfilling and lasting research,” upon “I want to leave a mark on the world and knowledge-creation seems a good way to do so.” But as tied to motivations as emotions might be, emotions are not equivalent to goals or motivations. As Rorty states, “…when we speak of psychological state as an emotion, contrasting it to motives, feelings, moods, or character traits, we focus on the ways we are affected by our appraisals, evaluative perceptions, or descriptions” (Rorty 2008, 21). Emotions convey something particular about the human self, and goal and motivations are understood in this particular sense of feeling and of being affected.

For most cognitivists, emotions cannot be morally evaluated as emotions in themselves—cognitivists are generally the strongest voices in denouncing the “emotions as deceptive” or “emotions as evil” tropes—but the cause or object of the emotion, and the actions taken in response to the emotion, are what can be morally weighed. This was the case with ancient philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, for whom a passion’s moral worth was determined by the object of the passion (Kingston 2008, 113). Such evaluations of objects, however, might differ or even contrast, for instance Spinoza’s association of pride with vice in contrast to Hume’s near praise of pride as aggregable self-satisfaction (and not exclusively vicious) (Ferry and Kingston 2008, 9). As Leah Bradshaw puts it, “emotional responses in themselves do not warrant our praise or blame” (Bradshaw 2008, 180). It is their *objects* and our *reactions to them* that are assessed (*ibid*). Aristotle remarks that it means nothing to simply feel bad about something—“for compassion to have any substance politically, it has to be converted to virtue, which is measured be reasoned actions” (*ibid*). It is choices and courses of action which are judged, not the experienced emotions—the joy, or sorrow, or anger—on their own (though they may have "caused" or propelled or contributed to the course of action) (*ibid*).

Given the establishment of emotions being evaluations and/or responses to some object in the world, emotions are deemed to be intentional—they have an intentionality, a direction, a relation. The objects of emotions are intentional objects, integrated within the interpretation of the experiencer, whether or not this perception or interpretation is accurate or not (Nussbaum 2001, 27, 28). In other words, it is not about the identity of the object in-and-of-itself, but about the way in which that object is understood relative to the well-being of the subject (*ibid*, 28). The objects may not be "objectively" good, or valuable by all, but for those experiencing an emotion relating to the object, they hold such significance in some way—not egotistical, but therefore localised (*ibid*, 51-52). Quoting Campos et al., Oatley and Jenkins remark that emotions "are the very center of human mental life" and "...emotions are those processes which 'establish, maintain change, or terminate the relation between the person and the environment on matters of significance to the person' and thus 'emotions link what is important for us to the world of people, things, and happenings'" (Oatley and Jenkins 1996, 122).

Nussbaum uses intentionality to distinguish emotions from appetites: appetites *push*, emotions *pull* (Nussbaum 2001, 131). An appetite will exist no matter the presence of an object, pushing one to seek out an object to satisfy that appetite, whereas emotions revolve entirely around certain objects and the meanings of those objects (*ibid*). Further, appetites are more specifically satisfied—hunger is only satisfied with food, or something to fill the stomach in the worst of circumstances (*ibid).* In contrast, emotions are quite versatile in the ways they might be satisfied (*ibid*). Similarly Rorty writes that "the immediate object of an emotion is characteristically intentional, directed, and referring to objects under descriptions that cannot be substituted" (Rorty 2008, 22). A favourite song, or a loved person, or an enemy cannot be simply swapped and produce the same emotion. Exchanging carrot soup for beet soup would still satisfy hunger—any preference for one or the other very usually is not about the meaning or worth or relationship of one to the dish, and if that is the case, it is because there is an emotional connection present, or it is at least not merely about satisfying hunger. Ferry writes that for Aquinas, the species of emotion is determined by its object: hope, for instance, is distinguishable from fear, joy, or despair by the conditions of its object (in the case of hope, a possible, future, good that is arduous or difficult in attaining, whereas fear is not good, joy is in the present, etc.) (Ferry 2008, 87). Emotions, for Reddy, are defined as "goal-relevant activations of thought material that exceed the translating capacity of attention within a short time horizon" (Reddy 2001, 128). Emotives[70] are "a type of speech act different from both performative and constative utterances, which both describes (like constative utterances) and changes (like performatives) the world, because emotional expression has an exploratory and a self-altering effect on the activated thought material of emotion" (*ibid*).

Oatley argues the intentionality of emotions allows them to act as signs or signals to the experiencer. He argues that emotions are both signals to the experiencer, steering them "towards those things we evaluate as worthwhile in our projects, away from what would be deleterious," but also operate as signals to others, who notice the way one reacts and acts and can infer based on their own experiences what the other is feeling, and "so: as evaluations, emotions are guides, to us and to others. As commitments, they are the sinews and articulations of our relationships" (Oatley 2004, 6). Emotions point people to what is vitally important to them, they determine or

[70] Emotives for Reddy came about as a term because emotions are not constative or performative, but a third kind of expression (Plamper 2010, 240). In other words, "to do justice to the mixed character of statements about emotions, Reddy suggests the concept *emotive*" (*ibid*, 252).

reveal one's priorities and commitments, and in general, they give life meaning (*ibid*, 12). A close relationship must exist between the coordination of goals and emotion, and according to Reddy:

> Strong emotions such as joy or grief indicate the relevance of high-priority goals to a present condition; sudden emotions such as the rapid onset of fear or anger indicate that a goal not currently being pursued must be given a higher priority in response to a surprise or disappointment in the environment…it is the goal-relevant intensity and valence of emotions that renders them inherently enjoyable or inherently uncomfortable. It is precisely here that emotions become politically relevant, because they are capable of guiding action long after explicit threats or explicit rules have been forgotten. (Reddy 2001, 119).

Emotion and Reason

Sokolon writes that "affect is connected to more than simply pleasures and pains; it includes a response to external stimulus and circumstances. And contemporary research finds that social decision making is an interaction requiring both rational and emotional contributions. A seemingly bad or painful emotion thus may be essential in a complex decision-making process" (Sokolon 2008, 168). If emotions are judgements, evaluations, and/or appraisals, they are *rational*, the cognitivists argue. Charles Taylor points out the reason-emotion dichotomy, and states that the philosophy and common sense of (presumably modern and/or Western) culture place "passion or emotion in another category from reason"; that "feeling and thinking are separate" (Taylor 2008, vii). Philip Walsh observes that even those who are critical of a stark contrast between emotion and reason often end up still maintaining a notion of rationality as *detachment*, whereas emotions indicate *attachment* or involvement (Walsh 2021, 377). Such a view lends itself to those perspectives which hold that emotions are to be restrained if one is to think clearly or rationally (*ibid*), that emotions will lead a person astray if they are not contained carefully. But Walsh counters such a position, arguing that it neglects the function of emotions as *capacities* that connect us to our world and give us cause and ability to reason about that world (*ibid*). As Solomon writes, “emotions do not simply ‘happen,’ but are activities we ‘do,’ stratagems that work for us, both individually and collectively… [and therefore] the emotions can be said to be rational (or irrational) despite the fact that ‘rationality’ is often restricted to those contexts involving articulate thought and calculation” (Solomon 2008, 193). Yet even if employing rationality in exclusively instrumental terms, in referring to a selection of means towards ends, emotions are clearly rational in that they have ends, whether clearly or vaguely defined, and are thus rationally purposive (*ibid*). Nussbaum argues that emotions are rational, though she is cautious about this claim and states that emotions at least certainly *can be* rational. She writes “some emotions are at least potential allies of, and indeed constituents in, rational deliberation” (Nussbaum 2001, 454). Ferry writes, “it is impossible…for humans to fully free even their sense experiences from the influence of reason” (Ferry 2008, 104). And indeed, if humans are defined by their reason, if man truly is a rational animal, even the perceived antagonist of reason, the emotions, cannot escape reason itself.

But as demonstrated in the historical context in Chapter 2, rationality must be defined. Two accounts of rationality are given by Robert H. Frank. Present aim theory states that “rationality is taken to be the efficient pursuit of whatever aims one has at the moment of deliberation and action” (Frank 1988, 67). This could mean, however, a person with a desire to drink cyanide would be rational in doing so (*ibid*, 68). According to self interest theory, by contrast, “an act is rational if it efficiently promotes the interests of the person who performs it”—if a person knew they could get away with cheating on a test but do not, this is irrational (*ibid*). The self interest theory of rationality certainly fits the problematised understanding of the interests that came about in modernity, that while perhaps not morally pure, the pursuit of self interest is rational and predictable. But if applied to the cognitivist view of emotions, something related to Nussbaums *eudaimonism* could emerge. Nussbaum, I believe it is quite safe to say, would not condone cheating, however following her *eudaimonistic* perspective, it would be because cheating is actually less rational than not cheating, in that not cheating—whether to prove oneself, to maintain moral commitments, or perhaps to preserve one's reputation—would better serve and promote human flourishing. Nussbaum's *eudaimonistic* view of the emotions, emotions as evaluations/judgements, therefore, subscribes to a benevolent[71] self interest theory of rationality. Ferry and Kingston do provide a refreshing cautionary remark in response to the preoccupation of fighting for the recognition of the emotions as rational entities: "Regarding our capacity to reason as inextricably tied to our emotional capacities may do little to change our understandings other than to suggest an alternative phenomenological description of what sort of reasoning is actually taking place" (Ferry and Kingston 2008, 10).

Rationality itself gives way to thinking about what is done with rationality, as shown above with the move from pure definition to a more practical understanding of what is rational. This might be simply rationality, but it can also be termed (rational) deliberation. Bradshaw provides a definition: "deliberation is…a nonspecialized kind of reasoning, the imaginative capacity that human beings have to forge an ethical life for themselves. The sort of intelligence that deliberation reaches for is "a state grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about what is good or bad for a human being" (Bradshaw 2008, 173).

Emotions as Political Entities

[71] Certainly befitting the liberal tradition, with cautious promoters of the benevolence of sentiments and interests such as Adam Smith and John Stewart Mill.

Kingston argues "that the rational normative ideal that dominates contemporary liberalism and liberal democracy in the Anglo-American world could only be successful on the foundations of prior suppositions about the political relevance of the passions" (Kingston 2008, 110). A paradoxical tension in the study of emotions in politics is the ongoing claims that emotions are being finally considered as political entities, after centuries or more of demonization, but that the emotions are also being revived from their former political relevancy. Of course, the demonization of the emotions in politics is incredibly political—political relevancy of the emotions need not be acceptance or praise of the role of the emotions—and it is furthermore incredibly clear that emotions have always, in some manner or another, been reckoned with politically. Before tackling the history of the emotions and their political trajectory, and before turning to some of the persistent misconceptions plaguing political emotions theory, it is necessary to detail how contemporary theories of emotions understand emotions as political entities.

Physicalist, universalising, naturalising views of emotions do find their way into political discourse frequently, usually presenting a view of emotions as inherently manipulative but nevertheless natural (in evolutionary terms) realities that simply must be dealt with, often with more conservative political frameworks (powerful leaders and bolstering security).[72] However, in addition to providing mostly dead ends for engagement and theorising, emotions theorists as aforementioned by and large do not subscribe to rote physicalist views of emotions, and such views do remain far less frequent when compared to cognitivist ones.

[72] See McDermott, Rose. 2020. "Leadership and the Strategic Emotional Manipulation of Political Identity: An Evolutionary Perspective." *The Leadership Quarterly* 31: 1-11.

Arlie Hochschild writes that emotions are shaped by social rules, forming “conventions of feeling” which may only be surprising when contrasted with unpatterned and unpredictable emotional behaviour (Hochschild 1979, 551, 552). Affect deemed socially unacceptable is more often than not suppressed by people, and individuals usually attempt to make their feelings appropriate to the situation they find themselves in (*ibid*, 552). Social factors influence both how people feel, and what they think and do about how they feel (*ibid*). Individuals attempt to determine what feelings are appropriate, what degree or extent to showing or feeling a feeling is appropriate, under which circumstances (*ibid*, 559). Hochschild writes that “we assess the ‘appropriateness’ of a feeling by making a comparison between feeling and situation, not by examining the feeling *in abstracto*,” and we assess with a “socially normal” yardstick (*ibid*, 560). Individuals engage in this “emotion work” to fit rules not of one’s own making—so much so that feelings are often spoken of as if they have or are duties (a “right” to feel angry, “ought” to feel grateful, “should” have hit us harder) (*ibid*, 563, 564). These “feeling rules” set the extent, the direction, and the duration of feelings (*ibid*, 564). Cognitive, bodily, and expressive techniques are also employed to perform this work (*ibid*, 563). Generally, the task for individuals is to reduce dissonance as much as tolerable between what is felt and what is believed or expected ought to be felt (*ibid*, 565). This demonstrates to a great extent the degree to which feelings or emotions are shaped culturally and communally. Further, Plamper notes that “…conceptions of emotion have an impact upon the way emotion is experienced in the self-perception of the feeling subject” (Plamper 2015, 32). So not only the type of emotion, and its degree of depth of expression, mould the way it is experienced by individuals, but the very range of possible emotions themselves already condition what might be felt.

Warren D. TenHouten views emotions as responses to social relations, as emotional objects are usually persons, groups of persons, categories of persons, or the self in relation to others (Walsh 2021, 384). This puts emotions squarely in the realm of the political. Human emotions are primarily about one's place in the world in relation to others and the social structures that are navigated by the self and others. In the most obvious sense emotions are political because "they are about power, persuasion, manipulation, intimidation," but even more deeply, there is a politics of emotions in regards to "the ways in which we position and…manipulate ourselves in relation to the world, quite apart from the effects of our emotions or expressions on other people" (Solomon 2008, 196). Labelling, recognising, and the reportage, description, and theorising of emotions is all inherently political (*ibid*, 196-197). Additionally, emotions are political because we use them to move others (*ibid*, 198). But emotions are political in ways beyond the social shaping or relevancy of the emotions, as argued by William Reddy.

William Reddy proposed two crucial terms in his history of emotions: first, emotive. In Reddy's own words, "statements about how we feel deserve a special term; I have proposed the term "emotives", which "do things to the world" (Reddy 2001, 322). Emotive was Reddy's answer in capturing the acting power of emotions. Emotions are ubiquitous to social life, and thus communities seek to train or cultivate emotions to reflect social values and structures, and consequently "emotions are subjected to normative judgments" (*ibid*, 323). Reddy argues emotives as a term is significant, in that is expresses both the fundamental uncertainty that humans live with, and why—"emotion claims can be neither true nor false; instead they are more or less successful attempts to alter or stabilize, explore or pledge" (*ibid*, 330). Stating the way one feels might be perceived as a neutral expression of a state of being from a common-sense basis, but Reddy counters this, arguing that in social reality, it makes a claim or a statement about the world.[73] Anger, joy, and fear all depend—according to cognitive and non-cognitive models—on outside stimuli, and the emotions in the end are judgements of those stimuli. Even if the physicalist model is correct, running from a bear might constitute fear itself, but the act of running nevertheless implies the judgement that a bear is to be feared. But it is much more clear for cognitivists that these judgements are at the forefront. Reddy, however, points out that the judgements are far from being neutral, and expressing certain emotions and controlling others has enormous social merit. Reddy argues that "those who achieve emotional ideals are admired and endowed with authority" (*ibid*, 323).

This leads to Reddy's concept of the emotional regime, which he famously explored in his attempts to understand the role of emotions in the French Revolution. While De Rivera, who uses "emotional climate" as a term describing "the mood of a cultural group or nation", an emotional regime comes about when the penalties and exclusions become a coherent structure, and compliance or defiance would be individually defining (Oatley and Jenkins 1996, 45; Plamper 2010, 243). For Reddy, this means emotions (or "emotives") are undoubtedly "of the highest political significance" and it is important to uncover and understand "how communities tend to shape the emotional management of their members (Reddy 2001, 323). Essentially, according to Reddy "any enduring political regime must establish as an essential element a normative order for emotions", and this is what comprises an "emotional regime" (*ibid*, 124). As Philip Walsh puts it, "…emotions are understood as 'appropriate' or 'inappropriate' relative to their relationship to the corresponding beliefs and their truthfulness" (Walsh 2021, 379). They are evaluated as appropriate according to social norms—what beliefs are held, what is deemed

[73] I would argue that emotions being declared as neutral states of being comes from a very specific culture and circumstance emerging from twentieth century therapy models, in which emotions are distanced and expressed neutrally strategically.

true, in a given community, society, or regime (and, what is a valid way of expressing belief, and of knowing truth)? According to Reddy, "a normative style of emotional management is a fundamental element of every political regime, of every cultural hegemony" (Reddy 2001, 121).

Emotional regimes can be strict or soft. Reddy argues such strict regimes are especially prevalent after conquest and colonisation when specific normative emotional strategies must be imposed to subjugate the oppressed society, and emotional suffering is a result (Reddy 2001, 126). In strict regimes, normative emotions are aspired to and even required, while deviant emotions are avoided (*ibid*, 125). In softer or more flexible regimes, strict emotional discipline is only required at certain times, or in certain places or institutions (for instance, the military) (*ibid*). This plays out more subtly than feeling compelled towards performing specific emotional displays. Emotional regimes are integrated in all elements of social being, especially in the "taken for granted" domain such as language and word selection. For instance, are conscripted infantry soldiers called brave heroes, or are they victims (Plamper 2010, 245)? This leads Reddy to argue that "emotives are…essential to understanding the political significance of ideology, law, state ritual, coercion, and violence" (Reddy 2001, 331).

The Historical Trajectory of the Role of the Emotions

The narrative of the affective turn—that hitherto emotions had been villainised and excluded—is not totally false.[74] But further research, particularly historical research (both the history of thought, and socio-historical research), has problematised this narrative, providing more than mere nuance. The rejection and villianisation of the emotions is not ageless, nor has it been newly introduced by Christo-Platonic thought in the middle ages only to be challenged in

[74] Amusingly, even Descartes complains about the lack of consideration and treatment of emotions prior to himself, writing to open *The Passions of the Soul* that hitherto the studies of the passions have been poor, and he has to respond to them "as if I were dealing with a matter no one had ever treated before" (Descartes 2015, 195).

the later twentieth century. Understandings of emotions over the millennia have been complex and varied, an indeed one of the most significant changes was the creation of the category of the emotions themselves (particularly complicating the discussion of historical "emotions"). Rorty emphasises the degree to which the emotions are not an ahistorical or transhistorical category, as at a particular point in history "passions became emotions" and later "emotions became affects or attitudes" especially as the intentionality of emotions was factored in (Rorty 2008, 20). These are and were not simple changes of term, but the creation and recreation of categories, each with their own criteria and foundational logics. Understanding those foundational logics are crucial to understanding what emotions are, and how they are used and understood, socially and historically. They are also crucial in understanding emotions as political entities.

Reddy writes in his discipline-altering work *The Navigation of Feeling* that "emotion is the one concept that has most needed theoretical investigation, that has most—and most mysteriously—suffered from theoretical neglect in our long Western examination of the self" (Reddy 2001, 319). Reddy argues that this opens the door out of the "poststructuralist dead end" of the late twentieth century and allows for the reestablishment and reconceptualization of the self, one that recognises agency, allowing freedom and historical change to regain their significance (*ibid*, 319, 320). Reddy's groundbreaking work typifies the emotions-hitherto-neglected narrative, but also pushes the other crucial question: what are the emotions? How did the category of the emotions come to be?

The creation of the category emotions saw both an expansion, and a contraction, of the emotions. Emotions as a term and category came to encompass formerly distinct and diverse phenomena. While this category does not come about until the nineteenth century, the dynamics leading towards its creation have their roots in early modernity. Rorty cites those opposing

Hobbes as trying “to secure benevolence, sympathy, and other disinterested attitudes as counterbalances to self-interest” by calling them “sentiments with motivational power” as an example of this expansion through reclassification (Rorty 2008, 20). On the other end, there was a narrowing of the emotions category, a contraction of focus of the proper domain of the emotions, which excised much of moral philosophy and theology. Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Spinoza, Darwin, James, and Wundt make up the general canon of passions and emotions in history and philosophy, while Augustine, Aquinas, Jonathan Edwards, Joseph Butler, Thomas Reid, Thomas Brown, Thomas Chalmers, James McCosh, and George T. Ladd are neglected (Dixon 2003, 7). Roughly, from antiquity to the mid-nineteenth century, philosophy and theology defined the emotions and the way they were to be understood, along with (to lesser degrees) rhetoric, medicine, and literature (Plamper 2015, 10). After 1860, the emotions were dominantly defined by experimental psychology, until the late twentieth century when neuroscience took over the role (*ibid*).

The history of emotions is an overwhelmingly European (and North American) history (Plamper 2015, 64). This stark Anglo-Euro-centrism is important to keep in mind both when making claims about the emotions, and when attempting to trace the history of emotions. In addition to providing a counter to the narrative of “the history of the West is the history of increasing emotional restraint,” Rosenwein in her work emphasises the necessity of abandoning the ahistorical transferring of the modern emotions category onto periods where this category did not exist (*ibid*, 68).

Rebecca Kingston unpacks what she views as the role of Descartes in the trajectory of the emergence of the modern understanding of the emotions as separate from reason. Firstly, she argues Descartes separated himself out from moral and social philosophy (jurisprudence), insisting his explorations of the passions were scientific (Kingston 2008, 111). Indeed, much like Hobbes, Descartes explores emotions naturalistically, anatomically and physically, in his work *The Passions of the Soul*. Kingston thus argues that "it is precisely this analytical disposition, as well as the analysis that flows from it, that sowed the seeds of the ideas that the passions can be thought of as separate from reason and that they are idiosyncratic, unique to each individual, and therefore not a suitable subject for broader social analysis" (*ibid*). Then, Kingston argues Descartes enshrines mind-body dualism and gives an alternative idea of what the soul is: functionally an entity in union with the body but conceptually distinct from that body (*ibid).* She notes that Descartes points to the body as the source of passionate motivation, rather than the (lower) soul itself—passions are for Descartes totally bodily, not of the appetitive part of the soul (*ibid*). This is a bit of a simplification, as Descartes also discusses the "emotions of the soul," which exist purely as entities of the soul, which he distinguishes from what he terms passions in their absence of bodily origin (Descartes 2015, 255). Fay Bound Alberti argues that the mechanistic character of Descartes' philosophy of the body meant that the mind or soul was but an observer of these passions (Alberti 2006A, 8-9). Consequently, the mind-body distinction allowed for the potential of a divorce between the physiological and psychological, and Descartes offered a physical origin for the passions (*ibid*, 9). Passions have their origin in the body/*soma* and are only processed and understood by the mind, and as such what had been considered "passions of the mind" were feelings perceived by the mind, but actually came from and were maintained by the "nervous fluids" of the body (*ibid*). She writes that Descartes' emphasis on the distinction between the will and passion meant that passions were relegated to the realm of sensations (things received into the soul) whereas volitions came from within the soul (Kingston 2008, 112). And the physical is strong and so for Descartes, Kingston argues, full self-command or control or eradication of the passions is an impossibility, *contra* the Stoics (*ibid*). I would argue that there is more subtlety in Descartes' arguments than this.

Despite the rigorous mechanistic character he ascribes to the physical body, his emphasis on the unity of soul, and of soul to body, is not necessarily as restrictive as is commonly depicted. Descartes writes "the soul is in a very real sense joined to the whole of the body, and that it cannot strictly speaking to be said to bee in one of its parts to the exclusion of the rest," and further the soul itself is a unified whole—a unified soul, wholly intertwined with a whole[75] human body (Descartes 2015, 207). There are no half souls, and the soul itself is not divided as Plato depicts, meaning there is no rational part that acts in distinct ways from an appetitive part.[76] Descartes writes, "one and the same soul is sensitive and rational, and all its appetites are acts of will" (*ibid*, 214). This does mean that for Descartes it is indeed the body that opposes the soul, yet the dualism of body and soul are possibly exaggerated (*ibid*, 215). Against a tripartite soul, Descartes' proposal is rather drastic, but especially in light of his emphasis on the unification of body and soul, the body is in no way demonised. While he did insist that the passions are strong, the physical reality of the world and the body is strong, and reason cannot simply stop a passion, this does not leave one helpless (*ibid*, 213). Passions can be reasoned with or rationally considered in order to take the best course of action in light of circumstances (*ibid*, 213-214). The more powerful the physical and bodily element of a passion, the more challenging it may be for the will, but the will is not helpless in the face of the passions (*ibid*, 214).

[75] The body's wholeness for Descartes is simply being alive, an amputation or injury does not reduce the soul in any way (Descartes 2015, 207).

[76] Descartes also argues that there can be no "appetitive-dominant" people or "reason-dominant" people as could be the case with a divided-soul model. He writes that no soul is so weak that the passions cannot be properly controlled with the right guidance (Descartes 2015, 217).

Importantly, Descartes is certainly no foe of the passions. He argues they serve a vital role in human life. The "natural function" of the passions, he argues, is to get the soul to consent to actions that will benefit the body (to preserve it, or improve it) (Descartes 2015, 250). A human is an intertwined soul and body, and thus emotions crucially operate towards human survival and thriving. Descartes portrays the soul/mind and the body working together through the passions, employing reason and experience to make the best choices regarding passionate experiences through life circumstances. Even more strongly, Descartes insists that there is no reason to fear the passions after reading his work, "for we see that they are all good of their nature, and that we are to avoid only their misuse or excess," and in fact, "it is the passions alone that make for all that is good or bad in this life" and "those most capable of being moved by passion are those capable of tasting the most sweetness n this life" (*ibid*, 279, 280). Thus, attributing the exclusion of the passions or the separation of the passion of reason to Descartes seems misplaced—Descartes theories do not stray very far from contemporary cognitivist perspectives if the whole of his *Passions of the Soul* is considered. However, what can be more easily and fairly linked to the trajectory is the attempt at naturalistic science. According to Desmond Clarke, the main impetus for Descartes' new depiction of the human mind and the emotions was Descartes' radical attempt to apply a standard seventeenth-century model of scientific explanation, previously applied to the natural world, to the very centre of concerns in moral philosophy and the philosophy of mind" (Kingston 2008, 112). Spinoza followed closely from Descartes, and "divided feelings into actions and passions, such that actions have the origin in us, while passions have an external origin" (Plamper 2015, 20). He also—as the mind is part of nature—believed feelings obeyed generally valid laws (*ibid*). Thus they could be, like Descartes desired, scientifically treated. And so Descartes seems to set forth the Enlightenment trends of physicalism, which eventually resulted in the divorce of mind, soul, and morality, from the discussions of passion. But Descartes was still far from the physical reductivism and secular writing of William James, and still emphasised the importance of virtue in the passions (Descartes 2015, 256). The divorce was not to be actualised till much later.

The vivid letter-writing of the Enlightenment overturned “the Western association of oral communication with emotion, and written with rational communication” (Plamper 2015, 113). With the Enlightenment, Plamper states, “the canonization of reason demanded sacrificed, and the strict separation of reason and feeling was one such sacrifice. Consequently emotion was defined as unreason, celebrated as such by some, damned as such by others” (*ibid*, 23-24). Emotions were not condemned or demonised by all, and during the Age of Sentimentalism (1720 – 1800), “during which Jean-Jacques Rousseau became the pathfinder for a cult of emotional authenticity,” emotions were embraced as natural allies that were necessary because they were not rational (*Plamper 2015*, 24). But Kant’s work more fully expressed the separation of reason and feeling, but negatively (contrary to Rousseau) (*ibid*). But the “affective discourses and terminologies in the eighteenth century were too complex for it to be possible to discern in them any *single* attitude to human passions (or to ‘emotions’ or ‘feeling’ or ‘sentiment’)” (Dixon 2003, 66).

There are however distinct themes and trends which can be deemed eighteenth century developments. As Hirschman points out, the distinction between the troubling ‘passions’ and the cool and calculated ‘interests’ emerged in seventeenth and eighteenth century moral thought, and in generally the eighteenth century view of the passions was that they were autonomous and active agents, not movements of the will (Dixon 2003, 64). The eighteenth century discourse on the passions was also highly political, of course (*ibid*, 65). In the eighteenth century, a huge question was the relationship between the state and the individual, with the pressing need to respond to Hobbes and Mandeville: was concern for the welfare of others natural, or something that needed to be enforced by the state (*ibid*, 68)? Further urgent questions were on public and private appetites, duties and responsibilities, and moral authority (*ibid*). Passions involve physiological modification, while affections are acts of the will with no bodily disobedience (*ibid*, 56). Yet, the distinction at this time is not between reason and "emotion," but still the spiritual and the worldly (*ibid*). But the developments of the eighteenth century would produce a radical change in the nineteenth.

In the nineteenth century, passion and reason came to finally be fully separated in the dominant western philosophical traditions, whichever prior trends contributed the most to this development be it Cartesian dualism or physicalism, the fears around passions in the social and political realm, or the new role of the interests and the shift in the moral understanding of the pursuit of self-interest and wealth accumulation. Reddy writes:

> In the late eighteenth century, reason and emotion were not seen as opposed forces; in the early nineteenth they were. In the late eighteenth century, natural sentiment was viewed as the ground out of which virtue grew. In the early nineteenth, virtue was regarded as an out-growth of the exercise of the will, guided by reason, aimed at disciplining passions—much as it had been from ancient times up to the seventeenth century. In the late eighteenth century, political reform was deemed best guided by natural feelings of benevolence and generosity. In the early nineteenth century, while some would have continued to grant benevolence and generosity a role in politics, much more importance was attached to personal qualities such as commitment to principle, soldierly courage, a willingness, if necessary, to resort to violence, and, above all, a proper understanding of justice and right. (Reddy 2001, 216-217).

Many novelties of the nineteenth century allowed for this "final result," but the rise of psychology was perhaps *the* deciding factor in this transformation. In the latter nineteenth century, "philosophy had to surrender its status as the master science to the natural sciences, whose claim to objectivity…placed the humanities under very great pressure to review their own methods" (Plamper 2015, 44). Now, "'objectivity' always meant the rationality of the scientist, understood to be a neutralization of emotion" (*ibid*). Some ancient philosophers held the passions to be *morbi*—diseases of the soul—and similarly, the philosophers and physicians of the nineteenth century saw passions "as potentially pathological moral states that were intimately connected with the affections of the body," based on anecdotes from medical and practical experience, physiological science, and religion and moralism (Dixon 2006, 46). And as the boundaries between philosophy, moral thought, medicine, and psychiatric specialisms grew stronger, the emotions were less frequently dealt with in the moral[77] disciplines (*ibid*). Psychology began to blossom as a discipline in the 1860s, and needed to carve out its own domain and legitimacy as a science, and in particular set itself apart from theology and Christian cosmology (Plamper 2015, 174). This did not mean, however, that there was a linear secularisation process in which Christian theological elements faded away, but it is more likely these elements were rechanneled into a new secular framework (*ibid*). For instance, not only did James' treatment of the emotions demonstrate the dominance of scientific rhetoric, but moreover, emotions are no longer the under the purview of theologians and philosophers, but of physicians and nerve specialists (Dixon 2003, 209). Indeed, according to Thomas Dixon, the very project of this new psychology of the nineteenth century was to wrest "the professional and cultural authority to define the mind and its emotions away from theologians and metaphysicians" (*ibid*,

[77] Historically, "moral" did not only pertain to ethics, but held a broader range of ideas, encompassing pleasure, pain, motive, and disposition (Dixon 2006, 38-39). Thomas Dixon writes that "'moral' could be used to suggest a contrast with 'intellectual'; the passions and emotions of the mind could thus be distinguished from its rational operations, as 'active' or 'moral' rather than intellectual powers" (*ibid*, 39). It could also simply be opposed to physical or even medical, so the study of the human character rather than body (*ibid*, 39, 43).

210). Plamper credits the reductionist epistemology and the experimental psychology laboratories with the separation of free will and emotion that took place in the decades of the later nineteenth century (Plamper 2015, 175). Plamper writes that "the process through which experimental design developed was…reciprocal: epistemology determined experiments, and vice versa; emotional experiments determined conceptions of emotion, and vice versa" (*ibid*). Further:

> Around the same time, representatives of the new science of psychology developed a physiological conception of emotion, detached from free will and intention, which could be applied to the study of both humans and animals. This particular idea diffused very quickly because of the emergence of a transnational scientific community whose members corresponded with each other, met at conferences, sent each other books and offprints, and exchanged doctoral students. (Plamper 2015, 175).

If emotions were deemed physical, experiments were designed to measure those emotions and prove the theory of the physical emotions, generating a wave of new research that altered the understanding of the passions henceforth. Emotions were essentially created in the lab.

It was the early nineteenth century, "and not before, that a modern type of Cartesian dualism gained the undisputed upper hand in French thought, a type of dualism familiar in our own time" (Reddy 2001, 226). Descartes may have placed the origin of the passions in the body, but it was in the nineteenth century that emotions were made to be physically measurable—emotions practically became heart rates and blood pressure, the pH of saliva, or urine's sugar content (Plamper 2015, 180). And this was not exclusive to French thought—it dominated the Anglophonic world, and made its presence known around the world. Unfortunately unsurprisingly, certain people, and certain animals or even breeds of dog, were deemed more or less suitable for emotional experiments—fox terrier crosses and white middle aged men were considered the ideal subjects, while women, black people, and hares were deemed too "intrinsically emotional" (*ibid*). Plamper writes that "the ideal human reactive body was really one which had rendered itself willfully unemotional, which had eliminated free will, and this was of course a contradiction in terms. Ultimately instability and ambiguity, the aporias and paradoxes, lay in the nature of emotion itself" (*ibid*, 186). It is worth noting that in animal experiments, habituation to the lab/experiments was treated as an absence of emotion (*ibid*, 181). The subjective and linguistic aspects of emotion were minimised, and feelings were mystified, made into foreign and intangible though measurable entities through this scientific objectification (*ibid*, 184).

The twentieth century certainly had its crises of epistemology, of moral and social life, of language, with upheavals through political and intellectual thought and practice all across the globe. But by the mid-1990s, in the USA and Anglosphere it was the life sciences that rose to scientific, epistemic predominance (Plamper 2015, 59), just as psychology and natural sciences had in the nineteenth century. Interestingly, it was the attack on the New York Twin Towers in 2001 that furthered the rise of the life sciences and solidified the rejection of the linguistic turn (*ibid*, 61). Plamper writes:

> Ultimately, 9/11 accelerated the bio-revolution that had begun in the second half of the 1990s. This revolution involved the final displacement of physics as the leading science by biology, and the appropriation by the new 'life sciences' of what the nature of what had for centuries been considered the 'eternal' questions of humanity—free will, the nature of the self, also of feelings—and dealt with by the human sciences. (Plamper 2015, 61).

The triumph of the neurosciences could be observed clearly in science policy initiatives, the Decade of the Brain (1990-1999) for instance, which "leveraged economically by the deregulation of financial markets, the Internet, easier access to venture capital, and generally with the biotechnology boom that accompanied the dotcom boom" (*ibid*, 225). Other factors that pushed for this new neuroscientific objectivity were, in the United States especially, were Christian fundamentalism with its creationism and intelligent design, and the retreat from Enlightenment ideas (*ibid*, 226). Additionally, the decline and hostile rejection of post-structuralism (*ibid*). Plamper puts the motivation succinctly: "unlike culture, nature can be an enormous relief" (*ibid*, 227).

Yet as Frank says, "our beliefs about human nature help shape human nature itself" (Frank 1988, 237). Are the "emotion" of Joseph LeDoux in his 1966 neuroscientific research, of Klaus Scherer's experimental developmental psychology in 1979, and of Barbara Rosenwein's historical studies in 2002, all referring to the same thing (Plamper 2015, 10)? For Robert Zajoc, social psychologist, emotion is "postcognitive", with cognition and emotion as separate—"emotion played a leading, unconscious, and temporally precognitive role in all human behaviour, in particular where decision-making was involved" but in contrast, "affective responses were …'effortless, inescapable, irrevocable, holistic, more difficult to verbalize, yet easy to communicate and to understand'" (*ibid*, 205-206). For Zajonc, cognition was "slower, more complex, and more precise" given its working with "culturally contingent language," whereas emotion was evolutionary and prelinguistic, rapid and not as conscious, and thus far more universal than cognition and thus defied cultural borders (*ibid*, 206). Zajonc also used "affect" consistently (*ibid*). The abundantly popular terms "affect" and "affect theory" in social and political theory and research showcases the embrace of the neurosciences across disciplines. Plamper remarks: "Influenced by the neurosciences, the notion [affect] has in recent years increasingly assumed the sense of purely physical, prelinguistic, unconscious emotion" (*ibid*, 12).

In this era in which neurosciences dominate, a post-postmodern era that remains nameless perhaps (Plamper 2015, 225), or maybe it is the "post-truth" era, "emotions—or more precisely affects, as strong physical and unconscious feelings are called in the neurosciences—are central to the neuroscientific literature today that sets the pace" (Plamper 2015, 225). Human and social sciences nowadays make casual use of the neurosciences (*ibid*, 8). However the *history* of the emotions is so far not under the influences of the neurosciences, and according to Plamper this is a good thing—historians are not able to make use of hypotheses and theories in neuroscience (*ibid*, 298). There is nothing inherently wrong with borrowing from neurosciences, but there is a real danger in simplistic adaptations of the neurosciences (*ibid*). And even neuroscientists, as well as psychologists and political theorists, are quite guilty of this. Plamper warns that "there is no general model of cognition or of brain functioning that historians can 'borrow.' There are many, many models; they have their own labs, conferences, and journals, their own leaders and followers, their own 'handbooks'" (Plamper 2010, 248). Thus, in political, social, and historical research, there is no default or certain discovery that might be borrowed from the sciences that will allow for a simple explanation of the emotions, simple understandings of why people behave, or events happen, the way they do. The simplistic adoption of the too-broad category of the emotions, as well as specific models of emotions (whether psychoanalytic, cognitive, or physicalist-neuroscientific), has however led to numerous problems and misconceptions in political research and thinking on the emotions.

Misconceptions: What Are the Emotions, Actually?

Oatley claims, using directly cognitivist language, that only recently have people "thought to evaluate the evaluations which are our emotions" (Oatley 2004, 37). However, in direct contrast, Kingston observes that the (liberal, democratic) Western tradition/canon of political theory is full of sophisticated understandings of emotions in political life, and so she asks, "how and why did the passions come to be largely discounted—or at least delegitimized and marginalized—with regard to what is expected of citizens in their public actions and to the standards by which we judge the appropriateness of political outcomes? How did the passions in their public manifestations become so suspect in our tradition" (Kingston 2008, 109)? Put in words more partial to what has been addressed so far, why does the reason-emotion dichotomy exist now, and why is it so widely believed that that the emotions have always been villainised and excluded politically?[78] Because this is not the full or even necessarily true story, and its perpetuation has led to a "reinvention of the wheel" phenomenon in political theory—discoveries that one philosopher or another "actually" took the emotions seriously, or integrated them into their theory; or that *finally* an "I" or a "we" is/are providing a political account of emotions. And beyond these reinventions, the power and significance of the emotions as political entities is possibly overexaggerated.

Solomon argues that "emotions are still on the defence in philosophy (and they have only come into prominence in psychology since the 1990s) (Solomon 2008, 207). Reddy even remarks that the common-sense disciplinary division of labour emotions to the sphere of psychology, though even there were largely neglected until after the 1970s (Reddy 2001, 316), and the negligence of emotions even within psychology is a persistent theme. For instance, according to Nussbaum, fifty years before her work *Upheavals of Thought* (2001) psychology rejected the emotions—they passed out of scholarship the way the "will" had earlier, with the desire for behaviouralism to see victory (Nussbaum 2001, 93, 94). She insists that the inclusion of emotions does not entail the abandonment of scientifically interpreting human action, but

[78] Or even more broadly socially and in research.

rather forces science to recognise the reality of human psychology (*ibid*, 441). This is true politically as well—political institutions cannot ask people to give what they cannot offer and thus must be inclusive of the emotions (Nussbaum 2013, 117). Nussbaum couples the narrative of the political rejection of the emotions, with a psychological-scientific rejection of the emotions. To be sure, the will had been more or less eradicated, and behaviouralism "wins" within psychology, and everything prior to Darwin is lost in a disciplinary Dark Age, as tends to occur with the cumulative approach to sciences (Plamper 2015, 179). And yet, it was psychology that created the category of the *emotions*, the too-broad concept that has entirely conditioned the way people understand their varying ways of feeling as individual creatures and as social beings. Simultaneously, the emotions are rejected and abandoned, and are also converted into neuro-chemicals and processes that determine the contemporary "hard-wired" and yet "neuroplastic" human. Coupled with the cumulative nature of modern sciences leading to this forgetfulness of the thought and theories that preceded and were concurrent with the discoveries that are deemed notable for placing in a text book, the popularity and persuasive power of the neuro- and life-sciences allows implausible ideas to gain traction (*ibid*, 223). The profit motive goes hand-in-hand with this.[79] As Nussbaum has done, such a psychology-bound narrative has led thinkers to rescue the emotions (passions) of the past, and give them the respect they deserve, though too often the category of the emotions gets transplanted into past thought, sometimes with its hard-brain-chemistry, and is not given its own historical treatment. This has led to a widespread collective amnesia about the emotions of the past—they appear as newly explored, newly theorised entities ignored until cognitive science discovered their relevancy. Whether or not

[79] There has been a very specific publication model of these "big ideas" books, which rests upon the claim that it is life-scientists who are dealing with the "big issues" of life, yet are using far more reader-friendly language, and simplified answers, than Jean-Paul Sartre or any other twentieth century philosopher (nevermind their predecessors) ever could (Plamper 2015, 223-224). The work of John Brockman and his New York literary agency, particularly.

philosophy is recognised (though often only as the prelude to the true answers that neuro- and -life sciences can bring forth), Plamper writes that "…the idea that more that two and a half millennia of Western theological and philosophical thought about emotion has simply been displaced by one hundred and fifty years of research into the psychology of emotion is deeply problematic," and Western and non-Western categories, further, make little sense when so much region-and-world-wide transfer has occurred even before the psychologisation of the emotions (*ibid*, 12, 10).

So even when political theorists endeavour to recover the "emotions" from the past, the distortion of the category of emotions comes through in their treatments of thinkers. This does not make their claims erroneous, but it certainly warrants consideration when extracting thought situated in an entirely different framework of meaning and even cosmology. For instance, Ferry is trying to put forth an understanding of emotion that could encompass the range from the most physicalist to most cognitive understandings of emotion:

> Conceiving of emotion as an analogous term enables us to have the best of both worlds, in a sense. Emotions at the lowest end of the scale, emotions most closely approximating the cognate experiences of nonhuman animals, allow for the least amount of control. They are more closely tied to the body and more difficult to govern in an immediate sense. In contrast, those emotion-like experiences that belong to the will are completely under our control. The bulk of human emotions fall somewhere in the middle to lower end of the scale. (Ferry 2008, 106).

Ferry goes on to relay how cognitivists who identify emotions solely with judgements, like Solomon, neglect the complex interplay of stances towards the emotions and risk neglecting the dangers that exist within the emotions (*ibid*, 103). He writes, "noncognitive theories err in the opposite direction by eliminating the emotions from moral discourse as events over which we cannot exercise any control" (*ibid*). Ferry argues that Aquinas, a medieval thinker, respects the complexity of emotions (*ibid*). However, Aquinas did not work with, or within, a category of the “emotions.” While Ferry of course skillfully elaborates Aquinas’ thoughts for the modern reader, Aquinas himself did not need to justify these differences under the wide umbrella of the “emotions,” because the complexity was expressed by and through the absence of the broad category, in more nuanced and specified language.

Commonly cited to bolster the modern cognitivist position with respect for the complexity of emotions are the ancients, who—allegedly unlike moderns—recognised the rationality in emotions. The Greeks (Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics) viewed the passions (*pathé*) as cognitive states (Taylor 2008, viii). Aristotle insisted that good practical reasoning relies upon the emotions (Abizadeh 2008, 60), so who better to call upon to bring the emotions back to their rightful place alongside reason? Again, it is modern thinkers, especially Descartes and Kant, who are largely attributed with divorcing reason and emotion. Kant divorced the moral law from the passions, and reason alone was to determine the will from practical rules without the consideration of feeling (Ferry 2008, 79). According to Solomon, in ancient and medieval philosophy the view of emotions as purposive and functional was present, and resurfaced in the anti-Jamesian theories of the nineteenth century and after (Solomon 2008, 194).

Kingston highlights three problems that certainly have led to the emotion-reason dichotomy, which then lead to misunderstandings of how to understand the emotions historically and politically, and the general exclusion and amnesia of emotions. First, it is “the effacing or problematizing of the idea of a passion, shared by a political community, whose cause and object is political life; second, a greater tendency to ascribe the causes of all passion to physiology; and third, a modern emphasis on Kantian rational norms as the sole acceptable framework for political science” (Kingston 2008, 110). Problem number three will be treated, from a slightly different angle, in Chapter Five, but the other two are part and parcel of psychologization, the transformation of the passions (and co.) into the emotions, and the transplant of this category onto the theories of the past.

The first problem Kingston provides I will deal with more broadly: the problem of the general exclusion of emotions in the political realm, and/or the narrative of the longstanding exclusion of the emotions. This problem gives rise to a multitude of misconceptions is that of the direct exclusion and vilification of the emotions in politics. Rebecca Kingston refers to the three different theoretical views of the treatment of the emotions within liberal politics, all of which are major themes and trends in the literature on emotions and politics. To start there is the "neglect thesis", which holds "that traditional liberal and democratic theory does not incorporate any discussion at all of the emotions and the passions of the citizenry" (Kingston 2008, 109). This might be considered the overall rejection that emotions have any relevance or legitimacy in politics. Of course there have been simplistic dismissals of emotions as simply irrelevant. But more persuasively and accurately, emotions were relegated to the private realm exclusively, and individualised to the point of collective and political irrelevancy. Using Hirschman's analysis as support, Kingston notes that "there was an equally significant move away from exploring the public causes and objects of the passions toward a focus on their manifestations within the individual soul" (*ibid*, 111). Descartes is another good example of this (*ibid*). Emotions became entities encased in individual bodies and souls, though increasingly bodies and brains, and with that they were reduced to issues that may have to be socially navigated, but certainly not communal. And the moral individual of the Enlightenment was expected to overcome their passions an appetites and operate from pure reason (Bradshaw 2008, 178).

Kingston observes that historically, the marginalisation of the passions was not an intentional project, but "unintended consequence of other intellectual concerns" (Kingston 2008, 125). Shortly, I will discuss how this statement is far more accurate than is often realised. But first it is necessary to address one of the most pressing and pervasive elements of political exclusion that runs counter to this statement: that passions were absolutely intentionally excised from politics for their alleged dangerousness. Kingston calls this second theory of emotional exclusion the “marginalization critique”: that the focus has only been on the dangers of public emotions and how to limit those dangers (for example, permitting only those that can be “moderated and sublimated” into personal interest) (*ibid*, 109). Writing about the “little serious regard for the important and varied roles that emotion plays and should play within the political arena,” Ferry and Kingston suspect that this “may stem from a deep suspicion of the dangers that unchecked passions have wrought in the political history of the West. Indeed, those who trace the birth of modern liberal democracy to attempts to find a solid basis for social accommodation in the wake of the violence of the religious wars of the early modern period may see good historical cause to sideline emotion in politics” (Ferry and Kingston 2008, 3). Hirschman’s narrative showcases this theory. And Reddy very specifically focuses on how the marginalisation of passions was historically crucial following the French Revolution and all politics thereafter.

Reddy argues that the French revolution “began as an effort to transform all of France, by means of benevolent gestures of reform, into a kind of emotional refuge” (Reddy 2001, 147). However, after the Reign of Terror, a new pessimism regarding emotions was inaugurated, and “not only were emotions rejected, their very historical role was overlooked and denied” and “sentimentalism as an intellectual and political program was rejected, then forgotten” until recent research (*ibid*). According to Reddy, sentimentalism embodies a notion that reason and sentiment are not contradictory, citing David Denby as stating “sentimental narratives occupy a central place in the project of the French Enlightenment,” because “reason and sentiment can no longer be posited as contradictory polarities in eighteenth-century cultural formations" (*ibid*, 154). In other words, for a brief time in history, emotion was the equal of reason when it came to the political realm and in the creation and formulation of doctrine and policy (*ibid*, 154-155). Sentimentalism, the spirit of the French Enlightenment and Revolution according to Reddy, was contrary to the old notion of virtue as founded upon the rejection of the passions in favour of reason (*ibid*, 158). Sentimentalism was starkly countercultural, and it argued that virtue is tied to simplicity and lowly rank as it is produced by natural sentiments shared by all humanity (*ibid*). Moreover women were more inclined to develop such virtue, while men were more likely to be swayed by passions (importantly sentiment does not encompass all passions, which will be delved into shortly); virtue is cultivated by reading and writing; and romantic attachment is the proper foundation of marriage, a marriage that will in turn be a refuge and a school for sentimental virtue (*ibid*). These cultivated sentiments, quite akin to those praised and explained by Smith, meant that "…political action could only derive from feelings of generosity and pity, natural feelings which moved the individual citizen both to anger against tyranny and injustice and to a willingness for self-sacrifice" (*ibid*, 188). Politics was absolutely emotional and could *not* be without the emotions, as "emotion leads directly to embrace of political action" (*ibid*, 189).

But that picture of emotion-driven politics was no longer embraced after the Terror. Emotion-driven politics, according to Reddy, became something to be avoided at all costs, even to the extent of erasing the significance of sentimentalism from assessments of that age. Retrospectively, the emotionalism of the late eighteenth century was downplayed, and instead painted by François Guizot, Victor Cousin, Théodore Jouffroy, Jean-Philibert Damiron, and others "as an age of dawning rationality and science whose promise was betrayed by a revolution gone astray" (Reddy 2001, 217).[80] And thus, Reddy argues that in is in this reaction to the French Revolution that the origin of the stark separation of liberal reason and romantic emotion can be found (Plamper 2015, 261). Reddy states that "it is this, and not so much Descartes, that is responsible for the dualism of *emotion* and *ratio* that still holds today. The connection of reason and emotion in the sphere of politics during the eighteenth century was successfully erased from any collective memory. The incision made by emotional overkill during the Terror was too great" (*ibid*).

This fear of emotion has remained embedded in political thought, and whether it is attributed largely to the mercurial late feudal princes or the French Terror, their exclusion is often deemed a safety measure. Sharon Krause asks, "what is the right combination of thinking and feeling, of reason and passion, of cognition and affect, within deliberation" (Krause 2008, 126). But she states that the common, typical answer is "that there is *no* right combination of reason and passion, at least when it comes to deliberation about important political questions and matters of justice" (*ibid*). Passions, desires, and emotions must be excised as they impede impartiality, a requirement of political and moral deliberation and judgement, at least as presented in political theory today (*ibid*). Thinking of these two emotions theories together—

[80] The limitations of Reddy's project will be more deeply dissected in the following chapter, but it must be recognised that Reddy is pursuing a specific political goal: a solidification of liberal politics. As such, it is worth interrogating that his primary focus is the Terror following the French Revolution and philosophical sentimentalism as articulated bythe bourgeoisie. An understanding of emotional regime might be quite different if for instance the actions of the *sans-culottes* and plebeian politics were examined; or perhaps if the Paris Commune was additionally examined. Aristide R. Zolberg discusses "moments of madness," revolutionary moments which he argues are characterised by feelings of joy, harmony, and creativity, feelings even opponents of events like the Commune had to recognise. Zolberg says that at these moments, "the private merges into the public, government becomes a family matter, a familial affair," highlighting the extent of political and institutional transformation at these moment (Zolberg 1972, 196). However, often these festive political events become buried or forgotten as they are always "followed by bourgeois repression or by charismatic authoritarianism, sometimes by horror but always by the restoration of boredom" (*ibid*, 205), of routinised, regimented orders devoid of creative participation. The aftermath often overshadows, or is attributed to, these initial moments.

their political irrelevancy, and political dangerousness—emotions are bodily, irrational private entities that need to be contained like pathogens.

The third theory of emotional exclusion according to Kingston is the view that “the passions are indispensable to the foundational commitments of liberalism, while denying their centrality for the procedural requirements of liberal politics” (Kingston 2008, 109). Traditional theories have relied upon emotions to secure commitments to liberal values like liberty and equality, but emotions have also been viewed as highly problematic (Ferry and Kingston 2008, 13). Hence the emotions have a historic significance, but they are dismissed as having any present significance, and in the present it is rational deliberation and rational-legal structures that anchor politics. For Kingston, “in normative terms liberal and democratic theorists in general have often not had an adequate appreciation of the positive role that emotional motivation can and does play in an ongoing way in public life” (Kingston 2008, 109). She heavily criticises this emotional exclusion in liberal politics and Ferry and Kingston argue that “we should avoid a narrow view of politics as an achievement of idealized consensual outcomes through rational deliberation” (Ferry and Kingston 2008, 14). This specific problem, however, will be returned to in Chapter 5.

Turning to the second major problem, that of the physiological attribution of all emotion, proves to be far more entrenched and significant than the more simple issues with psychological physicalist theories of emotion. In fact, it necessitates—finally—a deep dive into the category and term *the emotions* itself.

Theories of the passions are and were not the same as theories of emotions, and the verbal change from passions to emotions “signified theoretical, social and cultural changes” (Dixon 2006, 25). Historian Thomas Dixon cautions that “the historian should hesitate…before assuming that ‘emotion’ in [the eighteenth century] meant what it means today, or even what it meant in the nineteenth century,” that in this century it meant often simply agitation, or movement, or disturbance, but could also mean feeling, or physical expressions (*ibid,* 24). Passions, the historically well-established category, was replaced by the “emotions” as the dominant theoretical term, in philosophy, medicine, and psychology (*ibid*, 26). Passions and affections held stronger moral, religious, and medical connotations and often related to the soul; emotions were more an agitation or disturbance connected to evolutionary and neurological mechanisms (*ibid*). Hence, while it makes sense to be inspired by thinkers of the past in understanding the modern category of emotions, pre-nineteenth (though really twentieth) century thinkers *could not* challenge the reason-emotion dichotomy, because there was no category of the emotions that was held as a direct counter to reason. Passions might have been dangerous, unruly, and even irrational, but the contemporary emotions category cannot be mapped onto even only those passions.

The passions historically have been rather broad and undifferentiated, and various thinkers across time have combined and contrasted passions with appetites, affections, and sentiments (Dixon 2006, 26). Moral sentiments and religious affections were particularly demarcated from the passions, but especially significant in that along with the capacity to reason they were what distinguished human beings apart from appetite and passion possessing other living beings (*ibid*). However, the creation of emotions is far broader than even the passions, and has none of these major distinctions (*ibid*)—contemporary emotions would encompass passions, the highest religious affections, and the moral sentiments towards ones fellows, as well as the physical feelings of the heating of one’s face in anger or embarrassment, or the chill of fear. Dixon argues that it was departing from the older, traditional understandings of the passions—

rather than the legacy of those understandings—that lead to the creation of an emotion-reason dichotomy, that the category of emotions was created to oppose reason, intellect, and the will (Dixon 2003, 3). In Dixon's words, "in pre-modern and early modern texts, to assert an opposition between reason and the passions was not the same as asserting an opposition between reason and our modern-day 'emotions'" (Dixon 2011, 299). And again, this is a fairly contemporary category—the emotions as generally morally disengaged, bodily, involuntary, and especially non-cognitive entities, is a nineteenth century product (*ibid*).

Moreover, the category of the emotions was born in the nineteenth century specifically out of psychology and the move towards placing the origins of the emotions in largely physiological sources. It was in the nineteenth century that "the alliance between medicine, Lockean philosophy of the mind and the 'science of man' [was] fully realized" (Alberti 2006A, 16). Descartes and early thinkers are not necessarily off the hook here—the contributions to an eventual physiological understanding of passions made by Descartes and other modern thinkers are tremendously impactful. As Nussbaum touches on in her narrative of emotional exclusion, the erasure of the role of the human will was a significant factor in creating the reason-emotion dichotomy, which is embodied by the term emotions itself. The will disappeared as a locus of human agency in the modern age, replaced first by the passions and affections (and in the nineteenth century, the emotions), and then the body itself (Dixon 2003, 77). In Christian psychology, the earlier dominant psychology, the will was the source of everything, but following the physicalist and empiricist moves of Descartes and Locke, the acts of the will and movements of the soul were replaced with sensation and perception (*ibid*, 79, 80). By the eighteenth century, the living God had also been replaced with the absent Maker, and so people were now not agents of God's love moving according to will, but *instruments* of this Maker

God's love guided to bring about social happiness through the natural mechanism of self-interest (*ibid*, 88). As opposed to scripture and revelation, moral and natural philosophy was increasingly relied upon for moral authority (*ibid*, 93). The moral philosophy of the eighteenth century prescribed that each was "to live according to one's highest nature was to live as a rational animal, with libidinous passions subdued and godly and sympathetic affections cultivated (by reason, by the will, by habit)" (Dixon 2011, 302). There is certainly a reason-passion division here—passions are to be subdued, affections cultivated (*ibid*). Yet contemporary emotions are found on both sides of this reason-passion dichotomy (*ibid*).

Hume runs counter to this mode, humbling reason against the passions, and rejecting the model of the will and intellect as the minds two categories (Dixon 2011, 302). Hume was also a rare writer to use the term emotions, and in a way very akin to the contemporary term (possibly from Descartes) (*ibid*). It was fellow Scots who were also users of this term, namely Adam Smith, David Hume, and Thomas Brown (*ibid*). And it was Thomas Brown who secured the term emotions and brought it to prominence in the nineteenth century (*ibid*). Previously, the term emotions only signified commotion or disturbance—among people, the body, or the mind (*ibid*, 303). Hume and Smith, however, used this word non-systematically, usually meaning some agitation or movement of the mind (*ibid*). For Hume, emotions could attend passions, but Thomas Brown reduces "all mental phenomenon to a series of states, conceived of as basic psychological atoms, and divided into just three categories: sensations, thoughts, and emotions" (*ibid*).

It was Thomas Brown who was the first to favour the term emotions, as part of a mechanistic "science of the mind" (Dixon 2003, 101). It was in his 1820 *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind* in Edinburgh that a mental philosopher gave the term emotions "a coherent, systematic and central role instead of 'passions and affections', or 'active powers'" (*ibid*). This was a part of the advance of secularisation and psychologization—passions were for moral and theological investigation, but the emotions were never in the bible (Dixon 2011, 303). Evil passions may have existed, but there are no evil emotions (*ibid*, 306). The category of emotions was immensely broad: what once were able to be differentiated—appetites, passions, affections, sentiments—now were all simply "emotions," not readily distinguished (*ibid*, 304). Even the moral sentiments or Thomas Brown's "moral emotions," formerly characterised by their bond with reason, were now emotions with the moral component coming from feeling instead of reason (*ibid*, 306). And more over, the physiological roots of the new psychological theory of emotion cannot be understated. Fay Bound Alberti writes that:

> Although there continued to be a school of thought in eighteenth-century medical culture that viewed emotion as primarily a mental phenomenon with bodily effects (the 'common sense' model with which we are most familiar), most viewed emotions as material entities, produced by the condition and structure of the *soma*. Their emphasis on the body's constitution meant that an individual's susceptibility to degrees of emotion differed according to their physical predisposition, mental apprehension being dependent on the physical sensations. (Alberti 2006A, 14).

This was clearly characteristic of the physicalist theories of the nineteenth century, which ranked persons and animals on a scale of emotionality (and therefore, rationality too). Tomas Cogan, physician (1736 – 1818) asserted "passions derived from some 'originating cause' (perception or idea) that 'violently agitates the corporeal frame' and causes a 'change in the state and disposition of the mind'" (*ibid*). Hardly years later, passions wouldn't simply arise from something that disturbed the body—emotions *were* bodily disturbances, registered in the mind like any other empirical phenomenon.

Brown's terminology, methods, and conclusions were extremely influential in Associational Psychology, which is represented by James Mill, J. S. Mill, Alexander Bain, and Herbert Spencer (Dixon 2003, 135). In the Anglo world, Spencer and Bain were the most authoritative on scientific psychology and the most influential (*ibid*, 137-138). According to Alexander Bain, "emotion is the name here used to comprehend all that is understood by feelings, states of feeling, pleasures, pains, passions, sentiments, affections" quoted from *The Emotions and the Will* (*ibid*, 135). Under William James, student of Brown, the soul was replaced by the brain, and the brain did not act but was rather acted upon by viscera (*ibid*, 204, 205). James' theory, as outlined early in this chapter, remains a starting point for much of contemporary emotions theory and research (*ibid*, 231), and is often considered *the* starting point for the historical narrative of emotions research, which is dominated in contemporary work by psychology. Darwin is also frequently placed in this lineage regarding his work on expressions, but those two are the only nineteenth century thinkers who are generally ever referenced (*ibid*). Dixon has observed that "in the last three decades, those who have for various reasons appealed to the theories of passions and emotions of the past, have tended to refer to an increasingly stale canon of past theorists including Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Spinoza, Darwin, James and Wundt" (*ibid*), and I have noticed an almost identical list of main references for the emotions canon in political theory, with outliers expressing the novelty of deviating from this list. The neglect of other, often religiously oriented, theorists seems to be a case of victor's history (*ibid*, 231-232), of the win of psychology and the physiologically-sourced emotions.

The new physiological models, which held passions and affections as separate faculties divorced from reason, allowed for the understanding of passions as alien forces rather than parts integral to the self (Dixon 2003, 97). The passions/affections-turned-emotions came to be seen as the very opposite of reason, and completely separate from the will (and thus, also from "desires, goals, agency and moral responsibility") (*ibid*). And so when the new category of the emotions emerged, it was primarily non-cognitive (*ibid*, 105). Thomas Chalmers[81] for instance defined the emotions explicitly as "passive, non-cognitive and 'altogether unmodified by the will'" (*ibid*, 129). Dixon writes that "the new 'emotions' paradigm therefore created a starker opposition between intellect and feeling than had existed in earlier systems of thought, and a contrast in which a much wider set of mental states was on the 'feeling' side of the divide" (Dixon 2011, 304). Textbooks of psychology would even divide up the content, or literally the volumes, between an "intellect" (cerebral) and an "emotions" (visceral) category (*ibid*). There was a transition from a holism of body and mind, to a "splitting of psyche and soma in medico-scientific theory (emotions subsequently being related to the mind in the disciplines of psychology and psychiatry)" that has now become naturalised in emotions theory (Alberti 2006A, 2). Alberti explains that "this process was neither linear nor straightforward, the principle of mind/body holism being retained in medical practice well into the modern period. Yet the process by which emotions were increasingly seen to originate in the brain and central nervous system provides an important context for the nineteenth-century drive towards laboratory standardization" (*ibid*).

Contemporary writers—often to set up their argument for the value or rationality of emotions—insist "that either a particular individual, or school of thought, or period, or even the entire history of philosophy has been characterised by the view that the emotions (or feelings or passions) are entirely insidious and are to be subjected at all times to almighty reason" (Dixon 2003, 3). As shown in this very chapter, some of the major thinkers on emotions—Solomon,

[81] Royal Society Fellow, Presbyterian minister, and big Isaac Newton fan (Dixon 2003, 130).

Oatley, and Nussbaum—use this notion as their starting point. This is wholly untenable historically, but is symptomatic of how the history of ideas get distorted. Dixon uses Solomon as a case in point—Solomon is frequently cited as one of if not the first contemporary emotions-thinkers. Dixon cites Solomon's work *The Passions*, which argues that "thinkers of the past were responsible for teaching physiological non-cognitive and involuntary views of the passions. He suggests that the influence of classical, medieval and Enlightenment theories of passions as bodily feelings that overwhelmed people against their will is the reason that in the last century…people have endorsed a physiological, non-cognitive and involuntary theory of emotions" (*ibid*, 242-243). Solomon's recommended theoretical alternative is that "emotions are cognitive judgements that people actively and voluntarily make; they are things that people do to the world rather than things that their bodies do to them" (*ibid*, 243). But the Christian nor Ancient view was not anti-passion (*ibid*), and this can be seen even from an examination of ancient and medieval theories themselves, as I explored Chapter 1. The affections—the voluntary movements of the rational soul towards virtuous things—"were the crucial second half of the traditional picture" (*ibid*, 243). One that makes theories of the passions, and the category of the emotions, distinct things. Solomon uses passions and emotions synonymously and thus ahistorical misrepresentations arise; emotions are not synonyms for passions, affections, or sentiments, and ought not to be used as such (*ibid*). But because contemporary fields of study are largely autonomous and secular, history becomes distorted where only those thinkers who "foreshadow" scientific progress—in psychology in particular—are examined (*ibid*, 7). Two significant objections to such an approach are one, that it assumes the current theory is true as it traces the origins of that theory, and two, that it thus excludes influences that do not resemble the current, present day theory, resulting in a "problematically narrow and naïve account" (*ibid*, 7-8).

This applies to those who trace back physicalist interpretations of the emotions, as well as those who are trying to argue for cognitivist understandings of the emotions as they turn to past thinkers of the passions.

And emotion cannot simply be declared a modern, broader version of the passions, as they are defined in rather starkly different ways that indicate their underlying moral/theological versus secular intentions. As Dixon writes:

> The intension of ‘emotion’ (the definition of the term) has differed very significantly from the intension of ‘passion’: the former has tended to be defined in an amoral way as an autonomous physical or mental state characterised by vivid feeling and physical agitation, the latter has been defined in more morally and theologically engaged ways as a disobedient and morally dangerous movement of the soul (as well as often being used in a vague and general way to refer to a variety of lively mental states). (Dixon 2003, 18).

The physiological, largely amoral and therefore also irrational condition of the emotions is latent in its existence as a term. Passions are morally charged, contingent on their aims and the use of reason to provide their categorisation and worth. Thus it is unsurprising that those who advocate a cognitivist theory of emotions are “rediscovering” such positions in historical theories of the passions. But again, past theorists of passions could not juxtapose reason with every passion or passion as a whole; and contemporary cognitivists have to fight against the irrational-root in the emotions as a whole. It is therefore confusing, even misleading, to say that thinkers who discuss the passions (or affections, or sentiments) are theorising “emotions” (*ibid*, 19), and it becomes problematic when cases for political relevancy of the emotions are made when those cases depend on a vastly different theory of passion, sentiment, or affection.

Barbara Rosenwein emphasised the importance of knowing which words were used to signify emotions in whichever social or historical context you are treating, because not only is the category of emotion historically recent, but with that there come assumptions about what specific feelings or expressions are emotions, or not (Plamper 2010, 253). She subsequently warns against adopting the biases of the biological and neurosciences in their “presentist” and “universalist” tendencies—despite the root assumptions of the theories of these disciplines, the emotions of today are not necessarily the emotions of the past, and will not necessarily remain the emotions of the future (*ibid*, 259). Very directly, Dixon argues that “the word ‘emotions’ is currently often used carelessly and anachronistically to refer to theories that were in fact about ‘passions’, ‘affections’, or ‘sentiments’. It should, instead, be restricted to those theories that are explicitly about ‘emotions’; there are important differences in nuance to all these terms that should not be effaced” (Dixon 2003, 11). The extension or broadening of the emotions category has meant entities that were not passions, but appetites, affections, or sentiments (such as lust, religious feeling, or sympathy), become ‘emotional’ so that while there has never been a consensus on how to precisely define either emotions or passions, historically it is clear emotions as a term and category is wider and less precise (*ibid*, 18). The term emotion is used too broadly and liberally and his recommendation is that it ought to be narrowed (*ibid*, 12). However, this is not to say that its youth as a concept or its broadness make emotions a defective or incorrect concept and category, or that it is an inherently erroneous or misleading term (*ibid*, 25). But it does lead to significant misconceptions when historical and political matters are conflating two very different terms. While Dixon recognises that the over-inclusivity of the term emotions has made a consensus on what exactly it should refer impossible (*ibid*, 246), and it is impossible to erase the creation of the emotions term/category and return to pre-emotions language, at least acknowledging when it is and is not historically or circumstantially fitting is vital. Especially if the true potentialities of emotions in the political realm are to be navigated.

Conclusion

According to Leonard Ferry, the danger in recovering emotions from “the margins of normative discourse” is that the understanding of emotions as phenomena will be exaggerated, or the risks involved with emotions will be ignored (Ferry 2008, 80). Ferry writes that “what is needed is further work both at the level of understanding the emotions themselves and at the level of assigning value to them” (*ibid*). Such a statement is generally the consensus amongst those theorising the political role of the emotions. Despite disputes about the exact nature or historical role of the emotions, theorists are trying to uncover and remedy what appears to be so lacking in this dimension of political existence, and human life.

However, the contemporary narratives around the political exclusion of the emotions, and the prevalence of psychological theories in modern emotional discourse, have hampered efforts to treat this area of research. The distortion of the emotions as a concept and category has fostered widespread misconceptions and misapplications regarding political and philosophical history, and while the problems scholars raise about the neglect of the emotions are very apparent, these misconceptions have perhaps steered investigations away from more productive lines of thought.

Thomas Dixon remarks that “…the over-inclusivity of the modern category of emotions means that claims about emotions being good things or bad things (frequently the former in recent years) are sweeping, unsubtle and unconvincing” (Dixon 2003, 247). The trend in contemporary political theory of repeatedly rescuing the emotions from neglect or villainization have not only seemed to produce very little change in politics or political theory itself, but perhaps have been asking the same questions so often, attempted this rescue mission so frequently, that deeper and more pertinent problems have been overlooked. Again, Dixon reminds us, like thinkers of the past, that what we call emotions are a part of both violence and kindness (*ibid*). A more differentiated typology may have much use in allowing for a more thorough and accurate understanding of all that is included in the emotions, to be sure, and "a healthy sense of the potential destructiveness of human passions could be held in common with an appreciation of the importance of moral sentiments and more refined affections" (*ibid*). However, it is time to go "beyond good and evil" in the explorations of political emotions, and interrogate both the exclusion and the value of the emotions in politics using a different set of questions.

Chapter 5: Overcoming *Homo Economicus* and Thinking Beyond the Dichotomy

“I have never seen a class so deeply demoralised, so incurably debased by selfishness, so corroded within, so incapable of progress, as the English bourgeoisie….For it nothing exists in this world, except for the sake of money, itself not excluded. It knows no bliss save that of rapid gain, no pain save that of losing gold. In the presence of this avarice and lust of gain, it is not possible for a single human sentiment or opinion to remain untainted.”– Friedrich Engels, “The Attitude of the Bourgeoisie Towards the Proletariat” in *Condition of the Working Class in England*

Contemporary social life is both sharply fractured and more profoundly enmeshed than ever before, and humans must traverse a social topography of walls and trenches thoroughly laced with windows, bridges, and ladders. As technology has dramatically and deeply linked people and aspects of life across the planet, great fissures remain (or have been enhanced) and are often taken for granted in the forms they take, as are their consequences. The two topical dichotomies, the public-private dichotomy and the passion(-turned-emotion)-reason dichotomy, are such fractures. As the previous chapter revealed, the latter of these dichotomies brings with it the challenge of working with the elusive and historically specific concept of the “emotions,” but nevertheless facing emotions, tackling the dichotomy of emotion and reason, and mapping that into a social world with a strong but tenuous public-private divide must press forward knowing the loamy mire in which this work is situated. Emotions are political (as is the reason-emotion dichotomy itself)—they are politically relevant in the background and foreground, in hidden motivations, in judgements of policy, in the claiming and pursuit of ideals, and in practicalities of framing, debating, and assessing political actors. But surely a project of political emotions, whether at the level of assessment or a prescriptive project, ought to go beyond declaring relevancy or asking for a recognition of practicality.

Recognising the significance of emotions politically is vital, however most contemporary projects of political emotions barely move past this basic recognition. These projects champion the recognition of the significance of the emotions in politics, with the underlaying rationality of the emotions being the particular justification of their significance, and by that quality they are deemed necessary in the political realm. Yet these projects only get that far—including and recognising the value of the emotions. The emotions are to be examined and appreciated in regard to the value judgements they indicate in their experiencers (what does *x* emotion experienced by *A* towards *y* political act say about what *A* values, and how those values orient their worldview?). Or, we ought to pay attention to how emotions are used, maybe weaponised, by political actors to provoke certain behaviours or maintain a certain disciplinary structure within a political community (how does *x* emotion contribute to *y* and *z* behaviours in society, and what might that say about the values of that society?). These are crucial examinations, but fall short of diagnosing the challenges of the emotions in politics, of addressing, challenging, or mending the emotion-reason dichotomy, or properly considering the public-private divide and the barriers and boundaries it maintains in determining the scope of the political.

Two major questions must be asked in order to move forward in theories and projects of political emotions. 1. What perpetuates a dichotomy of reason and emotion, politically or otherwise? What in thought and practice provides the foundation and stamina of divorcing the emotional from the rational, and placing the emotional beneath the rational? When so much of contemporary life and thought is different even from early modernity, let alone from ancient Athens, it is vital to move beyond the quest for the original ancestor in the genealogy of emotional devaluation, and begin to interrogate the structures—material and ideal—that foster such devaluation for contemporary minds. 2. What are the aims of a project of political emotions? As with any political project, such aims will always be contestable. However, such aims are not easily separable from interrogating the perpetuation of the topical dichotomies. To investigate the role of emotions simply as a quest for the origins of the concept or the first instance of emotion's declared inferiority to reason would be an historical project, not a political one. To even challenge the dichotomisation of emotion and reason implies that there is some motivating goal—why question the place of emotions in politics, insist on their relevancy, if it is not a move towards something?

By and large, the projects of political emotions on hand in the past couple of decades have not adequately addressed either question. After an emotional-exclusion origin point is identified, contemporary projects insist that emotions are rational, and thus the way emotions are spoken and thought of politically should now reflect that significance—this is where analysis tends to end, with no consideration of what specifically needs to be altered to allow for that emotional inclusion. When it comes to goals, these projects adamantly state that emotions should be valued politically, and can be used politically, and we ought to use them to motivate citizens and secure liberal values in the nation state and globally. In fairness, this is a direct and explicit goal, but one that will be shown to be contradictory in essence. Often, these liberal projects demonstrate that emotions already are being used towards such political ends as they detail the relevancy of emotions politically. More significantly though, these projects remain entrenched in the emotion-reason and private-public dichotomies. The political subject of emotion is much like the universal bourgeois man, born of particularities that are left behind in private in order to experience universal, public political emotions and their concerns. Some of these projects are quite specific in what is touchable and untouchable in terms of political, and political-emotional, treatment. And perhaps most glaringly, the significance of emotion is attributed to their rationality. But rather than breaking apart a dichotomy of reason and emotion, emotions are up against rational evaluation. They may all be judgements indicative of values, but according to the liberal political emotions theorists, not all emotional responses are necessarily rational, let alone politically appropriate. While some emotions are justified as appropriate or inappropriate in terms of how they contribute to political goals, their value is still contingent on their degree of rationality.

I will argue in this chapter that the reason-emotion dichotomy (and moreover the particular manifestations of emotional exclusion that are most recurrent) is based on the very same material, structural conditions that created and continue to maintain the public-private dichotomy. This will comprise the answer to the first crucial question. It is not the case that emotions are excluded categorically from political life: the appearance of the exclusion of emotions directly maps onto the exclusion of certain groups of people from politics, who then become conflated with emotionality and a lack of reason as the grounds for their exclusion. When tracing the lineage of the devaluation of emotion—as nuanced as it is across time and place—it can be seen that "emotionality" is always attributed to those who are systematically excluded from political participation. Whether it was the women of Ancient Athens, or poor/working, colonised, and racialised populations through the modern period, emotions and their perils were attributed to those who were denied formal political entry. Neither of the aforementioned associations have vanished. But this is why caution is of the essence—ancient Greek notions about the female constitution and remnants of race science do not fit in with contemporary knowledge, yet they persist not for having convincing biological arguments (of course, they do not) but because of the implications about power that they allow their subscribers to uphold. In fact, exhibitions of emotions are constantly on display by white men in the political arena (usually anger is the one taken note of) who are supposed to belong there for their perceived rationality, with few to no consequences compared to those deemed too irrational for politics (especially racialised, working class women) whose words and concerns get dismissed on the grounds of perceived emotionality. The emotions may be decried in both cases, but it is the emotions of those who are already excluded from the public sphere on the grounds of class, race, and sex, that remain illegitimate. If emotions are to be brought into politics, recognised and included, merely adding them into the language or considerations of exclusionary institutions will change very little. If emotions are inseparable from human beings, even more so if they are inseparable from reason, our present institutions are inescapably emotional. And in light of the histories of the devaluation and exclusion of emotions, the emotions cannot be given proper treatment politically if the institutions borne of those histories, that maintain political exclusion, are left unexamined and structurally unchanged. It is not enough to argue for the inclusion of the emotions, if that inclusion is predicated on maintaining a system of exclusion. Thus, my answer to the second question will be explicit in this chapter: my aim of a theoretical project of political emotions is to work towards a dismantling of exclusionary politics and political barriers, and to foster broader empowerment and political understanding for all political subjects.

In order to fully elaborate these two question, this chapter will first outline the premises of the major contemporary projects of political emotions (of Martha C. Nussbaum, Rebecca Kingston, and William Reddy) in order to demonstrate that their principles are a) embedded fully in liberalism not only explicitly but ideologically implicitly and that b) despite differences of focus, analysis, and/or method, these projects are fundamentally the same project: reviving and reinforcing liberalism with the emotions. Second, the contradictory elements of the project of liberal political emotions will be examined, such as bourgeois universalism and abstractification, and the primary tenet of private property, which serve to in fact maintain the dichotomy of reason and emotion. Third, this chapter will demonstrate that capitalist interests persist as the foundation of liberal projects, in order to finally fourth, provide the basis for a new position from which the reason-emotion dichotomy can be actually overcome, focusing not on an abstract notion of emotion and its significance, but on people who experience political emotions and their genuine political participation.

Theories of the Political Emotions

Rebecca Kingston argues that developing a politics of emotions is a dire need, not only scientifically but democratically, “insofar as a normative project that does not incorporate a proper understanding of political passions will never be equipped to do justice to the majority who experience their political life on a different plane than that defended by a large number of liberal democratic theorists today” (Kingston 2008, 125). According to Kingston, “an intellectual trajectory leading to the denial of the political relevance of the passions was a necessary condition for the subsequent developments of liberal theory” (*ibid*, 110). As such, political theory, namely liberal political theory, has a void where the emotions ought to be acknowledged (Kingston 2011, 6). Cheryl Hall remarks that Kingston’s work is a part of a “rapidly growing body of political theory that seeks to counter the narrow focus on reason that has characterised so much of contemporary liberal political theory” (Hall 2013, 744).

However, as presented in the prior chapter, there are troubles with the conventional narrative of the exclusion of the emotions. As Hutchison and Bleiker note, few scholars would not oppose the idea that emotions are politically relevant, or denounce the efforts to provide space for emotions in political analysis (Hutchison and Bleiker 2014, 492). Yet such analyses are mired consistently in narratives to the contrary: emotions are central yet still neglected; emotions are demonised and dismissed as irrational; emotions are seen as merely personal and politically irrelevant; and including emotions in politics would be harmful (*ibid*, 494). Michael Neblo comments that:

> …not only is the supposed denigration of the emotions vastly overstated, many Western thinkers have strikingly anticipated different components of the emerging scientific view. The real significance of the new emotions research is that it scientifically *articulates*, rather than *overthrows*, some of the main trends in the Western tradition, and thus connects philosophical thinking on the subject to a progressive empirical research agenda. (Neblo 2011, 5).

This does not mean the views of emotions throughout the history of western thought have always been positive, but to argue they were outright neglected is fallacious. The usual exceptions to this neglect—Hume, Smith, Burke, writers of the Romantic movement, Montesquieu, etc.—are hardly rare exceptions (*ibid*). Indeed, according to Neblo "…not a single major thinker in the Western tradition has such a consistent and categorically negative view of the emotions, and most incorporate arguments that are quite explicitly to the contrary" (*ibid*, 6). So what drives the perpetuation of this story of the emotions, and why are projects to incorporate the emotions so strictly consistent with this framing?[82]

Yet it is undeniable that there exists a reason-emotion dichotomy in politics, and even if its origins get obscured it is this that contemporary theorists are responding to. This dichotomy is identified and condemned by many scholars of politics beyond political (and liberal) theory. In international relations, specifically work on globalisation, Svašek and Skrbiš report that emotions

[82] Where did this narrative originate, if it is demonstrably false? When I began this project, I had never encountered anything to put the conventional narrative in dispute. I would like to pursue this question in the near future, and have speculated that the origins do lay with the creation of the "rational economic man" and neoclassical economic reinterpretations of earlier economic, political, and philosophical texts in the early twentieth century. As I lay out in Chapter 2, economic rationality had its presence clearly marked on understandings of the emotions for centuries, but those understandings were transformative rather than neglectful. The contemporary commonplace narrative would thus be a recreated history of restrictive rationality, that would be shortly undermined in its own century. I also suspect it might simply be a narrative that, due to the category of emotions flattening and broadening feelings terminology, comes about due to falsely assuming historical continuity and as discussed in this chapter, liberal philosophy being unable to account for any other possible origin.

are either subsumed into discussions rather than explicitly discussed and problematized, or are treated as a mere appendage to human nature, an appendage that is in reaction to the social world rather than constitutive of all human interaction with social realities (Svašek and Skrbiš 2007, 372). The contemporary view of emotions in politics according to Kingston is that "emotions relevant to politics are a collection of essentially idiosyncratic responses of public importance and may vary considerably within the given population" (Kingston 2011, 46).

Martha Nussbaum challenges the common trope that the intrusion of emotions into politics is an exclusive trait of fascism, not only denouncing it as incorrect, but warning that "coding the terrain of emotion-shaping to antiliberal forces gives them a huge advantage in the people's hearts and risks making people think of liberal values as tepid and boring" (Nussbaum 2013, 2). Rebecca Kingston and Leonard Ferry argue that liberal democratic thought has preoccupied itself with neutralising public passions, before or through the public deliberation process, with the aims of a purely rational public debate (Ferry and Kingston 2008, 13). With such rational debate being predicated on "false notions of the relationship between reason and the emotions," political theorists must find ways "of integrating an appreciation for emotional life into the heart of our theories of public deliberation" (*ibid*). Bare rational principles, they argue, are not a realistic foundation for democratic deliberation (*ibid*). Hence, the exclusions of the emotions from liberal democratic theory is detrimental as an "overly ideal and utopian view of political life", embodied by the traditional normative, rational approach to theory, and is not reflective of a reality of which emotions are a part (*ibid*, 3). Emotionally-excised politics risks alienating those who are implicated in political life (*ibid*). Further, "the rational, normative vision of politics so prevalent today can be said to harbour an incomplete, if not manifestly false, concept of the human subject," one derived from Kant and viewing passions as Kant did, as “cancerous sores” (*ibid*). Thus, such a politics is a departure from real human existence as personal subjects, and as situated beings. Bradshaw provides a more dire analysis, suggesting that disembodied reason fell into question after the “failure of humanity” in the “political catastrophes of the twentieth century,” namely in how Germans could turn on their “fellow (Jewish) citizens,” and thus there was a “turn away from Kantian duty” and “towards a full embrace of emotions as the *true* locale of good judgment” (Bradshaw 2008, 176, 177).

And so, in order to align politics better with real experience, Kingston aims to restore what she deems “public passion” in liberal democracy. For Kingston, passion is “a type of affective state that is complex and of long duration, and in the midst of which various short-term episodes of emotion can occur” (Kingston 2011, 5). By “public passion,” Kingston indicates “that there is an intersubjective mood or general affective atmosphere both complex and of long duration that tends to be specific to regime types” (*ibid*). She argues that this can be identified in and demonstrated by ancient politics, in which ancient passion was public in that it first, “characterized the words and actions of the political class (that is, the class to which power and citizenship were ascribed within the terms of the constitution)”; second, “it concerned objects of significance for the whole community”; and third, “it carried with it a particular commitment to the broader character of the community” (*ibid*, 7). Kingston insists that “a good theory of public emotion must not only acknowledge public feeling but be able to draw from that commitment some principles to override and discount certain preferences on not only qualitative grounds…but specifically public ones” (Kingston 2015, 15). According to Kingston, “with the fall of this notion of the “public passion” in our intellectual history, the passions became regarded as mere projections of largely internal individual and idiosyncratic causes. This redefined them as a challenge, rather than a contributing factor, to our ideas of political community" (Kingston 2008, 110). Kingston argues that the new theories of rational-emotions of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries make significant impacts upon contemporary democratic, specifically liberal democratic, theory in four chief ways: first, opening traditional ways of public-private dichotomies up to be rethought; second, encouraging theorists to examine how political commitments might be sustained through emotion in liberal and democratic regimes; third, "reorganizing better outcomes in democratic practice including democratic deliberation"; and fourth, contributing to the development of more realistic political expectations (Ferry and Kingston 2008, 11).

The political relevance of the passions, for Kingston, means far more than public matters being emotional for individuals; rather, "there are discernible patterns in the type and quality of emotional reaction or disposition towards such matters that are shared by citizens or participants in a political community" (Kingston 2008, 110). These are "public emotions" or "public passions" which are shared by members of a political community in regards to the most fundamental questions for that community, often referencing their collective identity (*ibid*).[83] As examples of public passion, Kingston references the fear of citizens in the French Revolution, the fear and anger of Americans about 9/11,[84] and the public jubilation of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (*ibid*). These passions are shared public experiences but are not reductively shared

[83] I would wonder whether this indicates *all* members of a community, or most—how many people would be required to partake for this to be a public passion? Might there be hegemonic passions, determined not so much by the number but my their "common sense" appeals and consistency as important in public narratives? There are many rich questions that still seem hazily defined at this point.

[84] Kingston cites 9/11, curiously, as an example of how emotions can be used towards justice, with feelings allowing citizens to come together in the face of a tragedy perceived as touching the whole country (Kingston 2011, 10). I was only 9 years old on September 11th, 2001, but I distinctly remember through the very real feeling of certain Americans coming together, while other Americans were singled out and discriminated against for being perceived as "terrorists" very shortly after, along with the introduction of very restrictive and even blatantly illiberal security laws. The invasion of Iraq followed swiftly and with it the new threatening outsider of the "Muslim terrorist" became frighteningly entrenched in Western consciousness and liberal ideology.

beliefs or ideas (Kingston 2011, 56). Public passions are compatible with different and competing political views, projects, and ideological principles (*ibid*). The horror of the First World War characterises far reaching public passions, yet not all reactions were the same, for instance some responded with fervent patriotism, and others with anti-patriotism (*ibid,* 56-57). Similarly, Kingston argues “a shared emotional reaction does not necessarily lead to a shared sense of its significance or place within a larger political narrative” (ibid, 57). Public passions thus are easily pluralistic (ibid), even intensely conflictual. The public character of these passions comes from three features: first, that they are shared; second, they have a focus or object that is acknowledged as having an impact on all those in the political community; and third, that the impact of these objects are deemed to be important (*ibid,* 46).

Drawing on George Marcus, Kingston observes that hostility towards emotion and an over-emphasis on rationality has given unrealistic expectations to liberal democracy (Kingston 2011, 6). She writes that there was a justifying presumption “that any basis for citizenship grounded in affect was likely a product of undue or harmful influence over the citizenry, an influence that obscured judgement and made it difficult for citizens to discern their real interests” (*ibid*). Legitimate political claims, according to this overly-rationalistic model of liberalism, are to be devoid of emotional content and expressed instead solely through impartial juridical language (*ibid*). Hence, Kingston’s mission to discover what the positive role of public passions are, and in what ways liberalism might be deficient and in need of what political emotionality might offer (*ibid,* 11-12).

Kingston falls into a cognitivist camp where she views emotions as motivational, likely judgements plus an active principle (Kingston 2011, 29). Emotions are complex: not only cognitive, not only bodily, nor a mere combination of those two elements (*ibid*, 30). But she does recognise the bodily, physical side of emotions rather than reducing them to side-effects of judgements exclusively, hence she works with a propositional theory of emotions. The propositional approach states that emotions are complex and can be a set of evaluative or informational judgements that form and shape emotional responses—in plainer words, advocates of the propositional approach are cognitivists that also recognise the physical feelings too that may not be judgements, but are certainly emotions (*ibid*, 27). People can be wrong about their emotions, and emotions are all multifaceted and complex, but it still must be asked what the implications of such complex facets of human life for normative theory are (*ibid*, 30; 9). But the cognitive element of so many emotional experiences is not negated by instances of more purely physical feeling. And so, the incorporation of emotions into politics is not to be seen as a rejection or abandonment of reason. Kingston argues that "as we can generally be conscious of the emotions, especially those most relevant collectively, and relate them to some form of judgment, they are thereby *potentially* rational" (Kingston 2011, 23). Emotions possibly have a rational dimension, and regardless, are a significant element of human living that ought not be forced into hiding. Similarly, Nussbaum observes and questions a peculiar "either-or" that is attached to emotions in politics: politics requires technical calculation and thus cannot permit the presence of emotions, as those emotions would prohibit rational calculation (Nussbaum 2013, 396-397). But why is this an either-or—Nussbaum meaning by this that there is a false choice between either functioning and efficient politics, or politics inclusive of emotion? Why can emotion not coexist with reason in the political realm? As a cognitivist, for Nussbaum this is a foolish mistake as emotions are as rational as any other human activity. While Nussbaum speaks most thoroughly on compassion, anger, and disgust, she endeavours to seriously consider emotions as a whole for politics. She insists that emotions can be public; and these public emotions have serious political consequences, they are tied to normative goals, and are an important facet of political stability (*ibid*, 2, 16). In fact, for Nussbaum the big question is how to make political principles and institutions stable, and maintain an aspiration to (with no assumption of achieved) justice (*ibid*, 23). Public emotions are her answer to this, the cultivation of emotions that foster commitments to the pursuit of justice, and maintaining political stability (*ibid*, 136).

Kingston "seeks to preserve a more traditional distinction between public and private spheres (despite all the complex challenges this carries) and to highlight what [she takes] to be a phenomenon that can and in many cases does transcend, or at least is pervasive in unequal relations of power through common ownership in and articulation of an emotion shared by all vis-à-vis a matter or matters of public importance" (Kingston 2011, 50). Essentially, Kingston is directly determined to maintain the public-private dichotomy, while demonstrating that there are public emotions shared across society and this dichotomy when it comes to public matters. For "unless one can show that emotions matter beyond a purely individual and private level," as Hutchison and Bleiker observe, "there is no ground to examine their relevance for global politics" (Hutchison and Bleiker 2014, 499). The attempt at such a preservation of the public and private is of enormous significance to these projects of political emotions beyond just their relevancy outside of the private and individual, as will be demonstrated throughout this chapter. As previous chapters have shown, the reason-emotion dichotomy is historically and conceptually bound with the public-private dichotomy, and so in preserving this distinction, there will be many other carryovers. The explicit attempt to maintain one of these two dichotomies will reveal both fundamental characteristics, and foundational limitations, in these projects.

Institutions and regimes form the basis of Kingston's explorations and are the crucial component of understanding and cultivating public passions. Kingston identifies the regime as her focus of analysis in her project, and writes that "…at the level of regime…the nature of the mechanism of emotional transfer is manifested in different ways that are no longer fully neutral with regard to moral priorities, and indeed work in the interests of a form of political justice" (Kingston 2011, 192). Public passions are not, again, merely an inclusion of emotions, or an amalgamation of individual emotions, but are a very specifically and inseparably political form of and venue for emotion. In considering different regimes, Kingston argues that they each embody, express, and cultivate different public passions. These different manifestations "are not mere reflections of institutional leadership, or products of institutional conditioning (otherwise, each set of emotions would only reaffirm the existing state of affairs), but rather social and popular manifestations of justice-seeking within a particular institutional and political setting" (*ibid*, 192-193).

Kingston conceives of horizontal dynamics—when emotion is spread between people through adaptation and mirroring—and vertical dynamics—when leaders and institutions shape emotions (Kingston 2011, 54-55). Vertical dynamics are Kingston's primary focus, as her political theory of emotions emphasises the regime and institutional level, and argues that public passions can be differentiated according to the type of regime (*ibid*, 55). Through these regimes, it is inevitable that political emotions will operate in and through various institutions. Institutions participate in the shaping of social systems through material contributions and normative principles (for instance honour, equality, freedom, etc.) and the constitution of a "decent public culture" (*ibid*, 51). It is significant that vertical dynamics, those of the state and institutions, take precedence in this theory over the horizontal dynamics that would be more embedded in the populace.

Like Kingston's public passions, and much like Reddy theorises interpretatively as an historian,[85] a notion of emotional regime is more or less prescribed by Nussbaum as well. According to Nussbaum, there are two components of political emotion: motivational and institutional, always in dialogue with each other. A "government may attempt to influence citizens' psychology directly (for example, through political rhetoric, songs, symbols, and the content and pedagogy of public education), or it may devise institutions that represents the insights of a valuable type of emotion—a decent tax system, for example, could represent the insights of a duly balanced and appropriately impartial compassion" (Nussbaum 2013, 19-20). Institutions shape the intimate, for instance the legal definition of the family, and alongside that they shape feelings including envy, disgust, and shame (Nussbaum 2001, 422, 423).

The Liberal Rescue of the Emotions

The dominant projects of political emotions are explicitly, even prescriptively, liberal.[86] Kingston and Ferry assert that "most political theorists could agree…that the emotions play an important role in assuring the centrality of liberal values in the experience of the liberal democratic citizen" (Ferry and Kingston 2008, 12). Reason and emotion work together, relaying to citizens "the importance of a set of practices that express recognition of dignity and respect for the human person, the importance of freedom, and other key commitments through which

[85] Reddy's work focuses much on literature and documents of the periods he consults, and is very focused on arguing for his theory of emotives more so than presenting a technical and rigorous history.

[86] Sara Ahmed would be the most well-known outlier here, though her work on emotions is not only more politically critical, but I would argue operates differently than the political projects to reincorporate the emotions, being far more analytical about the present and current role and operations of emotions, shown in her work *The cultural Politics of Emotion* (2004), and her article "Affective Economies," both of which will be discussed later in this chapter.

liberalism can be defined" (*ibid*). The liberalism of these projects is not the selected focus in order to clarify contemporary socio-historical conditions, but rather to bolster the liberal project, the given politico-socio-historic endpoint for these thinkers regardless of explicit recognition as such. Any new theory of political emotions, whether drawing from cognitive neuroscientific research or the works of Enlightenment or other thinkers, works in order to support or contribute to securing liberal principles and liberal institutions and structures. This includes the liberal dichotomic structure of the public and the private spheres, even as they contribute to the dismissal of emotion over reason. Consistently, as much as these projects declare the aim is to rehabilitate, rescue, or restore emotions to political life, these projects are in fact efforts to entrench and bolster liberalism and its political institutions. Liberal thinkers are on a mission to rescue the emotions, in order to rescue or at least revive liberalism itself.

Kingston's goal is to show how, or whether, emotions might ground or precede liberal principles, specifically the three core principles of "the presumption of goodwill, the need for equality, and the notion of politics as a project in common and thereby always subject to revisions" (Kingston 2011, 197-198). A good "manifestation of public passion is one that contributes to well-functioning human emotional capacities" and minimises emotional suffering, for both victim and perpetrator (*ibid*, 207, 208). It is not simply about harnessing passion towards a positive goal, but taking initiative to prevent negative emotional outcomes. Kingston goes on to write that the residential school project in Canada demonstrates how neglecting to account for emotion in policy is detrimental, as the poorly conceived "ideal of an integrated community" ending up causing severe emotional trauma to indigenous persons and communities, undermining the desired outcome (*ibid*, 208). Kingston suggests this reveals the necessity of emotional accounting when it comes to public policy (*ibid*), and that factoring in the emotions would avoid such harms. Such an example reveals much of the unintended maladies of liberal political theory and liberal projects of political emotions. From the very "traditional" phenomenon of the universalising of the particular bourgeois subject, to disregard for material and structural factors, to justifications of a colonial institutional order, the liberal treatment of emotions reinforces these problems and contradictions more than it solves its own problem of securing liberal values via emotions.

Nussbaum explicitly champions "political liberalism," which she defines as "a political conception that attempts to win an *overlapping consensus* among citizens of many different kinds, respecting the spaces within which they each elaborate and pursue their different reasonable conceptions of the good" (Nussbaum 2001, 401). Broad approval of political and social principles is essential (*ibid*, 402; Nussbaum 2013, 23). Each person is thus able to agree to these broad principles within their own comprehensive doctrines, and even if consensus is not yet reached, it remains thus a future possibility (Nussbaum 2013, 128). But consensus requires a narrow scope (not broad or demanding enough to be controversial), and a shallow basis (it only covers the basics) (*ibid*, 129). Political liberalism "…requires a nation not build its political principles on any particular comprehensive doctrine of the meaning and basis of life, whether religious or secular" (*ibid*, 128).

Even the historical work of William Reddy serves as a project of reinforcing liberalism, though more ideological default than as an explicit attempt to use emotions to reinforce liberalism. Reddy's work endeavoured to free post-structuralism from its radical consequences (Plamper 2015, 262), whereby his development of the emotional regime and the concept of emotives would make possible meaningful articulations of political values in the post-modern, perhaps increasingly relativist era of the turn to the twenty-first century. *Yet a first distinct* irony is a certain ahistoricising tendency in Reddy's emotional regime. As Jan Plamper observes for Reddy, the nation state is the standard for an emotional regime, despite its modern and Western invention (Plamper 2010, 242). Returning to Reddy's specific naturalising of liberalism, Plamper further notes that Reddy too closely connects emotional and political regimes (Plamper 2015, 262). What Kingston sets out to explore explicitly, public passions through regime and institutions, Reddy does indirectly. First, by taking the nation state as the standard and typical form of political regime (*ibid*). Plamper correctly remarks that "during most eras of human existence there was no dominant state organization that ruled over large sections of society. Instead, a historical actor belonged to several communities" (*ibid*). As such, Rosenwein, who will be returned to in depth later, believes her concept of emotional communities has advantages in social and historical analysis over Reddy's emotional regime. Rosenwein points out that most people throughout history, namely the labouring poor, were part of many different communities and the sentimentalism of the salons that Reddy centres in his work may have applied in quite a varied way to members in these different communities (*ibid*). Plamper thus suggests that "emotional regime" should be used in the plural (*ibid*). Reddy however focuses on a singular regime, over a nation state such as France. Second, Reddy takes the conditions of modern liberal capitalist nation states—liberal democracies, within a market economy, with protection of minority rights—to be essentially the best configuration of an emotional regime in practice (*ibid*), even if he can identify constraints within this regime.[87] Plamper remarks on the "perplexing" nature of Reddy's work, in that "the transhistorical and transcultural position that

[87] Reddy has observed that the contracts of a capitalist market are large constraints that would place many liberal democracies in the middle of the strictness-to-liberty regime scale (Reddy 2001, 128).. Nevertheless, Reddy's use of neurosciences and cognitive theories is entirely intended to show that liberal regimes are the most conducive to human nature and human thriving, and historians have noted Reddy is for the most part retelling familiar narratives of liberalism and the French Revolution, and grafting on neuroscientific ideas to give them legitimacy (Plamper 2015, 262-264).

Reddy has created so that it might once more be possible to establish persuasive political valuations turns out to match precisely the utopia that provides orientation to many progressive forces in Western democracies—namely, Reddy's own contemporary political reality" (*ibid).* Liberal ideology and institutions become an unquestioned (or unquestionable) paragon of liberty, justice, and stability; and any circumstances of instability, injustice, or coercion are simply a different, totalitarian, or authoritarian regime. And like violence, oppression, and injustice, "bad" emotions are always conditional of "bad," non-liberal regimes.

A peculiar tension in the way in which these liberal projects seek to rehabilitate the emotions is by policing the emotions in ways not different from those of the *doux commerce* era of the passion-soothing interests. As Dixon notes, in shaping a dichotomy between emotion and reason, emphasis on emotional control was paramount whether in physical or social domains, as in both medical and moral works "individuals were encouraged to repress and master their own passions through the use of reason and will, for the sake of their health as well as for the sake of civilized society" (Dixon 2006, 36). Reddy and Nussbaum in particular are notably concerned with emotional control. Reddy states that in the development of emotional norms "…emotional control requires constant effort and…those who do it well are relatively rare, deserving of admiration and authority" (Reddy 2001, 121). Reddy speaks with some distance, focusing more on the observation that societies praise displays of emotional control, his belief that the most emotionally liberatory societies being liberal nation states with free markets contains the dichotomous, paradoxical prescription for emotional control. Nussbaum is entirely direct in her admiration and advocation of emotional control and restraint that is bound to her cognitive model, perhaps expected given her self-identification as a neo-Stoic. And instead of the broader mention of emotional control, Nussbaum firmly denounces certain emotions, like disgust and shame, and anger. However, anger is distinct from disgust, hatred, contempt, and envy, which focus on perceived permanent traits, not an act committed (Nussbaum 2016, 48). In this regard, Nussbaum sees anger as sometimes useful, in contrast to disgust and shame, but never as truly acceptable beyond its briefly useful functions.

Nussbaum does concede that anger can be an important signal, either to the person experiencing anger that something is amiss; or a signal to the world to draw attention to a violation (Nussbaum 2016, 37). Anger can also be a deterrent for those who might infringe upon justice (*ibid*). Still, it is not the only signal or deterrent and according to Nussbaum it is certainly not the best one (*ibid*). But this is the first "valuable role" of anger. Its second role is as "a necessary motivation for [the oppressed] to protest and struggle against injustice and to communicate to the wider world the nature of their grievances" (*ibid*, 211). Nussbaum also observes that anger seems justified and correct: "outrage at terrible wrongs is right, and anger thus expresses something true" (*ibid*). Yet Nussbaum derides anger because it is an irrational emotion (*ibid*, 237). She goes as far as to say that might be the main purpose of her work *Anger and Forgiveness*: "If this book achieves anything, I hope it achieves that sort of square-one reorientation, getting its readers to see clearly the irrationality and stupidity of anger" (*ibid*, 249). Politically for Nussbaum, "our institutions should model our best selves, not our worst" (*ibid*), and anger is very much a part of the worst in her eyes.

Nussbaum further remarks that while anger might point towards a legitimate injustice, making the anger correct and truthful, it could also point to what she considers a narcissistic slight, or a perceived injustice merely to someone's "warped" concerns with their status or perceived status, or misplaced social values and thus feature as an unreliable signal overall (Nussbaum 2016, 96). These concerns reveal the two troubling questions about anger that

Nussbaum sees: is anger identifying a real injustice or oppression, or is it reacting against a slight towards how one is viewed or regarded in terms of status? And, irrespective of the answer to those questions, is anger calling for justice or a remedy, or payback/vengeance? Even if the anger is well grounded and just, when something wrongful has been done to damage something of significance, a wish or desire for payback is always wrong, and Nussbaum argues that wish is almost entirely inseparable from anger (*ibid*, 93). Often, anger takes the place where grief and mourning should be (*ibid*, 95). If grief and mourning were not shunned, avoided, or even condemned socially, perhaps anger would be briefer, safer, and not something to avoid. But Nussbaum seems to indicate that because it is so hard to ascertain the motivations of anger, and its usual tendency towards destructive desires and/or actions, it is best avoided as much as possible. I however think it is necessary to inquire of these apprehensions what further concerns may be. That is to say, are status and vengeance clear cut as detrimental, and if yes, to whom and why?

Such an inquiry into the condemnation of anger is particularly useful in examining Nussbaum's political liberalism, both regarding its defense of liberal institutions and ideology, as well as in light of its aims as a project to incorporate emotions politically. Nussbaum observes that the law holds a view that emotion (the "heat of passion") might allow crimes to be viewed more reasonably, that while not excused, they are judged less harshly than those considered cold and calculated (Nussbaum 2016, 165). But to whom does this apply, and when? And is it the crime, or the accused, that is either passionate or cold? White cis, usually straight, men are often viewed more sympathetically if they commit a crime in the heat of passion, though white men are notoriously often shown sympathy in cases of calculated murder as well—or, a calculated crime will be perceived as inherently passionate, the calculation being borne of a passion no man can be reasonably expected to control. Non-white, non-heterosexual, even non-cis men are viewed as being more unstable, more risky if left amongst society, and perhaps revealing their true "feminine" and thus less emotionally stable (again) natures. White women have more leeway as well if they perform the "correct" emotions, namely in contrast to non-white women who like their non-white male counterparts tend to be labeled as inherently passionate and irrational, but misogyny does not exactly provide a win in that regard either. As will become clear, Nussbaum reveals the extent of the contradictory nature of the liberal project, and the unsavoury and oppressive views that are preserved in it. The first example of Nussbaum's very traditional liberal colour-blindness reveals itself to be not a mere example,[88] but a feature baked right into liberalism, in this case the inherent trait of bourgeois universalism.

The only acceptable form of anger is what Nussbaum has labelled "transition anger." According to her, it is the only species of anger that rejects "the road of payback" and the 'road of status", and thus is the form of anger for rational people, or is reasonable anger (Nussbaum 2016, 93). This anger, upon acknowledging the wrongdoing, "will rapidly move toward what I call the Transition, turning from anger to constructive thoughts about future welfare" (*ibid*). The wrong is recognised, but it is a forward-moving anger driven by the "cognitive content" of: "How outrageous. That should not happen again" (*ibid*). This form of anger asks how things might be done differently, what ought to be the case instead, so as to improve things (*ibid*, 37). Significantly, Nussbaum uses "Transition Anger" to evaluate and condemn political events and political emotions. Nussbaum writes, in a work that was published shortly after the Black Lives

[88] Nussbaum is certainly not a white-supremacist, but she makes many outrageous statements, as will be discussed throughout this chapter, that show unavoidably how the liberal model of race and treatment of racism end up at best failing to address, and at worst reinforcing, white supremacist ideas, tendencies, and institutions.

Matter uprisings in Ferguson, Missouri,[89] that "sometimes people who get angry at the injustice of a system want to 'smash the system,' to bring chaos and pain down around the heads of the people who upheld it," (*ibid*). I am sure that this is a genuine misunderstanding of the phrase "smash the system" rather than a deceptive misrepresentation. But Nussbaum here reveals the dangers of bourgeois universalism, and assumes that the system is a more or less neutral-to-good force, that perhaps makes mistakes, but is built to uphold justice for all people. Those who cry "smash the system" do not do this as a call for revenge, but to articulate that the *system* is the source of injustice, that the liberal institutions they are asked to rely upon for justice are the very institutions that have founded historic injustices and continue to perpetuate those injustices.

Nussbaum frequently frames the need for "transition anger" as a matter of strategy and pragmatism. Anger is incompatible with pragmatism for Nussbaum, and a good leader must be a pragmatist, moving rapidly to the "transition" "and perhaps for much of his life just stay[ing] there, expressing and even feeling Transition-Anger and disappointment, but leaving genuine anger behind" (Nussbaum 2016, 229). Even if violence becomes strategically necessary, it should always hold a "transitional" stance with the aim of creating a shared future (*ibid*, 230).

But Nussbaum carries on to caution those who protest or rise up, that their goal "must be a beautiful future in which all have a share" (Nussbaum 2016, 222). A "generous" mindset is more effective and advantageous than noble anger in political struggles (*ibid*, 212). Formerly hostile groups—the term Nussbaum will use to indicate former oppressors, or instigators of injustice or harm, who will inevitably have to be a part of the new more just future—must have

[89] As this review notes, while posing important points of thought, Nussbaum's ideas of transition anger depend on having a trustworthy legal system and the ability to meaningfully engage with creating a transformation, something perhaps even most people on the planet lack, and often that lack is the very source of anger. https://insidestory.org.au/revenge-and-restitution/

confidence in the new political institutions and principles that will be shaped and created through challenging injustice, through the transition (*ibid*, 213). As white liberals absolutely love to do, Nussbaum appeals to Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. as an example of someone who practiced justice-seeking the correct way, as someone that called for only transition-anger. Quoting King Jr. "'I have not said to my people 'Get rid of your discontent.' Rather, I have tried to say that this normal and healthy discontent can be channeled into the creative outlet of non-violent direct action,'" Nussbaum insists that this is a great model of rejecting the worst forms of anger, and instead channeling "transition anger" into building a more just, shared future (*ibid*, 221). She tells us that MLK felt that giving too much allowance to anger and violence, even in self-defense, would lead to a loophole for selfish behaviour and the movement thus being resented by broader society, while the goal was to win the respect of that exact society (*ibid*, 220). Yet resentment and hatred by a great deal of his contemporaneous society, and by the institutions of alleged justice, did not dissipate for King or the civil rights movement till well after his assassination. His language of peace, non-anger, and justice is hailed far and wide today, even within those institutions he was challenging, without fairly representing his circumstances or experiences while he lived, and those that caused his death. Nussbaum falls into the very common white and liberal trap of using King to tell marginalised protestors how to protest the *right*, not-disruptive, not angry, perhaps not-guilt-inducing way. To the contrary, King refused to condemn rioters and insisted that it is the conditions that produce riots that must be condemned, and that justice and equality must be given more importance than the maintenance of a quiet status quo. In his 1967 speech at Stanford, he declared:

> I think America must see that riots do not develop out of thin air. Certain conditions continue to exist in our society which must be condemned as vigorously as we condemn riots. But in the final analysis, a riot is the language of the unheard. And what is it that America has failed to hear? It has failed to hear

> that the plight of the Negro poor has worsened over the last few years. It has failed to hear that the promises of freedom and justice have not been met. And it has failed to hear that large segments of white society are more concerned about tranquility and the status quo than about justice, equality, and humanity. And so in a real sense our nation's summers of riots are caused by our nation's winters of delay. And as long as America postpones justice, we stand in the position of having these recurrences of violence and riots over and over again. Social justice and progress are the absolute guarantors of riot prevention. (Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., 1967).[90]

This is a completely different message, an opposite message, than Nussbaum uses his name for in her insistence on "transitional-anger."

However, perhaps the rejection of anger is itself a Stoic rejection of vulnerability, rooted in a fear of looking hurt, or irrational. Anger as Nussbaum notes is a signal of wrong-doing and of harm—a sign of vulnerability. While Nussbaum strives to show the importance of admitting to vulnerability as human beings, much of her writing on anger indicates a fear of weakness or vulnerability, belying the claimed intentions of avoiding the worst in humankind and reflecting instead status concerns. While Nussbaum does distinguish between non-anger and anger with a rational surface (Nussbaum 2016, 151), her condemnation of anger carries an edge of resentment, indeed perhaps the very irrational-anger over status concerns she condemns. For instance, Nussbaum correctly articulates that "men in particular think that they have achieved something if they can make a woman mad, particularly if she is calm and intellectual" (*ibid*).[91] She cites irritating encounters of men speaking over her, attempting to stow her luggage for her without first asking, and other similar occasions of obnoxious, pernicious, and enraging sexism

[90] Speech at Stanford by Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., "The Other America." Viewable here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dOWDtDUKz-U&t=7s

[91] There is a strange implication in this statement that supposes a woman not becoming mad would have any effect over the situation, as if there is a correct response to someone baiting and provoking someone when mostly, it is always a lose-lose experience. This also troublingly falls in line with the sometimes dangerous tendency for women to prioritise keeping the peace and staying calm, even dismissing their instincts in the face of danger, because anger is deemed impolite and unacceptable for women (despite simultaneously being inherently angry or emotional…).

in *Anger and Forgiveness* to which she notes she may have responded bitterly, with contempt and rudeness, but that anger ultimately serves no satisfying or productive end and in turn makes her look bitter or emotional. Further, Nussbaum relays the drawbacks and irrationalities she sees in anger through another example of gendered disparities. She writes:

> We often hear that women, in particular, need to connect with their anger. [Pamela] Hieronymi urges us all to be "uncompromising," meaning that we should continue to maintain three things: that the wrongful act was wrong, that the wrongdoer is a member of the moral community, and that one is oneself a person who ought not to be wronged. She seems to think that these three propositions entail anger. But who is more self-respecting? The Sandra who keeps dredging up every wrong, trying to pin blame on Larry (however justifiably, in a way), or the Sandra who simply gets on with her life and invites him calmly to go along? Anger looks like a childish and weak response, not an expression of self-respect. We may preserve Hieronymi's three claims, minus anger's payback wish. But we need to add to them a focus on constructing the future, rather than continuing to wallow in the wrongfulness of the past. (Nussbaum 2016, 119).

Anger is weak, and embarrassing for Nussbaum, childish and self-demeaning. Claiming that anger is irrational and dangerous seems like a surface justification of a totally separate condemnation of anger—embarrassment at having been affected, at not looking strong or mature enough to be able to brush things off. Therefore the condemnation of anger as Nussbaum presents it appears to be pragmatic and rational on the surface, but underneath rife with different emotional motivations, particularly an avoidance of shame, guilt, embarrassment, or weakness. And thus, it is crucial to examine how Nussbaum's prescriptive assessment of anger works to undermine some, and preserve other, political projects, and indeed police the emotions expressed in the political realm in accordance with the liberal institutions and ideological norms Nussbaum advocates.

In stark contrast to anger, Nussbaum argues that political problems ought to be confronted in the spirit of love (Nussbaum 2013, 15). She insists that love "is what gives respect for humanity its life, making it more than a shell," and is required in any society that aspires to justice (*ibid*). Nussbaum does not explicitly maintain the boundaries of public and private, but clearly maintains the public and private spheres in their liberal shapes. So while discussing institutions, and advocating the significance of the nation state, Nussbaum's politics remain highly individualistic. First, while sympathy should not stop at national boundaries for Nussbaum, the nation state is still the primary actor—rich or poor, all nations matter equally, as nation states (*ibid*, 122)—the essence of liberal equality, two disparate, economically unequal nations are formally equal. Indeed, the nation state is essentially a tool for individual cultivation, with Nussbaum arguing that the nation is a necessary "fulcrum" for global concern "in a world in which the most intransigent obstacle to concern for others is egotistic immersion in personal and local projects" (*ibid*, 17). The biggest challenge according to Nussbaum is not anything systemic—such as capitalism and colonial and imperialist liberal hegemony—but too much concern on the part of the individual with their own lives and immediately local issues. The problem for Nussbaum is within and at the level of the individual, and their alleged lack of concern for a broader community of a nation or world, and ironically individualism is thus wholly reinforced. What must be sought—and Nussbaum's emotions project is aiming to chart the path for doing this—are the boundaries of proper concern, which presently is too narrow; thus public policy should cultivate a broader concern for others, including those outside of the nation-state (Nussbaum 2001, 420-421).

Within these bounds of political liberalism, Nussbaum searches for the parameters for cultivating compassion in such societies. Nussbaum asks, "how can the public culture of a liberal democracy cultivate appropriate compassion, and how far should it rely on this admittedly fallible and imperfect motive?" (Nussbaum 2001, 401). Compassion is an utterly necessary ingredient of citizenship, as justice cannot reach and soothe all that compassion can (*ibid*, 425, 404). Nussbaum argues that compassionate individuals should construct compassionate institutions, which will in turn create and shape compassionate individuals, citing Smith's judicious spectator and Rawls' original positions as theoretical conceptions that might foster such individuals in those institutions (*ibid*, 405, 403). Kingston warns that empathy cannot be relied upon to solve the problems of liberal democracy, and moreover it might not even be desirable to base politics on empathy (Kingston 2011, 188, 190). Indeed, a compassionate society can still be an unjust society, Nussbaum remarks (Nussbaum 2001, 414). And yet, Nussbaum's compassion *itself* has certain political limits, or maybe "rational boundaries," that allow it to coexist with the principles of liberalism she endorses, of course as ones all people might "broadly" agree to (despite many definitively not agreeing to those principles, such as the ideas of private property and wealth accumulation, or what is tolerable in terms of racial prejudice, and might find wholly unjust). Whether in Nussbaum's or Kingston's project, bourgeois universalism strangles any real particular differences that exist within society, suffocating any opportunity to remedy actual political ills.

Again, Nussbaum argues that the scope of individual's care is often too narrow, and a big strength of national projects is to get people to commit to a common good (Nussbaum 2013, 3). Emotions thus remain within the private as Nussbaum attempts to politicise them in a liberal framework. The politically essential emotion of compassion for Nussbaum can and will be cultivated privately within families, and also in public education, particularly through the arts and humanities (Nussbaum 2001, 426). Within civil institutions and public policy, Nussbaum maintains this highly individual focus, hence her focus on education. Each individual must be shaped to have compassion and the right emotions cultivated within, and this will be done through a well-rounded, liberal (in the educational sense rather than the philosophical/political sense) education brimming with literature.[92] Education must be funded and promoted by any state that aspires towards justice and the development of good citizens, and Nussbaum warns that "cutting the arts is a recipe for the production of pathological narcissism, of citizens who have difficulty connecting to other human beings with a sense of the human significance of the issues at stake" (Nussbaum 2001, 426). I certainly agree that education is indispensable and should be a guaranteed provision for all, and that arts and humanities are vital within education, but it is worth remembering that some of the best educated, the most well-versed in literature, humanities, arts, were propagators of genocide, colonisation, imperialism, and fascism. Education is a vital good, but a western classical liberal arts education is no guarantor of shared values or morals or aspirations of justice, and the pursuit of justice as a social phenomenon requires social embeddedness. Kingston also emphasises the role education can play in cultivating public passions towards justice, though she more carefully emphasises political education, and the political structures of society in which it is cultivated (Kingston 2011, 184). But as a liberal project, justice for Nussbaum is produced by individuals, coming together *as* individuals to shape a society for this collection of individuals. Again, at all levels: international, national, and local, social, legal, or economic, individualism is a fixed assumption and basis.

While Nussbaum critiques the private, arguing that the notion of the "private realm" outside the scope of the law has harmed justice, she speaks of family crime exclusively (Nussbaum 2016, 135), not considering the broader economic scope of the private and its injustices. Further she refuses a reconsideration of the boundaries of what might be deemed

[92] One particular example is exposure to tragedy as an art/literary form, which works to cultivate "the ability to understand and sympathise with suffering" (Nussbaum 2001, 428).

public if it deviates from a liberal defense of private property especially. To maintain the private, and also challenge the aspects of the private sphere that she needs to, Nussbaum proposes the "Middle Realm." The "Middle Realm" is for Nussbaum "a realm in which much of our daily life is spent: in dealings with strangers, business associates, employers and employees, casual acquaintances, in short people with whom we are not involved in relations of intimacy and deep trust, but who are also people and not legal and governmental institutions" (*ibid*, 138). Following from Habermas's model, this middle realm fits wholly into the private sphere, and where Nussbaum wants to draw the line is between an intimate realm, where there still must be caution in protecting members of families and children legally, and the remainder of the private realm.[93] For Nussbaum, it is in this "Middle Realm" that legal institutions are most needed, where justice against wrong-doing ought to be turned over to the state (*ibid*, 141). And in this regard, both a fairly strict individualism, and a cementing of the dichotomy of public and private through the solidifying and preservation of the liberal sphere model, are achieved in Nussbaum's political liberalism of emotions.

True to the tenets of liberalism, Nussbaum endorses private property laws explicitly at times, and otherwise assumes their inherent importance and value. As an instance of the latter, Nussbaum argues that the victim narrative applied to giving the needy welfare, or women seeking justice against sexual violence, falls short in that by contrast, people do not and naturally would not question public resources being used to protect private property (Nussbaum 2001, 407). For Nussbaum, protecting private property ought to not be questioned, and therefore

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[93] This is a major example of the curious tendency Nussbaum has of barely consulting the literature of political theory, and instead defaulting to literature, or other disciplines like psychology, to make political arguments.

neither should welfare recipients nor victims of assault. Specifically critiquing the villainization of welfare recipients, Nussbaum points out that:

> All Americans in countless ways receive financial assistance from the government, and are highly dependent on that assistance. State money and state power support laws without which most of us would not know how to live: laws protecting public order, private property, the ability to make a binding contract, freedoms of assembly, worship, speech, and press, and protecting citizens against assault and violence. (Nussbaum 2001, 412).

Nussbaum operates from the position that liberal institutions are mostly just, and the best available, and so all citizens ought to be treated as a part of those institutions, whether they need more or less direct aid in the form of welfare, or simply use public, political, and legal infrastructure. She does not evaluate whether those institutions are the cause of disparities, but rather takes economic inequality as a natural given that must be treated with the utmost compassion. Property and inequality are simply not on the table for consideration by Nussbaum.

In fact, included in Nussbaum's capabilities approach—the basic guarantees of a good life every society ought to guarantee—is the right to hold property and have property rights on the basis of everybody else (Nussbaum 2001, 418). Rich and poor are equally guaranteed the right to hold property. As with all other liberal institutions, for Nussbaum property and wealth-holding is fundamentally just and fair but need to be approached compassionately. She argues that formal economic models should take into account "compassion information", as in, considering whether the economy actually doing something for people, rather than running as an independent engine (*ibid*, 439, 440). This also demands taking into account that different people might have very different resource needs, and thus require an empathetic consideration of all the different possibilities for all types of people (*ibid*, 440). However, Nussbaum's equalising and fostering of sympathy only ever amounts to what "significant redistribution" can be brought about through a "fair tax system" (Nussbaum 2013, 123). Drawing from Aristotle, Nussbaum observes that those who are satisfied are less prone to anger, and she theorises that this is due to "a diminished emphasis on narcissistic vulnerability" (Nussbaum 2016, 54), and thus material satisfaction is a very pragmatic goal for any society and its population. But Nussbaum cautions against too much material equality because she believes a degree of inequality is necessary "…in order to give incentives for striving and innovation that raise the level of the whole society" (Nussbaum 2013, 123). Further, Nussbaum believes that taxing the rich "more" (how much more is not clearly specified) constitutes inflicting "suffering," and that while it might be just to tax the rich it would best be done in a way that caused no suffering (Nussbaum 2016, 37). So even taxation must be executed carefully and with compassion to avoid inflicting pain or payback on the rich. Nussbaum insists there should never be a desire to inflict pain or bad conditions on others (*ibid*, 229), but who decides what pain and bad conditions are? Is the pain of a wealthy CEO who must pay more tax a form of suffering that ought to be held in the same regard as someone who cannot afford education, or food, or shelter? What would the compassionate route, with no payback, have looked like in ending slavery? Was paying out the plantation and slave-owners the compassionate compromise in the spirit of a shared future (and paying out continuously through the twentieth century, where the descendants of the enslaved had their tax money, portions of their wages, contribute to this payment)? Is revolutionary expropriation of plantations and the immediate freeing of slaves causing suffering to the former enslavers? The question seems to be answered mostly in terms of, compassion for *whom*? And that "whom" is determined by ideological foundations and political goals.

In determining what external goods are really important in life, apart from certain basic goods, a liberal society must refrain from providing full answers—according to Nussbaum, it is the citizens individually who must answer (Nussbaum 2001, 415, 416). In the same vein, competitive emotions, towards material or other aspects, should be allowed so long as they do not pose any threat to the stability of a commitment to the equal welfare of all (Nussbaum 2013, 124). As such, the nation state for Nussbaum provides a necessary political and social unifier, a way for people to cultivate a desire to support one another through patriotism. Nussbaum believes patriotism towards the nation state is essential, as “our lives are immersed in greed and self-interest, so we need a strong emotion directed at the general welfare to inspire us to support the common good in ways that involve sacrifice” (*ibid*, 209). For Nussbaum real patriotism is not coercive and celebrates freedom (*ibid*, 218), and thus does not pose the dangers of chauvinism that she attributes to nationalism. It may have been coercive in the United States earlier in the twentieth century, but she insists it no longer poses a problem of coercion (*ibid*, 217). Patriotism for the nation state is particularistic and healthy in Nussbaum’s eyes, ensuring that exclusionary values are avoided while also preventing motivating political emotions from becoming too “watery”—diluted, non-focused, and subsequently weakened (*ibid*, 207, 209). Patriotism is a love that can mean different things to different individuals, broad enough to captivate most citizens, but specific and concrete enough to focus their goals and attentions, unlike too-broad an object like “humanity” (*ibid*, 209). Patriotism bridges a person’s daily emotions with the broader ideals and concerns of society, Nussbaum argues, and allows people to care about these ideals to the point they would suffer or sacrifice for them (*ibid*, 210). The only dangers present for Nussbaum are misplaced values, as patriotism *can* support bad things, but not inevitably she insists, and patriotism itself is not exclusionary just as loving one’s own family does not mean judging other families as lesser (*ibid*, 211, 212). The particular shall lead to the general, and general ideas are tethered back to the particularistic and to personal love (Nussbaum 2013, 386).

Kingston, similarly, posits that the experience of emotions themselves allows people to overcome barriers of identity (Kingston 2011, 10).

The liberal projects of emotion argue that good nations and leaders can recognise and use emotion beneficially towards shared political goals, and to instill liberal values in the nation. Nussbaum insists political leaders must have “reasonable and appropriate compassion” (Nussbaum 2001, 435). These leaders must “…show not just mastery of pertinent facts about their society and its history, but also the ability to take on in imagination the lives of the various diverse groups whom they propose to lead” (*ibid*). The state should endorse devotion to liberal ideals (Nussbaum 2013, 7), but the challenge rests in ensuring the values endorsed are not strictly “of one particular comprehensive doctrine,” instead using emotions to support Rawls’ “overlapping consensus” (*ibid*, 6). Emotions in a cognitive theory are appraisals, with evaluative content, not mere impulses, (*ibid*) making them sharply political as well as inclined towards specifics. Thus Nussbaum stresses that the emotions must be directed towards principles that allow for pluralism within that broad consensus of political liberalism. Yet the outlook of the broad consensus is specific in actuality: bourgeois, mostly white, and mostly masculine. This creates a highly skewed framework for deciding what is acceptable in that pluralism, and what is unacceptable.

Nussbaum’s insistence that particular bourgeois, liberal capitalist conceptions of property and wealth are a part of the consensus, while anything too close to redefining or abolishing these conceptions of property is born of “payback” wishes, is a prime example of the particular, non-universal “universal bourgeois” of the liberal outlook. Race is another place where the particulars of the bourgeois subject become universalised to the detriment of all others. In one of many telling instances, Nussbaum argues a racist who is trying to become less racist yet fails, is better than a racist that conceals perfectly that racism (Nussbaum 2013, 395). But better for whom? While of course one would hope that people will work to shed racist beliefs, the problem of racism is in fact far less to do with individual racism (thus perfectly concealed racism is socially irrelevant regardless of which circle of hell racists end up in), than with a racist society where individual beliefs are mere symptoms, not the causes. The individualist and bourgeois universalist tendencies of liberalism presume that racism is merely a personal flaw or fallacious belief, that racism is a moral trait that one holds, an individual attribute rather than a systemic, structural relation. The state and society must therefore non-coercively work to remedy the *moral* straying of racist *individuals*. Nussbaum here pays no regard to the persons subjected to the constant racist-mistakes the self-improving racist makes towards them, presumably they are to move into "transition anger" and participate in the effort towards a new and better future with the person working to be less racist, or are simply distanced and abstracted into a universalised society. The particulars of existence, racial discrepancy in this case, only comes into play in how racists deviate from proper beliefs and how those beliefs might cause social problems, rather than in understanding and appreciating vast differences in social experience, and looking beyond individual beliefs as the source of such experiences.

From the perspective of bourgeois individualism, liberal systems really are the end of history, with no imaginable alternatives possible that would not constitute some form of despotism or collapse of society. Reforms may be welcomed, but only insofar as liberal structures, especially those embodying the fundamental liberal principles such as private property, or the rule of law and its enacting through the judiciary, remain steadfast. Justice is inherent in liberalism, and thus can be achieved quite exclusively within the liberal paradigm. Justice is framed very narrowly in terms of legality for the most part by liberal theorists.

Nussbaum frames justice quite starkly in terms of law and crime (Nussbaum 2016, 3, 195). People can and will turn to the law with their problems if a society has a sound basic legal structure (*ibid*, 211). Liberal institutions are essential as much as liberal ideals in realising justice according to Sharon Krause, as liberal mechanisms will provide the framework for deliberation, but more equality and discourse are necessary than liberal rights can provide on their own (Krause 2008, 142). Liberal institutions and ideals also are crucial to regulate the emotions, according to Nussbaum. She writes that "the dangers of bias inherent in particularistic emotion are kept in check through the rule of law and through a strong critical culture. But they are also checked by the specific way in which political ideals are realized particularistically" (Nussbaum 2013, 386). Without liberal institutions and principles reinforcing individual entitlement to determining their version of the good life, the individual's right to choice, the rights of freedom and property, emotions pose a social and individual risk.

In tension with the emphasis on the particular and private, on shunning coercion and ensuring the protection of individual choice, is being ill-at-ease with the emotions of the people. Nussbaum requires patriotism to try and bind the emotions of the people. Arash Abizadeh remarks upon Aristotle's conditional support for democracy to keep the emotions of individuals in check, and how that has been taken into liberal theory. According to Aristotle, a deliberating multitude is less likely to be led astray by *pathos* than the few, "the judgement of a single person is necessarily corrupted when he is dominated by anger or some other passion of this sort, whereas it is hard for all to become angry and err at the same time" (Abizadeh 2008, 74). But Aristotle insists that this must be a virtuous multitude, and for him this is his aristocracy, the rule of the virtuous (Abizadeh 2008, 74). Virtuousness is checked within liberalism by "judicial review (by "virtuous" aristocrats called judges?), which itself serves to highlight the tension between democracy and liberalism" (Abizadeh 2008, 75).

Liberal regimes are seen as more stable, humane, and rational in comparison to other regimes, which despite variations are all considered more or less despotic. Apparently, non-democratic states are permeated with violence especially during social protests, whereas liberal societies feature low violence in protests (Kingston 2011, 41).[94] Kingston characterises "authoritarian regimes" as having a broad pattern of suspicion and fear—both between subjects and public officials, and between subjects themselves (*ibid*, 51). In contrast liberal democracies have claims of equality and freedom, with a demand for empathy and compassion towards constituents or between citizens (*ibid*). Kingston's example of such empathy is the display of guilt for past injustices such as the Canadian government issuing the residential school apology (*ibid*, 52). This example is particularly problematic and shallow if even a glance is thrown towards any press at the time of or since this apology. It demonstrates one side of the issue of allotting the "good" emotions (or intentions) exclusively to liberal regimes. The association of the "bad" emotions with other, despotic, regimes is the other side, blinding any analyses of different regimes to nuance as well as ensuring that dangerous or problematic politics always remain only a true problem for the "other" regimes. Liberalism thus becomes the eidetic form of justice, something that may never be fully or perfectly realised in this world but the only thing that moves towards justice. All other regimes are simply fatally flawed, and cannot be ready for justice until they embrace liberalism. The complexities of international influence and the

[94] Does this mean the violence we have witnessed in Canada and the U.S. even in the last few years alone is neglected, or that these societies are not democratic? Is the violence perpetuated indirectly but especially directly by democratic nations in non-democratic nations around the world—for instance Canada in Honduras, the U.S. in Chile and Argentina—considered in such assessments?

dynamics of complicated histories are erased in this simplistic way of categorising emotions politically.

Returning to Kingston's concepts of vertical and horizontal dynamics of public passion, and remembering that vertical dynamics are Kingston's primary focus as her political theory of emotions emphasises the regime and institutional level, she argues that public passions can be differentiated according to the type of regime (*ibid*, 55). While Kingston's claim that regimes can be emotionally classified comes from a different direction, it is not dissimilar to the dangerous claims that lead people to attribute the rise of the Nazis to the authoritarian personality and German orderliness (thus Anglo societies do not and will not have the same risk of fascism); or claims that Russians typically are used to despotic authority and as a consequence are politically cynical and apathetic, thus making democracy almost impossible for them. While it is markedly different to attribute emotional tendencies to the social structures created by different regimes, instead of attributing regimes strictly to innate personalities, each attribution nevertheless functions deterministically. Liberalism is not recognised merely as one of many regimes, but a political and moral ideal to be always pursued and yet already embodied by certain (mostly Anglophone, certainly Western colonial or western European) nation states and their political cultures.

Though Nussbaum describes disgust and shame as completely unacceptable emotions, she makes an exception when they are used by and in liberal thought and regimes. So while frowning upon the use of the emotion she provides the caveat that "…both liberal and illiberal views use shame to motivate, but they use different types of shame. A liberal society asks people to be ashamed of excessive greed and selfishness, but it does not ask them to blush for their skin color or their physical impairments" (Nussbaum 2013, 23). Whatever flaws may exist within liberalism, it remains a bastion of pure and noble ideals for the political community to continuously work to achieve, the ultimate goal of mutual respect and thriving as a society. However in order to fit the ahistorical theoretical inclination of liberalism, liberal thinkers end up becoming historical revisionists, perhaps inevitably by maintaining the liberal universalist perspective, even when drawing from the historical record. Usually, historical cases are not merely cherry-picked to paint a certain picture, but events are portrayed so as to support liberal ideas and institutions even if significant elements of the events must be glossed over or left out, or misrepresented, as Nussbaum demonstrates with her drawing from Martin Luther King Jr,.

Moreover, Nussbaum's three "most prominent—and stably successful—" revolutionary struggles over the past century were Gandhi's resistance against the British, the U.S. Civil Rights Movement, and the struggle against Apartheid in South Africa (Nussbaum 2016, 212). She argues all three held a profound commitment to non-anger, which is certainly true (*ibid*). But what is her criteria for success and stability? Furthermore, is she turning to these examples for their easy appropriation into a liberal framework, compared to other much more profound revolutionary events in the twentieth century?

From the other direction, Nussbaum downplays historical and present-day ills within liberal societies, perpetuating the framework of the good and just liberal state versus the authoritarian evil and unjust one. Nussbaum has no hesitation in citing the "Nazi double-life" (Nussbaum 2001, 428) in which Germans in the Third Reich, even Nazi Party members, could go about their day to day lives with politeness, pleasantries, and even empathy and compassion for some people and creatures (the infamous focus on nature preservation and animal welfare)[95]

[95] "Hitler was a vegetarian!" being a common refrain to indicate bad people can do good things.

while devaluing, dehumanising, and murdering and condoning the murders of millions of people. The American/Anglo-colonial double life is disregarded by Nussbaum. She firmly argues that Nazi Germany may have had a social problem, but that the United States in particular is essentially and structurally immune to this problem due to the history and culture of their liberal institutions, despite the concentration camp having its origins in colonial Britain, and the racial and eugenicist politics of the U.S. and Canada being (even award-winning) inspirations for the Nazi regime.[96] Nussbaum always warns against the dangerous emotion of disgust, and cautions even against the way we turn the Nazis into aberrations rather than confronting their humanity, and thus our commonality with them (*ibid*, 450-451). And yet Nussbaum avoids confronting any commonality with the horrors of the Nazi regime—mass oppression, racism, and genocide—by assuring her readers that while the Nazi regime may represent the evil all humans are capable of, liberal institutions will ensure these horrors will not be repeated as in the case of the United States. Nussbaum argues that:

> Despite [Milgram's] grim predictions that any nation in the world could fill dozens of Nazi death camps, in fact not all nations have done so. And none have done so under robust conditions of democratic freedom. A vigorous critical culture counts for a great deal. Of course, this critical culture is important because Nazism was born of a German culture of obedience. (Nussbaum 2013, 197).

[96] The eugenics programs of forced sterilization of places such as Alberta and California, as well as the practices of U.S. border control between Texas and Mexico, directly influenced Nazi racial politics. See W. Mikkel Dack's 2011 article, "The Alberta Eugenics Movement and the 1937 Amendment to the Sexual Sterilization Act" in *Past Imperfect* 71: 90-113; as well as coverage of this history in the U.S. South in media works such as David Dorado Romo's piece in The Texas Observer, "To Understand the El Paso Massacre, Look to the Long Legacy of Anti-Mexican Violence at the Border" or Tom Abate's piece in the San Francisco Gate "State's little-known history of shameful science / California's role in Nazis' goal of 'purification'." It is also worth mentioning that contrary to the claim in Abate's piece that argues U.S. eugenics were economically motivated unlike those of the Nazis, Dack's work shows that at least in Alberta, though also in media throughout the Anglosphere, economic concerns were minimal for the eugenics movement and the idea of a "pure" or "healthy" population was primary. Further, a key figure in the American eugenics movement and direct influencer of U.S. eugenics laws, Harry H. Laughlin, received an honorary doctorate for this work from the University of Heidelberg in 1936 by the Nazi administration (see page 211-213 of Paul A. Lombardo's 2008 *Three Generations, No Imbeciles* (John Hopkins University Press).)
https://www.texasobserver.org/to-understand-the-el-paso-massacre-look-to-the-long-legacy-of-anti-mexican-violence-at-the-border/
https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/State-s-little-known-history-of-shameful-science-2663925.php

First, how might a robust democracy be distinguished from a non-robust one? Were Canada and the United States simply non-robust democracies during the heights of the mass genocides of indigenous peoples through deliberate starvation, biowarfare, forced relocation, and residential schools, not to mention the banning of languages and cultural practices? Are these genocides disqualified from this assessment because they lack that stereotypical German orderliness? Was the motivation of continental expansion and resource acquisition somehow different from, more justifiable than *Lebensraum*? And were Germans truly more obedient culturally than the German immigrants to the United States, than those descended from Anglo-puritans, or than the English in general?[97] I could ask endless rhetorical questions, but while I think there was a specificity in the atrocity of the Holocaust and the other genocidal murders committed by the Nazi regime that should never be dismissed, it is historically neglectful and even malicious to play down or leave out the genocides committed by the liberal imperial and settler-colonial states. The Nazis can only function as a "warning" for the abhorrent atrocities of which humanity is capable if the crimes of our Anglo-colonial societies including the attempted genocides of numerous Indigenous peoples are left ignored, or more dangerously, diminished into lesser catastrophes by hasty contrasts with the "shocking" crimes (or, at least, sensationalised while other crimes are trivialised or made banal) of Nazi Germany.[98]

[97] Though Nussbaum states Milgram was incorrect, and democracy ensures these atrocities cannot be repeated in all places, she does clearly concede that Germany was susceptible specifically due to a culture of obedience. Democracy thus protects against blind obedience, it would seem, from her perspective. However, the notion of obedience as the origin of Nazism certainly should be more rigorously interrogated at the very least, and likely fully dismissed. See David R. Mandel's "The Obedience Alibi: Milgram's Account of the Holocaust Reconsidered" (1998, *Analyse & Kritik* 20: 74-94) for a critique of the obedience argument, and how it serves to ahistorically affirm the excuses of "just following orders" made by Nazi officials.

[98] My father and grandparents immigrated to Canada from West Germany in the 1960s, and I have a slightly different experience as to how Nazis/WWII Germany are perceived or at least talked about in Canada. Most often, it is with the assumption that most Germans were good people, victims themselves, and with dread over the Soviet Union (as my grandfather was born in East Prussia).

Following from these beliefs, Nussbaum argues that restricting and banning any anti-Semitic speech in Germany makes sense, however this is not the case in the United States, where racists according to Nussbaum have to fight an uphill battle politically, legally, and emotionally if they want to implement racism (Americans "have been moved by the words of Martin Luther King Jr.") (Nussbaum 2013, 125). Thus, the racist speech of Neo-Nazis and Klansmen ought to be protected because it does not threaten the now (post-Martin Luther King Jr.?) anti-racist values of the United States or its liberal institutions (*ibid*). Nussbaum writes, "if some people want to urge their fellow citizens to feel the disgust at the touch of a black person's skin that millions of Americans in the Jim Crow South once felt, they will have a hard time succeeding. But nobody will charge them with a crime for trying" (*ibid*). The universal liberal-bourgeois perspective, again, clearly views racism as a personal flaw, an incitement to view others as "disgusting", with no consideration of the subtleties of racism as it is actually experienced by the racialised via individuals and the very institutions Nussbaum sees as the protective foundations against racism in society. The universal liberal-bourgeois perspectives holds that the values of the majority-good citizens, brought up in a healthy liberal civic culture, with a careful separation of powers and rule of law not only can protect a society from acquiescing to racism, but also render it devoid of racism. While structural racism is a term now familiar to many, especially after 2020, racism has always been inherently structural. However, the liberal treatments of the topic end up using political emotions to dismiss concerns and criticism of racism as a structural phenomenon. Historical revisionism becomes necessary to accomplish this task. But the liberal theories of emotions themselves do their part. Accordingly, racism is a consequence of cultivating disgust, and thus this wrong emotion of disgust can be countered with the right emotions of compassion, empathy, and love on the part of good citizens, and there is therefore no need for other bad emotions like anger (at systemic racism) to put society and the state at risk of futile payback wishes.

Nussbaum comes across as offensively naïve when she discusses some of the most dire and difficult issues of racism in recent history. Especially striking is her questioning why South African whites did not simply address their fears of a “dangerous” black population with rural development, education, and job opportunities (Nussbaum 2015, 215), in complete disregard for both the social and material interests that were a part of the foundation of Apartheid and of all racism, as well as the way racism socially manifests in individual beliefs through larger social processes. Those racially discriminated against are not perceived as dangerous or inferior due to their deprived circumstances; instead they are blamed for their deprived circumstances (of which they indeed are not the cause) on this allegedly innate quality or lack of one. This functions similarly when it is the poor being used to function as the political threat or when the idea is advanced of criminality as being inherent to one’s psychology and not about circumstances (or even the very condition of committing a crime). This naivety makes it especially difficult to accept Nussbaum’s hailing of the value of trust and a shared future—perhaps for the best, as I believe a critical dissection of the liberal use of emotion here is utterly necessary.

Trust is crucial for a stable society, according to Nussbaum (Nussbaum 2016, 212). Kingston explicitly distinguishes trust from political passions, noting it is an individual disposition to risk taking, but ultimately notes that in political climates of fear social trust might be weakened and suspicion heightened (Kingston 2011, 47, 171, 178). Reddy also highlights the erosion of trust in regimes of fear, citing the climate and even culture of suspicion during the Reign of Terror following the French Revolution (Reddy 2001, 201). Reddy and Kingston retain their individualist perspectives, but focus more broadly on a collective climate, or on the institution and regime. Nussbaum tends to place the impetus to trust on those who are critiquing society or the state, or who are calling for change. She does also of course acknowledge that institutions must amend themselves to also be worthy of trust, to do their part in that shared future, but rather than a systemic examination of fear, mis/trust, and anger in politics, she makes a moralistic call for certain individuals or groups—the oppressed—to be trusting and turn against the temptations of revenge. She writes that "it is very easy for the oppressed to believe that trust is impossible, and that they can win their struggle only by dominating in their turn, or perhaps by establishing a grudging *modus vivendi* in which each side defends itself from incursions by the other" (Nussbaum 2016, 213). Opponents should always be repositioned into future partners in building a future, and thus we should strive to find ways to secure their cooperation (*ibid*, 223). Nussbaum names Nelson Mandela who she argues "understood that to disarm resistance you needed to disarm anxiety first, and that this would never be accomplished by expressions of anger or bitterness but only courtesy and respect for the other's dignity" (*ibid*, 227). This is much to do with strategy, rather than being purely ethical, as Nussbaum claims that non-anger and generosity are simply more useful (*ibid*, 228). If you want cooperation, anger will work against you by heightening the anxieties of those who need to cooperate, whereas "a gentle and cheerful approach" will disarm defenses (*ibid*, 230). However it definitely carries with it a moralising tone, especially in its contrast with the mild admonitions Nussbaum directs towards oppressive institutions. As mentioned earlier, Nussbaum does argue that oppressors or former oppressors must share in the willingness to cooperate too. But the onus is put upon the oppressed to trust and extend good faith to those who have actively harmed them. Nussbaum again turns to the 2015 protests in Ferguson, Missouri to insist that some changes might be necessary in the institutions themselves. However, hers is an appeal to “shape up” so that institutions might become trustworthy again, rather than reaching to amend systemic oppression. She writes:

> The effort of reconciliation is ongoing, since race-based abuses in police practice and in the criminal justice system more generally must be corrected if trust is to be established. Terrible events around the nation in 2015, at least many showing extremely bad behavior by police to African-Americans, have at least made the nation take notice and make some efforts at both truth and reconciliation. (Nussbaum 2016, 239).

Giving into anger, according to Nussbaum, is inappropriate and unproductive on the part of those facing violence and oppression, and these protesters ought to reject those feelings and instead embrace an open and apparently cheerful demeanor in their pleas for systemic change. Liberal institutions, namely the police and criminal justice system, must address their “bad behaviours” (extrajudicial murders being pretty extreme “bad behaviour”) in order to reestablish themselves as worthy of trust and cooperation from those they have been oppressing. These institutions, fundamentally sound and just in Nussbaum’s eyes, must not be vindictively smashed, and anger at such violence must remain a temporary signal to move oppressed and oppressor together to build a more just, shared future. Political emotions matter—but only if they are being used to reinforce the liberal institutions of Nussbaum’s ideological alignment. The outrage of a population subject to random, unprompted, and extreme violence, by the state and by racist civilian terrorist acts, is not an appropriate political emotion and must be immediately transformed into a positive, “productive” one.

In past and present, liberal institutions ostensibly secure safety, security, reason, and good faith. As argued by these prominent liberal thinkers, dangerous emotions and violent actions are a feature of despotic, authoritarian regimes, be it in the past prior to liberal institutions, or those that currently refuse to adopt these institutions. Krause is rather explicit in stating that constitutional liberal democracy has rendered irrelevant concerns over passion in politics, especially expressed in religious matters and partisan politics such as those Hume feared (Krause 2008, 141). She argues that "the development of liberal-democratic political institutions has mitigated the dangers of extremism and instability" as they temper "the power of the democratic sovereign through mechanisms such as the rule of law, the separation of powers, and individual rights" (*ibid*). Thus liberal democracy has nullified any risks in passionate public deliberation (*ibid*). Other regimes are susceptible to the dangers of the passions due to their lack of liberal institutions. Rather obviously, liberal concepts and presentations of history oppose challenges to liberalism from critical left-wing and revolutionary socialist outlooks. But more insidious are the ways in which these universalist, ahistorical, and revisionist outlooks hinder and restrict any nuanced treatment of plain political and historical realities, and especially the emotions that underskirt them. Just as Nussbaum insists we must reject the bad emotions, the wishes of payback and suffering, that would in her eyes come with taxing wealthy individuals too highly, the liberal outlook curtails understandings of political actors, and subjects, and their emotions—effectively producing a political stalemate in trying to include the emotions.

Returning now to her work, if Rosenwein's emotional communities are applied to the present literature of political emotions, a clear picture can be composed of liberal self-understanding. Rosenwein posits a more historically nuanced category of emotional analysis compared to Reddy's arguably more ahistorical and universalising emotional regime—that of emotional communities. She argues that emotional communities "are, almost by definition (since emotions tend to have a social, communicative role) an aspect of every social group in which people have a stake and interest. Emotional communities may be large or small. In the modern world, the historian may even treat a nation—an "imagined community"—as an emotional community" (Rosenwein 2010, 12). In an interview with Jan Plamper, Rosenwein stated that emotional communities:

> are precisely the same as social [ones]; communities—families, neighborhoods, parliaments, guilds, monasteries, parish church memberships—but the researcher looking at them seeks above all to uncover systems of feeling: what these communities (and individuals within them) define and assess as valuable or harmful to them; the evaluations that they make about others' emotions; the nature of the affective bonds between people that they recognize; and the modes of emotional expression that they expect, encourage, tolerate, and deplore. (Plamper 2010, 252-253).

Through her work on emotions in historical communities, notably those in medieval Europe, Rosenwein observes that "emotional epithets and characterizations may be used by one group (self-defined by race class, estate, and so on) for or against another" (*ibid,* 13). Understandings and expressions or uses of emotions were thus community features, with different emotions, or different forms of emotional expression, being normalised and distinctive of certain communities.

Most people belong or fall into multiple emotional communities, such communities are almost always something lived in plurality (Plamper 2001, 256). These might be of a family, a neighbourhood, a city or county or country, a cultural group, a religious institution, a job, a club, or any other imaginable community, any form of human group. These emotional communities can even influence each other, spreading or contributing certain emotional norms or habits amongst one other as communities overlap (*ibid*, 257). As has become a dominant perspective, Rosenwein emphasises a strength of her community model in that as with specific groups, and specific places, people see emotions differently at different times (Rosenwein 2010, 14). For instance, Aristotle saw "mildness" as an emotion/*pathê*, but not happiness—the opposite of contemporary, twenty-first century thinking/feeling (*ibid*). Any historian, or anyone seeking to understand the emotions or their role in life, always must be mindful of these discrepancies across time, and never take for granted commonality in experiences or interpretations of a feeling/emotion/passion. Was *eudaimonia* a word for "happiness" for Aristotle, as some translators have it? Or is Nussbaum far more accurate to retain the term *eudaimonia* to express a very particular desire or effort towards human thriving, one that clearly does not map directly onto "happiness"? And, would twenty-first or twentieth century people *feel eudaimonia*, or instead is "happiness" felt with an articulation amounting to *eudaimonia* as the cause or source? Rosenwein states that the most important question to pursue of any emotional community is: what emotions are most fundamental to the expression of and sense of self (*ibid*, 15)? What are the definitive emotions associated with being a part of that community?

According to Barbara Rosenwein's framing, emotions are instruments of sociability, not only socially constructed and working to "sustain and endorse cultural systems," but also informing all levels of human relationship and interaction, "from intimate talk between husbands and wives to global relations" (Rosenwein 2010, 19-20). Furthermore, no person nor body exists autonomously from an environment—Janice Bially-Mattern argues that bodies thus do not possess innate emotions (Hutchison and Bleiker 2014, 504). Instead, emotions are contextually acquired capabilities, acquired through biological and social forces persons within which persons are bound complexly (*ibid*, 504-505). This socially embedded nature of emotion prompts Rosenwein to dismiss the quest for determining emotional authenticity (Rosenwein 2010, 21). Instead, these socially/culturally-fastened social signals should be examined in terms of the norms they demonstrate (*ibid*). If one emotion is the standard response of a particular group to certain phenomenon, the authenticity of sentiment is not what matters but why that response is standard, why that norm holds in the community and not another (*ibid*). And so, what does thinking of emotions in this way reveal about liberal emotions, and liberal projects of political emotions?

Capitalism: Emotions and the Interests, Again

The abstract and universalising perspective embedded in liberal thought means that theorising the political emotions through and for liberalism remains stuck, always at an impasse of striving to ground liberal principles through the real, experienced, and emotional, but having to quarantine and expunge those elements when they fail to reflect back abstract liberalism. Consequently, liberalism cannot account for the reason-emotion dichotomy nor the factors that lead to any exclusion of emotions from the public realm beyond an eidetic veneration of reason. With the ideal always taken for and substituted for the concrete, the structural systemic relations of the present modern social order remain obscure, and the deep alienation of individuals from the natural, social, and political realms—and even from themselves—is naturalised and unseen.

The extent to which capitalist industrialisation has produced potent emotions cannot be overstated. In her *Gefühle und Kapitalismus*, Ute Frevert draws upon Weber's account "of the way in which the modern capitalist economic and social order was entirely based upon "affect", and that "acquisitive greed", "agonal passions" and "temperamental values" were genuine motivations for economic subjects" (Plamper 2015, 283). In Weber's lifetime surveys showed the predominant affect related to modern machine work was "revulsion," and one metalworker had his thoughts and feelings on record, saying:

> When machines took over my work, with foundries and mills employing between eighty and a hundred men, you can imagine how it feels if you have worked for forty-two years without such din, and then suddenly there is so much racket and

> noise that it gets on an old man's nerves. I sweat all day long, feel anxious. Often I cry like a small child, and I can't sleep at night any more. I leave a light burning at night now, that helps me with my feelings. (Plamper 2015, 283).

These feelings are sharp and clearly traced to workplace conditions. They also reveal a deep alienation in daily work experienced by this worker, one that pervades capitalist work, social life, and politics as a whole. One due to this the natural activity of working becomes so foreign and antagonistic to the worker that the response is like an autoimmune attack—the conditions of work are so far removed from the worker's power, the invasion of machinery and restrictive management techniques are so obstructive to the worker's self-determination, that work is simply no longer one's own and the workers' own movements are actions are borne of coercion. As articulated in Hegel and Marx, self-consciousness is developed from the objectification of consciousness through productive activity, but as capitalist social relations produce a fetishised consciousness through the obfuscation of ownership and market exchange a person's own productive activity seems to vanish (Schott 1988, 125). Workers do not see what they do and create, as production and exchange appear to simply occur through "natural" market laws (*ibid*). Workers are not agents, but subjects of invisible market forces and the conditions of alienation are further cemented.

Bourgeois thought, arguably most fully expressed in Kant, is of the same fetishistic, alienating processes. Robin May Schott argues that the alienation that characterises the experience of individuals in capitalist society is very similar to the detached worldview of ascetic religious and philosophical devotees (Schott 1988, 119). Individuals are united only through an abstract universal bond, universalised "humanity." Social and moral understandings go through abstract laws in spite of the concrete and contextual. Schott tells us that "Kant's moral theory echoes the social phenomenon of objectification, in which relations between persons appear as exclusively mediated by the objective laws of exchange. The immediate social bonds between individuals disappear from view… as they become regulated exclusively by the objective law of morality" (*ibid*, 145). The concepts of liberal thought, especially bourgeois moral thought such as that of Kant, remain pure, true and constant because they have no history, no material grounding. Schott illuminates, writing that "the temporal character of already entrenched relations, which are reflected in the forms of thought, becomes concealed from the thinker. These relations appear as having no past, as being outside of history" (*ibid*, 127). This ahistorical objectivity refuses to acknowledge itself in relation to the social world: the subject is a universal yet atomistic being ("I"), all objects perceived by these individual beings are equivalent and fixed, and the relation between the knower and the object of that knowledge—the "I" and the object—is assumed to be unchanging (*ibid*, 143). Just as the realities of production are obscured with the appearance of natural objective economic laws, the specificities and conditions of the social and historic are obscured by objective truths, morals, norms, and goods. "Moral relations between individuals, therefore, presuppose a mutual condition of alienation", Schott writes (*ibid*, 146). These objective truths are as universal and objective as the universal (bourgeois male propertied) citizen of the public, with all particulars excised for their deviations from the pure abstract norm. In light of this alienated condition of bourgeois thought, the tendency and even need for liberal projects to be so ahistorical and revisionist becomes apparent. These projects are weighing liberal abstract concept against liberal abstract "truth"—the distortions of history—rather than turning to history to evaluate the concepts. That which does not fit into liberal objectivity cannot exist in liberal thought. If, as in Kant's liberal cosmopolitanism, "moral principles are universally valid, independent of the content of any particular social situation," then the real history of human relationships is denied as the origin or source of morality (*ibid*, 138). As in the purified sphere of (especially Newtonian) scientific analysis (*ibid*), such a reified world is taken as the only world, as the source of a pure and objective and unchangeable truth, and so morally, epistemologically, broadly conceptually, the bourgeois liberal outlook is one of sheer alienation and reification.

The hegemony of the liberal outlook has resulted in a totalising takeover of social experience with natural, objective laws and categorisation. Throughout the twentieth century, this was perhaps most potently done with the concept of the "rational-economic man" in neoclassical economics. While a much more rigid framework than can be applied to liberalism as a whole, as an attempt to explain all human behaviour it left a powerful socio-historical mark. In Robert H. Frank's work on emotion, Passions within Reason, he discusses how the logic of the rational economic man has even posited economic rationality as a foundation for love and (or) intimate or other social relationships, what he has termed a model of "exchange relationships" (Frank 1988, 185). Yet Frank insists that love by its very expression and definition is not about calculation or what one person does for another, indeed it is valued for its own sake as a feeling (*ibid*, 196). Indeed, love is characterised by what is done *for* the other, willingly to the extent it is desired, and not by what might be received. People are quick to rule out love when such conditions are implied, expected, or suspected. Love seems to be the emotion that most consistently challenges alienated thought as it is so specific, contextual, and circumstantial. It is not abstract sympathy or compassion, and does not work with universal applicability, and in fact insinuations of universality are often met with challenge. Significant and true as love may be—and powerful—it must be noted that a specific intimate love is important for the maintenance of the liberal intimate sphere, the sphere of social reproduction through the intimate family. More than other emotions, love and its intensity preserve not only the intimate family, but an entire market for consumption of tokens, entertainment, and other media.[99] Gisela Block and Barbara Duden specifically point to the romanticisation of marriage that led to the formulation of female domestic labour as non-labour—women's' physical work and sexuality was paid for by "love" (Plamper 2015, 55-56). Nevertheless, love often represents a breaking point where the totalising abstractions of liberalism and capitalism cannot hold.

At the same time, as capitalism has changed and intensified over the decades, alienation has become more deeply rooted in the everyday experiences of twentieth and twenty-first century people. The turn of the century metalworker's feelings were distinctly full of anguish, in response to harrowing intrusions upon the work process. But as the workplace has become more and more alienating over the twentieth century, and while many workers clearly articulate severe hardships and sources of immense difficulty in their work, a numbness has also taken hold as a direct response to alienation. Such a feeling should not be assumed to be felt universally or evenly amongst all workers, of all kinds, across the planet. But there is such pervasive estrangement in such an intensely alienating world that even the source of stressful and painful work experiences is obscured through the normalisation of enduring poor working conditions. Frédéric Lordon captures this remarkably clearly in his work *Willing Slaves of Capital* in which he marks the transformation in self perception from worker to consumer. Moreover, with the hegemonic liberal individualism of thought and the enforcement of "free" contracts in the marketplace, structural problems are perceived as individual ones, specifically as an individual lack of will or ingenuity as Berlant notes, and especially for those doing precarious work or who

[99] It is interesting that in addition to the preservation of romantic and familial love, there is a huge market that uses rational economic behaviourist principles to soothe and coddle and extract money from those who feel disaffected or like failures when it comes to intimate relationships. Relationships are framed as a wholly transactional thing, whether the transaction is material or social/cultural. This however is well beyond what is relevant for the arguments in this chapter and dissertation.

are unemployed/a part of the reserve army of labour (Berlant 2005, 4). Lordon echoes this phenomenon, writing:

> The individual subject imagines itself to be a free being, endowed with an autonomous will, whose actions are the effects of its sovereign volition: hence, had I wanted emancipation strongly enough, I would have been able to escape my condition of servitude; consequently, if I am in this condition, it must be the fault of my will, and my servitude has to be voluntary. (Lordon 2014, 13).

This alienation is not restricted to work—as mentioned before, it has come to characterise social and political life more broadly. And the breadth of this alienation even leaves its mark on resistance.

The liberty of capitalism, an absolutely essential part of liberalism, is the freedom of contract in the private marketplace, in other words the idea some are free to use others as a means to an end, and others are free to be used (Lordon 2014, ix). Formal and abstract liberty and equality may posit humanity as equal brothers (and non-men are included in this brotherhood when their material, "identifying" characteristics are put aside to enter public recognition), but material and historical equality and freedom are inconsequential after the overthrow of arbitrary rulership. In reality, economic dependence—where one agent "holds the conditions for the material reproduction of the other"—is the relation that forms the permanent background of all phenomena that takes place in capitalist societies (*ibid*, 7). The "voluntary" contracts, or "voluntary servitude" as Lordan puts it, "captures the tension of an aspiration to liberty that inexplicably persists in remaining unfulfilled," a tension that "can go no further politically than a call for raising consciousness" if the origins of this inequality and constrained liberty go unearthed (*ibid*, 13). Even Reddy, a defender of liberalism, observes the emotional constraints of the capitalist "free" contract, writing that while capitalist democracies appear to offer a great scope for liberty, “in practice, capacities and options are limited by contractual relationships (that is, by money and property)” (Reddy 2001, 127). Anyone who depends on a single contractual relationship, whether for income or identity, are severely limited in practical terms in what emotional management strategies they employ, even if those strategies are varied (*ibid*).

Work is carried out no longer merely to fulfill material needs, but has morphed into such a part of individuality that work is a way to earn love—at least love in the Spinozan sense of the joy which accompanies the idea of an external cause—and experience joy, argues Lordon (Lordon 2014, 71). Economic market forces really have come to embody the whole of the private realm, giving life its purpose and meaning—is a job something you are passionate about, does it fulfill you, does your work contribute to the world? Work is not expected to simply be a means to an end, though that is the reality for the vast proportion of people on earth. Finding labour fulfilling is supposed to signal moral worth and is the key to happiness, and if that is not the case then the labour being performed is something to aspire to one day abandon in pursuit of that higher, more satisfying (for the self and the world at large) form of labour. The elevation of work to life’s purpose has not largely served to criticise the way production is organised and labour distributed and carried out in society, but instead is a way to motivate workers to “find their purpose” in work, or be too ashamed to admit they have failed in their search for fulfillment and again blame personal attributes for hindering their economic successes. Lordon argues that such emotional tethers to work in late capitalism are an expression of the totalitarian dominance over employees that has been achieved economically, and cultivated by liberal egalitarian liberty (*ibid*, 79).

Lordon writes that the capitalist desire for perfect flexibility, from which divesting is at all times possible (i.e. one can be fired as readily as one is hired) “is the fantasy of an individualism pushed to its ultimate consequences, the imaginative flight of a whole era" (Lordon 2014, 44). Nothing can restrain capital any longer, not even moral or reputational codes (*ibid*, 45). The demands of emotion at work have intensified and even outstripped the emotional labour as described by Hochschild, where employers not only expect "employees to show the required emotions (empathy, attention, solicitude, smiling), but aims at the ultimate behavioural performance in which the prescribed emotions are no longer merely outwardly enacted, but 'authentically' felt" (*ibid*, 82-83).

History is practically irrelevant in liberal thought, and material conditions are ignored or rejected. Kant states this directly when it comes to his thought—his objective theory is in no way empirical, and his philosophy, the expression of objective truth, for him "remains unaffected by the particular practices of society" (Schott 1988, 118). Consequently, a further stumbling block is introduced in terms of interrogating the emotions themselves within liberalism: emotions are not understood as socio-historic entities. Even when the possibilities of historic or cultural variation are presented, or political uses of emotions are brought up, they are divorced from concrete history. As Dixon articulates, "in the late eighteenth century, the languages of passions and politics were frequently mixed. There were discussions…of how the passions could cure the body, and, less frequently, of how a greater role for the common people might improve the health of the body politic. More frequently, however, the analogy was between controlling the passions and controlling the people" (Dixon 2006, 35). Emotions are not merely subject to variation across place and time, but themselves are politically and socially contingent, and the way emotions are even understood in attempts to analyse their roles in regimes, or in attempts to include them seriously in politics, are predicated upon the developments of the concept as took place through the Enlightenment and the nineteenth century, as detailed in Chapter Four. Reddy goes into great detail in describing the specificity of socially curated emotions in detailing pre-, revolutionary, and post-revolutionary France, as well as the impact those emotions and events would have upon emotions of the later liberal period. Not departing too far from Habermas, Reddy notes that the *salons* offered emotional refuge from the increasingly elaborate honour code of the court (Reddy 2001, 145). As has already been elaborated upon by Habermas, Reddy describes the *salon* as a venue in which “friendly groups pursued at first esthetic, later intellectual pleasures; noble and commoner, wealthy patrons and penniless writers mixed on a basis of companionate equality….Both salons and lodges were linked by correspondence; letters took on a new, warm, intimate tone” (*ibid*). But further, in this period (1660 to 1789), there came about an optimism about the power of human reason, “in part on the belief that certain natural sentiments, sentiments that everyone was capable of feeling, were the foundation of virtue and could serve as the basis for political reform” and these ideas were spread through *salons* and Masonic lodges, print, academies, and arts, as well as novels, paintings, plays, and operas (*ibid*, 145, 146).

This was the era of the social contract and the public sphere (Reddy 2001, 146). But Reddy emphasises this was also an era with a “novel view of emotions as a force for good in human affairs,” with “enthusiasm for emotional expression and intimacy—for emotional refuge from a prevailing code of honor—expressed by many actors central to events leading up to and following the outbreak of the Revolution” (Reddy 2001, 146). The *salons* were democratic public spaces as well as emotional refuges (*ibid*, 186), as Reddy argues at least.[100] But after the French Revolution, the emotions associated with it were associated also with terror and disorder,

[100] They simply were not democratic public spaces as they required a direct invitation, unlike an open reading society meeting at a church or a pub.

and so “instead of natural moral sensibility grounding democratic enfranchisement of all, education, property, and the interests that property inspires are held up as the sole possible guarantors of order in the state. The granting of political rights to the poor is said to have been the principal source of the evils of the Terror. Simplicity had lost its luster” (*ibid*, 201). Feeling was relegated to the safe, feminine intimate space of the home (*ibid*, 205). The public once again became the space of pure reason, according to this narrative. Reddy writes, highlighting again the gendered dynamics that were present in these disputes over the emotions, that:

> A new, all-male Enlightenment was arising on the horizon of the past with the help not only of the Idéologues and Chateaubrriand but of a new generation of liberal theorists, including Cousin and Guizot, and eventually Tocqueville. This Enlightenment was a product of reason and its fruit was the Revolution of 1789, establishing a constitutional monarchy that would ensure the rule of reason through public deliberation, debate, and voting, limited to men of merit. (Reddy 2001, 208).

The Terror following the revolution “was denounced as a deviation that could be regarded as an outgrowth of the unchained, uneducated political passions of the plebs” (*ibid*).[101] Even if the revolution had been a novel expression of the positivity of the passions, it was swiftly replaced—and erased, Reddy argues—by the “safe” rational universal outlook of those better able to order and improve society: propertied and educated men. Passions were quarantined in the private sphere, among women and workers, perhaps not dissimilarly to Arendt’s framing of the ancient

[101] Reddy is in a tricky situation here as his work is explicitly carried out with the premise that class cannot explain something like the French Revolution and Terror (Reddy 2001, 177, 198), only emotives can. And so the class dimensions he inevitably must describe in sentimentalism are quite hazy. He makes references to “plebs” and a *sans-culotte* here and there, but (ironically) leaves them nameless, in contrast to figures like Robespierre and Rousseau. So, messily, sentimentalism and the passions that lead to the Terror are ascribed to the simple plebeian masses, but Reddy had outlined sentimentalism as a philosophy cultivated by bourgeois philosophers, jurists, and authors. The simplicity and passions of the masses were ascribed to them, without a clear indication they came from them. For contrast, Habermas specifically separates the literary, bourgeois public sphere from the plebeian public sphere of the *sans-culottes* to whom Robespierre was oriented, the uneducated, though he notes also that this plebeian sphere was nevertheless oriented towards the bourgeois public sphere (Habermas 1989, xviii).

world demarcated between the base, bodily, and needy—the emotional—and those able to freely act politically—the truly rational.[102] Nevertheless, despite adding emotion to the analysis of the history of *salon* culture, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution, Reddy immobilises these ideas in his concepts of emotive and emotional regime and instead of emphasising historical fluidity and political flexibility, diversity of emotion becomes rigid and objectified within his framework.

Not unlike Reddy's rejection of sentimentalism after the French Revolution, Dixon notes that in the aftermath of "insane" monarchs and revolutionary upheaval, the rational government of passions and people was an urgent focus for politics and social order (Dixon 2006, 35). The death of the passions, and the creation of the new concept of "emotions," coincided with increased secularisation, increased incarceration, and the expansion of the franchise (Dixon 2011, 308), and these are not events of mere timely correlation. The new category of emotions was created precisely with the aim of keeping with the social, political, and scientific movements of the era. Peter Stearns also sees social and economic change as the force behind emotional transformation, and cites the needs of newly industrialised capitalist society as the source of nineteenth century emotions, which further morphed and developed new standards and articulations with the rise of the consumer and the service sector of the 1920s (Rosenwein 2010, 22). Yet Sianne Ngai argues that there has been a further shift in emotions as they are expressed, felt, and understood in contemporary transnational capitalist society, and that they do not connect with the theories of social action or transformation, like anger and fear did for Aristotle or

[102] Sentiment and feeling certainly were a part of liberal discourse after the French Revolution, especially amongst English liberals, but tied firmly to the goal of developing the rational capabilities of those who are not self-governing who are sympathised with, so that one day they might be able to be civilised and even rule themselves. For an example case, see Eric N. Olund 2002. "From savage space to governable space: the extension of United States judicial sovereignty over Indian Country in the nineteenth century." *Cultural Geographies* 9: 129-157.

Hobbes (Ngai 2007, 5). This is not to say that feelings in contemporary society lack transformative power, but they are not the powerful passions of the past, and perhaps not even the emotions of a century ago.

Self-interest, as described in Chapter 2, increasingly took centre stage until it perhaps became almost synonymised with human nature. Reddy even remarks that self-interest is “an empty notion that can be filled in practice only by cultural structures, a notion that had its own history and could not be used without critical reflection” (Plamper 2010, 238). What is in the interest of a person is socially and historically variant, even personally variant. Human beings have needs, and human beings desire—as Lordon writes “to exist is to desire, and therefore to be active in pursuit of one’s objects of desire”—and as such all actions are interested by definition (Lordon 2014, 1, 5). But it has taken on a very particular meaning through capitalist rationality. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty illuminates the paradoxical moral and emotional orders of liberal capitalism, in which actions that are condemned are also encouraged. She writes, “while promoting the emotions that prompt habits of co-operation, they also reward radical independence; while condemning aggression, they also praise “aggressive initiative.” While admiring selfless devotion, they also reward canny self-interest” (Rorty 2008, 36). Ideological and political interests are expressed in the differences: which stockbroker has “envious greed” and which has “assertive initiative,” Rorty offers as one example, or the contrast between the rage of a veteran suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and the “politically aggressive indignation” of a military officer (*ibid*). Similar to the ways emotional management takes on different specific forms depending on class, as articulated by Hochschild, Rorty notes that:

> Status, occupations, and the extent of a family’s disposable income profoundly affects the ambitions, opportunities, and expectations of its members. Chronic unemployment, the reversal of stereotypic gender divisions of labour, laws affecting primogeniture—all these manifestly affect the tonal stress and tensions

> within family configurations. Class and ethnic patterns frame legitimate or forbidden outbursts of anger; they provide criteria for justified claims to power and property; they affect the emotional specifications of generic desires. (Rorty 2008, 360).

The articulation and experiences of emotion, the conditions determining what is in one's self-interest, and the perceptions of the resulting behaviour are all inseparably entangled with material conditions and social relations. They are not static or complete options that free agents might merely pick and choose via rational deduction. Rorty writes, "our psychology, our emotions, and our habits are profoundly influenced by the way that economics drives civic politics" (*ibid*, 37). Further, the self is re-made in the image of what is desirable under capitalism, a person's abilities, habits, and desires must make them both employable, and a good consumer (*ibid*).

Self-interest is Janus-faced in contemporary society, particularly after the intensified form it took after neoclassical economics gained strength. On the one side, self-interest is viewed with favour for being rational, calculative, and predictable. The other side, however, requires an emotive and desiring agent who will be a reliable consumer, perhaps rational when comparing prices, but motivated by capricious desires. Lordon argues that:

> The generality of desire…has room for the full gamut of interests, ranging from the self-declared economic interest, a historically constructed expression of interest as it *self-consciously* recognises itself in the form of accounting in monetary units, via all the forms of interest that are embedded in strategies with varying degrees of self-awareness, up to its least economic forms, indeed the most anti-economic, such as moral, symbolic, or psychological interests. Yet capitalist social relations draw much more widely from this range than a merely economistic reading would conceive. (Lordon 2014, 6).

Despite the typical reductivist presentation of interest as rational-economic utilitarian calculation (an understanding Lordon insists must be avoided (*ibid*, 5)), capitalism itself depends on a much fuller breadth of interests, and restrictively calculative economic self-interested behaviour is not compatible with human life. And yet, as Earl Gammon notes, the default understanding of rationality in these social circumstances "assumes a clear ordering of preferences in decision making and the maximalization of expected utility by economic actors" (Gammon 2008, 252). Gammon notes the reductive view of interest and rationality is especially pertinent in international political economy, for even if individuals are assumed to have a more complex expression of interests, markets and states are presumed to operate within a narrowly defined articulation of instrumental rationality (*ibid*). Further, Gammon remarks that rationality can be understood "as a historically conditioned product of a society's technologies of truth" (*ibid*). Drawing upon ideas of social reproduction, Gammon notes the way rational-calculative self-interest reinforces the public and the private/intimate as sharply distinct, even only within the private-situated economic realm. Economic rationality is seen to express an ideal form of the masculine "Western" self, which excludes the feminised non-"Western" other (*ibid*, 254). The feminised intimate realm is ignored and degraded, despite being an active economic site of social reproduction, the site of "a reproductive economy, responsible for the biological, socio-cultural, and institutional reproduction of society" which is the foundation for the masculinised 'productive' economy of market exchange (*ibid*).

The era out of which classical political economy emerged was also the era of natural theology, and early economic theory fit neatly in that framework with premises of an innately moral human nature (Gammon 2008, 272). Intervention in the economy would not be necessary, as moral behaviour, which extended to the expression of self-interest in market interactions, was a part of a divinely ordained nature (*ibid*). So certainly before 1830, with Smith and Ricardo and even Malthus, the market operates in accordance with natural laws of a natural moral economy (*ibid*). But after 1830, the understanding of the market shifted from a facet of the Divine Maker's morally ordered world to a mechanism of punishment and rewards to facilitate a particular order of social relations (*ibid*, 273). Gammon reveals that "though seemingly bearing some similarity to belief in the sanctioning of morality by natural law in classical political economy, the new mechanistic conception of the market was different in that it aimed at redirecting and correcting natural propensities, rather than allowing the economy of nature to work out its own logic" (*ibid*). Self-interest was no longer a natural component of human sociality that emerged through interaction and exchange, and instead took on a restrictive, disciplinary form in which rationality was increasingly narrowed in scope. The market was an enforcer of this rationality, ordering and disciplining mechanistic labours "whose innate moral propensities were seen to be lacking or in need of cultivation" (*ibid*, 276), workers who were not seen as inherently capable of the correct, rational moral actions self-interest was to produce.[103] Radical Liberal politician Richard Cobden argued that commerce and trade "were the 'grand panacea', the way 'to inoculate with the healthy and saving taste for civilisation'" (*ibid*), the way of ensuring rational moral behaviour in the world's people, of guaranteeing liberal progress. As observed by Jacob Viner, economics have become thoroughly secularised—not unlike the emotions themselves—and the specific moral underpinnings of early political thought have been eliminated (*ibid*, 272). With that, the condition of self-interest has become even more narrowed and restrictive than it was when it provided its initial counterweight for the passions in early modern society.

[103] Gammon further explores how these new ideas of the market were supported by phrenology. Just as early classical economics were underpinned by theological and moral beliefs of nature, in a secularising world liberal economics was underpinned by the "scientific" basis of phrenology, working to understand not religious, moral, or intellectual beings but "machines" (specifically how workers were described and viewed) whose behaviour was determined by their physicality (Gammon 2008, 274). The brute physical determinism of physiognomy and phrenology situated mechanistic understandings of economics, especially free trade liberalism, and allowed for its thriving in the Victorian era (*ibid*, 276).

Both self-interest and morality distanced themselves from the benevolence attributed to them by the earliest political economists. Just as liberal equality is only an abstraction, the "formal respect for persons as 'ends' accords…with the valuation of property over life"—Kant insists that stealing is *always* wrong, even were it to save a life (Schott 1988, 147). Morality itself, just like the narrowed conception of self-interest, is shaped to not only express but mandate the social relations of capital. Within the narrow contrivance of self-interest, not all self-interested behaviours are deemed equal. Lordon reflects upon the one-sided applications of self-interest and moral standards by observing the way capitalist collaboration must work around the principle of non-interference, of having other people realise the desires of another, in the hierarchy of the work structure (Lordon 2014, 3), in that the interest of the property owner, the employer, the capitalist is seen as having the default of legitimate self-interest with which workers and the propertyless must fall in sync. Schott argues that the moral dilemmas of liberal ethics—stealing medicine, deceitful money borrowing—demonstrate the contradictions of liberal society, in which concrete human needs are set against the universal conception of respect for personhood (Schott 1988, 147). She writes that "in bourgeois society, the abstract respect for personhood can undermine the possibility of sustaining concrete moral relations, just as abstract freedom can coexist with conditions that undermine individuals' ability to exercise their freedom" (*ibid*). Concrete needs, interests or desires, are seen as particulars of individuals and not a part of the abstract universal human condition, and when these concrete interests are acknowledged they are framed as involving competition between individuals and in need of regulation (*ibid*, 129), whether this is the selfish state of nature requiring governance by a sovereign power, or material needs impacted by scarcity that must be allocated through the market. So bourgeois universality is reductively produced by the conditions of capitalist society, and in Scott's words "refers to the subordination of all individuals to formal conditions of social existence, such a laws concerning property" (*ibid*).

As Hochschild emphasised in her work, feeling rules, the ways in which we manage, understand, and assess the emotions of ourselves and others, are implicit in ideology: as ideology gives rules which frame meanings, feeling rules allow for assessments within that (Hochschild 1979, 566). For instance, is a firing a personal failure or a capitalist abuse, and therefore is anger at a boss appropriate (*ibid*)? A change in ideological stance can thus produce new feeling rules by which people assess their emotions (*ibid*, 567). Emotions, their regulation and evocation, are undoubtedly an arena of political struggle, and it is seen as important for those who are in power to access the emotional lives of citizens (*ibid*, 568). But more potent are the strict regulative forces of the economic realm, that punishing market Gammon describes. Hochschild demonstrates the impacts of this as she assesses emotional management as it is manifest differently across class lines.[104] Her research from the 1970s demonstrated that children of different class backgrounds were prepared differently within the family in terms of the emotional skills of the workplace (*ibid*, 569). "Working class" children, those of "blue collar" families, were controlled by their parents and regulated through appeals to behaviour—*doing* the "right" or "honest" thing—while "middle class" children, of "white collar" families, were controlled by their parents and regulated through appeals to emotion—*feeling* or expressing the wrong thing, or having the wrong intention (*ibid*, 571). What is remarkable about the working class focus on

[104] Hochschild employs a working and middle class distinction here rather than a more rooted structural or Marxist conception in order to highlight the particular performative elements of work that are required in the broadly conceived service sector, the domain of what was often labelled as middle class or white collar versus blue collar (Hochschild 1979, 570). Post 1980, she has elaborated upon this concept and its distinctions as emotional labour and service sector work has become less sharply defined from the formerly more industrial "working class" forms. Regardless of the particularities of these definitions, though they are important, Hochschild's analysis of emotional labour hold up well and has only increased in significance, despite the term also becoming more frequently misused post-twenty-first century.

behaviour is that often it is in recognition that feelings or intentions might be correct, fair, or valid, but regardless they are expected to do the “correct” things, in line with the morality of a society based on private property. The middle class embodied a form of regulation that would become dominant in an era of precarious labour and fragile private life due to social media, of increasing work and behavioural regulation through expressing and even *having* the correct feelings. Where labour-power becomes commodified, the emotions have too, and potent and disorienting alienation permeates all social spheres. An interesting observation made by Dixon involves the move away from the older modes of the reason-emotion dichotomy in face of contemporary capitalist social relations and subjectivity: no longer are passions unruly subjects to govern, or dangerous enemies to drive out—emotions are “corporate employees to be managed, and psychotherapeutic patients t*o be counselled and understood” (Dixon 2011, 308).*

Because emotions are commodified, and become incorporated into political hegemony, Hochschild does point to the ways in which dissent is possible in the emotions. Rather than calling to include the emotions—since Hochschild views emotions as already utterly fused into socio-political structuring—Hochschild observes that ideological stances can be defied “by inappropriate affect and by refusing to perform the emotion management necessary to feel what, according to the official frame, it would seem fitting to feel” (Hochschild 1979, 567). Hochschild posits that what gets referred to as psychological effects of “unrest” or “rapid social change” is actually “a change in the relation of feeling rule to feeling and a lack of clarity about what the rule actually is, owing to conflicts and contradictions between contending sets of rules” (*ibid*, 567-568). New forms of social organisation, new social relations, inevitably produce new emotions, new expressions of emotion, and new emotional norms.

Sara Ahmed states that political narratives use emotions to create a "you" and a "we," cultivating the semblances of individual and collective bodies (Ahmed 2014, 2, 1). Power relations "endow 'others' with meaning and value," and emotionality makes claims about individuals and collectives, giving different emotional attributes to different groups—who is characterised by which emotions, who is hard, stern, and/or angry and who is given "soft" emotional attributes like compassion (*ibid*, 4). Emotions clearly transcend boundaries of public and private in their complicity in creating identities, and (mis)-representing those identities (Hutchison and Bleiker 2014, 506). And these creations of identity, as Ahmed also describes, are wholly interpretive, with an inevitable gap always remaining between the representation and what is being represented (ibid). When looking back upon history, just as when considering the framing of contemporary narratives, emotions are not always descriptive of feelings experienced or expressed but can be used to label others (Rosenwein 2010, 12). Is an "angry mob" actually angry according to its participants, or because hostile observers have attributed that description (*ibid*). As Hutchison and Bleiker note, "classifying is always a process of imposing order on far more complex phenomena and ideas. It inevitably involves choices that conceal as much as they reveal" (Hutchison and Bleiker 2014, 495). Especially as liberal theorists of political emotions are drawing from and developing their theories with support of ideas from the cognitive sciences, it must be remembered too that scientific knowledge is not immune from the social world or its hegemonic concepts, and indeed plays a role in reproducing consequent social inequalities (Morgen 1983, 203). Beyond more unconscious entrenchment of ideology, the ordering role of scientific thinking is what Gammon argues contributed to the present manifestations of emotional regulation and restriction in the Victorian and later market, with its phrenological links, a crisis of faith and epistemology after the failure of natural theology (Gammon 2008, 269). A frantic search for a rational basis of the social order after this Victorian crisis of faith meant that "…social technologies, such as the self-regulating market, became a means of ensuring control over human nature in the absence of evidence of a clear moral compass operating through nature" (*ibid*).

Gammon asserts that strict empiricism holds an "historically specific affective configuration of subjectivity" and with that it assumes affective neutrality (Gammon 2008, 263). Behaviours that have come to be normalised are conflated with reason (*ibid*). With the dichotomy of reason and emotion in play—which, as has been discussed, attained new heights in the Victorian world—"the absence or exclusion of affect in social analysis is not a matter of the methodological difficulty of its inclusion. What is occurring is an implicit sanctioning of a particular affective configuration of human subjectivity" Gammon argues (*ibid*). Emotions are not simply forgotten, or left out, of science or politics. Rather, certain emotional norms are constantly assumed and implicated in what is deemed rational (perhaps Nussbaum is the perfect case for this, with her rational and irrational emotions). Rational economic man, *homo economicus*, is conceptually affectively neutral, with only a vague conception of "happiness" (which is rational and linked to market activity and property) motivating behaviour (*ibid*). The rational economic man only becomes an "emotional animal" if prohibited from pursuing his (because this is abstract universal "man") rational preferences—"in turn, where emotion arises, it distorts the objective rational calculation of *homo economicus*" (*ibid*). Again, this is conceptual, a false abstract objective, emotionless understanding of human behaviour. There is less any real, pure dichotomy between emotions and reason, and instead a hierarchy between emotions. Ahmed describes how some emotions are taken as "elevated" signs of a cultivated person, contrasted with emotions that are lowly and associated with weakness (Ahmed 2014, 3). Some narratives, especially predominant in evolutionary explanations, portray a triumph of reason through the control of emotions and the capacity to experience and express the correct, "appropriate" emotions in the corresponding right places and times (*ibid*). And yet, even when emotions are represented as valuable and good, not contrary to reason, as the predominant liberal theorists of emotion assert, they remain a part of a hierarchy in which emotions are merely useful to utilitarian conceptions of reason, tools used by rational actors towards various ends (*ibid*). In the liberal project to include the emotions, the maintenance of the good bad emotional dichotomy, attached to who expresses "rational" good emotions, and who is prey to the unruly "irrational" ones, is merely the same reason-emotion dichotomy given a new gloss. Kingston asserts that the problem has been rooting emotions solely in the individual and private, leaving them largely unexamined; despite being essential for any regime based on rights (Kingston 2011, 17-18). And yet, an exclusionary politics of emotions, upon which the universalising liberal philosophy is predicated, cannot meaningfully challenge the reason-emotion dichotomy, and in fact it reproduces it. Emotions can only more meaningfully be considered in political life in a framework of broader social and political inclusion, and once the present emotional norms, disguised as rational economic behaviour, and predicated upon liberal capitalist institutions, are analysed and challenged.

Overcoming

Sandra Morgen writes that, as feelings, ideas, and actions are inextricably woven together in human experience and in their construction and impact, "to exclude the analysis of feelings from an analysis of experience distorts its very essence and inevitably diminishes the power of the analysis to depict the fullness of human experience" (Morgen 1983, 209). The thinker that strives for a pure, rationalistic objectivity shuns the tools with which to understand emotions, desires, and human feelings and how those influence their very rationalistic inquiries (Schott 1988, 192). Thus an exclusion of emotion means an incomplete and incapacitated view of human existence. Schott calls for a consideration of what "passionate knowing" might be, rather than pursuing knowledge in a strictly rationalistic way (*ibid*, 196). So, how can this be done? In light of the debilitating limits of liberal projects of political emotions, efforts to understand political emotions must transcend the reason-emotion dichotomy in a much more comprehensive way than has been done, moving beyond justifications for inserting elements belonging to the private sphere into the public.

A first step is a fuller recognition of emotions—rational or not, by any interpretation of the rational, emotions are simply a part of all life, including political life. Whether faced or not, spoken of or not, emotions are not only present but highly involved in political life, from the local to the global, from social policies to war. So the question becomes not how to include the emotions, but how they are already manifest in politics, and which emotions, or whose emotions, are either included or excluded. It is not about including the emotions, but about situating them within broader understandings of politics and political structures. Returning to Morgan, she writes "to take feelings seriously in scientific analysis means to place the emotional dimension of experience within the dialectic of individual and social, material, and ideal. It means that feelings are neither trivialized relative to ideas, nor divorced from the actual conditions and social structures from which they emerge and on which they have an impact" (Morgen 1983, 211). To even begin a political theory of emotions, emotions must be grounded in the social and political realities in which they exist.

In the *Theological-Political Treatise* Spinoza argued that the power of acting is "the power of affecting and being affected" and with that, affect, feeling, emotion could not be merely subjective (Lordon 2014, 145, 148). Emotions are properties, objectively caused, connecting human beings and their environment just like the weather (*ibid*). Emotions are not purely interior, subjective phenomena, but as many of the scholars of political emotions have emphasised, are directly connected to and situated in the physical and social worlds of lived experience. As judgements, as mere bodily reactions, emotions are an invisible but fluctuating and impactful atmosphere (to continue Spinoza's metaphor) that shape and sustain human relations. As Walsh articulates, people are both "centres"—of cognition, emotion, and other deeply personal processes—and yet also "always linked in irreducible ways to others, to their social roles, to symbols, structures and to society" (Walsh 2021, 372). So Walsh writes that while "emotions are certainly properties of persons" they are also bound to social conditions (*ibid*, 374). Though in lay psychology and the everyday language of "common sense," emotions seem to be the most essentially personal experiences, deeply individual, they contrastingly also feel opaque and as though they happen to a person, rather than within a person (*ibid*). Emotions are wholly relational. Abizadeh writes that "…the emotions themselves are not purely "subjective" but intersubjectively communicable, criticizable, defensible" (Abizadeh 2008, 72-73). And Ahmed argues that like capital, affect is not "within" things, but exists as an effect of circulation (Ahmed 2004, 120). While the Marxian analogy is limited, Ahmed describes how affect does not reside in any object or sign, but is an entity of circulation between objects and signs (*ibid*). Further, as with commodity fetishism, "feelings appear in objects, or indeed *as* objects with a life of their own, only by the concealment of how they are shaped by histories, including histories of production (labor and labor time), as well as circulation or exchange" (*ibid*, 120-121). From this Ahmed derives her concept of affective economies, which are both social and material, which describes the process by which the "…accumulation of affective value shapes the surfaces of bodies and worlds" (*ibid*, 121). Looking particularly at hate as an emotional example, Ahmed in her article "Affective Economies" shows how a negative attachment or relation, hate for the "other" (i.e. black, Jewish, etc.), becomes transformed into an apparent positive attachment, in this case alleged love or commitment to "whiteness" (*ibid*, 118). Normally, the hatred of the other is construed through a narrative of loss (jobs, land, money, etc., and I would argue perceived status in a hierarchy as well), narratives which frame an injury to whiteness, or some other "self"-identifier (*ibid*). However, this hate must circulate, because it cannot actually be found in one figure, cannot reside in one target (*ibid*, 119). This constitutes, according to Ahmed, an affective economy (*ibid*). Emotions are not things a person *has*, they involve other subjects and objects (*ibid*). And neither the negative emotion, nor the positive one, indicate that a value or political goal is similarly negative or positive. As Ahmed shows, love and hate operate within the same ideas and goals.

And like with the circulation of commodities, the circulation of emotion does not constitute political matters, but instead demonstrates the underlying structural foundations of our society and its institutions. Ahmed thus argues that emotions need to be remembered as effects, and not origins, and not necessarily a better form of judgement or assessing truth (Ahmed 2014, 196). While not diminishing their political significance, Ahmed argues emotions cannot be a ground for political judgement, as justice is not about feeling good, overcoming pain, or achieving happiness, and being content or feeling as though one is flourishing does not mean justice has been achieved (*ibid*). It is also worth remembering that even if emotions often involve specific behaviours, emotions do not *cause* behaviours (Barrett 2006, 41). So as with anything shaped by the historical, social, and political, even though emotions must be recognised as always inseparable from all human experience, they are not a guaranteed panacea for justice or certain values, or actions that would achieve political goals. Even with the recognition of the role emotions play at every moment of human life, the same political challenges are left to be faced. However, this recognition does allow for the further recognition of the specific elements of these political challenges that are shaped by emotion, revealing *how* emotion plays its parts in political life, and fostering space for assessment of how and whether those emotions shaping the political landscape line up with political motivations. Perhaps not surprisingly, to begin to do this the public-private dichotomy must be taken head on.

Morgan writes that just as “the feminist principle “the personal is political” is a reaction to a system of knowledge and knowledge production which separates and opposes realms of human experience which are neither separate nor dichotomous,” the study of feelings in politics, especially in light of its increased attention, must take place outside of the dichotomised framework of reason and emotion, and “not treat feeling as the irrational dimension of otherwise rational action” (Morgen 1983, 220). But this makes “the personal is political” more than an apt comparison. The rejection of the same dichotomy, the private and political, must follow.

If emotions are not entities emerging “within” the self, nor entities like objects outside the self, but operate through circulation, as entities of relation that shape the surfaces and boundaries of bodies and worlds (Ahmed 2014, 117), emotions cannot be private in any sense. The falsity of the twin public-private, reason-emotion dichotomies has been broken down in preceding chapters, but Ahmed stresses that if the notion of emotions as private entities is challenged, the ways in which emotions allow people to align with causes and with certain others, and against causes and certain others, becomes a crucial point of understanding political emotions (*ibid*). Not necessarily as judgements, but as circulatory pressures.

The matter that must first be addressed is the categorising of emotions into appropriate or inappropriate when it comes to the political. While the liberal projects of the emotion have aimed to dispense with the dichotomy of reason and emotion, this has failed because that dichotomy carried over as they still classify emotions as either beneficial or unsuitable for public life. Some emotions are quarantined in the private, and whether “irrational” is explicitly used to characterise them (as Nussbaum does of anger, shame, and disgust) or not, they are not meaningfully assessed in a way that challenges any reason-emotion dichotomy. Christina Tarnopolsky draws from ancient thought, citing Plato in recognising “that emotions are not virtues, and therefore that no emotion can be designated negative or positive for democratic deliberation without investigating the various forms of each emotion, and the different ways in which these various forms interact with reason” (Tarnopolsky 2008, 41). However, as mentioned, Nussbaum’s emotional project “suggests that legal and social policy should incorporate certain emotions as part of ethical decision making and avoid or negate the role of other emotions deemed undesirable” (Sokolon 2008, 169). Nussbaum, who draws upon John Stewart Mill to build her argument, maintains a highly restrictive view of the emotions, which Marlene K. Sokolon argues may undermine the goals of producing a more egalitarian society or reducing cruelty towards those who act outside cultural norms (*ibid*, 170). Even as Nussbaum rejects the dismissal of emotions as only being associated with unsavory political events (while emotions contributing to good political events are ignored), and remarks that it is values that should be assessed, not emotions (Nussbaum 2013, 213), she makes it very clear she wants compassion to be brought into the public, and other emotions to be shunned completely even where they have clear public linkages, like anger. Sokolon argues the primary danger of this restrictive politics of emotions is that it assumes that even if not all emotions are excluded, “negative” emotions (such as shame, envy, and disgust) "are not essential for sociopolitical decision making" (Sokolon 2008, 170). Might these emotions be also important for political decision making, if any other emotions are? Might the rejection of the oft cited negative emotions—anger, shame, disgust, envy—have to do with the very specific manifestations of a liberal social order, and the moral expectations and obligations that emerge from it?

Again, to restate, Nussbaum writes that while compassion "is far from being the entirety of public rationality, even when it is appropriately informed by definite theories corresponding to each of its constituent judgements," it does have an extremely valuable role (Nussbaum 2001, 453). On the contrary, according to Nussbaum shame and disgust *never* have valuable roles (*ibid*). Disgust is an emotion used for subordination (Nussbaum 2013, 182) and can thus only be used towards bad ends. Tarnopolsky directly counters this, arguing that rhetoric open to shame means one must be prepared to be shamed out of conformity and complacency by others "in the ongoing and mutual project of reflective self-examination" (Tarnopolsky 2008, 64). As discussed earlier in the chapter, Nussbaum seems to recognise this, and argues that shame and disgust employed by liberal regimes are usually healthier and motivate people out of illiberal positions, such as racism. This is a blatant contradiction in her position, deeper than the broader and more universalist contradictions of liberal thought in general, that simply cannot be resolved beyond this: Nussbaum generalises and universalises about political emotions as a whole, but becomes specific and thus self-contradictory when she is defending the particulars of her political liberalism and American liberal institutions. For Nussbaum, disgust is good when it is disgust towards individual prejudicial racism, but anger is inappropriate amongst black protesters in the face of system racism because it calls into question the justice of institutions Nussbaum wants to defend.

Kathleen Woodward notes that Nussbaum is a thinker who focuses much on personal suffering in order to elicit compassion, but asks: when does such compassion actually translate into action that alleviates suffering or directly counters and protests injustice (Woodward 2005, 63). Suffering and pain is central to the "liberal narrative of compassion" (*ibid*, 72). Drawing from Elizabeth Spelman's work on compassion, Woodward asks: "*w*hen does the feeling of compassion become an end in itself and thwart action" (ibid, 70). This might be especially of note in regard to Reddy's emphasis on emotional suffering and the political implications towards reducing it (Reddy 2001, 127). From Berlant, Woodward asserts that the politics of personal feeling cannot address institutional and structural injustices (Woodward 2005, 71). Instead, it might produce passivity (*ibid*). Berlant writes that ",,,the contemporary culture of true feeling…places suffering at the center of being and organises images of ethical or honorable sociality in response" (Berlant 2005, 7). This sociality of either honour or ethics comes down to a measuring out of the right amount of compassion (*ibid*, 10), not necessarily some organic drive to remedy the suffering. As Hochschild emphasises with emotional management, this might simply result in efforts to find the right words to ensure one is seen as compassionate, or as being up to date with world events. The focus is on displays of compassion, rather than remedy or change-focused action. Leah Bradshaw goes a step further, probing compassion itself, and remarking that for Arendt compassion was for the intimate realm, "where the heart aches for another" (Bradshaw 2008, 181). Though eradicating the public-private placement of emotions is essential, the focus on compassion within liberalism is significant to recognise, in that it allows sympathy for the political to remain in the private, grounding it in private, individualist responses. Bradshaw proposes instead a focus on empathy, which presumes equality, and thus allows for political solidarity (*ibid*, 178). She suggests "that indignation, not compassion or pity, is the chief catalyst for political reform. The victims of injustice do not want to be pitied; they want to be treated as the equals they are" (*ibid*, 182). Though scholars such as Nussbaum intend for compassion to benefit those for whom it is felt, and put policy on a trajectory of justice, compassion centres the one experiencing compassion, not the one for whom it is held.[105] Bradshaw in her argument for empathy over compassion is not merely replacing one term for feeling with another—one could use many terms as emotions are inconsistently defined—but is recentring the agency of the emotion. Bradshaw argues that "most effective movements in the modern world toward greater inclusion of the marginalized have arisen from the indignant demands of the excluded, and not from the emotive sympathies of the privileged and powerful" (*ibid*, 183). So centring compassion in politics might be far less inclusive and justice-oriented than it seems, as there are no required alterations to dynamics of political power. So, while emotions terms remain tenuous and fluid, it is important to consider why compassion is the go-to sentiment within liberal emotions projects.

While emotions are bound up with justice/injustice, justice/injustice is not merely a good/bad feeling, though feeling good or better is important even if it is not properly justice (Ahmed 2014, 191, 193, 201). However, Ahmed argues that "restorative justice has allowed the return of 'emotions' to the scene of justice in a way that is about dealing with the complex effects of injustice on social life as well as individual lives" (*ibid*, 197). More than the oft cited roles as policy motivators or allegiance builders, Ahmed observes that "emotions show us how

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[105] Woodward demonstrates such centring in an exploration of "conservative compassion." By this, she describes circumstances in which the compassionate act is not actually even intended to extend compassion towards those who are in dire or needy circumstances, but a backwards-facing compassion for the one who is supposedly showing compassion. She describes charity and volunteer programs where the creator or director of those programs is the one who is praised for their good sentiments, their compassion and care, rather than compassion being felt for the oft put-down and maligned users of those programs who are in need. Programs that "hire" the poor to work for food or basic essentials are the perfect examples of such "conservative compassion" charities or policies (Woodward 2005, 72).

histories stay alive, even when they are not consciously remembered; how histories of colonialism, slavery, and violence shape lives and worlds in the present" (*ibid*, 202). They also open up different futures (*ibid*), through emotional connections to the past and emotional responses to the present and ideas about the future. But for just futures, the emotions of those who know injustice must be those shaping the affective economies Ahmed describes, allowing the surfaces of the social world and the people living in it to be shaped through equal regard and recognition of the specificities which characterise political injustices. Bourgeois universalism, individualist and yet totalising in its alienating abstractions, cannot curtail emotional expression in the political realm if justice is an ambition, and thus the liberal framework must be abandoned.

Plamper writes, "what is the conceptual basis for Hochschild's studies on emotional labour? Alienation and emotional dissonance—these rest upon a distinction between an authentic and an inauthentic emotional self" (Plamper 2015, 122). Capitalist society is inescapably built upon detachment, is inherently alienating, whether that is the estrangement of the self from their labour, from nature, or from their feelings. In attempting to build liberal projects of political emotion, detachment still remains an essential feature. This is regardless of class, but cannot also be considered without class distinctions. For instance, Kingston regards the "long tradition of regarding state institutions as guardians of 'sober second thought' against the excessive emotional responses of private individuals and even elected legislative bodies" (Ferry and Kingston 2008, 11). Here, "expert" evidence is contrasted with the emotive response of citizens (*ibid*).[106] This indicates the presence of a boundary between the reason of officialdom, and an

[106] A very interesting example, and perhaps quite illustrative of my main argument: the "evidence" is rational, weighed against emotional and panic-prone citizens. But if we look to the climate crisis, we see climate scientists in outrage, in tears, as their advice is ignored or maligned into policies that serve the interests (rationality) of capital, citizens respond emotionally in varying and opposing ways to this phenomenon, and politicians responding with allegedly "rational" coldness.

emotive, unenlightened populace (*ibid*). But what Kingston discounts as she rightfully addresses the reason-emotion dichotomy, is the class interests at work here, of whether "reason" itself is rational, or whether a certain class with certain interests is rational. As widely acknowledged "sober second thought" is a measure to preserve the power and influence of the rational, propertied, educated bourgeois male.[107] It is not simply emotion as a whole or in itself that is excluded from political authority. The emotions of the propertied were merely granted rationality—earlier, against mercurial whims of princes, but always against the unruly passions of the masses, the poor, the propertyless. Within liberalism, the contrast between "expertise" and the passionate is still based less on what emotions are expressed, and instead upon what interests are expressed and might be thus maligned with emotionality and a lack of objectivity. This should certainly be no secret in an era in which the "angry white male" who dismisses others as being irrational or emotional has been recognised as a staple of the electoral climate (whether political opponents share in the emotional condemnation and accusations of irrationality or not). But even the emotions, as a nineteenth and twentieth century category, inevitably hold onto the bourgeois rationality that shaped them; and property and education being historically restrictive have further cemented the imbalances of emotion and irrationality throughout historical analysis.[108] As the liberal theorists of emotions all write, politics is about values, and emotions are entirely bound up with values. But liberal rationality is equated with the articulation of bourgeois interests, which are expressed in liberal values. And the appropriate political emotions

[107] And illuminated very well in the nineteenth-century liberal context by Macpherson throughout *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*, drawn upon in Chapter 3.
[108] Social historians have been concerned with gaining access to the emotions of those of the working classes, as much of what would be left as emotional records might only apply to the middle and/or upper classes, as Barbara H. Rosenwein has pointed out, or to only to segments of the middle class, for instance, with etiquette guides (Plamper 2015, 57-58).

for liberal theorists, are those which also support bourgeois interests and values, and preserve liberal institutions as the embodiment of justice.

A meaningful presence and understanding of feeling in politics necessitates that not only the doctrine of rationality in a strict sense, but the dichotomous and alienating ideology of liberal capitalist society as a whole, is replaced. In short, *homo economicus* must be overcome and replaced with a non-alienated understanding of human beings and their social world. Reddy actually details a few historic, nineteenth-century challenges to bourgeois rationality. After 1815, French socialists recognised and rejected "the extraordinary leap of faith that equated freedom of contract in civil society with the rational use of society's resources. They rejected the whole architecture built upon the notion of interest", a matter even liberals had been largely unable to coherently articulate and reconcile (Reddy 2001, 238). Yet contemporaneous liberals "complacently accepted the compatibility of the new gospel of rational spiritualism with the laissez-faire economy" (*ibid*). Reddy writes:

> …Guizot, Cousin, and the liberals of the *Globe* group insisted on the higher motivations that derived from universal principles of reason, justice, and beauty. However, only the socialists were prepared to recognize the new order's dirty secret. To them it was obvious that the practical workings of the civil order thrown up by the Revolution, and systematized in the law codes, assumed that self-interest did prevail, and ought to prevail, in the everyday business of life. Society was being run as if the mechanistic view of human nature were right. Only the socialists were prepared to offer practical alternatives. (Reddy 2001, 240).

In a period where emotions as a category had not yet been totally solidified, Charles Fourier provided alternative motivating passions that could direct social existence: the "butterfly passion" (which was the expression of a desire to change tasks every few hours) and the "cabalistic passion" (a desire to conspire, or associate, with others) (*ibid*, 238). While rational self-interest has remained firmly embedded as the central social principle, present-day conditions of work and social life are still as immensely difficult to reconcile with such reductive views of human drive and desire, and expansive recognition of the multifaceted essence of human expression and human need necessitates a new model to articulate full human existence, and to articulate the conditions of justice that human beings require. Not only the overcoming of a reason-emotion dichotomy is required, not only an inclusion of emotions as being rational or potentially rational, but a transformation of the understanding of human feeling outside of its dichotomous depictions. As Lordon articulates, this is not an endeavour to return to a former autonomy or freedom that has been lost, one that "only exists in the arguments of liberal individualism" (Lordon 2014, 142). It is not a project to recover something fuller and more authentic that may have been lost in the world of Ancient Athens, though past worldviews should not be neglected. But instead, an understanding of the human being, a situated, historical being, must be put in the place of the abstract universal bourgeois person. This requires the systemic political inclusion of the ideas, interests, and non-abstract persons that exceed or challenge those of liberal political thought.

As Aristotle remarked, "in most cases of having to make judgements under uncertainty, each person is not an isolated decision maker, but takes part in a dialogue" (Oatley and Jenkins 1996, 282). This is true whether that dialogue is recognised or not. One thing humans can never escape is history, the history that precedes one's present life, or the constant unfolding of history with each passing moment. Schott writes that Marxist, and Marxist-descended "critical thinkers" "have pointed to the economic basis of interests, which motivate philosophical thought, and to the ideological consequences of theory, which legitimate the distribution of economic and political power" (Schott 1988, 184). These interests also dictate who gets to speak, whether it is the male citizens of Athens, who shaped the language and voice of philosophy into an exclusively and exclusionary male voice, or the propertied bourgeois man of England or France who can speak for the entire human race so long as they conform to the common humanity that the propertied abstract from themselves and their interests. Schott emphasises that the questions of *who*—who philosophises, and what are their motivating interests—must always be asked, and the answers always examined. This must be the case for the emotions also. Who created the category of emotions, who created the reason-emotion, dichotomy, and what were their motivating interests? I believe my dissertation has not only answered this, but has issued a challenge to surpass this history and philosophy that contemporaries have been born into. *Who* will be expanded when the considerations of interests beyond those structurally embedded in liberal capitalism are expanded, and altered along with the social relations by which they were birthed.

Conclusion

Gone are the days where emotions could simply be dismissed as dangerous or irrelevant for politics. After the affective turn, emotions were everywhere, and taking them seriously in politics became a pressing question. Oft repeated is the notion that one would be hard pressed to find scholars who believed emotions had no role to play in politics, or were not worth exploring. And some highly influential political theories of emotion were born. Some, like Ahmed, focused on how emotions operate politically in our societies. But many projects insisted something broader was required, and with Reddy, Nussbaum, and Kingston taking lead roles, projects of political emotion were launched and developed in order to find further grounds for securing liberal principles and values in a society that had grown perhaps weary, perhaps cynical, of overbearing rationality.

But just as the self-interest of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had created the sharp contrast of emotion and reason, anchored to liberalism these new projects of political emotions recreated the reason-emotion dichotomy, giving it a more sentimental face but remaining entrenched in the public-private dichotomy that serves as its cradle. By maintaining bourgeois universalism and individualism, the alienation engrained within liberal capitalist society can only reproduce the very dichotomies intended to be overcome. This is a consequence of the absence of historical, material consideration in liberal thought, which itself results in uncritical acceptance of, even naturalisation of, liberal interests as moral values. As such, the only way to actually overcome the dichotomy of reason-emotion, and the public-private, is through a historical, material critique of liberalism, its institutions and its philosophical underpinnings, which maintain and enforce these dichotomies, even if some emotions are allowed to be politically involved or deemed rational. Once recognised, the restrictions that result from the liberal framework in meaningfully considering emotions politically can be challenged towards the creation of broader and yet less abstract understandings of living beings, their diverse interests, and world.

Schott writes that in effectively challenging and critiquing objectivist, universalising thought, changes to material conditions are necessary as reified social conditions are the root of this contradictory epistemology (Schott 1988, 191). Yet the development of an alternative praxis to subvert the distorted framing and understanding of the world and of politics, before material changes are achieved, could be possible (*ibid*). While my dissertation cannot on its own alter the hegemonic structural framework of liberal capitalism, I believe that it sets a different trajectory for assessing political emotions.

Conclusion

Jan Plamper recounts that in 1894, neo-Kantian philosopher Wilhelm Windelband stated in the inaugural lecture of his rectorship at the University of Strasbourg that there is nomothetic study—dominant in the natural sciences, endeavouring to seek generally valid laws and favouring reductionist experiment—and then there is idiographic study—favoured by human sciences and-not seeking the universal, but the specific and the unique (Plamper 2015, 7). Both orientations have their uses and merits, of course, but the increasing prevalence and ideological supremacy of the nomothetic approach has made a profound impact on the modern conceptions of reason, emotion, and the public. Liberalism, as a philosophy that emerged through a particular conception of reason, and shaped its public based on that reason, fell more and more firmly and reductively itself into a nomothetic framework, and as a consequence it is hindered in its ability to grapple even with its own history. Bourgeois rationality, as it views the world through a self-produced lens, sees only that which conforms to its rationality in its seeking out of universal and abstract laws of human society. Liberal projects persistently create and recreate systems and features of exclusionary politics through the abstract conclusions of bourgeois universality, yet are blind to such exclusion by their banner of universal applicability and rationality. And so quests for emotional inclusion or to understand the reason-emotion dichotomy are impotent if this bourgeois universality is invisible or remains unexamined and challenged. History viewed without consideration of the way that the multifaceted tensions of every facet of human experience impact each other, as only viewed as a progression of ideas and interventions, can only look non-reflexively inward, doomed to the same stagnation as Narcissus as he mistakes his reflection for tangible reality.

The social history based approach of the work I have here undertaken breaks through these enclosing limitations, culminating in some noteworthy achievements. First, it puts to rest the erroneous narrative of a millennia-long emotional exclusion up against a stark oppositional rationality, instead demonstrating that the highly nuanced pre-modern understandings of passions and emotions were not in a dichotomy with reason, and that this dichotomisation was due to the narrowing of reason through the countervailing passion theory and the conflation of reason with self-interested market behaviour (abstract economic rationality), as well as the narrowing of emotion as a category through secular psychology and reductive empirical objectivity. Second, through an interrogation of public sphere theory and the liberal theory of the public, I have revealed a much more complex and deep-rooted connection between the public-private dichotomy and the sphere model of society, and the dichotomy of reason and emotion that was forming in the modern period. Together this provides a completely new trajectory for understanding and challenging the dichotomy of reason and emotion and emotional exclusion and public exclusivity in political life. Instead of seeking to validate the presence of emotions in the history of political thought or practice, or justify emotional inclusion through psychological terminology—pursuits which have reinforced emotional exclusion and the restrictive dichotomies—I have traced the history of the dichotomies which produce emotional exclusion, revealed the narrowing of emotion and reason as concepts from which they originate, and thus have reestablished the starting point for broadening meaningful political inclusion.

I have argued that the reason-emotion dichotomy, predicated on the public-private dichotomy as manifested within the social conditions of the modern period, is not based upon the abstract exclusion of emotional experience itself but instead the actual multifarious political exclusion of social groups from meaningful political participation. Exclusionary politics means certain people and their emotions are restricted from the public, while those who embody the perceived neutrality of the bourgeois *homme-citoyen*, with interests tied to private property, are perceived as rational (despite their particular interests and inevitable emotionality) and are to not only participate in the political sphere, but govern as the embodiment of universal human reason, interest, and progress. It is therefore an impossibility to bring emotions into political life, as if they are entities that can be pulled out of embodied experience or taken off like clothing than can be brought in or out of the public arena, while maintaining the structures of the current public-private configuration of liberal representative political systems, which are based on bourgeois universalism.

Chapter 1 engaged with the history of the public and the private, and the modern understanding of the public as argued by Jürgen Habermas. Emphasised was the bourgeois universalist worldview, a perspective of abstraction that holds the bourgeois to be the embodiment of the human perspective, imbued with rationality, against the particular characteristics that marked an irrationality out of step with enlightened governance. Particular bourgeois interests and *homo economicus* were equated with the rational and the neutral, despite being highly specific historic, social, and material qualities. But as a consequence, the passionate and emotional, the irrational and distinct, became identified with the private and the intimate, the sphere outside the purview of direct political power to be given over to the rule of the rational bourgeois man. These explorations provided the foundation for setting the notions and concepts that have become a part of the hegemonic liberal political philosophy of present day against the specific social and historical conditions that spawned and shaped the development of these ideas. As Ellen Meiksins Wood describes, it is crucial to remember that “for all the variations” of modern thought “the tension between two sources of power—the state and private property—and the complex three-way relations between state, property, and the producing classes, had clear implications for the development of political thought throughout Western Europe and its colonial dependencies" (Wood 2012, 30). Chapter One was the first step in the demonstration of the relationship between the rational public and propertied interests through bourgeois abstraction, bringing forth the first crucial tension in the establishment of the dichotomies of reason-emotion and public-private, that of a public demarcated firmly from the rest of society.

Chapter 2 provided the first specific look at the nuance that characterised what we now describe broadly as emotions of the past, particularly the ways in which these emotions were understood in Western theological terms. It was the countervail theory, as articulated by Albert Hirschman, of the modern period, that set forth the trajectory that would restrict the meaning of rationality into its dichotomised form opposing the emotions. The first step towards this narrowing tendency was the transformation of the passion of avarice, the strongest passion and thus the most suitable to acting to counter the other passions, making human behaviour calculable and predictable, into a form of rational self-interest—a transformation from passion to reason. Against Adam Smith's hope that his moral sentiment would achieve ascendency in English conceptual language and in social regulation to counter the fractures commercialisation was affecting throughout his eighteenth century society, those very forces instead brought about an increasingly atomistic and narrow understanding of self-interests, turning the very notion of interest into predictable, rational, market behaviour which shaped the very fabric of society and governance. This constricted conception of reason, bourgeois rationality of the property owner and small commodity producer, abstracted into the universal human behaviour, based in constancy, predictability, and calculable action, was the reason that would be taken as the opposite of emotion in the reason-emotion dichotomy.

Chapter 3 addressed the contemporary scope and position of public sphere theory, and demonstrated that bourgeois universalism still determined this sphere. Contemporary sphere theory, which still either takes the form that Habermas set out with his foundational work on the eighteenth century bourgeois public sphere or remains in conversation with it, endeavours to expand, diversify, or multiply the public sphere without challenging its premises, and as a consequence liberal ideology and the bourgeois universalist perspective is only enlarged. This is even with the decay of the public sphere that Habermas observes, the refeudalisation of society, which thinkers Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge see as an inevitability of bourgeois interests and governance. Based on the abstraction and the universalisation of the specific characteristics of the bourgeois property owner, the sphere model of modern society, and the public sphere based on rational public opinion as defined by the bourgeois *homme-citoyen*, a very strict demarcation between the public and the private is created. This public-private dichotomy ensured that only the rational—defined by a subjectivity shaped by property converted into neutrality through liberal philosophy—would be a part of the political realm, while everything irrational—passionate, non-propertied, "distinguished" (by race or gender)—was to remain in the private. These bourgeois parameters, while insisting upon having a non-dominant character cancelled out by rationality, foster a persistently exclusionary politics, in which the requirements of participation are portrayed as open and universal, but only if transubstantiated through the institutions, articulation, and direct representation of bourgeois interests. Thus, at this point the shaping of the public-private and reason-emotion dichotomies have been shown to be particularly modern phenomenon, based in social and economic transformation through a privatisation of the economy and centralisation of the state, and are strictly based in the political exclusion of those deemed to be irrational, or hold opposing interests to those of bourgeois interests.

Chapter 4 returns to the emotions, emphasising that the both transhistoric (assuming historical constancy of the category of emotions) and ahistoric (neglecting a historical perspective in analysis) understanding that produces the conventional narrative of long-enduring emotional exclusion, has led to a flawed assessment of emotions and their place in the political realm, as well as their social foundation. Neglecting the dynamics of marketisation and secularisation that formed the contemporary category of the emotions, cognitivism, based in psychology, reigns over emotional theories of politics and discussions of emotion in politics. While not arguing for or against cognitivist theories themselves, I have questioned the presumption of the novelty of emotional theorising during and after the affective turn, as well as challenging the lack of understanding of the concept of emotions itself that pervades these theories, especially was they are wielded in social sciences. As Thomas Dixon remarks, "…the nature of the thing studied (our mental life) is changed by the theoretical instruments used to investigate and explain it"—is love a movement of the soul, or a neuron firing (Dixon 2011, 308)? The literature on social and political theories of emotion takes for granted the Baconian psychological amnesia-afflicted story of the emotions, looking at history with a twentieth century lens in an attempt to map the contemporary emotions onto theories of the past, discover who aided or hindered emotional inclusion of emotions, treating emotions as floating entities to carry in or out of the political sphere. But emotions as used in contemporary language is fully a product of nineteenth century experimental psychology, a discipline that was distinguished by its rational, objective, and secular scientific status, distanced from religious and moral understandings of the mind and movements of the soul. Thus emotions, as termed by this psychology, was reductively physical, untethered from the human will and thus wholly and definitively separated from reason. Passions, affections, sentiments, and emotions of the past were never consistently defined but were always a part of or existing in intimate relation to the will and the rational capacities of the human being. But the Victorian category of the emotions was sharply contracted and put in direct opposition to reason. Hence, while emotions as a category and term is not necessarily itself the problem, attempting to challenge the dichotomy of reason and emotion must confront the specific conception of emotion that it contains, which as I have shown in the preceding chapters and in this one, is tied to the modern public-private dichotomy.

Finally, Chapter 5, the two dichotomies are brought to confront each other, their confrontation revealing that they are in fact not separate or conflicting dichotomies, but each a head of Orthrus, borne of the bourgeois abstract worldview with its rational economic man, supporting and reinforcing each other. These dichotomies have been further solidified by the liberal political theories of emotion which, while attempting to include and recognise the political significance of emotions, have maintained and strengthened the compositional elements of these dichotomies. These projects have as their motivation the use of the emotion to fortify commitments to liberalism, and invigorate liberal principles themselves, including the direct preservation of a sharp public-private dichotomy, and securing of private property as an unchallenged right and good, and so they directly sustain the premises and practical applications of emotional exclusion from the political. The emotions these projects seek to include are those deemed rational emotions, to be incorporated into the political sphere for their utility, while upholding mechanisms to keep irrational and harmful (to bourgeois interests) emotions restricted within the private and intimate. These projects of emotional inclusion are entirely, therefore, exclusionary political projects, replications of the exclusionary bourgeois politics of centuries past. Thus, including the emotions in political life is not a matter of declaring emotions to be beneficial or rational—that merely reproduces the conditions to which emotional exclusion is attributed. Instead, emotional inclusion can only come about through fundamental structural changes to an exclusionary bourgeois liberal political system, towards a broadly inclusive political system that brings forth the participation of all people, as well as the emotions that they experience in relation to their lived political experiences. Emotions are not to be viewed as garments brought in and out of the political arena as is deemed fitting by the hegemonic interests of bourgeois society, but must be regarded as embodied in people and groups of people who have been and remain proscribed from public life. Only a radical transformation of social and political structures would be able to produce a politics that recognises the fullness of human life, including the emotions.

My dissertation has opened up several new inquiries. These avenues of research could not be, and should not have been, addressed within this work, but will be questions I shall pursue in my further research. First, I would be curious to investigate what seems to be a particularly twentieth century amnesia regarding the political emotions, even regarding specifically liberal understanding of emotion. It seems as though after the Victorian period, sometime in the early twentieth century, a connection was severed between past understandings of rationality and emotion, and modern ones. I presently have an article in development exploring the role of sympathy in Victorian liberalism as a direct challenge to the claims of those such as Kingston who argue that liberalism has long shunned the emotions, but I would like to focus more specifically on the source of this fracturing amnesia. Was it the rise of neo-classical economics, the Cold War, deepening social secularisation, something else? Even for instance the totally repurposed and subverted portrayals of Adam Smith's philosophy seem to fit into this problem. Remarking upon George Santayana's famous maxim, "those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it," Hirschman remarks that this is holds far more rigorously when it comes to the history of ideas, than events (Hirschman 1997, 133). My explorations throughout this research seem to confirm this suspicion, and this points to the significance of this theoretical-historical inquiry.

Second, I would like to explore what an emotionally broadened *economy* might be like, particularly in light of the different conceptions of human needs and passions put forth by Charles Fourier. As I have diagnosed the alienation and exclusion of emotional life as having a profoundly economic cause, what would economic life, production and distribution, look like or even feel like, with an expanded view of the human producer as not merely a calculative economic agent. As I touched on in the final chapter in terms of the way love is both wholly counter to capitalist rationality, but also manipulated in particular more than other emotions by capitalist industries, as capitalism must make desiring and consuming into a perpetual motion machine, what would breaking free from the hurricane of imposed consumptive-needs constitute? What sorts of economic relationships would be brought forth by such a different arrangement of the means of human subsistence? Would human flourishing and emotional depth be merely perhaps greater, or composed in entirely different ways?

Third, certainly related to the second to some extent, is what structural features require the most urgent transformation for a truly inclusive, genuinely democratic politics to emerge? Further, how can these transformations be undertaken? Would a more democratic and robust public sphere be a feature to be transformed, or perhaps wholly and newly created? If so, what conditions could bring about and continue to foster a healthy, authentically inclusive (democratic, and comprehensive of the whole of human experience from family to work to emotion to education to recreation) public sphere? Could this possibly be a “counter” public sphere, if a bourgeois public sphere can still be recognised in contemporary society? This question is especially pertinent in the face of corporate digital totalitarianism that, counter to the hopefuls of internet freedom decades ago, has seemed to dramatically nullify political discourse and engagement in a way that embodies the critical function of the Habermasian notion of the public sphere. With that being said, I have also noticed what might appropriately be labelled a revival of a plebeian style theatrical tradition in the digital sphere that is so pervasive of twenty-first century everyday life, expressed in deep irony and theatrical denunciations of those in power, flaunting the patrician conventions of decorum and even civility. I suspect that this network of questions might be the most significant follow up to the work I have done here.

Lastly, a question I believe must be asked is whether or not present circumstances can even be characterised by an exactly bourgeois condition, with its emphasis on a broad universality and human development, rather than a more specifically petty bourgeois one, of even more rigorous atomistic individualism and development as exclusively accumulation of economic assets. If there has been such a transformation, which I suspect very strongly, it would be crucial to map the history of this transformation and determine its driving tendencies—economic crises, twentieth century universal education, financialization, consumer culture/identity, perhaps. I further would anticipate that there already have been examinations of this bourgeois versus petty bourgeois quandary, and I would eagerly engage with that research. But my investigation of this question would be in direct response to the second question and the third set of questions I posed above, looking at this transformation in regard to what necessary alterations of public sphere theory and understandings of political criticism, dialogue, and antagonism, would have to take place, and what consequences or openings that would leave on the politics of the future.

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