TEHRAN URBAN REFORMS BETWEEN TWO REVOLUTIONS

DEVELOPMENTALISM, WORLDING URBANISM AND NEOLIBERALISM

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Abstract

The will to 'improve' through urban reform has a long and troubled history in Iran, enduring continuities from the first attempts at modernization in the Constitution Revolution (1906-1911) to the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Such history has witnessed elitist as well as populist urban modernizations. This research examines the commonalities between urban reforms in Tehran with a focus on the 1990s reform. A pioneer plan of a broader economic reconstruction project launched after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini (1989), the 1990s urban reform in Tehran was a multilayered project that articulated a modernist urban renewal and a democratic cultural change with a mayor-centred decentralization. The 'worlding' character of the reform reflected a reaction to international isolation and to the extreme particularism of the Iranian situation, and signified a shift from the populist Islamic urbanism of the 1979 Revolution toward neoliberal urban governance.

While these urban reforms symbolize the different development ambitions of each era, they share a focus on speeding up the mobility in the city, intensification of land use, disciplining space, and beautifying the city. They draw our attention to the local production of capitalism, globalization and neoliberalism through urban processes and planning. They have contributed to the construction of a developmental state as well as its dismantling in Iran. They were exclusive and inclusive at the same time, opening new horizons for engaging the public in political struggles over the right to the city, while leaving the city in a perpetual speculative redevelopment cycle of the physical landscape. This research consists of a macro analysis of five major interventions in the city through the last century, and field research on two case studies of Navab Highway and Enqelab Street, linked to the 1990s reform. These case studies narrate two distinctive processes common to all urban reforms in Tehran: a relatively uncontested implementation of modernizing projects where the public apprehension of "improvement" adopts the notions developed by planners or "reconstruction" agendas (ex. Navab Highway project) and a parallel processes of resisting the state attempts to regulate and remap the public spaces through imposing desired functions or conflicting uses of the space (Enqelab Street).

Acknowledgment

This research project was inspired by my recent experience as an urban planner in Iran. In 2003-4, I was involved in policy-research with IFRE, Iranian-French Research Institute on old neighbourhoods in Tehran. We were working with Beryanak community, a neighborhood on the west side of Navab Highway, on earthquake preemptive interventions. I used to pass Navab Highway several times a year to reach the airport or drive to Esfahan in central Iran since the highway was opened in 1996, but for the first time I started to look at the highway through a local lens. Talking with people living in the neighborhood around the Navab complex, I met with household members who cared enough to mention the bitter stories of their neighbors who had lost homes in the process of the highway's construction.

The thesis developed out of these personal experiences and the massive support of the Faculty of Environmental Studies at York University to which I owe my thanks for its rigorous intellectual community of colleagues with whom I worked as an RA and TA during these years. I owe special thanks to: my supervisor Roger Keil for his support, teaching me about neoliberalism and local governance and helping me to build my own research project; Stefan Kipfer for teaching me urban politics and to engage with important questions; Liette Gilbert for her insightful comments on my work and her support as director of the PhD program at FES in my first year at York and in Canada; Arang Keshavarzian at NYU for agreeing to take a place on my supervisory committee with Roger Keil, Stefan Kipfer and Liette Gilbert, and for his assistance with introducing several papers written on Tehran. Many thanks to Kaveh Ehsani, a geographer and political economist at DePaul University doing research on Tehran, a friend with whom I shared my thoughts and ideas on Tehran during this long journey. I thank Guiti Etemad, architect and urban planner in Tehran, for her support of my field research on Navab and Enqelab Street. The City Institute has been like my second home at York University and I am grateful to Sara Macdonald for making this happen. I am indebted to Homa Hoodfar, my friend at Concordia University, who helped me to settle down in Toronto and start my PhD. Thanks to all who I interviewed in Tehran, named or unnamed to the reader throughout the text. Thanks to the many people I met and talked with in Navab complex and surrounding neighbourhoods. Heartfelt thanks to Mohammad Eskandari, who went through multiple drafts of this dissertation, to Sohrab Mahdavi for his edits on chapters II and III and to Nathan Schaffer for the final edit of this text. Very special thanks to Javad Faal Alavi for his patient care and support through the mess that is involved in finishing a thesis. Thanks to Yousef, my dear son, who gave me rides to York on many cold days throughout the Canadian winter. Thanks to all the examining committee for their time. This thesis is dedicated to my young activist friends in Tehran building strong right to the city campaigns in recent years.

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Acronyms

A-Tec: A-Tec Consulting Firm
CR: Constitutional Revolution
CSTD: Council for Supervision on Tehran's Development
CRFW: Commanding of right and forbidding of wrong (*amr-e be ma'rouf va nahy-e az monkar)*
DP: Development Plans
ECP: Executives of Construction Party
HCAUP: High Council of Architecture and Urban Planning
HFIR: Housing Foundation of the Islamic Republic
IRI: Islamic Republic of Iran
IRP: Islamic Republic Party
JICA: Japanese International Consulting Agency
ML: Municipal Law 1960
MCS: Militant Cleric Society
MHUP: Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning
ORPI: Organization for Regulating Polluted Industries
PFZ: Project Freeze Zone
RL 1968: Renewal Law 1968
SCUB: Section to Combat Unlawful Behavior
SDL 1933: Street Development Law 1933
SOFRETU: Société Française D'études et de Réalisations de Transports Urbains
SCRFW: Section for commanding of right and forbidding of wrong
SDL 1933: Street Development Law
TA: Territorial Arrangement
TAFC: Tehran's Article Five Commission
TCP: Tehran Comprehensive Plan
TECO: Technical and Engineering Consulting Organization
TM: Tehran Municipality
TMR: Tehran Metropolitan Region
TNR: Trans National Railroads
TPC: Tehran Professional Committee
T25DZ: Tehran's 25 years Development Zone
URL1968: Urban Renewal Law 1968

Chapter 1: Introduction

The common image of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) is that of a theocratic state, one that incorporates a revolutionary and pro-poor politics and clerical leadership. The image of the state governed by *velayat-e faqih* (guardianship of the jurist) is misleading to the extent that it fails to consider the modernizing politics of the new Islamic elites that shaped the IRI in the second decade after the Revolution. This research examines the central role of professional technocrats in translating these politics into transformative plans and urban reforms in Tehran as part of broader transformations in the 1990s. In the Second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (HABITAT II) in 1996, Tehran was one of the 25 cities recognized as a benchmark for future urban reforms. Now, twenty years after such recognition, Tehran is ranked among the most polluted, economically challenged and socially polarized metropolises in the world. The 1990s reform in the Capital constituted of conflicting projects of liberalizing the cultural life and public domain of Tehran, modernizing its infrastructures and physical landscape and building a neoliberal foundation to govern the city. This multilayered reform was engineered as a response to governmentality crises emerged after the eight years of war with Iraq (1980-1988) and intensified factional conflicts in the second decade of the IRI. It was the pioneer project of a broader economic reconstruction project to develop and modernize the country by a capitalist agenda, rather than the revolutionary and populist one, a hallmark of the Iranian politics after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini (1989).

In 1989, President Hashemi Rafsanjani, the second figure of the Revolution after Ayatollah Khomeini, and the architect of Iran's shift toward a free market economy, appointed Qolamhossein Karbaschi as the mayor of Tehran, to engineer a bold urban reform as part of a postwar reconstruction project. The metaphor of the city as a "sick body" in urgent need of a cure was used widely in the public and professional journals of the day to address the problems of a poorly equipped city of 6 million people. The provincial urbanism of the Revolution was blamed for ignoring Tehran's needs and suspending the major investments to develop city's infrastructures including a subway system and policy of "housing the poor" was criticized for causing rapid and unordered

growth in the city. Initiated in 1987 in response to severe decline of oil prices in the international market, the Municipal Financial Self Rule Act projected that central government budget for large cities are totally removed in four years; Tehran Municipality under Karbaschi pioneered in accepting the implication of the act in 1989. Cuts to public funding for cities were initially justified on the basis of general austerity measures; the cuts were never revised, not through the oil boom of the early 1990s nor in the late 2000s when the rise of oil prices enabled the IRI to invest huge amounts of its revenue in military research and technology as well as patronage social spending.

Rafsanjani reshaped the technocratic body by supporting the center-right groups of the Islamist technocrats or those criticized their revolutionary past; he revived central planning and reconciled the technocracy with government's decision making. His engagement with technical expertise rather than revolutionary ideology marked the bureaucratization of factional conflicts over the future of the IRI. In a fight against conservative commercial capital and the revolutionary Islamic left, Rafsanjani and his center-right forces relied on technocracy to build a development agenda reliant upon the productive potential of the emerging Islamic industrial capitalist class and to build Iran's non-oil export economy. Under the hegemony of neoliberal agenda in international economic institutes, restructured technocracy played a vital role in deconstructing the Revolution's populist compromise and shifting the constituency of the IRI from the urban poor and disadvantaged to the middle classes; it failed, however, to create a developmental state capable of building a non-oil export economy in Iran.

This research examines Tehran's reform of the 1990s as reformulation of the "will to improve" under the IRI. Urban reform in Tehran has a long and troubled history, enduring continuities from the first attempts at modernization in the Constitution Revolution (1906-1911) to urban transforming efforts of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and re-articulation of reform project in recent decades. Such history has witnessed the elitist as well as populist urban modernizations. This research examines the commonalities between urban reforms in Tehran with a focus on the 1990s reform. The reform under Karbaschi was a multilayered project that combined a rescaling of the state power with a modernist urban project and a democratic cultural change. To understand

how these conflicting aspects came together in this reform, I track the political, social and institutional contexts which shaped the reform as an articulation of previous secular and leftist urban reforms and the Islamic ideals. This initials to examine three major processes of land speculation in Tehran, history of urban planning and imagination and practices of modernizing the urban in Iran in recent decades. Through this historical analysis, I can track down how Karbaschi adopted selectively the pro-growth proposals of the 1968 Tehran Comprehensive Plan that had been abandoned after the Revolution, and incorporated them into his intensification and expansion policies for residential and commercial land uses that were in sharp contrast to the goals of the 1968 plan. The history of the urban reforms in Tehran and their political, institutional and discursive legacies explain how the 1990s reform borrowed from both elitist and modernist urban planning in the pre-Revolution era as well as globally praised recent models like the London Docklands.

Tehran has been the main scene of national politic and state-society conflicts. In mid- 1990s, when privatization of the state-owned industries inflamed factional conflicts among local interest groups, Tehran Municipality and its urban reform policy were the first to be attacked by hardline conservatives who had found the democratic cultural change of the city problematic. In April 1998, Karbaschi was accused of violating the law and embezzling public assets. He was imprisoned after a controversial public trial. Having rebuilt its social support base, the Islamic left returned to power through the presidential election of 1997 and took a major step in limiting mayoral arbitrary power by forming city councils throughout the country.

Concepts

1. Urban Modernization as a “Will to Improve”

Only one decade after the Revolution, Tehran, the centre of the uprising against Pahlavi modernization (1921-78), became the platform of new efforts to build a modern urbanity, indicating the power of middle class aspirations in the city. To understand the revive of modernization projects in post-Revolution Iran, one must step back from conventional accounts narrowing the IRI according to its anti-West rhetoric and

investigate how the legacy of pre-Revolution modernizations were rearticulated into social and political ambitions of different Islamic factions. This research examines the crisis of governmentality and rising factional competition in the IRI as animating force of new modernization effort in the so-called post-war reconstruction era (1988-1998). Tehran urban reform exemplifies the impacts of globally hegemonic discourse of neoliberalism of the 1980s and circulation of the Asian development models on shaping a new agenda for "improvement" in the IRI. In this research, I use the "will to improve" to refer to social and political construction of development and modernization projects. I have borrowed this term from Tania Li (2007) and agree with her conception that it shows a presence of enduring continuities in the discourses and practices of modernization in the recent history of developing countries. However, I depart from her formulation of "improvement" as technology of power employed by "trustees" or technocrats who rely on central government institutions to capitalize on their expertise. Li suggests that "interests are part of the machine, but they are not its master term. There are indeed hybrids, in which improvement schemes serve to enrich a ruling group or secure their control over people and territory. There are instances of bad faith. There are sound reasons to be sceptical of some of the claims made in the name of improvement. But for several centuries trustees have endeavored to secure the welfare of populations" (Li 2007: 9). I argue that Li's conception of the term ignores the historical transformations of the "improvement" projects and marginalizes the role of political and economic interests that motivate such transformations. My research on the history of urban reforms in Tehran indicates that modernizers have always framed their projects through societal interaction and process of negotiation with other political actors. As such, there is no metaphysical quality attached to re-emergence and re-articulation of the "will to improve" in the different historical periods and major social transformations in Iran. The long and troubled history of urban reforms in Tehran has witnessed the elitist as well as populist modernizations, embedded in the local processes of the nation-state building and social transformations, and affected by the global-local dynamics.

The "will to improve" also materializes the state policies toward capital accumulation and social control. Major urban reforms in Tehran have contributed to capital accumulation through creating cycles of land speculation: the urban reform of the

1880s marks the first speculations in the emerging land market in Tehran; Land Registry Office, established in the 1920s, consolidates and legitimizes land grabbing in the age of nation-state building; the urban reform of the 1960s disciplines the city through middle class ideals and opens the city to land speculations regulated by Comprehensive Plan (1968). This research will focus on the adoption of intensification policy in the 1990s urban reform, and commercialization of the city through new speculative spatial patterns. I argue that continuity in the elitist modernizations has overwhelmed the potential for breaks in Tehran through the last half-century. Social engineering through spatial practices has become an enduring component of governing the city, even in its most prominent political raptures like the Islamic Revolution. However, even the elitist social engineering projects have led to social processes of claim-making around promised ends, which produced more conflict than what could be resolved; in the 1979 Revolution, the Capital and its upper and middle classes lost their vantage point in the geography and history of modernization in Iran and claim-making was monopolized by the traditional middle class, the urban poor and farmers. In the 1990s, the center-right government revived the role of Tehran in its reconstruction and urban renewal project, supported by and consolidated the position of emerging modernist elite groups among Islamic commercial and industrial capitalist class, a contested process which temporarily marginalized both leftist and conservative Islamists. The final chapter of this dissertation focuses on Enqelab Street—the spatiality of discontents in Tehran—to examine the unintended transformative potential of post-war modernization of the city through expansion of higher education in Tehran, materialized in the political activism of the student body.

2. Modernity and Modernization as Practical and Analytical Concepts

While the focus of this dissertation is on the efforts to modernize Tehran and not the role of the city in Iranian modernity, the analytical and historical relations of the two are of paramount importance to this research. I use the terms modernity and modernization both as analytical and practical concepts: practical concepts include the terms used by social actors to make their actions understood by others, for example different usages of modernity and modernization by liberal experts who came to power in

the post-WWII era, Reza shah, the renowned despot or the Islamist technocrats. I also use these terms as analytical tools, despite the vagueness of the terms and the controversial debates around them.

The analytical literature on modernity and modernization is broad and diverse. In investigating the relation of modernity and modernization in the context of this research, one may ask if the revolutionary cry "Neither West, Nor East, the Islamic Republic" in 1978 Tehran articulates the rejection of two rival models which were conceived as alternative forms of modernity and modernization. Did the proposed Islamic model aim to present a different conception of contradiction and flux (modernity) or create a different discourse and strategy for governing society? One could safely assume those alternative forms were thought, debated and challenged by the Islamic revolutionaries to build a "third way." Scholars studying the Islamic intellectual movement in Iran (Mirsepassi 2010; 2000; Chehabi 1990; Tavakoli 2009; 2001) have examined the influence of scholars like Frantz Fanon and Edward Said on the process of religious movements before and after the Revolution.[1] However, they mainly conclude that a long-term endogenous comprehension and invention of modernity, based on rethinking the social codes of Islam, was interrupted/reinforced by a process of adopting Western modernity. Tavakoli (2009), for example, argues that Islamic codes for cleanliness and hygiene changed in Iran, in the time of consecutive cholera outbreaks of the late 19th century. Mirsepassi (2010) suggests a political renaissance occurred among Islamic thinkers through the 1906 Constitutional Revolution.[2] Chehabi (1990) follows the same argument, studying two distinctive forms and periods of reformist efforts among Islamists to cope with secular trends in the IRI.[3]

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[1] Habermas was invited to Tehran by reformist figures in 2002. He talked about 'democracy and

[2] According to Chehabi, *Nehzat-e azadi,* the party that formed the provisional government in 1979, represents Islamic modernism, which is different from religious reformism. Religious reformism is an "attitude among the members of clergy" but Islamic modernism is associated with "people who are close to the religious establishment but outside it" (27).

[3] The newborn religious intellectual movement, which is based on liberal theology and has been led by Abdolkarim Soroush (a follower of Karl Popper, the philosopher of science) advocates alternative Islamic modernity since 1990. Islamic modernity, according to Soroush (2002), builds upon the potential of Islam as a religion to renew itself through interpretation and jurisprudence (*ejtehad*). Islamic modernity relies on rationality not secularism. Introducing the concept of "religious pluralism," Soroush (2002) suggests that a secular mind cannot possibly be religious, but religious pluralism could integrate rationalism with a

There is a common understanding of modernity as a process rooted in the Enlightenment of the seventeenth century and its transformative consequences in the West, including the "rational mentality", capitalism, and state bureaucracy. Classic modernization theory was built around this understanding of modernity. In 1957, Samir Amin, the Egyptian economist, problematized this common assumption with his study on colonialism and the way it contributed to the formation of capitalism as a global system and to underdevelopment (its by-product). Edward Said (1978) also criticized the uncritical acceptance of the romanticized presentations of the East in the academy and problematized the self-affirmative notions that set the West as a norm/standard. Said focused on the ways in which Western orientalism created the East as a precondition of colonial intervention. Such critical positions nourished the conceptions of modernity as an imperial construct and also as plural modernities (Cooper 2005). While the classic perspective frames the modern as a bundle/package fixed in a specific space-time context or as "the belief in 'linear progress, absolute truths, and rational planning of ideal social orders'" (Harvey 1989: 31), the plural modernities thesis argues timeless conceptions of modernity.[4] The modernism that resulted from the first conception was '"positivistic, technocentric, and rationalistic' at the same time as it was imposed as the work of an elite avant-garde of planners, artists, architects, critics, and other guardians of high taste. The "modernization" of European economies proceeded apace, while the whole thrust of international politics and trade was justified as bringing a benevolent and progressive 'modernization process' to a backward Third World" (ibid: 35).

Timothy Mitchell (2002) and Cooper (2005) convincingly cast doubt on the analytical value of the "alternative modernities" thesis.[5] Mitchell suggests that capitalist

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minimal secularism. Such a project would consolidate democracy and civil society against absolute supremacy of the *Faqih* (high status Islamic jurist).

[4]Aihwa Ong (1997) and Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) argue that Chinese government and Bengali intellectuals have initiated an alternative modernity in the late 19th century. They emphasize on how these efforts have transformed western universalizing forms, while using aspects of Western technology, law, and social practices.

[5] As Mitchell (2000) suggests "alternative modernities" acknowledges the importance and variation of non-European developments, but he argues that "the language of alternative modernities can imply an almost infinite play of possibilities, with no rigorous sense of what, if anything, gives imperial modernity its phenomenal power of replication and expansion." More importantly, he suggests that the vocabulary of alternatives can still imply an underlying and fundamentally singular modernity, modified by local

modernity has a power of replication not found in other modernities. He argues that this power relies on its construction as representation, and on its constitution as "the world-as-picture" (xii-xiv). But such representation has also made the modern unstable, because it opens it up to re-articulation and displacement: "Every performance of the modern is the producing of this difference, and each such difference represents the possibility of some shift, displacement, or contamination" (ibid.). None of the representations can ever match its original, and a universal modernity becomes impossible.

Cooper (2005: 135) also warns about the risk of recognizing "any notion of improvement or progress—of directed change or change welling up from social processes" as another modernity. He suggests it is useful to see modernity as the end point of a certain narrative of progress, which creates its own starting point (tradition) as it defines itself by its end point, but this conception is a demanding one, because we need to discuss narrative subjectivity: "is it told by intellectuals or by ordinary people, by the person writing the account in question or the people about whom the account is written?" (ibid: 126) The conception of modernity as a representation runs the risk of turning modernity into an "empty signifier," or empty name.[6] Cooper calls for a historical grounding and nuanced reflection of modernization processes around the world. An historical grounding, however, would lead us to emphasize the links between modernity and capitalist development in other contexts as well.[7] He suggests that Mitchell and others, who define modernity through the history of capitalism and imperialism, actually are defining its causes and they are less clear about modernity itself.

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circumstances into a multiplicity of 'cultural' forms. It is only in reference to this implied generic that such variations can be imagined and discussed" (ibid: xii).

[6] In critiques on modernization in Latin America, Octavio Paz used the term "empty signifier" or "empty name" to address different ways adopted by societies to deal with challenges the modern world imposed on them. He suggested there is as much modernity as there are societies (quoted from Julian Go 2013: 183).

[7] Cooper is critical of narrating the modernity as a consequence of the rise of capitalism or as a "capitalism-plus" as he calls it. For some example of this see Giddens (1991) and Roger Friedland and Deirdre Boden (1994). Anthony Giddens (1991) explains his view of modernity in its links with capitalism and at the same time specifies its results. He suggests that modernity is the homogenization of space and time, from the rich and varied ways in which people situated themselves in their contexts to an impersonal interchangeability. Roger Friedland and Deirdre Boden (1994): "We treat modernity simply as the intertwined emergence of capitalism, the bureaucratic nation-states, and industrialism, which, initiating in the West but now operating on a global scale, has also entailed extraordinary transformations of space and time" (2).

Ferguson (1994) presents another example of historical grounding and examines the appeal of modernization in Lesotho, as the claim that economic and social standards can be made to converge *at the level of the most affluent societies.* For most Africans, he adds, modernization means health facilities, education, a decent pension, and so on. He suggests that these appeals indicate that modernization is linked to development. Development has been used to refer to two different things: "On the one hand it is used to mean the process of transition or transformation toward a modern, capitalist, industrial economy—the modernization, the development of the forces of production," as a movement in history. In the second meaning, development is used as a social program, in terms of "quality of life and standard of living" which refers to the reduction or amelioration of poverty and material want (15). The link between modernity and development in practical language would not decrease the ambiguities of the terms at an analytical level, but it confirms the importance of the political projects that were/are built around these concepts.

3. Worlding Urbanism

Urban reforms are integrated in different imaginaries of being global, from building powerful states and competitive economies, to branding cities through identical events, popular sport, trendy music, spectacular architecture and so on. They are also entwined with new reference models for modernizing space and society. Urban models circulating recently in many Asian countries are marked by flooding urban reforms with limitless dreams about mega-developments, demarcating buildings, technological urban innovations, exhibitionary spaces, or conventional standardization of urban space measured by UN Habitat. The Navab project, one of my case studies, exemplifies how urban reform in Tehran was entwined with the Canary Wharf model of redevelopment in London, a model of gentrification that changed the old fish market along the Thames into a mega office project. The transformation of Enqelab Street, my other case study, also illuminates the practices of "worlding" in development of higher education in the city and modernization through expansion of the culture industry. Ananya Roy and Aihwa Ong (2011: 5) coined the concept of "worlding practices" to address distinctive practices of urban modeling, inter-referencing among Asian cities, and the forming of new solidarities

that collectively seem to raise an *inter*-Asian horizon of metropolitan and global aspiration. They argue that recent "inter-referencing in Asia" has brought a spectrum of experiments that reinvent urban modernity in the global South, a process not similar to universal forms of global economic and political integration. These efforts to be global cannot be understood merely as a form of globalization imposed by the West on the rest. New practices of inter-referencing involve South–South coordinates, be it the Burj Khalifa in Dubai, the subway system in Shanghai or the Nature Bridge in Tehran, or other symbols of hyper-developments; they emerge as South-based global referents (Shanghai, Singapore, Bogota and Medellin as global models). Such forms of inter-referencing make possible the transformation of urban disorder, the dystopic conditions of the global South, into civic order and postcolonial pride. Produced by capitalism, Asian-referenced urbanism may be brutal and violent. These urbanisms self-consciously present themselves as non-western processes, and deploy the motifs that reference other Asian models.

Tehran's 1990s reform was inspired by models of urban development in Malaysia and Singapore and aimed to change the global image of Tehran as a "traditional" undeveloped city ruled by clergy or as a center of extreme particularism of the Islamic Revolution. The Islamic urban modernizing effort in the 1990 Iran was to adopt the Asian worlding practices, and at the same time was in competition with its major examples; the IRI relied on national pride crafted by Pahlavi regime against Arab world, Turkey and emerging economies in Asia, including China, South Korea and Singapore. Such national identity politics merged with claiming a leading role among Muslim countries created specific pattern of referencing to Asian models in Iran, which was controversially considered as a non-Western pattern of development, and revived at the same time the reference to Western urban models and re-adoption of Pahlavi urban policy to distinct itself from Asian model as continuance of the 1960s Iran, when the country carried a pioneer role in rapid modernization and industrialization in Asia.

The reform was conflicting in its internal functions as well. The center-right referred to and successfully adopted the Asian capitalist models of urbanism to marginalize the Islamic left and its provincial urbanism, while it was unable to realize the

promised “take off” move in modernization through physical reform in the urban landscape and deregulated city finance. I examine the geographical shifts in the IRI’s development policy followed by adoption of such policy and its consequences, including the rise of Tehran to the top priority in the list of state investments in infrastructures and political empowerment of Tehran Municipality to initiate an ambitious urban reform focused on administrative efficiency, rapid mobility, and conventional standards of urban hygiene and beautification of the city; mayor of Tehran was assigned an unprecedented power to mobilize the required funding for urban renewal through deregulated financial sources. To examine the consequences of the reform, I focus more specifically on the mayor-centred decentralization and rampant capitalization of space followed by the reform. The research documents the democratic impacts of the reform in facilitating cultural inclusiveness in harshly disciplined city through opening the public spaces to heterogenous publics of citizens and non-Islamic lifestyles, and develop the horizons of engaging the publics in politics through supporting political reform movement, free elections and expansion of civil society organizations.

4. Neoliberal Urban Governance as an “Institutional Fix”

Neoliberalism is a politically guided intensification of the market rule over the social. The mid-1980s were a turning point in the search for a new institutional governance model for cities and a redefinition of the role of central government in cities in the global South. Most of the neoliberal developmental agendas adopted national economic strategies with metropolitan areas as their engines. The politics of local and global competition were diverse, ranging from supporting integrated public sector planning and supervisions to extreme competitive city marketing (Thornley & Newman 1996). Central governments tried to retain control over certain activities, such as the transportation systems initiated by local authorities in major cities (Gordon et al. 2004) or over areas of increasing importance in the national economy and population movements, while transferring certain planning rights to the local governments. In Turkey, new financial regulations were introduced in the 1980s and followed up in 2005 to guarantee

additional financial resources for local governments, and to allow them to carry out their new responsibilities.[8]

I borrow the concept "institutional fix" from Peck and Tickell (2000) who used the term to discuss the ways in which welfare state restructuring caused "a regulatory vacuum." They explain an institutional fix is part of a qualitative reorganization of the mode of social regulation and a re-articulation of the state with the economy, rather than the absolute withdrawal from it—an institutional response to economic pressures and instabilities. The state offers up part of its own domain as a new institutional space for colonization by private capital at the same time that it helps guide this investment into the space of the physical environment. This study examines the mayor-centred decentralization as an "institutional fix" in Iran to cope with the austerity measures of the mid 1980s oil bust: a process of forming a stronger local government, essentially based on Municipal Financial Self Rule (*khodkafei-e shahrdari-ha*), through dismantling the central supervisory functions in the absence of city councils or other local representative bodies to replace them. Since their formation in the 1890s, municipalities in Iran were funded by the central government budget. The conjunction of war, a decline in oil prices and financial deficit, and the construction of a neoliberal political imaginary shaped the process of municipal empowerment in Iran. Oksala (2012) notes that neoliberal governmentality became hegemonic as its utilitarian claims were linked to an economic doctrine. Neoliberalist arguments fallaciously suggest that good governance aims to maximize the material wellbeing of the population and that only economic growth can deliver a higher universal living standard; this doctrine is based on the argument that "economic knowledge is objective and politically neutral and political decisions have to be based on the economic truth" (123-4). Relying on partnerships in the development of vacant lands, redevelopment of large sections of already built areas and

[8] For example, Jane Jenson (1999) used 'neoliberal' as a general descriptor for post-welfare state citizenship regimes. Nikolas Rose (1999) argued that welfare agencies are now to be governed by competition and consumer demand and technologies such as budget disciplines, accountancy and audit. Wendy Larner (2000) suggested that 'less government' has not been equal to 'less governance.' Larner (2000) further argued that neoliberalism has come with more governance and its best example is the conformation of the institutions and individuals with the norms of the market. Roger Keil (2002: 230) argues that everyday life is the site and product of the neoliberal transformation: "the epochal shift form a Keynesian-Fordist welfarist to a post-Fordist workfarist society is reflected in a marked restructuring of everyday life."

commercialization of public services, housing and basic urban amenities as mechanisms of financial self-rule radically restructured the state-ruled municipalities and created a public sector which relied on land speculation and deregulated urban growth.[9]

To examine the neoliberal urban governance in Tehran, I examine the Municipal Financial Self-Rule Act as a pioneer act of liberalizing the economy and deregulating urban governance: Tehran Municipality relied on construction sector and its rapid expansion as the main sector of urban economy and major source of municipal finance. Such institutional restructuring dismantled central urban planning in Iran. Urban planners who were authorized by the central government to supervise and guide the municipal authorities in physical planning turned to consultant-contractors working for the local government. The economic landscape of Tehran is different from China and India, where cities have turned to industrial hubs and is more similar to Turkey, Egypt and Lebanon, where 'empowerment' of local governments led to growing frauds and informal coalitions with private developers and local actors as well as the rise of the military as an ally of local actors in speculative real estate activities (Ong and Zhang 2008; Shami 2001). Studies on decentralization show that cities in India and Lebanon—where a relative absence of government motivated community activism have witnessed decentralizations with more democratic outcomes (Roy and Nezar AlSayyad 2004).

The mayor-centred decentralization in Tehran became a political important move in rescaling the state and its internal contestations. Such decentralization opened the municipality up to the factional conflicts that led to first election of the city councils in Iran[10]—a major challenge to powerful conservative establishments. Tehran Municipality

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[9] In the 1980s, the research on privatization did not include the privatization of public social services as an act of privatization and was focused on privatization of the State Owned Companies (SCOs). This emerged out of the World Bank's definition of public assets as "government-owned or government-controlled economic entities that generate the bulk of their revenues from selling goods and services" (Megginson et al. 2001:321). Only recent studies on privatization with broader definitions have discussed the links between decentralization agendas and privatization processes and shown such decentralizations, despite promises to improve the socio-economic development, have led to less support for urban social services, especially education and health.

[10] Another important change in the institutional setting of the municipality in 1990s was the election of the city council in 1997, the final year Karbaschi was in office. I do not examine the impacts of the city council on the decentralization process, as it goes beyond the time frame of this research. However, it should be noted that for the first time after the Revolution, and by huge efforts to overcome the conservatives' hostility toward the establishment of any electoral local bodies, city councils formed in Iran in 1998 two

boosted the urban construction sector and redirected a tremendous amount of capital that was floating in the informal trade circles into the city and used them as its fiscal power base. In exchange for the political security of investments for developers, the municipality would extract fees and taxes on investment in its bold urban reform and renewal projects. The process of municipal financial self-rule consolidated the political autonomy of Tehran Municipality and led to the conservatives' rule over the city and city council in coming two decades.

Entry Points: Theoretical, Empirical and Historical

1. Neoliberalism and Capitalism

The distinction between neoliberalism and capitalism is important, notably regarding the different perspectives on the post-war economic shift in Iran, as economic liberalism (Nomani and Behdad 2006) revived capitalist relations (Amirahmadi 1990) and neoliberal restructuring (Pesaran 2011; Maljoo 2012). Rather than an ideology, capitalism is the whole ensemble of social relationships, institutions, practices and ideological mechanisms used to make social conditions as favorable as possible for the accumulation of capital. The set of beliefs in free markets and individual private property that supports the establishment of capitalism is liberalism (Polanyi 1956).[11] The revolutionary government in Iran was not an anti-capitalist government and society was

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years after reformist President Khatami was in office. Elected mayors have ruled the cities since then (Madanipour 1988).

[11] Karl Polanyi (1956) argued that the reference to past liberal values to save 'individual freedom' from fascist and soviet ideologies emerged as a political project to marginalize the alternative interpretation of freedom as 'freedom for all individuals' guaranteed by the state regulations after the WW2 (Polanyi 1956: 257-8). Plehwe (2009) has studied the intellectual movement that nourished the neoliberal project since the late 1930s through looking at the formation and activities of Mont Pelerin Society. The first critical studies on the shift to neoliberalism examined it as the New Right ideology and policy. Stuart Hall (1983, 1988) examined the intellectual background of Thatcherism as an 'authoritarian populism.' Hall (1988) used the Gramscian concept of 'passive revolution' to describe Thatcherism as a transformation organized from above but based on gradual accumulation of small changes. Bob Jessop et al (1984) criticized Hall's argument for the celebratory tone and fuzziness of the concept 'authoritarian populism' and ignoring the economic dimension of Thatcherism and the economic trade between capitalist class and conservative party. These debates motivated more research on the economic nature of the interventions to restructure the welfare state (Marchak 1991; Martin 1993; Teeple 1995; Belsey 1996). Germy Gillbert (2015) also discusses the difference between capitalism as an ensemble which capitalists use in order to make social conditions as favourable as possible for the accumulation of capital, and 'neoliberalism' as a particular political philosophy and set of beliefs in favour of a policy agenda which has vastly increased the power and prestige of finance capital at the expense of everyone else.

not a non-capitalist one. The Islamist leftist government, like other models of government with a desire to rebalance the relation of capitalist and non-capitalist parts of the economy, tried to limit the presence of capital in the social domain.

The social rupture come by the Islamic Revolution disrupted the capitalist relations and economy in Iran. When the first neoliberal economic restructuring was forming in Chile, Iran was in the process of building this anti-imperialist Revolution (1979). One decade later, a neoliberal rationality was formulated to overcome the crisis of the Revolution and war and normalize the system through an ambitious reconstruction project. Scholars studying the reconstruction project agree that it failed to achieve its goals, including the goal to restore Iran's share in the global oil market, to build a new private sector, and to boost a non-oil economy based on new industrialization processes. Iran's economic shift was partial, lopsided and unarticulated, and has been called "homegrown" by IMF for such particular features. The term homegrown, Roy suggests (2011:262), can be understood to mean the ways in which global circulations of market rule find a home in national contexts of development. But it means something more than the local habitat of neoliberalism and refers to the discourses and practices through which a multitude of social forces actively produce and take up the norms of market rule. Scholars who have studied the impacts of neoliberal shift on the economy in Iran disagree on its achievements. In the urban field, I would argue that mayor-centred decentralization was a major accomplishment in state rescaling, building local government and more localized governance in Iran. By governance I mean what Walters (2004) calls the mechanics of governing, through multiple ties, which cross the boundary of state, civil society and economy.[12] In his study on *The Role of Decision Making Processes in Urban Management Systems*, Karbaschi (2013) introduces the decentralization and empowerment of Tehran Municipality as his main accomplishment and a vital factor to promote his urban reform: "Tehran Municipality had reached a significant level of decentralization through the organizational reforms during the 1990s, proving the fact

[12] Governance, Walters (2004: 32) suggests, "recognizes that private government has insinuated the social body. It connects mainstream political science to arguments that have long been made within feminism and Marxism: that regulation operates in homes, firms, schools and many other sites beyond the domain of institutional politics." My study distinguishes itself from positive and normative expectations about evolving forms of governance.

that in an efficiently decentralized structure, urban services and projects can be dramatically boosted in both quantity and quality" (253). Neither the existing literature on post-war Iran and Rafsanjani's economic reconstruction, nor the urban research on Tehran have not examined the links between the broader neoliberal shift in Iran and the urban reform in Tehran. Examining the historical background of local government and municipalities in Iran, this research focuses on the socio-economic and political connotations of state rescaling in the 1990s. I will study the enduring conflicts produced by such decentralization process led now to seek a restructuring reform by both reformist and conservative forces either through assigning more power to municipalities through direct residents vote for the mayors of large cities, the core element of the *Integrated Urban Management Act* proposed to the government in 2013 or by retaining the central government supervisions which were dismantled in the 1990s.

2. A Global South Perspective on Neoliberal Urbanism

The invention of an uneven and partial neoliberal economic reform is not limited to Iran. The conventional method of comparative studies and looking for commonalities and differences of one particular social transformation in different contexts is to look into area studies framings of societies and social processes.[13] As Claudia Derichs (2015) suggests, area studies are not bound to geographical settings but derive from a politically informed defining and "scaling" of localities, ethnicities, languages, religions, and cultures.[14] The largest conception of this type is the "global south", a term replacing the precedent "developing countries." In the edited volume of *Cities of the Global South Reader,* Miraftab and Kudva note that despite the diverse trajectories of urbanization in the global south, the historical legacies of colonialism build the common ground and

[13] Robinson suggests (2006, 2011) that urban studies have analytically divided the world of cities into wealthier and poorer or into different regional groupings of cities, with subsequently very little comparative research across these divides. This divided nature can be traced back to two theoretical conceptions of the urban experience of modernity (cities as privileged sites for cultural experience of modernity in Simmel (1997) and Wirth (1964) works), and to developmentalism. Approaching urban modernity and development as reinforcing processes or focusing on distinctive features of cities in underdevelopment (Santos, 1979), Robinson concludes that scholars of poorer cities, frequently choose to engage with these theories to secure publication in international journals, or to authorize their research findings for a wider audience.

[14] Derichs (2015) argues that the reciprocal relationship between space (area) and regimes that 'scale' particular elements of empirical reality is obvious. The epistemic challenge thus lies in diversifying 'area knowledge' and decentreing the perspective on the phenomenon that is chosen for analysis. The value-added aspect of area studies understood this way, we might reason, lies in respecting the dynamics of scale. The scale rather than the space becomes a key analytical tool.

commonalities between cities set as the global south. Theorized as Third World urbanism in the 1970s (Abu Lughod 1996; Kay 1989), the colonial legacy was analyzed through concepts of over-urbanization, intensified regional imbalance, urban primacy (primate city) and dual city (Frank 1967, 1975; Amin 1982; Roberts 1978). The Third World urban mapping was mainly focused on the Latin America and Africa (Abu-Lughod, 1996),[15] and Middle Eastern cities, remained out of the map, were conceptualized by rentier states theory, which shares the same assumptions attributed to cities in the Third World urbanism (Anderson 2006).[16]

Recent formulation of Asian urbanism thesis by Ananya Roy and Aiwa Ong, built around critical approach to structural fixity and universalizing lens adopted in the Third World urbanism, represent a promising yet untapped approach to conceptualize the "will to improve" and post-colonial pride and efforts to build a capitalist modernity through transfer of development models and inter-referencing in Asia. Roy and Ong study different examples of modeling in Asia, including the Wenzhou model of development, the role of "success" ideology in development of absolute state and capitalism in Singapore, the eco-urbanism in China and green model of the development in Dalian, the "Islamic modernity" and Dubai's model of urban wonderland and global city building and branding in Kolkata. They also rely on the literature produced by other scholars but studying the processes which are involved in such modeling, including the post-colonial state-building process, the role of middle class in development politics, neoliberal urban policies, dynamics of the capitalist city, urban movements in Asia and immigration and

[15] The theory of 'dependent urbanization' gained momentum in urban research in Iran in the 1970s, when an urban research group, named *Urban and Regional Research Group*, formed in the National University by Mehdi Kazemi Bidhendi, an architect educated in Brazil, and Guiti Etemad. They argued that urban processes under Pahlavi had led to the disintegration of the urban network and the formation of the 'primate city' of Tehran. The group was deactivated in 1983, when its major scholars were purged from university. In the years to come, inequality, informal settlements and housing policies became the main track of research on urban society in Iran (Piran 1991; Athari 1995,1999; Khatam 1999, 2000), while indigenous architecture and urban planning turned to the main focus of research for post-modern/Islamic architects and planners (for example see Habibi 1989,1999; Moqtader 1999).

[16] One of the debates around neoliberalism, to which rentier state scholars have contributed, is the question of market reform in oil-exporting economies. They suggest market reforms were implemented when the oil busts occurred. Such argument disregards the role of dominant economic discourses in shaping policies to respond to the oil busts. The ISI retreated from market reform while the early1990s oil bust was in process. Critical reviews by Mitchell (1991, 2009), Okruhlik (1999), Anderson (2006) and Ehsani (2010) examine the failure of the rentier state theory in addressing the nature of the economic reform in the oil exporting countries.

ethnic and racial solidarities and conflicts in transnational networks (Hibou 2004; Logan 2011a, 2010; Park et al. 2011; He and Wu 2009; Elychar 2005; Keydar 1999; Ma and Wu 2005).[17]

This research benefits from thesis of inter-referencing in Asian urbanism and circulation of its models in the Middle East. I also benefit from historical analyses that focus on international dynamics and their impacts on modernization and capitalist processes in the Middle East and oil exporting countries in the post WWII era. Iran is a prime example of the United States cold-war policy to support "development to prevent revolution" in global south, especially the countries neighboring the Soviet Union. The main contribution of this research to existing literature on neoliberalism in Iran and the Middle East is its simultaneous application of these historical and regional lenses to analyse the formation of neoliberal governance in Tehran through a major urban reform. Studies on neoliberal process in the Middle East usually focus on the economy and state apparatus and leave the urban out. These studies unpacks the complexities of the neoliberal processes in the region, for example Tim Mitchell (2002) and Ülkü Selçuk (2011) examine the emergence of the mafia mode of production in Egypt and Turkey.[18] Hinnebusch (1995) suggests that neoliberal policy has intensified the tension between liberal "technos" and statist "politicos" on overdevelopment of the state in Syria. The same tension could be seen among neoliberal and institutionalist economists/government experts in Iran in last decade.[19]

On the urban and regional levels, there are similarities in neoliberal processes in Tehran, Cairo and Istanbul with Asian urbanism. For example most of the stock market

[17] For example He and Wu (2009) have examined the land reform in China, a unique effort in transiting societies to build a market for urban land. They explain the urban land allocation to government organizations and work units resulted in rare investments in urban redevelopment. Shanghai was the first city to implement land reform, proposing time bounded land use rights to developers in 1987. The Shanghai government promoted the leasing system as a major source of the local revenue. In smaller cities, land-related revenue accounted for up to 60 percent of the total local revenue (He and Wu 2009: 288).

[18] According to Ülkü Selçuk (2011), the mafia mode of production emerged through market reform in Turkey and powerful economic circles linked to the state, and held the direct command of the armed forces. He argues that neither their antagonism nor their alliance with the conventional bourgeoisie could be essentialised.

[19] Hinnebusch (1995) has argued that the crisis of accumulation was aggravated in Syria by the 'overdevelopment' of the state. The new balance of class power reflected in the tension between liberal 'technos' and statist 'politicos' and pressures of the private sector motivated the economic liberalization, engineered by the state through selective liberalization compatible with regime stability.

activity and privatization progress has happened through infrastructure and other mega-projects. "While government budgets were contracting, Cairo was exploding: 'dreamland', the TV commercials for the most ambitions of the new developments promised, 'is the world's first electronic city.' Buyers were invited to sign up now for luxury fibre optic-wired villas, as the shopping malls and theme parks, golf course and polo grounds, rose out of the desert west of the Giza pyramids— but only minutes from central Cairo on the newly built ring road" (Mitchell 2002: 273-4).

What is particular to the formation of neoliberal urban governance in Iran is its emergence as a liberal ideology against political Islam. Existing literature indicates that in Muslim contexts neoliberalism usually contributes to the rise of political Islam. An example is Indonesia, the country where the efforts to dismantle the secular post-colonial state and erect decentralized conservative Islamic governments are in debt to neoliberal discourses and practices. In Egypt, the Islamic charities and Muslim Brotherhood benefited from privatization and NGOization of the social services in the cities (Bayat 2007; Ismail 2013). The neoliberal process in Iran resembles more to the post-apartheid South Africa, where South African Congress articulates the market reform with freedom and democracy (Hart 2008). However, these similarities, as Roy (2011) argues, do not support the narrative of "planetary neoliberalism and its localization."[20]

3. Karbaschi and History of Urban Reforms in Tehran

After writing the draft of my first two chapters on post-war reconstruction project and market reform in late 1980s, and a general argument on Tehran's urban reform by Karbaschi, I started to study the history of the urban reforms in Tehran before the Revolution, to answer my questions on how the post-war modernization in Tehran links with the imaginaries and practices of modernizations under Pahlavi and beyond. In 2012, I went to Amsterdam as a guest researcher to join a team of historians in the International Social History Institute working on the history of oil in Iran. There I found interesting archives on contemporary Iran and wrote a chapter on the first urban reform in Tehran in the 19th century. This opened a pathway for studying urban reforms as extensions of the

[20] Shami (2010) and McCarney and Stren (2003) have studied the state spatial shifts, decentralization and local governments through economic shifts of the post 1980 era.

"will to improve"—as modernizing/development projects. My study on the history of urban reforms changed my first narration of the 1990s reform in Tehran, developed through a political economy lens on the urban renewal. I gradually incorporated the politics of the modernization into my conception of the reform, as I extended my historical studies to the urban reforms under Pahlavi. Finally, I limited my historical research to three major incidents, which are highly illuminative of common symbols and measures of urban reforms in Tehran, i.e., the urban mobility and capitalizing on the land. This includes: mapping of the new wall around the city in the mid-1880s; the street building in Tehran in the 1930s; and finally the emergence of central urban planning in the late 1960s. In studying these incidents, I have examined how did urban modernization emerge as part of a political agenda, by introducing symbols of urban "progress" through global-national and local interactions, and mobilising the urban expertise to achieve them. Through this historical lens, I have focused on the transfer of ideals and dreams on the urban reform among different generations of technocrats, and political shifts, the changes of laws, regulations, and planning tools and institution buildings, which enabled them to implement the reform.

Methodology and Personal History

As Germani (1978) has observed, the choice of a subject in social science, when it expresses more than a short-lived interest, usually finds its roots in some sort of personal experience. Before I started my PhD program, I worked as a sociologist and urban planner on Tehran for more than 15 years. From 1992 to 2007, I participated in planning teams working on Tehran and contributed to different decision-making processes regarding Tehran's urban development, housing policies and social planning. Since 1990, Tehran Municipality had encouraged the redevelopment and renewal of the city by opening all areas to potential high-rise and commercial construction and I witnessed how Tehran Municipality resisting any effort to regulate its construction policies, from the early stages of my career. Urban planners once entrusted by the central government to prepare Tehran Comprehensive Plan of 1992, had turned into the municipality's consultant-contractors and were working on projects that conflicted with the plan prepared by them and approved by the MHUP. In 1998 and by emerging political

frictions which led to the arrest and imprisonment of the Tehran Mayor, Karbaschi, the community of the urban planners in Tehran was divided into two opposite camps: most of the planners aligned with Karbaschi against the conservative faction who "was trialing the mayor of Tehran to beat president Rafsanjani." I developed my career in the middle of major shifts in the urban planning and governance of the city, as an opponent of the mayor-centred decentralization and municipal urban development policies. When I decided to start my PhD program in 2007, I was sure a theoretical focus on the topic sheds light to many unknown aspects of my experience as urban planner. The urban reform in Tehran was a policy set at national level and was linked with different aspects of the post-war reconstruction project: the actors, institutions, discourses and practices of these interventions were formed simultaneously and should be studied as interrelated processes. I planned to do my comprehensive exams on neoliberalism, rentier state and local governance, to get prepared to deal with questions of economic as well as urban restructuring.

Methods

As mentioned before, my research is both informed and challenged by my experiences as a planner, and I recognized the advantages and obstacles such formative experiences elicit when seeking out evidence and data in the field. The concept of 'evidence' needs clarification, when a research constantly moves from personal observations to more 'objective' lens of quantitative data, official plans, interview with other planners and local people. In his book, *Extended Case Method*, Burawoy (2009: 269) suggests, "the participant observer cannot escape the contradictory poles of participating and observation." This contradictory situation is true also for those who engage in the analysis of their own experiences with planning and development projects. I interviewed planners, official figures and some of the executive managers involved in implementing the reform plans and projects in Tehran, 15 in total. I also interviewed 18 residents in two sites of my case studies, Navab neighborhood and Enqelab Street. Working in Navab was much easier than Enqelab Street. I was familiar with some of the neighbourhoods around the highway and had enough connections to launch my research. I had been invited to many meetings on Navab project in the Municipality and MHUP,

and it was not difficult to dig deeper into the issues I was curious about. But Enqelab Street was a different story. Enqelab Street remains the most contentious space and a sensitive place to be studied in Tehran, as it is the site of both Friday Prayers and student activism. In 2011, I was looking for a site to examine resistance to top-down modernization projects. To reintegrate myself in the planning circles in Tehran, I started working on a small design project on Enqelab Street and rented a house that happened to be close to the street. As a young student of the 1980s, for me Enqelab Street represents the 1979 Revolution and the sad story of the Islamization of the universities and the 'Cultural Revolution' of 1981-84. Through my research in 2011, I explored the street's everyday life, its physical and emotional bordering between Friday Praying, student activism and the function of higher education. I learned how the street revived its role as the spatiality of dissidents in the political movement of 2009. I lived there for 7 months in order to familiarize myself with the space and closely observe its social dynamics and physical transformation. The interviews on Enqelab Street include three interviewees from authorities in major universities, two cultural centers and four staff from bookstores along the street. I also found people, through my personal networks, who dared to talk about their experience protesting in the street in 2009.

I use macroeconomic data and national census to portray the demographic and economic transformations of the city—though I am aware of the problems associated with these data. Even the 10 years' census, the most trusted data produced by the Statistical Centre of Iran, has problems in terms of defining the migrant population, city/rural divides, employment indexes, etc. I also have referred to the data of a published survey (2005) I did for the Urban Renewal Organization on Navab complex. The survey was based on completing 180 questionnaires, a 10 percent sample of Navab complex residents, and was completed by my assistants and myself during 2004. I have organized the results of this survey in separate tables in order to be comparable with my findings in later research. I will point to discrepancies between the two sets of data in chapter six.

Politically sensitive events took place in Iran since I started my Phd program at York. The disputed 2009 presidential election stormed political society, which led to conflicts with the west in general, including Canada. I faced doubts on how my fieldwork

would go in Tehran. The fieldwork of 2011 was the longest and the most challenging. What encouraged me through all the difficulties that emerged throughout my long journey of PhD study was the idea that, given my experience and background, I am in a unique position to conduct and publish this research.

Case Studies

This research has a historical lens with five cases of reform in Tehran analyzed in the historical sequence in which they appeared in the city. The historical view, however, primarily serves as support for my main research covering Tehran's urban reform and governance in the 1990s. The two case studies of Navab and Enqelab streets will be examined as two different processes of transformation of the city in this era.

Navab Highway, passing through old residential neighbourhoods in the center of Tehran, is the largest mega project of the 1990s and to date. The project symbolizes the urban reform under Karbaschi, both for the role the construction of highways played in his reform, and also for the symbolic meaning of the highway in urban modernization efforts aiming to increase the movement, the speed, and the efficiency in the city. Navab Highway also stands for the neoliberalization of the governance in the city, due to the fact that the financing of the project, as well as the re-planning of the highway was brought about through mayor-centred decentralization in Tehran.

Enqelab Street introduces a different example of the city's redevelopment in the 1990s. The urban reform revived the street's cultural centrality through support for its central art institutes, and facilitated the dramatic expansion of the higher education institutes along the street. These two processes attracted thousands of students, university staff, print industry workers, art activists, audiences and costumers, and led to an over-commercialization of the space. The modernization of the 1990s and its urban reform did not change the main characteristic of the space: being the city's main political street and one of its most important public spaces.

Outline of Chapters

Chapters two and three are focused on three important urban planning incidents in Tehran: one in the late 19th century and two in the Pahlavi era (1920-78). Chapter two examines the construction of the new city wall in Tehran in the late Qajar period and the emergence of the land market, urban engineering and the first imagination and practice of urban modernity and modernization. Chapter three explores the development of urban engineering and architecture as a strategy of 'building to power' under Reza Shah. This chapter also examines the 1968 Tehran Comprehensive Plan in the context of a "policy of promise" in the post 1953 Coup era and in the Cold War atmosphere. These incidents will be approached as important urban reforms with structuring impacts on the formation of the city's social space, and its organization as a process of accumulation and landscape of collective consumption.

Chapter four covers the rupture with the previous models of modernization and urbanism and the invention of the provincial modernity and urbanity of the 1979 Revolution. The "housing the poor" policy and decentralized urbanism will also be examined. I investigate the rise of the first economist-technocrats who replaced the leftist engineers who managed the economy and society during the war. This chapter presents my accounts of how Islamic technocrats shaped the neoliberal model of modernization and urban governance in response to a crisis of governmentality at the end of the war (1988), and in opposition to conservative Islamism. Chapter five discusses the urban reform of the 1990s. Presenting my arguments on the formation of its discourse and practice, I discuss the reform since 1988, when post-war biopolitics and new techniques of calculation were employed to reinforce the metaphor of the "sick body" of Tehran. This chapter includes my exploration of the building blocks of Tehran's urban reform as a neoliberal modernization of the city. Chapter six and seven present the results of my two case studies for this research. Chapter six explores the process of the planning, re-planning and construction of the megaproject of Navab Highway in 1991-96. Chapter seven examines the transformation of Enqelab Street in the same period—the main site of the emergence of higher education centers. These two spaces have special importance for the general argument of this study: the conflicting aims of the urban modernization in a

neoliberal context. The re-planning of the Navab Highway manifests these conflicts as it entangled the municipality in a dramatic violation of urban codes and rules to implement a public redevelopment project. Enqelab Street, host to the city's main universities and higher education institutes in the 1990s, examines how worlding urbanism is a conflicting project and process, as it focuses on expansion of higher education and universities as a site of production of development expertise, which is accompanied by the growth of student activism. Enqelab Street is examined also for its role in the liberal cultural reform that was part of the 1990s urban reform.

Chapter II: City Wall and Emergence of Modern Urbanism in mid-19 Century Tehran

> Until now in our country, it has not been customary for government authorities to be learned. Even now it is assumed that the only knowledge they need is drills of all kinds—military, marching, platoon, shooting, sword, and canon—while these are the lowest tasks of an authority and should be learnt in the final year of school. The most important thing that they need to learn is science… Now there is a new regulation at schools… all students without exception must study basic sciences such as arithmetic, geometry, trigonometry… geography, physics, and chemistry… in the first two or three years. In the following five or six years, they can study additional sciences… Until now, they (our predecessors) focused their attention on increasing their powers, which were dependent on the number of armed personnel… Today, [however] distances have shrunk and cities are getting closer… Steam carriages remove distances and with them the ramparts of customhouses. (Abdolghaffar 1868: 330, 352).

Introduction

In this chapter, I examine the first urban reform in Tehran: the emergence of mapping and urban engineering, and the commodification of urban land in the mid-to late 19th century. This era marks the transformation of the urban economic, demographic and political landscapes in Tehran, as well as the transformation of the urban actors in the city. The demolition of the old wall and the construction of the new symbolized the birth of urban modernity in Tehran; it was an engineered secular form of urbanity, influenced by colonial globalization as well as democratic movements, which led to the Constitution Revolution (CR) of 1906. Many scholars have examined the Revolution of 1979 as a rupture with secular modernity created by the CR (Amir Arjomand 1988; Afary 1996; Foucault 2013).[21] Others have focused on the shifting representations of the modern in each revolution and found interesting similarities between the two (Abrahamian 1982;

[21] For a critical analysis on Foucault's accounts on Iranian Revolution see Afary, Janet and Anderson, Kevin B., 2005. *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Chehabi 1990; Bayat 1997). This study suggests that beyond major socio-economic and political transformations of Iranian society during the long historical period framed by the Pahlavi regime, the urban reforms followed by these two revolutions (1930s and 1990s) were reactions against the failures of these revolutions' populist politics and worlding practices to reintegrate the post-revolutionary society.

This chapter focuses on the construction of a new wall around the city during the Naseri era (1848-96), intended to articulate its growth and modernism, as a case study of urban transformations accompanied by the Constitution Revolution and underlying the future changes of urban modernization in Tehran. Increasing the size of the city fivefold, the construction of the new wall responded to the flow of migration and new activities into the city as well as new processes of production and consumption of space that went beyond the city's historical patterns. This chapter examines how new *techniques of rule* (the methods of calculation, demography and cartography) were initiated and institutionalized to manage urban renewal when the economy was collapsing, the treasury was empty, the monarchy was hammered by riots, and foreign powers were gaining a strong economic hold in Iran. I examine how social agents of the modernization of Tehran, including the shah and statesmen, as well as urban landlords and engineers, designed and constructed the city's new wall as a technology to create a land market in the city. We will see how this project capitalized on land rents by translating low rents of the state's agricultural lands (*arazei khalesh*) into private urban lands. Finally, I will discuss how the "constructive destruction" (Moses 1942) of old neighbourhoods transformed the structure of pre-modern Tehran.

Tehran, Capital of Iranian Modernity

Nineteenth century Iran witnessed a major rift in the absolute power of the Kings of Qajar. War with Tsarist Russia, contagious diseases, movements across borders, and deepening economic relations with neighbouring countries Russia and the Ottoman Empire, played important roles in diminishing the basis of the Iranian monarchy (Adamiyat 1971; Bakhash 1978; Afary 1996; Amanat 1997; Ettehadieh 1998). Here I consider economic relations and contagious diseases as urban processes with significant

impacts for modernization of the state and cities. The increasing contact and interaction with neighbouring peoples raised the spread of epidemic disease, and commensurate public social awareness, at the time when the dreadful cholera outbreak of 1818 went from Iran to Russia, and then on into Europe. The spread of the disease wiped out thousands of Tehran's residents in 1849, 1851 and 1855. Iran lagged considerably behind neighbouring countries that used quarantine strategies to control epidemic outbreak. Due an increase in public awareness, the intelligentsia and laymen alike no longer regarded epidemics as divine providence. The Qajar government was forced to take responsibility to lower the risk of these diseases. According to Tavakoli-Targhi (2009: 422), "The state sought to eradicate these diseases by building public toilets, sweeping streets, collecting garbage, and paving roads. Cemeteries, slaughterhouses, and tanning and finishing houses were moved out of urban living quarters. These state-initiated measures for freshening the air of public spaces concurred with the fundamental juridical concepts of 'purity' and 'filth.'" The same was true for famine. Famine riots provoked and precipitated the development of urban infrastructures to control food supplies. Mass migrations from rural areas to Tehran, during years of famine (in 1868-69)[22] forced the government to establish the first charity in Jalalieh Square to provide shelter for starving migrants (Mahbubi Ardakani 1991: 130).

From the 1830s on, Iranian nobles developed an interest in new (military) industries as well as in the education of a new cadre of statesmen, the result of the Qajar army's frequent defeats in the long war with Tsarist Russia. This reform movement aligned with a popular movement for freedom from Qajar's despotic rule and the colonial influence of British and Russian powers. At the time when colonial influence and the import of foreign goods and capital were taking their toll on Iran's underdeveloped economy, both the centralized modernization movement and the constitutional movement approached the west in a controversial way. The west was seen as a model of progress and a source of democratic inspiration as well as a colonialist and interventionist power. As such, the tendency toward westernization grew alongside the desire to overcome western political and economic hegemony (Adamiyat 1972; Kasravi 1984; Tavakoli-

22 The date conversion in the Iranian calendar to Christian dates and translations from Persian is by the author.

Tarqhi 2001; Matin 2011). Building alongside one another, these contrasting movements complemented and completed each other in many different ways, despite conflicting on their privileged positions, on supporting top-down or bottom-up change.[23]

Power-Knowledge in the Mid-19th Century Tehran

The information available regarding city populations in Iran before the 19th century is largely based on travel accounts. Although the institution of property tax audits go back to the pre-Islamic era, when the advent of Islam censuses carried out the collection of *jizieh* or tribute money (Salehi 2003), very little documentation is available due to the dispersion of historical documents or the subversion of the survey institutions with changing governments and the influence of long term wars. The first attempt at a population count in Tehran took place under the premiership of Amir Kabir for the purposes of tax collection (Ettehadieh 1998: 27), which coincided with the first International Statistical Congress held in Brussels in 1853 (Pakdaman 1974: 326). 15 years later, and at the time of the demolition of the old wall (*Tahmasebi*), Abdolghaffar Najm-od-Dowleh[24] was appointed to conduct a count of the population of Tehran. In 1900, Akhzar-Alishah, supported by the head of Law Enforcement (*Nazmiyeh*), took charge of a count of the city's residential quarters, including both their housing and commercial units. The last census, prior to the establishment of a special office charged with the task of regular counting in 1924 (Pakdaman 1974; Ketabi 2006), was carried out by Tehran Municipality (*baladieh*) in 1922. In what follows, I will discuss the results of

23 For an analysis of the economic relationship between Tehran and the provinces, see Sheik ol-Eslami (1978: 225-250).

24 Abdolghaffar, the son of Ali Mohandes Esfahani, was one of the well-known mathematicians of his time. An instructor at Dar-ol-Fonun, he introduced modern European mathematics to Iranian students. The list of censuses conducted from 1830 to 1930 (ibid: 327) appears below:

-"The Number of Houses and Other Buildings in the Capital Tehran in 1852," *Brown Collection Report*, Central Library of the University of Tehran.

-"Population Count of the Capital in 1868," by Abdolghaffar Najm-ol-Doleh.

-"Population Count in Tehran in 1883," under the supervision of Modir Lashkar (the name of military commander*),* with a table printed in the journal of Tehran Municipality, *Annals of Tehran Office of Statistics, 1925.*

-"Enumeration and Registration of Buildings Circumscribed by the Fortress of the Capital," conducted by Akhzar-Alishah, 1900, a handwritten manuscript, Central Library of the University of Tehran.

-"List of Houses and Buildings of Tehran," prepared in 1918 by the Office of Properties of the Ministry of Finance, published in a table in the *Journal of Agriculture and Commerce* of the same year.

-"Population Count of Tehran" in 1301 (1922).

the first three population censuses: the way that they reflected Tehran's population growth, the transformation of the social fabric, and the transformation of the spatial landscape.[25]

Dar-ol-Fonun, the first polytechnic school established in Iran in 1849, played an important role in initiating the first map of the city and the design of the new wall.[26] It is commonly believed that Dar-ol-Fonun was modeled after the Ottoman *Nezamiyeh* or Military School (Mahbubi-Ardakani 1991: 257). Dar-ol-Fonun was primarily a military school with courses in military strategy (*fanavari*) and basic sciences. Gradually, however, with the expansion of its curriculum to include mathematics, geography, demography and statistics, teaching basics and specialized sciences were separated. In the first years, only medical science was linked between the Dar-ol-Fonun curriculum and the sciences taught at the old schools, but later the curriculum expanded to include literature, history, and fine arts as well. The government not only set aside allowances for students, but also guaranteed jobs after their graduation. In the first year, 100 students were selected from among "princes … children of state authorities, governors, and well-to-do families." In 1855, 45 students were sent to Europe to further their education.[27] Most of these students returned to Iran after 4 or 5 years, and began to work mainly in Tehran. After having studied in Paris, Mirza Reza Khan Mohandesbashi (also known as Mirza Reza Khan the Engineer) wished to build streets like those he had seen in Paris. Mirza Nezam-od-Din Kashani who had also studied mining in Paris was appointed as Minister of Mining and Roads (Mahbubi Ardakani 1991: 322-37). Among students enrolled in the first year, twelve students studied engineering (Moqtader 1993: 261). Dar-ol-Fonun, in contrast to the old schools with a wider range of students, was the school of statesmen. "It is incumbent upon every citizen of Iran," a state announcement published at that time emphasized, it was imperative for, "princes to ministers, state authorities, merchants and tradesmen, to school their children and engage them in these sciences"

25 Following Abdolghaffar's census, attempts made to establish a system for keeping statistical records did not come to fruition. This included attempts done by Hossein Khan Sepahsalar, appointed as the Prime Minister in 1871, after his long career as Iran's ambassador abroad.

26 To build the polytechnic school, a plot of land that used to have a barrack in Arg neighbourhood was proposed and part of the tax money collected from the two provinces was allocated to its costs. Mirza Reza Mohandes Bashi, who studied in France, designed the building (Mahbubi-Ardakani 1991: 268).

27 Among them, 12 students studied military sciences, 19 studied in various fields of industry and mining, 3 studied medicine, 3 law and political sciences and the rest studied mathematics, astronomy, and the arts.

(quoted in Mahbubi-Ardakani 1991: 313). Only in 1911, and after the CR, new legislation on sending talented students abroad, emphasized that beyond the scientific talent, students should be from poor families, meaning government would only pay for students who could not afford the education expenses (ibid. 363). The financial support of Dar-ol-Fonun did not last long and was cut down when the shah, realizing the influence of modernization on the freedom-seeking drive, became apprehensive about the effects of modern education on political discontent. No student was sent abroad between 1855 and 1895 (Mahbubi Ardakani 1991: 357), excepting certain nobility, who recognized the changing times still sent their children to Dar-ol-Fonun or abroad with their own money. In 1880 the number of students studying at Dar-ol-Fonun reached 262. Abdolghaffar studied and taught at Dar-ol-Fonun, and played a significant role applying his knowledge, including demography and cartography, in building the modern governmental institutions. These new institutions were intended to manage various crises, from food supply, to development of the capital city, to building dams to combat water shortages in southern Iran.

Population and Modernization

In the process of the population counts, and by their scientific virtue, population became a measure of state power in the Iranian society while a discourse of demography was being shaped by a new intelligentsia. Comparing the high mortality rate in Iran to the relatively low ratio in Europe, Abdolghaffar tied the success of the modernization program to a reduction in mortality rates and argued that a large household was a characteristic of lower class, and unprogressive. Surprisingly, such a discourse had supporters in religious circles. Sheikh Abu-Taleb Zanjani, a seminary cleric interested in demography and Persian translator of some of the books written by Ebn-e Miskawayh in the 11th century, followed the same argument (Ketabi 2006: 33). In his book *Tahdhib al-Akhlaq (Cultivation of Morals)* written before 1030*,* Ebn-e Miskawayh (1966) had discussed the dangers of exponential demographic growth long before Thomas Malthus. Interestingly, Abdolghaffar and Zanjani agreed with Ebn-e Miskawayh and Malthus that population growth would lead to a food crisis. They discredited the old argument that 'larger population brings more strength to the state' and argued that the government

should carefully measure growth rates (Pakdaman 1974: 343).[28] We know that Miskawayh's theory was completely ignored in the post-Revolution populist era and demographic growth was again considered as a symbol of political power in international relations. In Chapters 4 and 5, I discuss how the Islamic economist technocrats discovered the importance of Malthusian theory in the art of governing, and as a result, incorporated the revival of Pahlavi's family planning into their new development plans in the late 1980s.

Statistics and the Invention of a Class Language

In his classic study of the *Old Social Class and Revolution in Iraq*, Hanna Batatu (1978) discusses the theoretical and practical difficulties of the application of sociological class analysis to the Middle Eastern societies, including their internal instability and abrupt upward or downward shifts. Here I adhere to his simple but clear definition of the classic sociological standpoint that "'class' is, in essence, an economically based formation, though it ultimately refers to the social position of the constituent individual" (Batatu 1978: 6-7). This definition presupposes the notion of inequality "being basically with respect to property… which varies in character and significance in varying circumstances… [class] may… exist as a distinct form of its own or as an element within a status group… or may embody several different status groups" (ibid). Class is not, most of the time, an "organized, self-conscious group" (ibid). The Iranian scholar Ahmad Ashraf carried out extensive research on the portrayal of class structure within 19th century urban Iran, and Ervand Abrahamian, the prominent social historian of Iran's contemporary history, has discussed these difficulties through different lenses (Ashraf 1980). Being aware of the limits of the sociological tradition, studying modernisation through the lens of class conflicts, specifically the assumed causal-relation between class structure and politics, I will focus on class dynamics, as one of the factors shaped by and shaping the early urban modernization in Iran.

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28 Malthus asks why the population which should have increased exponentially has not reached the number that it should, and, he reasons, by appealing to a Darwinian principle of survival, that population growth is controlled through food scarcity and poverty. In this way, he takes the first steps in popularizing natural theories in19th century classical political economy. According to Polanyi (1957), Malthus had invented a fable about "the geometric growth of population and arithmetic growth of food supply" to justify the continuation and intensification of poverty in 18th-century England, contrary to welfare promises of the Industrial Revolution.

According to Ashraf (1980: 7), the semi-colonial society of this period consisted of three classes: 1) State functionaries, which in turn consisted of two groups, men of letters and men of swords; 2) Men of religion and clerics; and 3) Men of commerce and trade, including shopkeepers. The role of the clergy and merchants in the CR and other major political events of the day has been the focus of many studies, while the first has usually attracted less attention. Furthermore, the geographies of these classes (and ethnic groups), the socio-spatial dynamics of the cities, the land and housing markets were not the object of in-depth study until recent years. The re/publishing of some of the original documents of the 19th century and publicizing of the personal histories and memoirs related to the Qajars (for example, Sadvandian and Ettehadieh 1989; Ettehadieh 1998, 1995) have triggered new studies on 19th century urban accounts and reports. In order to better understand the growth of state functionaries, urban landlords and labouring classes and their agencies/achievements in urban renewal, I examine the original reports of 1853, 1868 and the 1900 census as well as the related studies which present and discuss other historical documents on Tehran. Table 1 shows the growth of housing units in Tehran, using the data of three surveys carried out in the second half of 19th century. The annual construction of 154 houses in the city indicates Tehran's slow growth in general. The data confirms the higher growth of the three outer neighbourhoods and the decline of residential land use in the core (Udlajan and Arg neighbourhoods).

Table 1: Increase of the housing unites in Tehran in the second half of the 19th century

Year of the survey	Arg	Dowlat	Udlajan	Chal-maydan	Sangelaj	Bazaar	Suburb	Total
1853	232	------	2619	1852	1695	1524	146	8018
1867	195	*	2558	2347	1969	1488	1024	9581
1900	-----	2705	2125	3372	4448	2625	-----	15275
New	-5	57.5	-10.5	32.3	59.6	23.4	-3	154.4

* New houses per year 1853-1900. The population of the Gate of Dowlat area in this period falls outside of the city limits. There is a discrepancy between the sum total of houses in the residential areas (15,275) and the general figure mentioned in the census (16,275).

Tax collection was the main purpose of the censuses done in this era; the information they collected on households (though regarded through different lenses of the respective census administrators) were considered important factors in establishing the main categories of the population and to classify them. Until the 19th century, the term '*ro'aya'* (king's subjects) was applied both to the ruler's subjects and to the deprived urban masses. '*Nokar'* was also used to name both state-assigned paid employees, which were rapidly on the rise, and home servants. These terms functioned in the past, when '*ro'aya'* were subject to the same tax base and population differentiation was impractical. The first censuses included important efforts to reframe the old concepts to make them useful in recognizing the new class of state employees from home servants as well as differentiating the main layers of the popular classes.

Table 2: Class and social structure of Tehran in the 1853 census

House	Social classes and house ownership							
	Houses owned by state servants			Houses owned by tradesmen shopkeepers and servants			Total Tenants	Total house-holds
Total	Housing units	Land-lords	Tenants	Housing units	Land-lords	Tenants		
7872	2028	2028	1545	5844	5844	600	2145	10617
100	------	25.9	------	-----	55.0	-----	19.1	-----

Source: Extracted from Sa'dvandian & Etehadieh 1989

In the census conducted under Amir Kabir (1853), when urban masses were recognized as population, Tehran's population was divided merely into servants (*nokar*) and serfs. Servants were those who worked for the state, i.e. salaried functionaries occupying various positions in the government. Abdolghaffar refers to this population as the "king's subjects" in the 1867 census. He did, however, distinguish between men of letters and men of swords. Abdolghaffar avoided using the word '*nokar'* (servant) for statesmen and instead used the fuzzy categories of servant/serf, previously used in the 1853 census where classes were differentiated gentleman/servant/slave (*aqa/nokar/qolam*). 'Gentlemen' (*aqayan*) included statesmen, tradesmen and

shopkeepers. In doing so, Abdolghaffar took the first step in recognizing the ownership of the labour force (free and unfree labour) as the main factor in understanding and classifying diverse social groups—a distinction previous censuses failed to identify.

Domestic servants, according to Abdolghaffar, were people who had no dwellings of their own and lived in their master's houses. In defining the activity of servants, he added: "[They] are those who have no skills whatsoever and take up this type of job out of desperation" (Abdolghaffar1868: 353).[29] This change of meaning points to a wider discontent in using the word servant for court scientists. The granting of military ranks like 'brigadier-general' to civil elites shows how social statuses of the new specialists in Qajar's court were linked to the military positions and not to men of science, who did not directly play a role in executive affairs of the government. Abdolghaffar insisted that a 'servant' should be one who is totally ignorant in the spheres of "science, trade, and industry," which he considered the knowledge capital of the new class. Thus, in Abdolghaffar's census, functionaries consisted of three groups: state authorities, their employees, and military men. The latter are treated separately according to their ranks and positions. The other two groups joined merchants and shopkeepers (*kasabeh*) and were regarded as gentlemen.

Table 3: Social differentiation of population in Tehran in Abdolghaffar's census of 1867

Total	House-holds	Land-lords	Tenants	Total	Gentlemen, Shop-keepers	Servants footboys	Military
Number	13845	5581	4263	62451	42648	11323	8480
Percentage	100	69.2	30.8	100	68.3	18.1	13.6

Source: Population of Naseri Capital, Abdolghaffar 1867

The recognition and classification of different social classes were consolidated by legal developments: Asking servants to obtain identification papers from the police, the Count de Mont Fert handbook on police force tasks defined the word 'servant' more accurately as "office boy (*farash*), tea-server (*qahveh-chi*), waiter (*abdar*), busboy

29 In his "Introduction on the Development of Tehran and Its Obstacles" Shapur Rasekh (1962) also mentions that Abdolghaffar's job classification consisted of two groups. The first included clerics, shopkeepers, and tradesmen while the second group consisted of black domestic servants and ordinary servants.

(*pishkhedmat*), room servant (*khadem-e otaq*), cook (*ashpaz*), cook assistant (*shagerd ashpaz*), sherbet-server (sharbat-dar), horse-keeper (*mehtar*), coachman (*jelowdar*), muleteer (*kaleskeh-chi*), supervisor (*nazer*), gardener (*baghban*), and all those who serve a room or a person" (quoted in Ettehadieh 1998: 148). He clarifies further "the class of employees and labourers who are not called servants are of two kinds: those who work in offices and those who work for the government, police or as bailiff, chamberlain, foreman, etc." (ibid). I discuss some parts of this handbook in coming pages.[30]

In Akhzar-Alishah's census conducted in 1900, once again the word servant appeared in the same sense used in the 1852 census, i.e. those in the service of the government. He calls himself "servant" for the same reason and writes: "In 1317 L.H.C. [1899 AD], it happened that I served the government as a member of the servant class." However, he left his work unfinished and did not extract the number of servants and serfs from the detailed information of his census.[31]

Space and Construction of the Modern State

Despite Amir Kabir's attempts to separate the Qajar court and the administrative apparatus, as well as his attempts to lay down a financial system where income would go to the state treasury rather than to the royal court treasury, there was still no distinct boundary between the two apparatuses in the mid-19th century. Princes received a good amount of the state income in the form of salaries and rewards. The treasury's main income sources were taxes, endowments (religious donations, *waqf*) and gifts.[32] Taxes increased both in variety and quantity when the total revenue from taxes decreased as a result of wars, cholera epidemics and famines in the 1830-60s. These included taxes on agricultural products (grown on state and private lands) as well as imports and exports

30 In Abdolghaffar's census, military men are differentiated from the rest of the inhabitants of residential quarters while in the previous census they were counted as residents of the districts. The different methods of collecting data are responsible for this difference.

31 As far as I know subsequent researchers did not complete the work. Extraction of this information and its comparison with that of Amir Kabir's census can be very helpful in learning about the process of transformation of various class categories in Tehran of the time.

32 The text of the endowment document of Haj Molla-Ali Kani, the religious jurist of Naser al-Din era, which was drawn around 1886 lists properties in Tehran that include two villages, six qanats, two gardens, Marvi School building, a small bazaar, a library, two farms, and a house. To learn more about the importance of endowments in providing necessary urban services, see Ettehadieh (1998, 177-195).

(Meredith 1970: 70, 74). The insufficient revenue to pay for state expenses caused discontent among soldiers and servicemen and increased taxes led to public resentment and protests. Some of the ministries and state offices, such as customhouses, post and telegraph offices obtained their income from selling services. A portion of the income generated by Ministers or authorities was paid to the shah, as part of a case-by-case price-setting practice (Sheikh-ol-Eslami 1978: 202-205). Assisted by his financial minister, the shah would decide how to obtain the financial resources to provide for public works. When the decision was made to demolish the old city wall and construct a new one, the sale of state lands now situated inside of the city boundaries was considered as a financial resource to cover public works expenses. It is reasonable to assume that taxes were levied on private lands once located within the new wall, though such a hypothesis would need to be verified by further documentation.

Property leasing in Tehran played an important role in providing income for princes and the nobility. The shah himself was one of the major owners of shops in the bazaar. The decision to construct the new wall in the years of famine and economic crisis surprised foreign diplomats and the shah was accused of mimicking Parisian design. The measures taken by the shah to finance the budget deficit, including the sale of state agricultural lands (*khaleseh*) and the granting of exclusive mineral exploitation rights and trade permissions to foreign investors, indicates that the decision to build a new wall in the interests of commodifying vast agricultural lands was part a purposeful rationale. The new wall provided large plots of land for development as urban land in the most expensive parts of the city, thereby enforcing land-commodifying processes, which then led to new forms of wealth as well as landlessness and poverty in the city.

From 1869, when the grand royal court (*vezarat-e darbar-e a'azam*) was founded with nine ministries, the affairs of Tehran were ceded to the Ministry of Ehtessab (Mahbubi Ardakani 1991: 5). An Arabic word, *Ehtessab*, referred to the Islam's ordinance and codes for guiding social life and economic activities. The Ehtessab Ministry collected urban taxes levied on bascules, caravansaries, and market squares. Despite the wide discontent among tradesmen for taxes that arbitrarily increased, income was still not sufficient to provide for the costs of major urban development projects

(Mahbubi Ardakani 1997: 289). In 1882, Tehran Municipality (*baladieh*) developed out of the administration of the Ehtessab Ministry. Shah went along with the Count de Mont Fert's suggestion to increase the police force's jurisdiction in demographic and urban administrative matters. The Count had been commissioned to transform Tehran's Law Enforcement into a modern police force and the government had approved his handbook in 1879 (titled *The Handbook of Law Enforcement*). According to the handbook, it was the duty of the police force to "conduct research on epidemics and famine, keep alleyways clean, ensure proper construction of buildings, maintain order in the streets, and provide alleyways with proper lighting" (Ettehadieh 1998: 124). The abstract of the handbook (prepared for the government's approval) notes: "It is the task of the police force to pay attention to the supply of food and perishables, know when to store grains and cereals, to be used when prices go up" (ibid). Moreover, "those who damage public properties, like street lanterns, or cut city trees, ruin water springs and drinking fountains (*saqakhaneh*), dig holes in public pathways… anybody who runs horses through streets and marketplaces… anybody who throws rubbish in the streets instead of taking them to the specific places set for this purpose" faced fines and imprisonment; and "anyone who leaves Tehran for four to five months should inform the police before his/her departure and after his/her return… Anyone who wishes to build a house or a new building next to a passageway or street must register the structure's plan with the police so that the quality of the building can be assessed… Anyone who wishes to change his/her place of residence should inform the police" (*ibid*: 146-151). Some of these tasks which overlapped with those of the Municipality (*baladieh*) were not carried out effectively during this period.

City Wall and the Rise of the Modern Capital

In the second half of the 19th century, Tehran had not developed beyond the old wall of Tahmasebi for 300 years despite the fact that its population had increased. It needed new lands and space to house its new population and modern institutions emerged in this century. With the demolition of the old wall and the construction of the new, accompanied by Nasser-ed-Din shah's sale of state properties and the nobility's sale of private lands, the first urban landowners (in the new sense of the word) would emerge.

With the elite and nobility's appropriation of new urban lands following the city's expansion towards north and west, residential neighbourhoods in the center, south, and eastern parts of the city gradually became poor, run-down and deprived. At the same time, this development was accompanied by the expansion of alleyways and the appearance of new streets. Sales of commodities were no longer confined to marketplaces and bazaars. Shops found their way into the streets of the newer parts of the city. Echoing Benjamin's observations (1999) about the construction of passages in Paris at the beginning of the 19th century, the appearance of streets in Tehran created a space for a modern way of life and a new conception of progress. Disgusted with old houses, traditional customs and manners, the new upper and middle classes abandoned the old residential areas, which they considered un-modern. The process of modernization coincided with the process of westernization (Safamanesh 2009: 122-123).

Mapping the Wall

While Tehran had no walls during the 14th and 15th centuries, the construction of a wall in the 16th century was regarded as a sign of 'cityness.' In the words of Amin-Ahmad Razi: "Tehran was adorned with a fortress and furnished with a thousand *souqs* (marketplaces), thereby finding a metropolitan character" (quoted in Takmil-Homayoon 2000: 38). The city wall was repaired in the 18th century and a moat was built around it. The surface area of the city within this wall was 12 square kilometers. Urban development was very slow in most cities in this period, and was carried out without any significant support from governments. The city of Esfahan was an exception. Shah Abbas, assisted by scientists and architects of his time, like Sheikh Bahai, prepared a plan for the demolition of the old wall for urban development, and for Esfahan's renovation in the closing years of the 16th century. This plan remained a model for the next 100 years (Moqtader 1993: 259), however, details of the demolition of Tehran's old wall and the construction of the new wall in the second half of the 19th century was markedly different from that of Esfahan.

A plan was conceived for the development of Tehran around 1865, basically consisting of the destruction of the old wall, the expansion of the city, and the erection of a new wall. The Minister of Finance, Mostofi-ol-Mamalek, and Mirza Issa Khan, the

Minister of Tehran, were charged with its implementation (Gurney 1992, 62). Historians and memoirists have expressed different opinions about the motivation for the construction of a new city wall and its necessity. Critics believed that the construction of a new wall would not be effective in protecting the city against foreign invaders equipped with modern warfare technology, particularly fortress-busting cannons. They linked it with the shah's interest in imitating the city wall of Paris, which he visited in 1866.[33] Lord Curzon, the British Ambassador in Iran, wrote cynically about the construction of the new wall and moat, mentioning that a part of the money sent by England to help those affected by the famine of 1871 was spent for the wall's construction (Mofidi 2012). The political and administrative advantages of the new wall could not have justified its high-priced construction, given that the people were suffering from famine and poverty. In reality, the shah's order for the demolition of the old wall and the construction of the new one was issued six years before his trip to Europe. Edward Pollack wrote, "the city wall is ruined by water erosion in so many places that people can easily pass through it" (Pollack 1982: 82). The city gates still had economic importance: they were the only access point for merchants, tradesmen and peasants to bring their goods to the city for sale. They each had to pay fees (*ransom*) to enter the city. Those who had rented the gates from the government, fixed different fees for vehicles carrying goods and travelers, and collected money, part of which was then paid to the government (Sheikh-ol-Eslami 1978, 233). The gatekeepers recorded the amount of food taken into the city and these statistics were used for controlling the food supply. The moat was like a water channel collecting rainwater, particularly in Shemiran and along the Alborz foothills, preventing floodwater from entering the city, directing it to the southern part of the city wall.[34]

In the debates raging among historiographers with regard to the imperative of building a new wall, the importance of the wall from the point of view of land supply and urban property has been overlooked. Development of the land market required a physical (or non-physical) sign to mark city boundaries. Building outside the city wall was not

33 The shah wrote comprehensively about his observations (see Moqtader 1996; Berogesh 1995).
34 By an order of Aliqoli Mirza Etezad-os-Saltaneh a group of Dar-ol-Fonun engineers measured the volume of water during floods to make calculation for the construction of the new city moat. Their measurements during one of intense rainfalls amounted to two korurs and two hundred thousand and fifty-two cubic zar'.

popular due to the absence of security. The expansion of the Dowlat District across the northern part of the wall disrupted land prices. After the construction of the new wall, the surface area of the city increased from 12 to 32 square kilometers (Moqtader 1993: 478). Land properties around the city were considered part of state property owned by the government or by major landowners. The expansion of the city was profitable for the monarch and landowners who were also among the decision makers. They did their best to reduce the cost of the construction of the new wall, illustrated by a construction-related document that includes proposals for the use of old building materials, and the requirement of compulsory work in calculating construction costs: "The building materials of the old fortress are utilized in the construction of the new one; convicts can be used to carry out construction work. In addition, healthy beggars who fill the marketplaces and alleyways can be made to work there and receive a wage" (Mofidi 2012).

Figure 1: Limits of Tahmasebi Wall (Kerziz's 1858)



Source: Atlas of Tehran Metropolis: http://www.irancarto.cnrs.fr/record.php?q=AT-030309&f=local&l=en. The original copy of the map is kept in the Golestan Palace document center.

Construction of the new wall was such an important venture that its details were recorded in various documents. For example, Mohammad Hassan Khan Etemad-ol-Saltaneh (1989: 156) writes on the scope of expansion in various geographical directions:

> As a result of population growth in the capital, it was ordered that Tehran should grow around one thousand eight hundred *zara'* towards Shemiran Gate and one thousand *zar'* in the other three directions. The gentlemen Mostofi-ol-Mamalek and Mirza Issa, the governor of the capital, are to carry out this task. In addition, a number of engineers are commissioned to determine the length and width of its moat…. The governor of the capital has taken the responsibility to complete the work of digging the new moat in three years. The periphery of the city is estimated to cover three and half *farsang*s and it will have twelve gates.

At the time of Abdolghaffar's census, approximately 15 percent of the population (mainly migrants), and 10 percent of the houses in the capital, lay outside the gates of the Tahmasebi Wall (Abdolghaffar's census was conducted two years after the demolition of the city wall). Examination of the last map of Tehran inside the Tahmasebi Wall, prepared by August Kerziz (the Austrian teacher of Dar-ol-Fonun) and his students in 1858, shows that there was not much land, nor garden space within the wall. The expansion of the city to house the growing population stood out as a necessity.

In regards to the income obtained from these lands, Abdolghaffar writes:

> It is impossible to be more precise in providing a true estimation, particularly when it coincides with digging the moat and collect the increase of the value which will be produced as the price of the lands situated outside the city or next to it will be increased, where people gradually built houses… Once the position of the gates and the streets leading to them is determined, it will be known how much land will be divided in a time span of one year and how much income it will bring to the court to be spent on renovations and repairs (Abdolghaffar 1868: 351).

The new wall was built according to a plan designed by Buhler, the French teacher of Dar-ol-Fonun, who had simply adapted the plan used for the construction of the Paris

Wall (Mofidi 2012). When the demolition work began, Abdolghaffar undertook the task of preparing a map of the properties that the shah intended to add to the city. With the assistance of the dean of Tehran Polytechnic School (Dar-ol-Fonun) and 20 students, he completed the task in eight months. According to a report published in the newspaper *Dowlat-e Elliyeh Iran*, the map was presented to the shah in 1868 and its drafters "were rewarded three thousand toomans" (Pakdaman1974: 339). The preparation of the map of the remaining neighbourhoods of Tehran continued for 17 years after the completion of the census. A second copy was completed and delivered in 1887 once the mapping of the city's suburbs was finished. Abdolghaffar compiled a thesis on the surface area of land and buildings around the old city wall and within the new city, together with a map of the entire area, and presented it to the shah. As mentioned earlier, the construction of the new city wall increased the surface area of the city by 2.5 times. The basis for calculation of this expansion is not clear, but as the growth of Tehran in the subsequent years showed, the expansion area was not particularly ambitious. Had all the other conditions remained constant, it could have led to a reduction in the price of land; however, capital growth came not as a result of industrial or commercial development but rather the centralization of political power and the new bureaucratic system. The value of land in Tehran began to increase because, in contrast to industrial cities, state and private capital were invested not in new industries but in urban modernization, particularly in the new parts of the city. Consequently, urban land was turned into a profitable commodity, whose interest rose more quickly than industrial or commercial capital interest, which had previously been an easier way to accumulate wealth.

The shah and the nobility had previously invested in the construction of bazaar and commercial properties with the aim of helping industry and commerce. Having the ownership of 95 shops, 7.5 percent of the total, the shah was considered a major property holder in the bazaar. Mo'ayer-ol-Mamalek, a member of the nobility, owned 85 shops and the Friday Imam owned 47 shops in the bazaar. Sheikh Fazl-allah, the famous high jurist, owned two caravansaries (Ettehadieh 1998, 39). Such investments show the importance of commercial leases in the production and accumulation of wealth in the city. The flourishing Qajar nobility, knowing no other safer source of income than to pursue a career in government or leasing properties, could not be motivated to invest in commerce

or industry. As such, with the construction of the new wall, a part of state and private land properties were relocated within the city.[35] The private landowners, particularly Mostofi-ol-Mamalek and his son and prime minister Mirza Yousef Ashtiani, were major landowners in the city, along with Mirza Issa Khan, the governor of Tehran and the head of state properties. The last two individuals, who were relatives, were responsible for the construction of the new city wall (Gurney 1930: 67-68).

Commodification of the Land and Building New Gardens

Urban development and modernization plans for Tehran, including the construction of new streets, were concentrated mainly in the Dowlat and Sanglaj districts. Firuz Mirza, another Qajar prince, bought the houses of other princes around Alvand Garden, north of Sanglaj District, and his son, Farmanfarma, inherited a large part of this land. He added to his inheritance by buying another piece of land in Sanglaj. The *qanat*, built in this land by his order, is still in place (Ettehadieh 1998, 37). During the construction of Jobbeh-Khaneh Street in Dowlat District, Ala-od-Dowleh made an investment in the construction of 136 shops along this street (Sadvandian, 421). The gardens closer to the city were sold and new gardens were built inside the city wall. Ilkhani and Lalehzar gardens were parceled and sold for 90,000 *toomans* during this period. The Amin-ol-Sultan Garden was sold to the Russian Embassy (Ettehadieh 1998: 166). Hassanabad and Yousefabad gardens were bought and reconstructed by Mirza Yousef Ashtiani in the name of his father Mirza Hassan Mostofi-ol-Mamalek. Referring to these two gardens Mo'ayer-ol-Mamalek writes:

> Mostofi-ol-Mamalek had green hands. He planted the fruit trees of Yousef Garden himself. The fruit were unique… In spring he would walk several times from Hassanabad Garden to Yousefabad, covering an area 250,000 *zara* [=104 centimeter]. He would walk along a wide street stretching from Behjatabad to Yousefabad, lined with roses, eglantine and other beautiful flowers, creating an earthy heaven of colors and scents. (Ettehadieh 1998: 9)

35 This type of state land (*khaleseh*) was rented for a long period of time and Tehran relied for its food supply on the surplus produced on *khaleseh* lands around the city.

In relation to the fragmentation of these two gardens, and to the construction of streets during the end of Naseri era, Alameh Qazvini writes:

> Hassanabad district on the northwest of Tehran, once situated outside the city, is now divided into parcels and sold. The late Mostofi-ol-Mamalek undertook the construction of Farmanfarma Street, stretching from Vazir Alley to Vanak Street. He bought the lands along it, including Hassanabad, Behjatabad, Yousefabad, Vanak and Evin, and made them habitable. (Kariman 1976: 85)

Correspondence between Mirza Hossein Mobsser-ol-Saltaneh, who was appointed as the head of customhouse in Kashan, and Mirza Hassan, his chamberlain who pursued the work of buying land for him in Tehran, shows that unprecedented land-dealings were going on in Dowlat District 20 years after the demolition of the old city wall and the construction of the new wall.

Table 4 - Cultivate New Gardens as Land Speculation in 19th century Tehran

Year	Total	Shemiran Gate	Dowlat Gate	Other gates		
Neighbourhood	Total city	Dowlat	Sanglaj	Bazaar	Chal-maydan	Udlajan
Number of gardens in 1853 Census	12	9	3	------	------	------
Number of gardens in1900 Census	250	40	155	9	3	8

Source: Amir Kabir census (1953) and Akhzar-Alishah census (1900), in Sa'dvandian and Ettehadieh 1989.

In his letters to Mobsser-od-Dowleh, Mirza Hassan writes in detail about how these deals were flourishing, and how Mirza Issa and Buhler divided Dowlat District and participated in the deals, particularly in Mostofi-ol-Mamalek's land next to the British Embassy (the old barracks and paper-making factory), where foreigners were ready to pay inflated rents. "His Excellency, Amin-ol-Soltan (Prime Minister) has bought a garden near the embassy for twenty-five thousand toomans. He then ordered to dig a qanat there with the land increasing in price on a daily basis," writes Mirza Hassan in one of his letters, suggesting Mobsser-ol-Saltaneh buy and retain two pieces of land in that area. Ensuring the latter, he added that a plot of land in close proximity to Count Garden "used

to be only 30 to 2000 *Shahi* per *zar* …[but] is now not sold [for] less than 3,010 *Shahi*" (Ettehadieh 1998: 162-5). A group of merchants also began buying up residential lands in the northern part of Tehran during this period: "Even merchants like Haji Malek and Haji Aliakbar Shirazi and some others intend to invest on lands." (*ibid*: 163).

The cause of this unprecedented boom is said to be largely due to the presence of foreigners staying in Tehran. In fact, because Tehran was never a typical colonial city, there weren't as many foreigners living in it as its colonial counterparts, and the notion of a "dual city" couldn't be applied. The British mainly invested in the oil industry, thus exerting their influence in the southern part of the country. Nevertheless, Tehran was growing due to colonialist policies. In this period, Britain and other European countries were active in Tehran. They would obtain permissions to invest in commerce and help in the construction of modern bureaucratic and military institutes. The competition between Britain and Russia was growing fierce. According to Ashraf (1981), the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the expansion of a cross-country railway in the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea area helped international commerce flourish, integrating Iran into the world market. Mirza Hassan (Ettehadieh 1998: 165-7) has also written about the flood of foreigners entering Tehran for investment and railway construction. He regularly loaned out Mobsser-ol-Saltaneh's money at 18 percent interest, and when he couldn't find trustworthy clients, he would invest the money in lands. Even foreigners were busy in land-dealings in Tehran, until they were forbidden by the government (ibid).

For a better understanding of the methods used by landowners to lead urban development toward their own lands inside the new wall, let us look at the extant census of gardens in this period. Amir Kabir's census (1853) gives no figures for the number of gardens situated inside the Tahmasebi Wall, however, 12 gardens were counted outside the northern part of the wall in the same year. About half a century later when the gardens inside and outside the Tahmasebi Wall had disappeared, 250 gardens were registered in Akhzar-Alishah's census, all inside the Naseri Wall. The area covered by Akhzar-Alishah's census is approximately the same area surrounded by the Naseri Wall. Comparing the extant maps show a considerable investment in the development of land properties, gardens and flower gardens of this period, though more extensive research is

needed in this area. In fact, construction of gardens and *qanat* was a kind of preparation for urban lands that mainly took place in close proximity to noble districts. As a tribal custom, Qajar kings spent summers in houses they had built outside the city. Gardens flourished in favourable climates. Nasser-ed-Din shah constructed Bagh Shah ("King's Garden") and Yaqut ("Ruby") Palace on the hills of Sorkheh Hesar, in the eastern part of Tehran for the same purpose. A large portion of the nobility also had gardens around the city for the same reason. According to Abdolghaffar, at least 8,000 people left the city in the summers. The function of this custom changed in the process of the construction of the new city wall. Gardens were built to become urban lands, to be subdivided and sold later. Without the investments made by the state and landowner in the construction of streets and the provision of urban utilities and services, it was impossible to buy land in the new districts for the purpose of selling it at higher prices in the future—particularly where the nobility and foreigners lived. This situation led to a loss in land values in the rest of the city compared to the north. In fact, the old districts lost both their financial value and social status long before the appearance of automobiles in the capital.

Table 5 – Socio-spatial segregation based on class in Tehran's neighbourhoods 1853

Neighbourhoods	# Court-yards per building	Total landlords		Total tenants	Total households
		State servants	Vassals, tradesmen, shopkeepers		
	No	%	%	%	%
City	1.10	19.1	55.0	25.9	100
Arg	1.18	53.9	46.1	----	100
Udlajan	1.11	24.9	43.3	31.8	100
Bazaar	1.13	18.4	74.3	7.3	100
Sanglaj	1.20	29.9	37.6	32.5	100
Chalmaydan	----	11.6	63.3	24.8	100

Source: Extracted from Sa'dvandian & Etehadieh 1989

Modernization projects were concentrated in the Dowlat neighborhood. The rapid growth of this new neighborhood (housing 18 percent of the population) was a sign of the declining prestige of Arg, which used to house approximately 200 royal families. As table 6 indicates the ratio of tenants to landlords has been increased in Arg, while the

ratio of servants to masters has been decreased, comparing to 1853 census. Arg Square lost its prominence and Tupkhaneh, with its banks, post and telegraph offices (among other modern institutions), was turned into the main square of the city. Six streets branched off from Tupkhaneh: Naseriyeh and Babhomayun to the south, Cheragh Gaz to the south-east, Lalehzar to the north, Ala'-od-Dowleh to the northwest, Marizkhaneh Street stretched west to the new horse-racing field, and Jalilabad stretched from Sepah Street to Galubandak.

Figure 2: Abdolghaffar Map: Tehran in 1889



Source: Atlas of Tehran Metropolis: http://www.irancarto.cnrs.fr/record.php?q=AT030310&f=local&l=en

The Abdolghaffar map of Tehran inside the Naseri wall shows that the city was expanded to the north and west in order to contain the gardens, while the city-border to the south did not change.

Table 6: Social status of Arg and Bazaar neighbourhoods in 1867

Description	Estimation of the population based on householder, tenant and servant					
	Total	Householder Master	Servants	Tenants	Percentage of tenants	Ratio of Servants to masters
Total	147,256	84,228	17,665	45,363	30.8	0.2
Arg	3,041	1,414	803	824	27.1	0.6
Udlajan	3,041	23,118	6,034	7,343	20.1	0.3
Bazaar	26,674	15,189	3,497	7,988	29.9	0.2

Source: Population of the Capital in Naseri Era, Abdolghaffar 1867

Table 7: Ethnic composition of neighbourhoods in Tehran 1867

Tribal Origin	Total number of population	Population combination based on Qajar Tribe and other provinces					
		Percentage	The Qajar	Tehran	Esfahan	Azerbaijan	Others
Total	147,256	100	2008	39245	9955	8201	87847
Percentage	100	----	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Differentiation of Tehran Population, Abdolghaffar Najm-al-Dowleh – Pakdaman 1974, 385

Private spaces in the new residential areas were also designed on the basis of a new city planning pattern. Houses in Dowlat, where the nobles and the educated lived, were larger than other houses of the city. They were built by architects familiar with European styles, but decorated with elements of Iranian design. These houses were not merely imitations of western architecture, which later became prevalent in the Pahlavi era, but they combined local architecture with European styles. The new style came to be known as Tehran Style (Safamanesh 2009: 124). When the Qajar aristocracy collapsed through the constitution movement, the Qajar's monopoly on architectural innovation ended, and non-Qajar, rich and powerful families could use the same innovations in their own buildings, essentially democratizing the new style. Mokhtari Taleghani (2011) suggested

that before the constitution movement, "nobody dared to imitate the architectural forms used by nobility. Nobody could build a house similar to Zel-ol-Soltan. It was just impossible." The internal design of houses changed and the differentiation of private (*andaruni*) and public (*biruni*) spaces within houses faded out. The reception room, which used to belong to the public space of the house (*biruni*) because it hosted male guests, was incorporated into the private space and was called "guest-room" (Moqtader 1993: 262). We know nothing about how noble and educated women regarded these changes but we do know that religious families were clearly against them. In 1890, Mirza Hassan bought a house for Mobsser-ol-Saltaneh in the proximity of the embassy in Dowlat and later wrote: "In case you return to Tehran, you don't need to stay near the embassy. Instead, we can rent you an inexpensive house for 6 or 7 toomans, and lease that house to foreigners, particularly as their women do not observe the *hejab*" (Ettehadieh 1998: 162).

At the time of the 1900 census, Dowlat District had many amenities such as schools and public baths. Once the school-construction campaign turned into a cultural contest among distinguished figures as the result of constitutionalists' passion and zeal and the Society of Ma'aref (founded in 1894), three out of the seven schools built a year later in Tehran were in Dowlat District (two in Lalehzar and one in Shemiran Gate). Dowlat District had grown in size by annexing parts of the other districts and housed 18 percent of the population. Of the remaining schools, two were built in Udlajan, one in Sanglaj and one in Chalmaydan (Mahbubi Ardakani 1991: 384-391). The Constitutional Assembly (*Majles-e Shoray-e Melli*), founded as a result of the constitutional movement, made primary school education compulsory, which gradually included girls. Since then, the government has been responsible for the construction of schools and the supervision of educational programs.

The Street, Symbol of Modernity

Street construction became a prominent symbol of progress and modernization from the 1880s forward. With the transfer of shops from the covered spaces of bazaars to open streets like Almaseyeh, streets turned into the public space of the middle class.

A large number of diplomats and foreign merchants lived along Dowlat Street. It had a majestic gate, decorated with an image of Rostam and Sohrab (Mofidi 2012). According to Ernest Ursell who visited Tehran in 1880, "Dowlat is a long street going all the way to Tupkhaneh Square. It is paved with stone and trees line the street along two streams" (quoted in Mofidi 2012). Built in 1868, Almaseyeh Street stretched from to Tupkhaneh Square to Arg Square. Shemiran Road linked Dowlat District to Shemiran Gate. In summers, the wealthy took this road to reach their villas. In Abdolghaffar's map, Khani Abad Street passed through southwestern agricultural fields to reach the Mo'ayer-ol-Mamalek Garden and stretched to Khaniabad Gate in the southwest of Tehran. Amiriyeh Street, also a long street, started from Tupkhaneh Square and ended at Bagh-Shah Gate in the northwest of the city. Various parts of this street were called by different names. Gomrok Street reached Gomrok Gate in the west. It was the passageway of caravans coming to Tehran from Qazvin (sometimes carrying European goods) on their way to caravansaries in Tehran Bazaar. Rails were laid down along the main axes of the city, around the same period as horse-drawn wagons (Moqtader 1993: 264). The wall surrounding Arg neighbourhood was demolished in late Naseri era and turned into streets. Naseri Street was constructed on the eastern side of the Arg and has been regarded as the first modern street of the capital, with Shamsolamareh Palace and modern shops emerging along it in following years.

Travelers visiting Tehran during this time have left images showing both old and new urban elements, elements they've classified as both western and eastern (Jackson 1873: 473). Clapp's description of Tupkhaneh, the square that replaced Sabzeh Maydan as the main city square, further demonstrates the integration of urban elements:

> The center of Tehran—its central square (Maydan-e-Tupkhaneh)…is now surrounded by the Imperial Bank of Persia, the telegraph offices, police headquarters, and municipal buildings. The famous parade ground not far to the west, the Khiaban-e Ala-ol Douleh (a main avenue leading north from the Maydan) and the old palace containing many interesting antiques, hemmed in by ugly office buildings, abandoned anderuns, and cheap shops; typical oriental bazaars which aggregate miles in length; in addition to which are the

> magnificent wooded grounds of the British and Russian Legations some distance from the center of the city and the beautiful, even if less elaborate, American Legation park outside the ramparts. Khiabani Lalehzar, or the principal shopping street of the foreigners, might also be mentioned, as well as the neat brick building occupied by the Majles (Parliament), the narrow-gauge horse tramways which serve several parts of the city, numerous motor bus lines, beautiful gardens (overemphasized in all descriptions of Persian cities) hidden away behind mud walls, the houses of the shah and other notables. (Clapp 1930: 72)

Table 8: Urban utilities in residential areas of Tehran in the 1853 census

Residential areas	Houses	Mosques/ takiehs	Schools	Public baths	Water reservoirs	Stables	Shops
City	8,018	169	19	153	72	170	4,260
Arg	232	6	2	14	----	22	128
Udlajan	2,619	46	4	5	33	33	1,146
Bazaar	1,524	46	6	30	20	45	685
Central Bazaar	----	5	1	7	----	----	1,236
Sanglaj	1,695	33	6	33	19	53	553
Chalmaydan	1,802	30	----	16	----	12	512
Outside wall	146	3	---	3	----	5	204

Source: Extracted from Sa'dvandian & Ettehadieh 1989

Conclusion

Tehran's new city wall was constructed to accommodate and facilitate the growth and development of the capital in the gestation period of building a modern state. The development of Tehran was due to an increase in the number of state functionaries and their need for modern amenities. The newly established districts inside the city wall tell us about the vision of the new urban class vis-à-vis civil life and urbanization. Technocrats belonging to the new class took on the tasks related to the construction of the new city wall, and in so doing, became the agents of modernization. The fact that their project conflicted with the patriarchal bureaucracy of the Qajar did not push them toward

a democratic Constitution movement. The overwhelming majority of the students sent to Europe did not become constitutionalists despite their initiation into western democracy and European political thought, and remained faithful to Iranian technological and bureaucratic reforms. The Qajar government, however, which the elites wished to reform from within, resisted forces of contemporary modernization. Bureaucrats' modern education gave rise to scientific and technological legitimacy in some circles, but decision-making power remained in the hands of those with an interest in the old structures of power. Powers of the royal court and the government were not separated: royalty had extensive say in the daily decisions of government. Many ministries were in the hands of princes and the old guards, with generals and marshals commanding the army. As a result, the scope of reform that the educated state cadre could direct and put into action was inevitably very small, limited largely to technological matters. Economic reform was even harder to achieve as the shah regarded the economy as an extension of his own dominion. He determined tax rates and granted privileges and monopolies to whomever he wished. In the process of the old wall and fortress' demolition, the shah himself turned into a pivotal land dealer (Sheikh-ol-Eslami 1978: 220). Despite Abdolghaffar's optimism with regard to the liberating effects of new engineering techniques, the city's development concentrated power in the hands of an elite who proved incapable of embracing all aspects of modernization. In reality, real estate in Tehran attracted investment and generated wealth. Old districts lost their value and the city was polarized more than before. The modern educational system was incapable of effecting fundamental changes without political reform. As it is known, new institutions like customs, finance, post and telegraph offices as well as the police force and insurance companies were in the hands of foreign executives and consultants for nearly half a century. Their scope of power was based on the agreements with the shah and his prime minister (Mahbubi Ardakani 1998: 320, 354).

Chapter III: Urban Modernization under Pahlavi

> Iran is not worse off than fifty years ago. It is the outside world that has changed…. Our lives were no different than others so long as horses were the main mode of transportation. But from the minute Europe boarded the train, nature cursed the donkey-straddling people of Iran…. Inventions in Europe transformed economic conditions in the West. In quality and in price foreign commodities surpassed their Iranian counterparts…. The foundations of Western Civilization are not their schools and libraries or scientists. These are all branches, leaves, and fruits of civilization. The basis of the 'better-than-us' civilization is the railroad…. We never identified the root cause of our predicaments…. We attempted all kinds of patriotic moves: we did sit-ins at embassies, we demanded justice, we clinched a constitutional system of governance, and we drafted a Constitution based on the British model…. Leaders of the freedom movement showed great bravery; in short, we showed our love for the country as much as our capacity, patience, and half-baked rationality allowed us to…. We listened to freedom-seekers and our situation got worse. Japanese patriots recognized that the schools, governmental offices, and political machinery of Europe can only run on the railroad and are maintained by continued progress. That's why they first focused on the material/financial situation…. The current Western civilization is the outcome of the industrial revolution. If we want that civilization, we must accept its premise and set out to acquire its prerequisites…. A robust will is needed to take control the affairs of Iranians and eliminate the disagreements of today by an "I command" mandate…. Iranians will not come to themselves by wishing it. Prosperity must be imposed on Iran. (Ali-Akbar Davar, 1923; quoted by Bayat 1993: 118)

Introduction

What Ali-Akbar Davar[36] says in 1923, less than two decades after the Constitutional Revolution in Iran, is a criticism of the constitutionalists for their efforts to overcome the country's underdevelopment through seeking freedom and political reforms. A parliamentary representative then, Ali Akbar Davar became one of the main architects of Reza shah Pahlavi's modernization (1921-41) in years to come. His suggestion that

[36] Davar cooperated with *Shargh* magazine run by Seyed Zia Tabatabai in 1909, but during the height of the Constitutional Revolution he was studying in Geneva and spent the war years (1910-1920) in Europe. He witnessed the vanishing of hope and optimism in progress and social transformation in those years. He was under the sway of the anti-democratic and authoritarian views of Vilfredo Pareto, who was teaching at the Lausanne School (Bayat 1372: 127). As Tavakoli-Targhi writes, the phenomenon of authoritarianism did not come about overnight. Before the rise of Reza Pahlavi, Constitutionalists regarded their predecessors as ignorant and saw the Constitutional Revolution as the beginning of the age of modernization in Iran (2001: 142).

Iran is in need of an industrial and technological revolution had roots in the praxis of the intelligentsia in the era before the Constitutional Revolution. By the failure of the efforts aimed at building a modern liberal state through the Constitutional Revolution and the deterioration of the country in WWI, a breed of politicians/technocrats emerged in Iran that blatantly defended the imposition of the social and economic reforms by a benevolent dictator. Transforming the Constitutional aspirations to a state-initiated development project,[37] they succeeded in founding the institutions of the modern state in Iran.[38] As Stephanie Cronin has observed, the activities of these technocrats in passing legislation and administering laws followed the ambitions of constitutionalists. But they increased the gap between the elite and the rest of the society, and in so doing, left ominous marks on the lives of the non-elite, provincial residents and the poor (2007: 73). This chapter focuses on the spatial aspects of such a development agenda: the reorganization of the territory through forced political integration and emergence of urban engineering and planning as part of nation-state building agenda.

The occupation of Iran by the Allied forces through the first half of the 1920s, the threat of famine and the risk of being partitioned by the foreign forces created the grounds for the rise of the militarized regime of Reza shah Pahlavi who replaced the Qajars in 1924. As Katouzian (2003: 20-25) suggests, clergies, educated people, nobles and all progressive factions of the parliament supported Reza shah for his power to end the chaos that had emerged a few years after the Constitutional Revolution. A small

[37] During the reign of Reza shah, alternative views on "progress" were sidelined. First, the social democrats who were seeking justice and democracy were increasingly seen by the ruling class as a Bolshevik threat. Second, the religious forces in favour of modernization who were alienated by the radical secularization of the state apparatus and society, turned against modern transformations. Stephanie Cronin amply studies these trends in her essays (2004, 2007).

[38] Researchers and historians of this particular historical period have studied the rise of Reza shah and his 20-year reign from two vantage points: first, the classic framing of political economy for the transformation of pre-modern societies into a capitalist one; and second, the lens of social history. The main debate among political economists revolves around the consistency of the Iranian path in comparison to the 'European' model, framed within the capitalist mode of production and the reshuffling of dominant social classes. Some described the dominant economic structure before the establishment of a modern state as feudal (Bharier 1971; Nomani 1975; Foran 1994; Amir-Ahmadi 2012), others saw it as proto-feudal/proto-colonial (Matin 2015), and yet a third group of scholars found the footprints of Asiatic despotism or the evidence of a hydraulic society (Katouzian 1981)—as Karl August Wittfogel would have it (1957). Readers can find a short treatment of the varying hypotheses and debates on this historical period in Amir-Ahmadi 2012, Chapter 2. For the social and political history of Reza shah era see: Abrahamian 1981, 2008; Bayat 1992, 1993; Atabaki 2007; Cronin 2007, 2012; Chehabi 1990; Tavakoli-Targhi 2001; Schayegh 2002; Mahbubi-Ardakani 1992.

group of politician-technocrats created the key institutions of the modern state in Iran in this pivotal era. According to Abrahamian (2008: 75), half of the fifty technocrats who worked as minsters with Reza shah were educated in foreign countries, almost all of them were masters of one or two languages, and three quarters of them came from families with titles. The clout of technocrats in the authoritarian regimes are short-lived; the shah saw himself as the target of conspiracies and terror in his second decade of rule, and as such would often change his mind about those around him. Even the prominent members of this first generation of Iranian technocrats were forced to pay him lip service, and the term *chaker* (subservient) came to replace *nokar* (servant)—a term usually used in the Naseri Era to show docility (Abrahamian 2008: 75). The elimination of Davar, Teimurtash, and Farmanfarma, who were once the triangle of command within the government and held a special place within the administrative apparatus, marks the fact that prominent technocrats were not tolerated by the authoritarian political system they contributed in building.[39] Contrary to Davar's claim, however, the increase of Reza Khan's power was neither limited to what he believed as legitimate power of "a robust will," nor was it short-lived.[40] Pahlavi ruled Iran for half a century.

Reza shah was exiled during the occupation of Iran in WWII. Throughout the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s, there was political cohesion, the amelioration of existing social divides, and the emergence of the second generation of technocrats—the nationalist technocrats—who brought a new urban policy focused on social housing. After the coup against Mosaddeq in 1953, a group of internationally well-connected technocrats came to power with roots both in landed and capitalist families and international credit institutions, who actively pursued US President Harry Truman's (1945-53) theses on 'anti-revolution impacts of development.'[41] Abol-Hassan Ebtehaj

[39] Ali-Akbar Davar committed suicide in 1955 after Reza shah removed him from power. Teimurtash (another minister who came from the landed aristocracy) was poisoned in prison. Farmanfarma (the Sorbonne-educated Qajar prince) was killed on one of his properties after suffering repeated imprisonment (Abrahamian 2008: 76).

[40] Davar had promised that after a few years when "the affairs of Iran saw some semblance of order, when the country could boast of factories and capital, our independence would not be empty claims, and you could start the struggle for a labour party and a capitalist cult." (Davar quoted in Bayat 1973: 130).

[41] The Point Four Program was a development assistance program for Third World countries announced by US president Harry Truman in 1949. It took its name from the fact that it was the fourth goal of the foreign policy he discussed in his inaugural speech in 1949.

was a major figure: he was Davar's colleague in the Ministry of Finance, Iran's representative at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, the Middle East Director of the International Monetary Fund (1951-54), and the appointed head of the Management and Planning Organization (1954-58). Recognized as a reformer of Iran's banking system, Ebtehaj took a chance (in what was a favorable international context and competition between East and West) and founded development planning in Iran. The government's development mission extended from strictly physical engineering to engineering the economy through central planning. Assisted by US policy pundits, Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi issued his six commandments at the beginning of the 60s and set the "White Revolution" into motion. Some of the cardinal points of this revolution included: land reform (whereby the vassalage system was abolished and large parcels of land were distributed among millions of peasants), women's rights reform, nationalization of forests and farmlands, the establishment of a Literacy Army, and profit-sharing for factory workers. In the same decade, planning for Tehran and other large cities began. In the 1970s, breakneck transformation in Tehran was conflated with monarchical quixotism. Tehran became the center of the glorification of the past (hallmarked by the extravagant celebrations of 2,500 years of monarchic rule), its military brandished its might, and the power to crush dissidents was normalized.

Three main processes will be studied in the first phase of Pahlavi era: Territorial reorganization through Iran's transport revolution in the 1930s, the mutual relations of urban modernization and industrialization, and resistance against disciplinary modernization. I will study the reign of Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979) through the transformation of the political role of technocrats in the post WWII context and the emergence of central planning in Iran. In this regard, the policies of Tehran Comprehensive Plan (1968) and the roles of international consultants, in particular Victor Gruen and Constantinos Doxiadis, in drafting the Tehran Comprehensive Plan and Tehran Action Plan will be discussed. All these will trace a picture of a city that, at the end of the 1970s, became a ground for social revolution.

Theorizing Urbanization under Pahlavi

The state of research on Iranian cities during the rule of Reza Pahlavi is richer than that of his successor son, Mohammad-Reza. There are many monographs available from that era, while the few extant documents from the 1940s to the 1970s are less detailed.[42] Of studies that focused on the Reza shah period, the article by Ehlers and Floor (1993) on the history of urbanization in Iran is particularly significant. Ehlers' article (1996), *Capitals and Iran's Spatial Organization* explains that from 1736 (when the 300-year-old capital of the Safavid, Isfahan, fell) to 1888 (when Tehran was chosen as the Qajar seat of government), the capital changed location five times; Tabriz, Qazvin, Isfahan, Mashhad, and Shiraz were far apart from each other and in geographically diverse regions of the Iranian plateau. To Ehlers, in addition to ethnic diversity and the repeated change in political sovereignty among ethnic groups, geographical characteristics reduced the state's political sovereignty and "distanciation of power" (Harvey 1989a). Such peculiarities distinguished Iran from its western neighbor, where the Ottoman Empire had maintained Constantinople as its capital for centuries.

The studies on social and urban transformations under Reza shah (Abrahamian 1982 and 2008, Cronin 2009, Bayat 1990, Marefat 1981, Safamanesh 2009, Victor Daniel 2005, Mo'azamdar 2000) reveal the important place of Tehran within the country's urban network at the beginning of the Pahlavi rule, when Iran's population was estimated at 11.5 million (Bharier 1972: 56) with 11 percent of the population were living in urban centers, of which 2 percent (210,000) took residence in Tehran. The national economy or national market did not exist. The development of capitalism faced limitations of capital, absence of free labour and a lack of security in trade routes. According to Bharier there were 100 cities with over 5,000 residents in Iran, of which

[42] With the fall of Reza shah, researchers had access to official documents of the period for two decades. It was also possible for non-Iranian researchers or those associated with universities outside Iran, to access those documents. At times in cooperation with newly established organizations like the Social Research Institute of the University of Tehran, these researchers conducted valuable research. This access was no longer available to researchers during the reign of Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi or after his downfall. Additionally, in the 1960s and 70s, critical urban research was conducted within a closed framework, like the Dependency Theory, which dealt only with issues like rural migration to the city, poverty, and marginalism.

only 15 exceeded 30,000. Other than being a magnet for surplus agricultural products in their respective regions, these cities lacked substantial growth rates. Centers that had a role to play in international or regional trade had mild growth rates. Tehran, (population +200,000) in the central part of the Iranian plateau, Tabriz (population +200,000) in the northwest, and Mashhad (population +100,000) in the northeast, comprised the three major urban centers (ibid: 58). The nation-state building process in the Reza shah period, radically transformed the geographical significance of regions and cities of Iran. Urbanization increased and became more centralized. While Iran's population increased from 11.5 to 14.8 million (with an average annual growth rate of 0.8 percent), urbanization doubled (from 11 to 22 percent). Worthy of mention is Bharier's overestimate of the urban population in 1925 (2.47 million). This overestimate was corrected later by Zanjani (1991) to 1.27 million; it still led, however, to an underestimate of the rise of urbanization under Reza shah (see for example Ehlers and floor 1993: 253; Hessamian et al. 1985: 37; and Saeidi Rezvani 1371: 41). Even the application of the term 'over-urbanization' to the post-Land Reform era is rooted in an underestimate of urban growth in decades before the reform.

Bharier's research shows that in the 1930s and 40s, for the first time, net migration from villages to cities was positive and urban centers saw a consistent increase in population. Some cities witnessed a population decrease due to economic depression when their population moved to Tehran and oil-cities in southern Iran. Tehran's role in the urban network radically changed and its growth rates during the Reza shah period reached 4.5 percent, a figure that was without precedent. Tehran population was 210,000 in the 1921 census, a mere 55,000 increase during the half century since the Abdolghaffar census in 1867. In 1941 Tehran was host to 500,000 residents. It is important to recognize that in addition to the concentration of economic development in Tehran, larger economic slumps (e.g. the occupation of Iran during WWII and the oil nationalization movement) increased the city's population concentration significantly. As *Table 9* shows, the growth of Tehran from 1945 to 1955 was 8 percent per year, which was never as high in its history, even after the revolution of 1979. The reasons for this steep growth rate are unclear, but given the post-revolution experience, we can say that political crises and the

economic slump were causes of population shifts.[43] The population of Tehran reached 4.5 million by 1975; suburbanism and peripheralization emerged on the outer reaches of the city. In fact, the population of Tehran grew from 2 to 14 percent of the national population within half a century. The urban population also jumped from 11 to 47 percent by the end of the Pahlavi era. I argue later that many researchers attribute the rise of urbanization to the Land Reform of 1963 and the increase of oil income in the 1970s. The dependency and rentier state scholars both explain the rapid urbanism and capitalization within the urban network as the outcome of the dependent structure of the Iranian economy (Hessamian et al.1985; Katouzian1981).[44]

Table 9: Population trends in Iran and Tehran in 1921-76

Year	1921	1941	1956	1966	1976
Population of Iran (millions)	11.5	14.8	18.9	25.8	33.7
Urban population (millions)	1.26	3.2	6.0	9.8	15.8
Share of urban population (%)	11	22	31.7	38.0	47.0
Tehran region population (millions)	___	___	2.0	3.5	5.3
Population of Tehran city (millions)	0.210	0.530	1.5	2.7	4.5
Share of Tehran region's population from Iran (%)	___	___	10.5	13.5	15.8
Share of Tehran city from Iran population (%)	1.8	3.6	7.9	10.5	13.4
Share of Tehran city from urban population (%)	16.7	16.5	25.2	27.8	28.6
Share of Tehran city from region population (%)	___	___	75.0	77.1	85.0

[43] Unfortunately, the statistics that Bharier offers on migrations within Iran are from the aggregate of the first half of the century. Based on his research the close to 2.3 million who migrated between 1900 and 1956 to urban centres, 46 percent came to Tehran and 22 percent to oil-rich cities (Bharier 1972: 52 and 56).

[44] In an essay on "Rapid Urbanism" I showed that growth rates after and before the Land Reform of 1963 didn't change significantly (1997: 113-116). Zanjani (2013) suggests that some of data published by the Statistical Center of Iran on the 1976 census was misleading and the source of the confusion.

Centralized Government, Logistics and Territorial Connectivity

Abrahamian criticizes European accounts of the nature of power of Qajar kings that appears in travelogues in the 19th century. These accounts present Qajar rulers as wielding absolute power. Contrary to these accounts, Abrahamian writes, the shah and the Qajar court did not have power over local governors because there were no substructures for an absolutist regime of power (2008: 8). Only during the Reza shah period did the geography of the population, capital, and political power become centralized and monopolized—the modern state emerged from the ashes of the Qajar Empire.

The appearance of a national market in all capitalist countries was predicated upon the uniformity of the national urban network and upon overcoming obstacles in their connection. As Harvey explains, the modern era is marked by an increase in the distanciation of social interactions and resolving spatial resistance in various countries (1989: 222). He points to the efforts in 18th century capitalist Europe to build water canals, rail and paved road networks to support an economy of commodities and export trade. Karl Polanyi also writes on the rise of the nation-state in bringing about mercantilist capitalism:

> The centralized state was a new creation called forth by the Commercial Revolution... in external politics the setting up of sovereign power was the need of the day; accordingly, mercantilist statecraft involved the marshaling of the resources of whole national territory to the purpose of power in the foreign affairs. In internal politics, unification of the countries fragmented by feudal and municipal particularism was the necessary by-product of such endeavor. Economically, the instrument of unification was capital…finally, the administrative technique underlying the economic policy of the central government was supplied by the extension of traditional municipal system to the larger territory of the state. (1957: 65)

No doubt the relationship between the cohesion and centralization of the power of the state and the establishment of a national market affected Iranian capitalism in a different way than in Europe, which was going through an industrial revolution and the emergence of free market in the 18th century. It is also true that many European countries in the 19th century received capitalism differently:

> If there was a time-lag of some half a century between the industrialization of Great Britain and that of the Continent, there was a very much greater lag between the establishment of national unity. Italy and Germany arrived only during the second half of the nineteenth century at the stage of unification, which England achieved centuries before, and smaller Eastern Europe states reached even later. In this process of state building the working classes played a vital role, which further enhanced their political experience. In the industrial age, such a process couldn't fail to comprise the social policy. Bismarck made a bid for unification of the Second Reich through the introduction of an epochal scheme of social legislations. Italian unity was speeded up by the nationalization of railways. (ibid: 175)

Capitalism in Europe had to overcome the resistance of local traders and the independence of urban rulers, for whom the free market was not in their best interest. These actors fought for the monopoly of the guilds on non-competitive commodity markets against the competitive export capital and its supporter, the central state.

The spatial process of building the modern state in Iran is not a well-researched subject. Those working with Max Weber's notion of the 'oriental city' (1978) suggest that no resistance emerged in cities against a rising power of central government. Ahmad Ashraf, a senior urban scholar working on Qajar and early Pahlavi suggests:

> These institutions [guilds] were established by the government and the reason for their existence was to serve the government's revenue apparatus; as such, they have never had the chance to help with the establishment of civil society…. guilds were used in an organized and pervasive manner under the premiership of Reza

> Khan… in the early part of the 1940s, Seyed Ziaeddin Tabatabai tried to unify the guilds under the Party of National Will, to function as a powerful arm of his own party…. In 1947, leaders of guilds of the Bazaar formed the Union of Bazaar Guilds of Tehran… to counter the influence of Tudeh Party [a new-born leftist party] and to give support to the government and the royal court. (1995: 33-35)

Keshavarzian (2007) argues that Ashraf ignores the many instances of Bazaar movements in the constitutional era, oil nationalization, and the 1979 revolution as non-organized and not linked to the guilds' activities.[45]

To examine the spatial aspect of the rise of the modern state in Iran and its impacts on the urban network, the legal and political aspects of provincial autonomy should be mentioned. The promise of the Constitutional Revolution on regional autonomy, a reflection of the vital role Azari Turks, Lur and Qashqai tribes played in its victory, remained unfulfilled. However, most of the tribes kept their semi-autonomy, for the limits on distantiation (Harvey 1989a) of the central government power. Facing the weakness of Qajar rulers in resistance against colonialism, the Constitutionalists called for a more powerful central government in Tehran to counter the force of territorial partition. Touraj Atabaki suggests that Iran and Ottoman Empire in the 19th century had yet to secure their respective countries from "the danger of European occupation and the partition of minorities." During WWI parts of Iran were in the hands of Britain and Russia. The Ottoman Empire had lost many of its territories and was partitioned during the War. The October Revolution in Russia relieved Iran from the pressure of the Tsarist regime, but the dispersion of the constitutionalists and the desolation due to the impact of WWI didn't allow them to establish a strong government capable of building a new center-provincial structure (2007: 6). The nation-building efforts of Reza shah benefited from the retreat of colonial forces after the October Revolution.[46] Iran used the opportunity posed by the socialist revolution in Russia and the voluntary abolishment of

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[45] For a recent study on the subject, see Ahmad Meidari's (2004) article that explores the relationship between guilds and the Iranian state during the 6th parliament of IRI (1998-2003) and their debates to reform guild's system law.

[46] The Constitutional government in Iran was unable to benefit sufficiently from the Bolshevik Revolution. The envoy of Lenin to Iran was even killed by tsarist officers who headed the Iranian army, named the Qazzaq army (Atabaki 2007).

tsarist agreements to renegotiate or revoke Britain's colonial controls over the extraction of resources, and the monopolization of industries and financial institutions. Reza shah overturned the capitulation agreements (under which Europeans in Iran enjoyed the privilege to be subjected to their own consular courts rather than those of the Iranian judicial system). The right to print money was transferred from the Imperial Bank of Britain to the National Bank of Iran. The Indo-European Telegraph Company was nationalized and imports were subjected to new tariffs (Abrahamian 2008: 75).

Clawson's study (1993) on the "revolution in road transportation" needs to be read in this political context. His research confirms that investment in road transportation continues after the first years of the consolidation of central government power in the provinces. Even in 1940, the last year of Reza shah's reign, one fourth of the government's budget was spent in this sector. This was twice that of the military budget and more than the whole budget for industries. This investment in infrastructure went along with technological innovation in transport.[47] The cost of transportation dropped by 80 percent between 1920 and 1940 due to new technologies, and this increased and diversified Iran's share of the export market. It also brought enough foreign currency to purchase equipment for industrial projects (Clawson 1993: 249). Cities around the country and especially those on the outskirts of its territories and neighboring Russia, Turkey, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf countries, became connected through a national network of roads. According to Clawson, the leveling of the prices for the same commodity in various cities is the best indication of the establishment of a national market in this period. In her book on *Deadly Life of Logistics*, Deborah Cowen (2014: 8) reminds us that network space, constituted by infrastructures, information, goods, and people, is dedicated to flows and as such, strongly contrasts with the territoriality of the national state. However, global flows do not rule out the fact that logistics created the national boundaries in the first place. The Ministry of Roads constructed 1,000 kilometers of paved road between Tehran and larger cities, and 5,000 kilometers of gravel road under Reza shah (Abrahamian 2008: 69 and 77). The construction of the Trans-National

[47] Clawson suggests that road transport was revolutionized by the new technology of trucks that had changed their loading capacity and engine power. He enumerates in detail the difference between trucks used during World War One and the 1930s in Iran: number of cylinders, gasoline storage, load capacity, and engine power.

Railroad began in 1926 from taxes levied on sugar and other goods entirely from the Iranian capital.[48] The project ended in 1941, the year Reza shah ceded power. The state's unbound dedication to investment in the railroad was a constant point of contention among the ruling elite and popular discontent. In 1938 the investment in railroad construction reached one-third of the country's budget. The first airport was built in Tehran in 1938.

Territorial connectivity contributed to the radical changes underway in the political, social and economic structures in Iran. Such connectivity weakened the power of the local elites, eased the movement of military units and forced the settlement of the tribes. The 150-year autonomy of the tribes was diminished (ibid: 93). Most historians who studied this period suggest that the construction of the trans-Iranian railway was motivated by security and military concerns, including the need for a faster, large-scale deployment of troops in the south (where powerful tribes such as Bakhtiyari and Qashqai resisted the extension and consolidation of central state authority) and for facilitating British military aid in case of a Soviet attack (Tabari 1977: 65; Katouzian 1981: 116; Matin 2013: 87).

The Trans-Iranian Railway facilitated the confiscation of land in the hands of the gentry and landowners in remote areas, the increase in taxes, and the movement of local elites to Tehran.[49] In a 17-year period (1925-41) state revenue increased by a factor of 15. In addition to revenues from import/export tariffs, tolls from roads, and conventional taxes, a tax on wages and commodities was also levied and collected. Even though oil revenue was not a big portion of the state's budget, it nevertheless doubled in the decade of the 1920s. The government forced Bakhtiyari tribal leaders and Sheykh Khaz'al, the governor of Khorramshahr port in the oil-rich region of Khuzestan and a Qajar prince, to hand over their share of oil revenues to the state coffers (ibid: 66 and 67). Clawson

[48] This was a 1394 km. network that connected Bandar Shah in the north, Mashhad in northeast, Zanjan and Tabriz in northwest, and Ahwaz and Abadan in the south.

[49] Relying on a modern army, Reza shah was able to crush several regional uprisings, including the Jangali Movement in Gilan, Khiyabani and Lahuti in Azerbaijan, Simitqu in Kurdistan, Pesyan in Khorassan, and Solat al-Dowleh in Fars Province. The presence of army units in all provinces and the ease of communication between these units with new roads, allowed for the massive displacement of Lur tribes in 1927. The fact that many of the elites had to leave their territories due to the concentration of political power in the capital is yet to be seriously studied.

attributes the increase of exports to transportation security and new technology. Stephanie Cronin writes that elites, especially tradesmen, in provinces during the 1920s enjoyed the increase in trade due to the security of roads (Cronin 2007: 136).

Tehran-Abadan Urban Network

Remote from each other and weakly linked, Tehran and Abadan shaped a double core urban network in this era. In terms of industrialization, no city, including Tehran, could compete with Abadan, where the bulk of oil industry was concentrated. Since the discovery of oil in 1908, Britain had invested substantially in the Khuzestan region on oil extraction and petroleum production. The first core of Iran's industrial workforce was formed in Khuzestan. In terms of urban and regional development, petroleum cities were pioneers of urban modernization in Iran. Under Reza shah, Tehran, an unimportant city in terms of industrialization, turned to a center of consumer goods industries. Isfahan and cities in the northern provinces also benefited from industrialization projects.

Figure 3: Increase of industrial cities in Iran 1925-41



Source: Khatam, based on Korby map of 1977

Tehran grew as the center of the modern state's institutions, including the military, bureaucracy, the new education system and modern legal and political institutions. Abrahamian asserts that the military force during Reza shah increased tenfold, and bureaucracy increased by a factor of 17: "In 1921, the military totaled no more than 22,000 men… By 1941, it mustered more than 127,000 men. Likewise, in 1921 the central government had been no more than a haphazard collection of semi-independent mostowfis, monshis, and titled grandees. But by 1941, it had eleven full ministries employing in excess of 90,000 salaried civil servants" (2008: 67). Such geographical concentration created a new urban network with Tehran as its core growing at the expense of other cities. Such urban primacy, as *Table 10* shows, continued to grow under Mohammad Reza shah.

Table 10: Emergence of urban primacy in Pahlavi era

	1921	1941	1956	1966	1976
Tehran	200	530	1512.1	2719.7	4530.2
Population of the second city	200	__	289.9	409.6	667.8
Second city name	Tabriz	Tabriz	Tabriz	Mashhad	Mashhad
Urban primacy rate: Tehran population to the second city	1.0	__	5.2	6.6	6.8

Source: National Census 1956-76

Between 1932 and 1938, the government implemented an industrial program on whose economic merits experts do not agree. Foran regards Reza shah's industrialization program as inconsequential and unimportant: "Reza shah also experimented with industrialization but it was not a strategic aim for him and as a result remained limited, haphazard and regionally highly uneven" (Foran 1993: 244). And Matin writes: "the amount spent on the railway project equalled the $260 million invested in all industries combined. Industrialization attempts were intended for the production of basic items for the new army and therefore changed the traditional socio-economic texture of Iranian society only marginally" (2013: 867). Floor's research (2009) indicates that investment in

industries went beyond military needs. Katouzian (1981) also confirms that the banking system supported the industrial projects initiated by a group of private sector investors who were close to the shah. Studying Iran-German economic relations in this period, Jennifer Jenkins argues: The "non-imperialistic image" that Germany projected in the 1920s, and the conviction that it pursued solely economic plans in the region, opened the door to greater contributions. As a result, between 1927 and 1931—during an important conjuncture for the Iranian economy— Germany began to replace the United States as "the Shah's favourite third power." Great Britain and the Soviet Union supported this by their silence: three treaties were signed with Germany between 1928 and 1930 (2015: XXXIII). These treaties attracted more investments in the staple economy.[50] In addition to staples, as Sodagar's research suggests, three hundred new factories, that were established in different cities, produced the basic alimentary, clothing, and consumer needs of the population. More than thirty thousand workers were employed, which equalled the total industrial workers of the time (1975: 171).

According to Bharier, in the closing years of the 1930s around 20 percent of the country's budget was dedicated to new industries (1972: 29). Sixty-three of the new factories were established in Tehran. In 1935, around 43 percent of the country's total industrial companies were located in Tehran (409 companies in total), whose capital was three and a half times more than the companies established in provinces (ibid: 252). The concentration of industrial investments provided the foundation for Tehran becoming a working class city and left behind older industrial centers like Tabriz and Kashan. The increased population of the working class at the end of this era confirms the effects of industrialization on the city's social fabric. In 1921, non-waged workers including shop owners, traders, artisans, and other self-employed workers comprised two-thirds of the city's population, meaning the bulk of the city's working population was self employed. Government employees comprised 14 percent while waged craftsmen and their assistants were less than 8 percent of the households. It is significant that, while 14 percent of

[50] Jenkins writes: "In the early 1920s, and contemporaneously with the outreach to the United States, the Iranian government sent a flurry of proposals in Germany's direction: projects for oil exploitation along the Caspian Sea, forestry management on the Caspian coast, and the building of a Tabriz-Tehran railway" (2015: XXXIII).

household heads were listed as "superfluous" jobs, the small group of capital-owners (1.3 percent of households) had been counted separately in this census.[51]

Table 11: Social classes in Tehran 1922 (%)

Capitalists	Merchants	State employees	Guilds	Agriculture labour	"Un-useful" jobs	Total
1.3	61.0	14.1	7.0	1.6	14.0	100

Source: The census of 1922

In 1932, due to construction projects and new industries, the proportion of waged laborers increased to 31 percent of all employment in the city. A third of working people were in government jobs, a portion of which was workers of state-owned factories. The labour class within a decade became a commanding force within Tehran. The expanding social services, mainly public educational and medical centers, were headquartered from Tehran. An increasing number of government positions absorbed the educated elites coming from other cities. However, major portions of government employees were not of the elite, because three-fourths of them lived in poor and deprived southern parts of the city (only one fourth lived in prestigious neighbourhoods Arg, Dowlat and Hassanabad). Waged labour and craftsmen were living in the main part in older neighbourhoods or on the peripheries of the city.[52]

Urban Renewal: Making the Modern Urbanized Citizen

The 1920 coup had not fully unfurled when Seyed Zia Tabatabai, the Prime Minister of the coup, announced a swath of new rules and regulatory codes to bring order to public life in the city. The same pamphlets hung in public squares that invited

[51] In the 1922 census, for the first time the concept of household was defined and employment data was classified for the heads of the household. Women's employment was considered unimportant. As such, 70 percent of women head of households were classified as employed in "superfluous" businesses.

[52] Tehran is divided into 10 districts in the 1921 and 1932 censuses. In this period, concentration of the population tends to increase in newer, peripheral parts of the city (in the east) and two older neighbourhoods of Sanglaj and Bazaar. The population of two southernmost districts (Qanatabad and Mohammadabad), where brick workshops, slaughterhouse and new factories cropped up also increased. The name of many of the streets and alleys in these older neighbourhoods—like Zoghalforush-ha (coal-sellers) Alley, Qaterchiha (mule-drivers) Alley, and Sabunpaz (Soaper) Neighborhood—is indicative of the importance of an industry or a production unit in the identity of the neighborhood.

informing on Qajar elites also announced the establishment of a new public order. The publication of so many public announcements within the few days after the coup is indicative of the "civilization" that the new rulers advocated. Until this period, Tehran, much like other mainly Muslim-residing cities in the country, followed the codes of sharia. Moral and ethical laws were enforced in public spaces by a *mohtaseb*, a semi-official figure who acted in relative independence from the state (Cook 2002). But with the abolition of the mohtaseb function in this period, the municipality and police took on the duty of public education based on state injunctions. In Seyed Zia's pronouncements many of the previous public behaviors were banned and others were encouraged. Acts such as rowdiness, travelling showmanship, knife and dagger carrying became prosecutable. Urination and defecation in public, washing clothes in running street aqueducts and slaughtering animals (for home consumption) in streets were banned and punishments were provisioned. Public baths and bakeries were forced to follow sanitation guidelines, and the washing of the dead at home became illegal (Shahri 1978: 258-262).

The Prime Minister appointed Gasparian as the Mayor of Tehran in 1921 and brought the municipality under the supervision of the prime minister's office. In 1923, Reza shah appointed Brigadier-General Buzarjomehri, a confidant of his, as the acting mayor of Tehran. Such militarist approach to the management of the city suggests resistance against municipal plans as well as the urgency felt by the state to implement these plans. The first steps that the municipality took were toward the improvement of urban services, like covering the open waterways, the installation of gas lanterns in passageways, cleaning water cisterns, and the relocation of herds outside city limits. But as Ehlers and Floor (1993) mention, soon the physical engineering of Tehran started and extended to all other cities around the country.[53]

Urban renewal of this period formed along three interconnected lines: first, building the legal and institutional foundations for renewal; second, defining the street as

[53] The government's urban modernization policy resulted in one of the most decisive formal changes that affected the morphology of the traditional Iranian city, namely, a restructuring of the old city centres according to planning principles that were applied uniformly from Rasht in the north to Bandar Abbas in the south. The principles of urban renewal were applied (for the most part) without any consideration for historical patterns of development of the cities, the existing architectural dforms, or observance of indigenous cultural values (Ehlers and Floor 1993: 254).

the central element of urban renewal; and third, redeveloping the central space of the cities as the state's power base. We will first look at the legal foundations that provided the ground for renewal. Of these laws, the Municipal Act (1921 and 1930), the Street Development Act (1933), and the Land Registry Act (1931) were central. The passage of Street Act of 1922 predates the mentioned laws but its importance was pivotal. In addition to these laws, planning documents for the city of Tehran (like the maps of 1930 and 1937) must be considered as part of the legal foundation of urban renewal.

On the institutional side, the establishment of the Land Registry Office and transformation of Tehran municipality from a public to an executive local body of the government apparatus had transformative impacts on urban governance. The landmark new building of Tehran Municipality, erected at Tupkhaneh Square in 1921, demonstrates the importance of disciplining the cities and citizens in early stages of the formation of nation-state in Iran. The municipal administration started with the health and accounting departments added to the existing central department. Within a few years, the engineering, foodstuff, and endowment units were added to the original three. The 7th parliament passed a new municipal act in 1930, which drastically modified the constitutional era urban laws. It assigned the responsibility of selecting the mayor to the Interior Ministry. The Municipal Council, which previously appointed the mayor and supervised his work, was to act as a consulting outfit. The new law provisioned ways to raise the budget for the municipality (Roshdiyeh 1964: 162) and, along with the 1930 map of Tehran, allowed for the construction of many thoroughfares.

An important institution established to promote urban renewal in this era was the Land Registry Office, without which capital holders would never have gone into building construction. In 1914, some attempts had been made to register land at the time of property tax collection, but land registry was not obligatory. In 1927, the parliament passed the Land Registry Act that Davar had prepared and registration became mandatory. With the establishment of Land Registry Office in March 1932 within the Ministry of Justice, the ministry adjudicated legal disputes over property. It is noteworthy that before the Pahlavi era, the land property regime in Iran had no legal foundation. Cronin writes:

> In pre-Pahlavi Iran property rights were legally vague. This legal vagueness rendered the country unfavorable to capitalist economic activity. Reza shah legal reforms changed this situation. Two sets of laws were passed, in 1921 and 1929, which concerned the formal consolidation and legal codification of inviolability of private property in land. Specific legislation provided for the legal registration as opposed to hitherto customary titles of property and title deeds. At the same time, the new Civil Code strengthened the notion of the absolute ownership of land. (2005: 7)

Matin (2013: 88) argues that Reza shah's legal reforms did not conjure up the "capitalist spirit" but it was merely a formal consolidation of private-property rights.[54] The impact of such legislation on the ownership structure and speculation of the urban land has not yet been researched.

In this period, as soon as the city expanded and land came within its limits, large landowners divided their property into smaller lots for sale. It was customary in Iran for families to own their residential houses; the state and large landowners couldn't prepare or build their properties, so they divided land into smaller lots to sell them. Changing the function of large agricultural land in this period was a source of accumulation of wealth for large landowners. This is in contradistinction to the development of Istanbul, where the state and large landowners saved their ownership of the land, where the informal housing was erected. To date, large landowners are still engaged in legal battle with residents that have built their houses "overnight" (Karatepe: 2013). In the process of reconstruction in Tehran, the structure of ownership continued with the division of agricultural land into smaller lots. The fact that land division and sale started at the beginning of the renewal period while the price of land was minimal (especially on the

[54] Matin argues that new property laws enabled many "untitled" city-dwellers such as Reza shah himself to acquire, often through intimidation, agricultural land, and such class compromise left the pre-capitalist economic fabric of Iran unblemished. A small class of mega landlords was consolidated. It attached an organizationally modern military bureaucratic state to a materially pre-modern society. The result was a modern nation-state without a nation (2013: 90-2). In the 1930s the ownership pattern of Iran's estimated 50,000 villages in 1930 was as follows: absentee landlords 57 percent, religious endowments (Waqf) 15 percent, Reza shah 5 percent, state lands 4 percent, peasant ownership 18 percent (Gharatche-Daghi cited in Karshenas 1990: 68). In 1941 37 families owned 20,000 villages (Foran 1993: 228). The British legation report 16,077 on "Seizure of land by the shah" 1932-34, FO371/Persia is one of the important documents on the subject.

peripheries of the city), had an enduring effect on the process of development. Other than agricultural land, the allotment of land atop the old moat reflects the small-lot structure of the real estate market. On the construction of Enqelab Avenue, for example, Marefat writes: "according to several merchants along the avenue, anyone who would fill the 15-meter deep moat and prepare the ground could become the owner of land along Shahreza [Enqelab Avenue]… The large gardens and small garden pavilions of the Qajar period gave way to large villas and small gardens all along Shahreza and adjoining streets" (Marefat 1981: 87).

As we shall see later, collective or public ownership of property, in the form of cooperatives or community residence, was not an established practice until the 1979 revolution in Iran. Only during the oil nationalization years did the government initiated several affordable housing projects (complexes or two-story houses) in Tehran, whose ownership was collective (Azhdari 1946: 15). Several modern townships were also constructed in the 1970s in cooperation with foreign investment firms with collective real estate ownership. The ownership of residential properties in Tehran belonging almost entirely to their residents has, on the one hand, resulted in a wider distribution of rentier practices due to the reconstruction of Tehran compared to other cities, and, on the other hand, has contributed to legal transgressions by residents. It was not the intention of the Land Registry Act to bring residential owners—who didn't want to sell their land after all—into order. The astronomical profits pushed for making valid documents. Moreover, the Qajar's lands confiscated by the new shah, the royal court, or the army commanders, required official registry and regulation. Reza shah had confiscated many lands belonging to the tribes as well (Abrahamian 2008: 77). It is not clear how much land the shah and the royal court had in their possession in Tehran.[55] In 1929, municipalities were given the

[55] The existing documents point to several estates that Reza shah owned, including the Saadabad Garden in the Tajrish Canyon in northern Tehran that the shah had purchased from the daughter of Nasser-ed-Din shah, on whose ground a palace was built to house the shah's family. Pahlavi Avenue was also built to connect this palace to Marmar Palace inside the city. This avenue was private until 1941. Reza shah also bought the Zel os-Soltan Garden when he was Minister of War but later donated it to the Ministry of Education. He showed an avid interest in procuring land, but as far as we know, the bulk of land that he purchased or obtained by force was agricultural land. After his death, he was owner of a million two hundred thousand hectares of agricultural land. Some of his property came under strict government land. Abrahamian point to reports of the British Embassy in Tehran regarding the land hoarding practices of the

right, for the first time, to own abandoned, barren, or moat-covered land. According to legislation passed in 1932 by parliament, municipalities had the right to use endowed land for the development of the city. This law was against the sharia and was overturned once Reza shah left power (Ehlers and Floor 257, 259).

Khyaban was the second key component of the urban renewal introduced to Tehran in this era. Before that there were three general levels of streets in the city: *ma'aber* [arteries], *kucha* [alleys] and *bombast* [cul de sac] (Marefat 54). [56] Khyaban is a word that first appeared in the 1867 map of Behlor (according to which the Naseri Wall was constructed). Daniel writes that in this map, "Khyaban is synonymous to ma'aber, connecting older thoroughfares to Mashq Square and ultimately to the gates [of Tehran]" (2005: 38). Given what has been said and the definition of Khyaban in Dehkhoda Dictionary ("A road in a garden, passing through two rows of trees"), we can say that Khyaban was a road that initially cut through gardens lined with trees and the first streets were also constructed in gardens inside the city:

> As part of the new role of government, the municipality now replaced private endowments with public funds for the maintenance of roads. The creation of new streets, of course, was accompanied by asphalt paving, an important improvement for streets that had been muddy in winter and dusty in summer. The urban planning outlook of Reza shah described the city street as more than a functional route. It was also to be an aesthetically pleasant space where people would come to walk. Accordingly, the streets were lined with plane trees, a rarity in the past. (Marefat 85)

With the establishment of the Ministry of the Interior, the Office of Elections and Municipal Affairs was formed, which was responsible for plans that the municipalities around the country had to implement (ibid). This, however, didn't mean that the office

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shah, like this one: "[His majesty] is so covetous of land that it won't be too long before we ask why his lordship doesn't register the whole of Persia in his name."

[56] Ma'aber, generally refers to a public thoroughfare, an urban collector. It was by definition a through street, with a width corresponding to the number of people using it. The ma'abers of Tehran were oriented North-South, corresponding to the slope of the land. They were often avenues with distinct origins and destinations, leading from one facility to another, from a city gate to a bazaar. They were neither straight nor of uniform width, and were seldom wider than six meters across (Marefat 1988: 54).

was responsible for street planning for different cities. This ministry had issued a set of regulations for expanding passageways (at least 16 meters across) in the central parts of Tehran as well as squares, the maximum height of the surrounding buildings, landscaping and tree planting, which municipalities had to follow if they wanted to construct a street.

While in Tehran the process of construction of the streets was based on a plan that Tehran Municipality had in its possession since 1930, in other cities streets were built following requests by residents. Officials in the municipality or municipal councils would send petitions to the central office to either ask them to build roads or grant them permission to do it. There were also instances of dispute between locals on the construction of roads and streets. Victor Daniel's study of the history of thoroughfares in Iran cites petition samples for street construction in the eastern city of Birjand and the south-central city of Shiraz. In the latter, those opposing street construction took issue not with the state or municipality but with petitions and the way local papers championed the cause: "An apple polishing group aspiring to appear modern, not even owning a brick in this city… imagine themselves walking the streets of Paris or London… and need to feel that their fantasies have been realized" (2005: 39).

Critics saw the street network and construction model as non-native and imported. Marefat (1998), however, asserts that street layout and construction had its roots in the Persian garden model:

> Traditional Persian gardens were planned on strict geometric principles**.** The most usual pattern was *chahar-bagh*, a quadripartite design in which the two principle axes subdivided the space into four parts (usually equal)… The main paths were tree-lined and carried water channels from the *ganats*. These garden paths, not European urban design, formed the framework of the street pattern in Mahalla Dowlat. … Thus, Dowlat seems to owe more to Persian garden design than it does to European urban design, and as much to traditional land use habits as it does to European city planning. (63-5)

According to Ehlers and Floor (1993), 19 streets were constructed or expanded between 1927 and 1931 for a total of 78 kilometers in length. Among these streets, Pahlavi and Shemiran streets (12 kilometers long) linked Tehran with Tajrish village in the Shemiran region at the foot of the Alborz Mountain Range, determining the future growth of the city in the half century to come. Studying the changes of population density in Tehran in chapter five (table 22), I will argue that early modernization increased the density of the city as its built-up area expanded smaller than its population, comparing existing maps of the late Qajar (1891), the rise of Pahlavi (1922) and years close to the Islamic Revolution (1976). Under Reza shah, the city area reached 46 square kilometers, which was 2.4 times larger than the area of the city under Nasser-ed-Din shah (Habibi 1996: 223), but the population increased by a factor of 3.4 and the density increased from 82 persons per hectare to 115. The built area expanded to 252 square kilometers in 1976 and density to 180 persons per hectare.

Figure 4: Expansion of Tehran under Pahlavi, along two new roads north to the Shemiran



Source: Khatam. Tehran expanded from Tahmasebi walls (black area) in 1850 to Naseri city in 1890 and to the Pahlavi Tehran 1976

The Street Widening Act of 1932 listed detailed instructions for the homogenization of architecture around streets and squares. The destruction of the Naseri

Wall started in this period, which increased the surface area of streets and passageways in the city. Four wide streets were built on top of the old moat (Karimian 1976: 297), and adjacent buildings, like the University of Tehran structure and the Railroad Station, were

Figure 5: Tehran Municipality design for new streets 1937



Source: Atlas of Tehran Metropolis: http://www.irancarto.cnrs.fr/record.php?q=AT-030312&f=local&l=en

* Municipality design for new street in Tehran includes three groups of streets: new streets built at the margin of the city on the moat, new streets built on old paths (green) and totally new streets that were built through demolishing the residential areas (purple). The map shows also the streets that were designed but never built

included within the city limits. In addition to Pahlavi and Shemiran streets, 5 new streets (totalling 7 km) were built and 12 were widened (40 km) for a total length of 47

kilometers. Streets that were widened were between 8 and 16 meters wide, after which they reached 18 to 26 meters across (Ehlers and Floor: 257). As a general rule, in the newer parts of town, in the north and west, streets were mostly widened, but in the south, where the older city fabric prevailed, 3 new streets (Buzarjomehri, Jalilabad, and Sarcheshmeh) were constructed, appearing like a gash in the middle of the old section of the city. Many of the streets planned for the southern part of the city were not constructed, which could indicate the resistance of local officials or lack of initiative.

According to Marefat, the "Planification Map of Tehran" of 1937 was the chief guide to the orthogonal grid of streets in the coming decade that was to superimpose upon the existing dense, irregular pattern of the city. Shahreza and Pahlavi intersection formed the backbone of this network (1988: 88). Tehran's traditional patterns of mazelike growth were interrupted. Only in the Bazaar, the very heart of the old city, were some proposed streets never implemented. Massoud Keyhan, then head of the Geographic Institute of the University of Tehran, estimated (1932: 236) 1.8 square kilometers (or 9 percent) of the area within the Nasser-ed-Din shah city was occupied by streets and squares.

The urban renewal under Reza shah had some similarities to the restructuring of Paris under Haussmann in terms of the concepts and metaphors of renewal. Shah knew of the pre-eminence of Paris as a model of city planning, possibly through many members of his administration who had studied in France. "Haussmannization" of Tehran, however, as Habibi argues (1999: 158), is about "borrowing" from or imitating Haussmann's plan for Paris, and is perhaps not warranted, except in the most general way of following in the footsteps of modernist Paris. Tehran did resemble Paris in that it valued the density and concentration of space. This is a time when territorial reorganization facilitated the concentration of capital in Tehran. The renewal of Tehran aimed to create a new center of power befitting a centralized state. Such a project could not leave the old neighbourhoods intact. Destroying the structure of the old neighbourhoods by widening their streets closely takes after the urban modernism of Haussmann. The bodies of the cities were radically reengineered, under highly concentrated political power: "The orientation of the new transport investments reemphasized, for example, the tendency toward centralization of administration, finance, economy, and population in Paris. It re-posed the thorny issue

of the proper balance between geographical centralization and decentralization of political power within the nation" (Harvey 2003: 109). The achievements of the projects were remarkable regarding the contexts in both cases. The urban modernism in Tehran, like Paris, relied on the idea that state expenditures in transport and infrastructure are productive and promote the growth of economic activity; the conception of urban renewal was based on the improvement of the city's capacity for the circulation of goods and people. The social conception of property in both cities changed radically, engaging different social groups in the buying and selling of property as a speculative activity. The mid 1850s Paris and 1920s Tehran, however, was immensely different, making any meaningful comparison difficult. The prosperous trading center of the Western world since medieval times, Paris was the most important manufacturing city and the center stage for the French Revolution mid-century. Paris was a grand center of conspicuous consumption and at the same time a working-class city, with more than half of its 1.8 million people depending upon industry. What was perhaps the first great crisis of capitalism, the crisis of labour and capital in 1848, was overcome through long-term application of surpluses of capital and labour to the reorganization of the transport and communications system (ibid: 150).

Any urban renewal project that took place after Paris, regardless of location, would doubtless exhibit similarities in objective, dimensions, or implementation strategies, but there are also many points of divergence.[57] If the objective of urban renewal in Iran was not to find solutions for the crisis of labour and capital, and their redirection to urban renewal was like Paris, what was the initial impetus and how did it relate to major interventions such as the establishment of universities, mandatory military service, and a change in dress code? The Nasser-ed-Din shah modernization was a precursor to that of Reza shah, although the latter, like any good modernist, would reject any affinity with the former. It is only during Reza shah's renewal, however, that transformations started to move outside the circle of the elite (Arg neighborhood) and affect a much larger population as it targeted the building of a nation-state. Through

[57] In France the railway network expanded from 1931 kilometers in 1850 to a web of 17,400 kilometers in 1870, the telegraph system was built from nothing in 1856 to 23,000 kilometers ten years later, the first accurate cadastral and topographical map of the city was made in 1853. (Harvey 2003: 138).

street construction, urban renewal connected the self-contained and autonomous neighbourhoods of the pre-modern city to a city center representing the power and bureaucracy of the state. By promoting ideals like public health, mobility and convenience, the state became patron to a nation, and by housing the government power at the center of the city (Mashq Square, Tupkhaneh and Baharestan squares) it gave that power a symbolic significance. This renewal also helped with the establishment of bureaucratic institutions of urban governance and planning—contrary to the development of urban centers under colonial rule, where the majority of people found themselves outside the center. Urban architecture and planning in this period reinforced the tie between the old and the new parts of the city. This was, for example, contrary to colonial practices of the British in oil cities of southern Iran: for example, in Abadan, where vocational and residential spaces for oil industry workers were completely separated from the local population, or in Morocco, in regards to city planning of the French colonial rule, where the new and old sections of the city were kept radically separate.[58]

My emphasis on social history methodology intends to take the state-society relations and the new middle class agency more into account in conception of urban transformations in this era (i.e. support and resistance of various social sectors toward urban renewal). The existing archives of communications between city dwellers and municipalities in this period show while street construction was a nation-wide project with the aim of changing the meaning of urbanity, but the project could not have come about without a public demand being shaped among residents. In Tehran, street construction in the previous period was limited to the Arg and Dowlat districts, but residents of the older neighbourhoods demanded what had previously been denied them. Daniel's research focuses on the construction of Pahlavi Avenue through public petitions and requests sent to the municipality and the shah (2005: 39). A grid plan of wide avenues was a sign of renewal and was accompanied by public investment in infrastructure, especially electricity. Narrow streets prevented the construction of water

[58] For British urban planning in Iran see Ehsani "Social engineering and the contradictions of modernization in Khuzestan's company towns: A look at Abadan and Masjed-Soleyman." *International Review of Social History* (IRSH) 48: 361–399. For French planning in morocco see Dethier, "Evolution of Concepts of Housing, Urbanism and Country Planning in a Developing Country: Morocco, 1900-1972," in L. C. Brown, ed., From Madina to Metropolis (Princeton, 1973), 197-243.

supply networks, and no city other than Abadan boasted such a network. Paved roads became synonymous with sanitation for neighbourhoods. Automobiles stood for comfort, mobility, and speed. Labyrinthine passageways pointed to a disorderly, backward, and dangerous past. Architects of that period, even those with a critical approach, were instrumental in promoting new ways of seeing urbanity among the public. The France-educated architect, Abbas Azhdari, lists streets, sanitary water supply, and electricity as criteria for a desirable city in an article in a municipal periodical (1934):

> Today in the civilized world, the word city is reserved for a place that has at least three characteristics: First, a clean and sanitary environment whose streets are free from mud and slush in the winter, dust and soil in the summer… wide enough to allow the sun to beam through to provide for the health of residents and the mobility of vehicles. Parks, gardens, and large squares are accessible to all residents of the city… the second characteristic presupposes the first, sanitary water and disposal of dirty water and other unsanitary refuse of the city. A city whose water supply is not sanitary and which has not been properly equipped with today's technology is like a city with no water at all…. And the third, which is more an aesthetic and comfort concern than general health, is the question of lighting…. We have no city today that meets these requirements…. Any traveler that comes to Iran today will see that in cities, small or large, there are no longer those crooked and twisted alleys without trees but wide and clean streets. The first steps we have taken are limited to appearances and we need to go further. (Kelaye and Qolamnejad 2013: 10-11)

Street construction in Tehran, contrary to in Paris where central districts were the focal point of workers' resistance, posed no security concerns for the state; however, force was employed for their construction because the state saw itself as a legal representative and defender of the public: it had a historical mandate to bring progress to Iran. The most significant renewal project that suggests political motivation was the destruction of major parts of Sangelaj Neighborhood, which was undertaken under the pretext of building the Tehran Stock Exchange and a new commercial center, both of which never materialized. The City Park was later built on this land after petitions by the

Architects Association and the agreement of the municipality in the 1950.[59] The emphasis on people's agency in street constructions doesn't mean that all social sectors benefited from urban renewal equally. The municipality paid residents whose houses had to be demolished to make way for streets a minimal sum and drove those families to misery. In the north and west of Tehran, street construction quickly led to the renewal of adjacent neighbourhoods. Simond (1935) writes: "All the streets have been paved in the past two years and many news building have been raised" (Quoted in Ehlers and Floor 1993: 257).

During this period, a law was put in place to allow the municipality to buy land for road construction, but not the land on either side of the road. Although the municipality was permitted by law to have a share in the increased property value of an adjacent site, this right was never exercised. Reza shah devised special regulations for buildings lining main streets. For example, all buildings had to be two stories for a homogenous appearance. A city that up until then had been built based on social and religious conventions didn't lend itself easily to these regulations. The words of Simond, the commercial attaché of Britain, are revealing:

> New regulations had been issued to the effect that all buildings on designated avenues must be two stories or more in height; owners who did not comply were to be forced to sell to proprietors who would promise to do so. Not long after the regulations came out Reza shah was walking through the streets of Tehran, accompanied by the acting mayor, with peoples currying out of the way. He asked, 'Why do these ugly, one-story shops still remain? I have told the military to force the owners to add another story or have their shops destroyed. I wonder if you, a civilian, could succeed where the army has failed.' The official plunged into the task, and within a few weeks, sections of the avenues looked as if they had been bombed from the air. (ibid: 258)

[59] According to Shahri, the destruction of Sangelaj Neighborhood was due to Reza shah's abhorrence this part of the city because it was where the Cossacks, he included, were stationed before he became shah (1978: 120).

Streets and avenues unhinged the closed structures of old neighbourhoods, and in addition to increasing social distinctions in the city, eased communication between neighbourhoods:

> Earlier *maydan*s were more like medieval open spaces, evolving and changing over time and encompassing a variety of activities. They evolved as urban needs and urban people defined them. By contrast, Reza Shah's new *maydan*s were timeless, almost static places dedicated to symbolism rather than action. In effect, Reza Shah attempted to retain (at least the shadow of) an important feature of Iranian urban life while changing its symbolic content… An architectural feature of each new *maydan* was a central element—usually a statue or fountain, a piece of the new State iconography. Statues, many of the monarch himself or of national figures such as the poet Ferdowsi, were commissioned and made in Europe by famous contemporary sculptors, then shipped to Iran. Whether it was a statue of the monarch or of an acclaimed hero there was one goal: edification of the public through heightened awareness of the national heritage of Iran. (Marefat 1988: 91)

Pulling down the old statues became the first symbol of regime change since Reza shah era. Reza shah's statue in Baharestan square in front of parliament was pulled down during the political upheaval of the early 1930s. The third element of urban renewal in this period was the new city center, which came about through the destruction and renovation of buildings in Arg District and the construction of new offices in Mashq Square. This large new square (16 hectares) was first used in the 1830s for military exercises and then it became the main army quarters in Tehran. Another part of the square was designated for Tehran's national garden or Bagh-e Melli (Ghaffari et al 2012). This was a garden or public park that the British poet, Vita Sackville-West, traveling to Iran described as "a public garden at the center of a dusty square."[60] In the span of a

[60] Vita Sackville-West (2007) traveled the Middle East region by herself in the first half of the 20th century, and offers us a description of the city and the coronation ceremonies of Reza shah in 1925. Her description of Bagh-e Melli tells us that this first public park in Tehran didn't resemble the beautiful gardens on the outskirts of the city portrayed in various European travelogues. Sackville-West, who was

decade, the center of Tehran was lined with Olympian buildings, each one of which was designed by a well-known architect. Arg Square and Mashq Square represented an architecture of power, spaces inaccessible to the public yet within close proximity to the Grand Bazaar. The buildings of the ministries of Finance, Justice, Customs, Mine and Industry stood within the boundaries of Arg Square, while those of Foreign Affairs, War, as well as law enforcement and postal offices, and a new prison ("Ministry of Justice Incarceration House") were in Mashq Square (Habibi 1994: 90).

These centers of state power were coterminous with the center of commercial activity in Tehran and they remained central until the 1960s, when the Tehran Comprehensive Plan earmarked Shahestan-e Pahlavi in the northern part of the city as the new center of power. Mashq Square today is part of the heritage of the city—a museum of architecture of Iran with symbolic significance. Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammad-Javad Sharif, stood outside the ministry building in 2014 to record his message of peace and reconciliation, addressed to the 5+1 countries during the nuclear negotiation. Buildings of this era were important in terms of their functional use for state power to reproduce itself. They also stood for the importance of architecture as a modern profession and architects as important players in the life of the city.

The architecture of this period has been the subject of many studies[61] but it will suffice for the purpose of this study to touch on two main influences of this period. First, Iranian architects of this period came up with new ways of reproducing the modernist project by applying its tenets to their aesthetic sense, providing examples of crossbred architecture that informs the current architects and architecture of Iran. Second, in the span of only two decades, architects of this period built offices, industries, hospitals, universities, schools, and residential houses that changed the lives of people in unimaginably new ways. I will thus end the urban renewal project of this period with a tribute to architects of this period in shaping Tehran:

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adept at gardening, further writes, "with the exception of a few shriveled cloves and pods of marjoram, cordoned off by barbed wire, nothing could be seen" (Sackville 2007: 35).

[61] The research group named as "Memari-e doran-e Tahavol" (architecture of the transformative era) have a long and widespread research project on the subject. They published several books on each prominent architect and buildings. Also see Safamanesh (2009).

> [Reza shah's] building program responded to new functions of city and state. On the other hand, the program itself gave rise to new functions, not the least of which was the creation of a modern profession of architecture in Iran… The modernization of Iran brought architecture and archaeology into a symbiotic relationship for the first time. Architecture became a convenient instrument for state propaganda and archaeology provided its vocabulary of power…. The new State architecture of Iran used pre-Islamic imagery supplied by archaeological excavations sanctioned by Reza shah. (Marefat 1988: 95-97)

The urban renewal project initiated by Reza shah sidelined the intelligentsia, Bazaar merchants, and the non-government elites who had previously run newspapers and publications, established schools, and provided urban services during the urban renewal efforts of the constitutional era.

City as the Site of Rebellion against Authoritarian Modernity

Many researchers have speculated on the context and processes that led to Reza shah's gradual disillusionment with his associates and subordinates. Katouzian (2003) names dozens of ministers, politicians, officials, and parliamentary members who were killed, imprisoned, or exiled. Beirut became the headquarters for intellectuals and technocrats that the shah had alienated, and functioned as a regional and international link for these dissidents. In addition to those who had been exiled or who had migrated, many leftist activists, poets and writers, journalists and political critics of this period were killed, imprisoned, or confined. Before Reza shah, Yeprem Khan, a constitutionalist fighter was the head of Tehran police force. Reza shah placed his own confederates in the police force and increased its clout. The force was able to control the capital effectively.

Reza shah was able to address issues that had previously caused social unrest; a prime example being bread shortage: he built Tehran's 60-thousand-ton grain silos, which stored the city's grains needs for six months. The city's reconstruction, however, had generated new inequalities and discontent. Although many of the new facilities and institutions, like the University of Tehran (Habibi 1994: 91-92), the Railway Station,

hospitals, and many factories were built on top of the former moat, the location of new governmental buildings, municipal services, and service centers led to discriminations. The geographical distribution of these services compounded the inequality that the circulation of capital had already created in the city.

Tehran experienced a process of creative destruction (Harvey 2003: 254) in this period. The affluent houses in old neighbourhoods were abandoned because the lowering value of land in the old center of the city didn't justify their maintenance. New streets added to the value of the city's arid lands and made further accumulation of wealth possible after their sales and purchase. The price of land in northern parts of the city increased exponentially with the new services that the government offered. This increased the city's social stratification. The existing documents portrays a three-faced city: the well-to-do city, with access to the best resources at the foot of the mountains of the north; the city with its new administrative center to the south of the well-to-do city, with ostentatious government buildings and commercial streets in the wealthy part of the old town; and the older city, with the exception of Arg and Dowlat districts, which expanded east and westward. In the older city, some new streets were constructed as well as the train station and industrial facilities like the grain silo, but in social and physical terms, it was a city left to its own devices. Ja'far Shahri (1999) has given a detailed account of the southern districts of Tehran in this period.[62] A statistical comparison of censuses of 1921 and 1932 confirms the above claim. The city of Tehran in the 1921 census is divided into 10 districts (as opposed to 4 in the previous census during the Qajar) of which the main concentration of population is on the eastern periphery and two older sections of Sanglaj and Bazaar.

[62] The name of many locations in this older section of town—like Zoghali-ha ("Coal-sellers") Alley, Qaterchi-ha ("Mule-driver") Alley, Sabun-paz-khaneh ("Soap-makers") Neighborhood—indicates the importance of an industry or a production unit in the identity of the neighborhood. The Hazrati Bazaar (near Shah Abdol-Azim Gate) and the shops near the Southern Gate, as well as fruit depots, were places that labourers from villages would gather. They roomed in lodges around these gates for the period of their stay. Mule- and camel-drivers, which carried passengers and goods to and from these gates, had also settled in these neighbourhoods. Other than village migrants and poorer labour classes, a large group of unemployed citizens, along with prostitutes, itinerant gypsies, drug addicts and fugitives lived alongside the former moat. The latter group had increased in number during the discord of the late Qajar period and with the growth of the city had been pushed further south. Their former places of residence, like the Sar-e Qabr-e Aqa Cemetery, had now been incorporated into the main part of the city. (1999: 111-124)

Reza shah's urban policy caused urban dualism in Tehran, in regard to socioeconomic development and its spatial manifestation within the city. For example, new industrial enterprises were concentrated mainly in the south and southwest of the city, close to the traditional brick works. Together with the construction of new and expansion of old residential quarters for workers, this particular part of the city very definitely developed a special image as an underprivileged and socioeconomically problematic section of Tehran under Reza shah: "the street plans and house types of the new quarters were quite unlike those of the old city. The layout of the new residential areas was almost rectangular. The local roads were paved, 15-20 meters wide, while the throughways could be as wide as 25-35 meters. New also were the sidewalks, lined by open ditches which served the purposes of water supply, irrigation, and drainage, and which were unhygienic and a hindrance to traffic" (Ehler and Floor: 271).

The high price of land along with indifference to the living accommodations of the urban masses gave social discontent new dimensions. In 1938, the first landlord/tenant law was legislated by the parliament to control the burgeoning increase in rent prices. A year later, Kargosha'i Bank, a division of Melli (or National) Bank, started to give loans for the purchase and repair of houses (Mahbubi-Ardakani 1992: 126). The establishment of Rahni Bank, with the aim of providing housing, also took place in this period (Saeidi-Rezvani 1992: 143):

> Over-crowding in the old quarters could not be alleviated by driving wide avenues through them. The municipalities had no authority or funds to implement low-cost housing programs. [The focus on state buildings] made the building of especially low-cost housing a less attractive venture for investors, especially where the small local builders were disappearing due to a lack of skilled labour in the entire construction sector as well as the lack of capital to organize investment in low-cost housing. Moreover, building costs had risen, unmatched by a rise in wages… Previously, each family, with the exception of the poorest, occupied a house of its own, and this may still be the rule for the majority… the number of homeowners was relatively large in 1925, but by 1941 this had dropped. The demand for housing was exacerbated by the inflow of migrants from the rural areas.

> Consequently, rents were very high. While the general cost of living index for 1940 was 130, the rent index had risen to 200, the base year 1936 being 100. (Ehler and Floor: 274)

Discontent due to high housing costs showed itself after Reza shah was ousted from power and later during the oil nationalization period. In cities, few attempts were made to invest in infrastructure, limited to constructing a street or two. In fact, what the cities benefited from was the migration of the elite from villages. The calamities of modernity—the state interfering in the organization of daily life of its citizenry through proclamations and pronouncements—could be felt throughout. Urban uprisings of 1928-29 in Esfahan, Shiraz, and Tabriz started with protesting military service, which had been made mandatory in 1927, conscripting first the village and then provincial and city youth. Shops and guilds first closed down the bazaars. The discontented clergy led these protests. But as Cronin has argued, the solidarity between secular reformists and the clergy that had been effective during the Constitutional Revolution—and later in other historical occasions—was no longer present. As Cronin puts it, by fulfilling the demands of nationalists, Reza shah had set them against the rest of the population. This made it impossible for protestors to resist his drive to implement his plans (Cronin 2008:132-8). Urban discontent was not limited to active service but extended to state interference in the daily affairs of the populace. Military and railroad construction budgets were coming from heavy taxes that were unbearable to the public. The presence of the military in provinces may have added to the general security of the country, but it was also a form of interference in people's affairs. In 1926 the right to determine taxes was taken from merchant guilds and the government took it into its own hands. In 1927, the Civil Law came into effect, reducing the power of the clergy to look into people's personal affairs. In 1935, a large-scale uprising took place in Gowharshad Mosque in the city of Mashhad against government taxes and corruption, which was violently put down (Abrahamian 2008: 93-4). Resistance to the mandatory removal of cover for women and the donning of a chapeau (instead of the cap) for men carried punishments from house detention to monetary penalties and imprisonment. The state interference in labour issues—labor

protests against wages and long hours of work, especially those of Abadan Refinery strike—were usually accompanied by violence.

Tehran's middle class, who had most benefited from modernization in this period, maintained support for the shah despite all these atrocities. From its state-building project, to economic privilege, increasing wealth, and the formation of a new lifestyle, the middle class had gained handsomely. In the mid-1930s, the Amjadiyeh Stadium was built in the middle class neighbourhoods of northeastern Tehran and the first steps were taken to transform football into a national sport. The stadium became a symbol of how the state played a role in shaping bodies and building the future generation. The young prince appeared in sports attire among the attendees in the opening ceremonies to present himself as a model for future generations (Schayegh 2002). The construction of the first national park in Tehran is important for its role in regulating leisure time. Before Reza shah, some private gardens were opened to the public, but in 1927 a parcel of land in Mashq Square, which had been set aside for the construction the first national park, was landscaped in Tehran. Golnar Tajdar's (2010) research, based on newspapers of the time, shows that the National Park was first supposed to house a lodge, a cinema, a sport facility, and a theater on its peripheries, but with the concentration of administrative buildings in this area, the plan was reduced to a simple leisure area. The National Park had a short life span. Its use between 1927 and 1928 was limited to official or public celebrations, like guild ceremonies for changing the dress code, fireworks for saints' birthdays, the landing of the first airplane, and the first bicycle race in Tehran. Ghaffari and others who have studied the building structures in the Mashq Square write that in 1934, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Museum of Iran were built on the grounds of the National Park (2011: 6).

On the wide streets of Tehran, the speed of cars and non-adherence to traffic regulations had increased the number of accidents. The excitement of modern life was in full swing. Between 1927 and 1929, the number of accidents and deaths increased from 128 to 247 (Tehran Municipality 2nd Yearbook: 127-8). Marefat speaks of Shahreza (Enqelab) and Pahlavi (Valiasr) avenues as upper-class neighbourhoods:

> Many new institutions—including Tehran University and a number of major secondary schools—were built along Shahreza Avenue. As the value of property along the street increased, apartments and multi-story buildings were erected. Mixed-use buildings appeared. They had three or four stories with retail shops on the ground floor, offices on the second, and residential apartments on the upper levels. [Pahlavi] Street, like Shahreza, featured tree-lined pedestrian paths with water from the *qanats* [water channels] running in *jub*s [open irrigation ditches] along its entire length. Many villas and some walk-up apartments developed along Pahlavi, especially its northern part, making it one of the fashionable and prestigious residential districts. At major intersections, commercial nodes with luxury shops and cafes also appeared. (1988: 83-4)

With the fall of Reza shah not only the exiled heads of tribes returned to their lands, but older statesmen also returned to the stage.

Tehran during Oil Nationalization

After the occupation of Iran by the Allies in September 1941, Tehran was host to a conference between the Allies' chiefs. To forestall any danger of Iran falling to the Germans, presidents of the USSR, USA, and UK decided that Reza shah should relinquish power and confine himself to an island in Greece. Though his son, Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, was chosen as heir, the outcome was a humiliation for the court and the Iranian elite, and reinforced suspicions of a foreign conspiracy among them and the intelligentsia.

For some years, the city was embroiled in agitations that came from the shah and the court, foreign powers, clerics and politicians, each of which pursued their own interests. The most important of these was the unrest outside a bakery in December 1942, fomented by the allocation of grain to 75 Allied soldiers based in an Iranian army garrison. Protesters used their hunger as a weapon to show their discontent over social inequalities (Mc Farland 2004: 98). The young king, who had assumed power under these conditions, opened the political space for a period of time. With the war's end and the

lifting of the Allies' occupation, the Soviet army refused to leave the country and formed the pro-Soviet Democratic Party of Azerbaijan who claimed autonomy in Iran's northwest province of Azerbaijan. This encouraged the Iranian government to try and establish stronger relations with the US. The extension of a 10 million-dollar line of credit by American Congress, the dispatch of a delegation of American engineers in 1948 to draft the Second Development Plan by Mavara' Bahar (Overseas) Institute, the allocation of 25 million dollars to the state of Iran, and the shah's visit to Washington to receive economic and military assistance, all took place in the same year, and shows the extent to which Iran sought after and accepted American aid and influence. In 1949, President Harry Truman inaugurated his Point Four Program, which extended technical assistance to "developing countries" with the foreign policy objective of stymieing the spread of Communism. Iran was the first country in the region that Point Four targeted.[63] In 1945 and during the administration of Premiere Qavam, a seven-year plan was prepared, in which urban services like electricity, potable water, sewerage, and building improvements were provisioned. The First Development plan was in fact a list of reconstruction projects that government assigned a budget for them (Ministry of Interior 1992).

In 1948, the parliament approved the First Economic Development Plan (1948–54), which called for comprehensive agricultural and industrial development. The Management and Plan Organization (named Plan Organization at the time) was established to administer the program. In 1950, the Iranian government signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement with Ambassador Henry F. Grady. In addition to migration from villages due to WII and the economic slump in this period, Tehran saw an increase in population:

> The rate of population growth doubled during the second quarter of the century [from an annual rate of 0.8 to1.5 percent]. By then, the population of Iran had entered the stage of demographic transition characterized by continuing high

[63] Following the Truman doctrine, the US State Department formed an office for Greece, Turkey and Iran's affairs. Iran was put on the same list as the two countries in which communist guerrillas were active. Truman's new ambassador to Iran had been seasoned in Greece.

> fertility and decline in mortality. After World War II, the rate of population growth accelerated further, due primarily to improvements in public health and notably to the eradication of malaria (Banani, 1961).

Between 1941 and 1956, the annual rate of population growth averaged 2.2 percent. (Aghajanian 1991: 703). In countries like Iran a drastic reduction in mortality rates due to medical interference—new medications and equipment while birthrates remained constant or even increased—led to an "unprecedented" spike in urban population growth in the mid-20th century. The average rate of mortality in Iran in the four decades of the Pahlavi rule (1930-1980) fell from 32 (out of 1,000) to 13 while birth rates only decreased from 40.6 to 40.1 (Amani 1978: 73, 80). Reduction in birthrates was dependent on transformation of family structure and women's social role that didn't occurred until the early 1970s. Contagious diseases came under the purview of the state in mid-20th century (for example general smallpox vaccination started in mid-1940s).[64] Water-borne diseases came under control in 1970 by municipal treatment plants and tap water availability. Thus, effective factors in an increase in the population of Tehran changed drastically during the two Pahlavi rules. During Reza shah, 80 percent of Tehran's population increase was due to migration. This percentage came down to 60 percent at the time of Oil Nationalization and to one-third after the Land Reform Act. This phenomenon has gone largely unnoticed in studies of migration to Tehran. The city area did not increase at the same rate as the population growth in the 1940s and 1950s.).

The fall of the dictatorship of Reza shah turned specialized forces that had previously been in the service of government, or unable to assume a social role, into independent agents. In 1944, eight architects who had studied in Europe and were working for the government on the design and construction of government buildings came together and formed Anjoman-e Me'maran-e Diplomeh ("Society of Diploma-Holding Architects"). In addition to construction projects, these architects also taught at the School of Architecture that had been established in 1938. They strove to be a more coherent influence on the country's architecture. They published *Architect* magazine to start a conversation with specialists, intellectuals, and academics from non-architectural

[64] To learn more about strategies to combat smallpox, see an article in *Yadegar* magazine, no. 33, 1947.

backgrounds. Even though the editors of the magazine claim in the first issue that theirs is a "specialized and enthused magazine that neither wishes nor attempts to touch politics in any form," given the existing "construction discord" it was incumbent on its writers to "fulfill their duties to the best of their abilities to improve the construction and sanitary conditions of cities in the country" (*Architect* 1: 3). [65] The view of the writers in *Architect* on urban issues was penetrating and critical. They proposed specific policies to address the rapid growth of Tehran. As an example, they criticized municipal policies for fixing city limits, which led to the privation of a large group from urban services, and proposed setting aside areas on the peripheries of urban centers to build low-income housing for migrants (Azhdari 1946: 17). The idea of low-income housing is repeated in other articles of the magazine. In another article, the idea was traced back to 1936, when, inspired by a social construction plan in France, Ali-Akbar Davar set up a state institution called Bongah Sakhteman ("Construction Agency"). This agency was established but never able to continue with its stated aim (Sheibani 1946: 28). In 1946, Rahni Bank approved the plan to build 1,000 units in the southeast of Tehran with the help of one of these architects. *Architect* published six issues over a period of two years.

City planning in this period took on a reformist approach and tried to plan for public interest against avaricious urban landowners. Tehran lacked an overall plan that put a cap on the expansion and growth of the city. There wasn't even a map of the constructed land within the city. According to the Society, in the absence of a map and progressive plan for the city, large landowners were free to build passageways and register the land to sell it subsequently. Once the land was sold, the municipality couldn't change the plan at will, as it interfered with the buyers' rights. Naser Badi', one of the founders of the Society, who was also the head of City Planning of Tehran Municipality, suggested that the municipality draft a comprehensive plan for the city that could respond to long-term needs and provision for services, and according to which title holders of the land would register their property; it was necessary for land registration to receive a certificate from the municipality. He advised the municipality to not fear debt, to

[65] The Society of Diploma-Holding Architects was established by well-known architects Vartan Havanesian, Mohsen Forughi, Keyqobad Zafar, Manuchehr Khorsand, Ali Sadeq, Nasser Badi', Iraj Moshiri, and Abbas Azhdari.

construct streets and offer services by long-term borrowing (the way it was done in European cities), to reform the Passageway Law of 1941, to freeze areas that the municipality may need, to refuse issuing permits for building construction to avoid compensations, and to levy a tax on abandoned plots of land within the city to prevent owners from holding onto their property in hopes of future gains (1946: 18-19).

Figure 6: Tehran in 1953, before the great expansion through 1968 Comprehensive Plan:



Source: Atlas of Tehran Metropolis: http://www.irancarto.cnrs.fr/record.php?q=AT030313&f=local&l=en * Ministries and governmental buildings were located north of the Qajar city and Grand Bazaar. Tehran's Railway Station defined the border of the city in the south.

The housing and urban services crisis reached its historical peak in this period. Two thirds of the residents of the city lived in dwellings of two-rooms or less; since kitchens were counted as a room in these censuses, in fact these households lived in dwellings with one room. Shantytowns cropped up on the peripheries of the city, where no electricity, tap water or urban services were available. With government support to address the housing crisis, three new neighbourhoods (Narmak, Naziabad, and

Yusefabad) were added to the city of Tehran. The land in these neighbourhoods belonged to the government or had no title-holders. These were given to Sakhtemani Bank to develop and sell to the public.[66] In 1956 a law was approved that further limited land-grabbers to appropriate abandoned, endowed, or government land within a 10-kilometer radius of Tupkhaneh Square. The population growth of Tehran exacerbated the city's water shortage. In 1946, the municipality drilled 17 wells in southern and eastern parts of town to address the crisis. The water from these wells was stored in a tank underneath a city square. Next to the tank, valves were provisioned to make it easy for residents' access, and in the middle of the square a fountain with decorations was built (Badi' 1946: 52-54).

By 1953, the development of electrical capacity was of public interest and demand was on the rise, but implementation lagged far behind. Forty thousand Tehrani families were waiting for their subscriptions to be processed (Schayegh 2012: 621).[67] In the late 1950s, treatment plants reduced water-borne diseases. Before that, water was carried to tanks through open ditches. The government desperately needed monetary resources to proceed with its reconstruction plans. Instead of appealing to foreign creditors, the Iranian parliament asked for increase the share of Iran from the revenue of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC):

> In 1949, the nationalists of the parliament suggested the AIOC agreement be renegotiated and the committee concerned with oil matters, headed by Mosaddeq, rejected a draft agreement the AIOC had offered for not including the 50-50 profit-sharing provision that was part of other new Persian Gulf oil concessions. Subsequent negotiations with the AIOC were unsuccessful… by the time the AIOC finally offered 50-50 profit sharing in February 1951, sentiment for nationalization of the oil industry had become widespread. On March 15, the

[66] In Narmak, 2.5 million square meter of land in 8,500 lots with an average of 350 square meters were sold. In Naziabad, a residential complex was built for labourers. The district of Yusefabad was government land and in 1954 was sold to the public by the Ministry of Finance (Badi' 1962: 213). The 400 unit Farahabad Complex (Piruzi Street) was built as a residential complex with proper urban area (Hashemzadeh Homayuni 1962: 21).

[67] Tehran Power Bungah, founded in 1949, proposed different plans to raise the capital's power output. Until the 1960s, private suppliers remained important providers of power. In March 1953 the MPO had transferred funds to forty-eight cities to allow them to build power stations (Schayegh 2012: 621).

> Majles voted to nationalize the oil industry. In April the shah yielded to Majles pressure and demonstrations in the streets by naming Mosaddeq prime minister (Hooglund 2008: 32-3).

Oppositions to the British claims on the oil revenues brought together a wide coalition of actors from various social divisions in the Oil Nationalization Movement, following which, and in the spirit of the Constitutional Revolution, the era turned into one of freedom of expression, social networks, and civil organizations (Foran 1994; Abrahamian 2008). A new coalition was formed between provinces and the central government, notably with the Qashqai Tribe that regarded Mosaddeq as the hero of nationalism (Foran 1994: 429). This era didn't last long, however: the 1953 coup brought the shah and the court back into power.

The Cold War Technocracy and Centralized Planning

For several years after the coup, leftist and nationalist technocrats who had assumed responsibilities in the administrations after Reza shah, especially during the government of Mosaddeq, disappeared from centers of power. However, the 35-year rule of Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi saw two different generations of Iranian technocrats. The first group adhered to the "develop to prevent revolution" model, or what Schayegh (2012) has called "promise politics." They thrived from 1930 to 1945, when the dominant discourse in the US called for the development of the Third World to forestall the spread of communist revolutions. The Iranian government used promise politics after the coup against Mosaddeq to plan for development and modernization. The policymakers in this period came from old land-owning and capital-holding families, knew the Iranian economic mode of operation and society well, and had been educated and experienced in the post-WWII atmosphere. As such, they looked at the state's relationship with bigger powers and Iranian society though a Keynesian and Truman's Point Four lens. The coming about of the "White Revolution" could be argued to be an attempt on the part of Mohammad-Reza shah to keep power away from these technocrats. The second group came to power when the state was stable: when social competition between eastern and western blocks had ended, when the Point Four Program in Iran had ended (1967), and

when Iran's economy was integrated into the global economy. This period was concurrent with the increase in the price of oil in the world market and the swelling of Iran's income through oil. The technocratic discourse of this period centred on mass-consumption and militarism.

The most important technocrat of this period was Gholamhossein Ebtehaj,[68] the representative of Iran in the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944. The conference had symbolic significance for the technocracy of this era. Ebtehaj and Bretton Woods is perhaps the starting point of an ideological and financial link to the US. This third generation of Iranian technocrats changed their focus from physical development plans to economic and public sector planning. This shifted the locus of interference of the government in public affairs. In 1954, Ebtehaj was appointed as the head of the Plan Organization, and during his tenure (1954-59) wielded significant decision-making power. The technocracy of this era had many privileges compared to their predecessors and successors, and they used those privileges to strengthen their power. They assumed power at a time of social competition between the eastern and western block, and were working within a government that had lost its legitimacy after the coup and oscillating between militarism and development to curb the tide of social unrest. Ebtehaj, Alikhani (Minister of Finance), and their colleagues were representatives of a section of the ruling class who insisted on economic development rather than militarism as a solution for crises, thereby creating a point of contention between themselves and the shah (ibid 445; Alikhani 1381: 212). The idea of the independence of the specialized institutions from the political arm of the government for which Ebtehaj strove, shows that the institution of technocracy was a site of struggle over discourses and political doctrines within the ruling power.

The "develop to prevent revolution" discourse, that had its roots in US policy after WWII, became prevalent in the 50s and with the Mosaddeq administration. Point Four in Iran focused on agricultural development and the peasant society. Point Four's

[68] Ebtahaj was a colleague of Davar and head of Melli Bank of Iran for one decade. In 1952-54, he was the Middle East director of the IMF, and became a trusted figure among the Americans, who suggested to the shah that he should be given a more prominent role in the administration (Ebtehaj 1992: 293).

first financial aid was paid in 1950 to stop malaria in the provinces (Hamraz 2002; Sajedi 2008). The objective of the technocrats of this generation, by contrast, was to draft comprehensive plans for the development of human resources, various economic sectors, and the urban and rural society. The foundations for urban planning were laid during this period. The Second Development Plan, and one of its major projects, the Karaj Dam, came about with the help of American consultants of Mavara' Bahar Institute and the Point Four Program, which shows the dimensions of "promise politics" both at this juncture and before the drafting of the Comprehensive Plan of Tehran.

The Second Development Plan (1955–1962) provisioned considerable funding for infrastructural preparations, including electricity.[69] Based on his study on the Iranian government's construction of the Karaj Dam and the rise of consumer society in Iran, Schayegh (2012) argues that a politics of promise emerged as a key factor in shaping the post-1953 Iranian politics of development. He suggests that Iranian officials benefited from and played with American worries around Soviet gains in a fragile post-coup Iran. Abol-Hassan Ebtehaj, the head of Management and Plan Organization (MPO) from 1954 to 1959, played an important role in transferring the pressures in Tehran to American partners. As Schayegh suggests, industrialization was the top concern of technocrats like Ebtehaj, and he pursued aggressive policies in matters of infrastructure that, at times, clashed with the agendas of certain U.S. decision-makers; without the Cold War and resultant U.S. aid, these projects might not have ever been executed or may have proceeded at a much slower pace (2012: 637). The economic growth rate in this period reached 7-8 percent per year, but militarization was effectively competing with industrialization and the country's military budget spiked from 83 million USD in 1953 to 183 million in 1955 (Ahmadian 2004: 145). Ebtehaj and his colleagues strove to change this dynamic by controlling the governments' financial resources and promoting planning as a tool for development (MacLeod 1964: 33).[70] To do so, the MPO needed to

[69] At least one third of the Second Plan's overall expenditures was set aside for the construction of hydro-electrical dams, including Karaj, Sefidrud and Dez and municipal electricity outlay. Karaj Dam, a 180 meters high and 390 meters long hydro-electrical dam was constructed (1958–1961) 60 kilometers north of Tehran, to meet "a popular consumerist demand for electricity" (Schayegh 2012: 618).

[70] Some have called Ebtehaj Iran's first technocrat due to these undertakings (Bostock and Jones 1989). In fact, Ebtehaj's expertise and trust in the international financial world, at a time the US was pursuing cold war politics, helped him with the pursuit of a development program that had no social backing. The head of

convince the parliament to financially outfit the organization with experts. This was not an easy job in the presence of the Ministry of Finance. Ebtehaj chose the easy way of reaching an agreement with the Ford Foundation to get financial support for hiring economic consultants, and the scientific members of the Economic Bureau took on the job under the supervision of Professor Mason of Harvard University. Known as the Harvard Advisory Group, this assembly of savants was in Iran from 1957 to 1962, and, with the help of Iranian counterparts, drafted and provisioned for the implementation of the Third Development Plan. Mason later wrote that their circle in effect constituted a government within the government, or a foreign government within the government of Iran (quoted from Madanipour 2010: 488).[71] The success of the Plan Organization within the bureaucracy of the time was in accepting responsibility for central budgeting, which gave the Organization an advantage over other outfits. Ebtehaj believed that central budgeting would reduce corruption and errors in development projects. In his memoir, he lists superfluous projects and mistaken steps that led to the wasting of national resources.[72] The Third Development Plan was Iran's first plan that, instead of listing projects to undertake, set policies for all economic and social sectors and laid out steps and schemes to implement projects (Ejlali 2002). Ebtehaj left the Plan Organization in 1959, in the middle of drafting the Third Plan. In 1962 he spent several months in prison for embezzlement, and in the tumultuous proceeding years remained in the private sector.

World Bank at the time backed him by funding his big projects, including the establishment of new bank in Iran (MacLoad 1964: preface).

[71] Thomas MacLeod, the head of the group and a Canadian economist, writes in his book that members "accepted administrative responsibilities," in addition to consultation and recommendation, "and at times authoritatively influenced government decision making," but this trend gradually subsided with the exit of Ebtehaj from the Plan Organization, and charges of foreign interference emerged (1964: 22). According to the Encyclopedia of Saskatchewan, Thomas McLeod was a senior official with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Dean of Commerce at the University of Saskatchewan in 1952. He did extensive international development worked in the ME, in Turkey with the Ford Foundation, in Iran with the Harvard Advisory Group, and in Nigeria with the World Bank. http: //esask.uregina.ca/entry/mcleod_thomas_h_1918-.html

[72] Ebtehaj wrote later that public sector in Iran was ineffective due to interferences by the shah and foreign interest: "the shah has a deep and conspicuous influence on government decision making… the fearful reality is that the royal government of Iran gives off the feeling that it doesn't listen to economic reasoning and Iranian views; it only listens to foreign demands" (1964: 160). By "foreign demands" he probably means military advisors, as he later argued that his opposition with raising the military budget was the main conflict with the shah (1992: 445). MacLeod observation also confirms the negative influence of the IMF and foreign creditors on economic decision-making: "development plans are graded according to foreign interests rather than economic measure. Roads are built first because this is what foreign creditors want…. Feasibility studies of plans are left to foreign advisors who suggest these plans to begin with" (1964: 167).

His successor was critical of his over-reliance on the West and driving a wedge within the government (Majidi 1998: 44).[73] The clergy's dissatisfaction with Point Four policies, in addition to America's role in Iran, stemmed from the initiation of socio-cultural reforms. Shah devised policies based on Point Four programs, called, "The Revolution of the Shah and the People" or The White Revolution. It had six principles: land reform, the transfer of shares in public factories to land owners in return for land, nationalization of forests and pasturelands, nationalization of water resources, women's suffrage, and the establishment of a Literacy Corp, which was given the task of spreading literacy in villages. The clergy and nationalist forces received the White Revolution as furthering the influence of the state on society.[74] The shah put the Land Reform Act to a referendum in a congress of 4 thousand peasant representatives in order to suggest that the opposition had no social base.[75] Howzeh Elmiyeh (Qom Seminary) rose up against the White Revolution and was met with violence. In 1963, Ayatollah Khomeini was exiled to Iraq. The relationship between the state and civil society was now based on mistrust and repression. In February 1962, seventy newspapers and magazines were closed. The number of magazines never reached the same figure even a decade later (Barzin 1975: 14-18). To the state, political participation was synonymous with social institutions' acting in the service of the magisterial executive orders coming from the shah. Kazem Vadi'i, one the theoreticians of the White Revolution, justifies the elimination of parties and political forces thusly:

> Under normal conditions, Iran could've supported parties as its influential social arms, but in the process of complete industrialization of the country, and only a quarter of a century of transition from a traditional society to the current industrial

[73] In fact, Iranian society following the coup had suffered from deep-running fissures, which showed themselves in political conflicts within the state, and between the clergy and the state. MacLeod's book documents some of the conflicts emerged when Ebtehaj was blackballed and imprisoned, and once the Harvard Advisory Group decided to leave the country.

[74] The clerical establishment was against land reform because it threatened land endowments, and against women's suffrage because it contradicted religious mores. The clergy also opposed the Provincial and Local Councils Act because it removed the prerogative of Muslimhood for voters and elected officials. Nationalist forces were also ambivalent about these reforms. They did not accept that land reform, a strategy had been implemented in Egypt and Syria by nationalists, could be suggested by the Americans.

[75] The implementation of land reform took ten years, and half the peasants who worked on estates became owners of on average 3 hectares of land. There is disagreement among scholars on the consequences of land reforms on peasant inequality, agricultural productivity, and the peasantry who didn't work on estates (see Hooglund 1982; Lambton 1969, 1984).

> one, a national will to action doesn't allow for disunity of opinions and thoughts, and discord amongst group and political bodies. (Vadi'i 1965: 94)

The White Revolution reinvigorated and reinforced the shah's power in Iran. His arrogance came down on the technocrats who had gained popularity, or had shown a degree of independence, including: The Minister of Agriculture, Hassan Arsanjani, Tehran's mayor, Ahmad Nafisi, as well as 300 army commanders, summarily dismissed in 1963. In the second half of the 1960s, polarities in the Iranian political sphere abounded. Growing from 55 million in 1963 to 2.1 billion USD in 1971, oil revenues saw a major rise. They increased to 15 billion in 1974 and reached 20 billion USD by 1976 (Ahmadian 2004: 150). In 1967, after 26 years on the throne, the shah attended his own lavish coronation.[76] The expansion of capitalism was accompanied by tight-leashing of capitalists (Holiday 1979: 42): Fearful of the increasing wealth of the 150 families who owned two-thirds of all industries and financial institutions in the 1970s, shah spoke of the danger of "industrial feudalism." In 1972, a high social council convened and decided that 500 large private enterprises had to sell a third of their shares to their workers (Bashiriyeh 1995: 157-8).

Modernization: Between Industrialization and Militarization

The Fourth Comprehensive Plan (1968-72) foresaw the establishment of industrial zones in other major cities to stimulate the decentralization of Tehran. Expensive industrial decentralization had been achieved through government investments in infrastructure and industrial poles around the country in 1970s (Mofid 1987; Karshenas 1990). Increases in oil revenues gave the government free reign to invite influential architects from around the world to design hotels, museums, and cultural buildings. The HCAUP organized two international conferences (1970 and 1974) in which famous architects attended. The 1970s was a decade of rapid growth in the middle class, made

[76] In 1971, he presided over the anniversary of 2500 years of Iranian monarchy, and renewed his bonds with Cyrus the Great next to his tomb. The shah's increasing reliance on the military, which had to be supported by US loans, brought mass ranks of American personnel into the country to occupy seats in civilian or non-civilian capacities. He abolished the two-party system of government and replaced it with a single party in 1975 and duly changed the solar Islamic (Hejri) calendar to a *shahanshahi* (royal) one in 1976. These developments further polarized the political landscape.

possible in part through the increase in the oil revenues. Improvements in education had led to an expansion of the service sector.[77] A large section of this workforce was in education and health services. The Bazaar had no link to the government and, contrary to the middle class, this made them more determined to oppose the regime in power (Keddie 360-1). The plan to raze the Tehran Bazaar, which followed the success of demolishing its counterpart around the shrine of Imam Reza in the city of Mashhad, was seen by Tehranis as an attempt by the state to destroy a center of traditional and religious values. This plan was never implemented. The Bazaar also participated in the unrest of Qom Seminary in 1963, which shows its link to the clerical establishment. At the time of the government's violent attack on protestors from religious seminary schools in the city of Qom, the nationalists were no longer in the political scene and leftist organizations had limited clout among students and the intelligentsia. Guild organizations came under the supervision of the government and the Iran Novin Party acted as a mediator between labour and employer (Bashiriyeh 1995: 192). The government used the "danger of industrial feudalism" tactic to control prices, increase wages, prosecute some industrialists, and reduce bank loans to the private sector, all of which led to discontent among capital holders in industry. The conflict between the bourgeoisie and the court was one of the factors that caused internal crises before the revolution (ibid 158). Modernization in the military led to the inflaming armed personnel. One quarter of the middle class, including low-ranking officers and recruits, were employed by the armed services, which soon surpassed the numbers of all those of neighboring countries (Katouzian 1981: 254).

Tehran Comprehensive Plan: Shaping a New Planning System

The Third Development Plan provisioned the formation of the High Council of Architecture and Urban Planning (HCAUP) to devise regulations and design projects for the city of Tehran. This took place when comprehensive plans for Tehran and 16 other cities in the country were being drafted. As mentioned above, comprehensive planning

[77] Some researchers argue that the growth of secondary school education lacked proper foresight and planning, which led to "an army of unemployed diploma-holding graduates" for whom the job market couldn't provide, and which the government had to absorb (Katouzian 1981: 333).

started with the Management and Plan Organization realizing the inadequacy of reconstruction projects in bringing about development. The 1960s was the golden decade of development planning throughout the world. The Keynesian outlook saw the city as a public commodity, one produced through government intervention. City planning in Iran was critical of the anatomic urban engineering of Reza shah (articles in *Architect* magazine) but it had no models to which to appeal. Attention to urban poverty, which had become prominent with rapid urbanization, continued in the 1960s. In 1963 Ehsan Naraqi established the Social Research Institute in the University of Tehran.[78] The institute convened a conference on the issues of Tehran in that year, indicating the depth of the urban crisis. The fact that city was divided to three socially segregated parts was discussed extensively. Prepared by the Tehran Comprehensive Plan in the mid 1960s, the triple divisions revealed the spatial hierarchy of the wealth in the city, with a small wealthy area at the north, a large middle class area in the center and proportionally large degraded working class neighbourhoods in the south. The conference report shows that subjects like housing shortages, services, shantytown dwelling, the expansion of poor neighbourhoods without proper electricity and running water in the south and the addition of townships on the peripheries of Tehran were main topics discussed by researchers, university professors, and administrative officials. The "unordered growth" of Tehran was the main theme of many papers. The deputy mayor of Tehran complained that "the buildings and townships have been developed everywhere and by whoever has wanted in whatever way and wherever they have wanted" (Nafisi 1964: 426). The Javadiyeh District mayor spoke of the danger of unrest in this informal settlement of 80,000 residents due to lack of municipal services (ibid 92). In 1965, the MPO hired the engineering consulting firm of Abdolaziz Farmanfarma and its American partner, Victor Cruen, as consultants in city planning matters. The firm came up with a comprehensive plan in 1968. The aim was to give direction to the growth of Tehran, in whose spirit the group proposed part of the population to be moved to satellite townships on the outskirts of the city. Madanipour writes on this comprehensive plan:

[78] Naraqi came from an influential clerical family. He was a graduate of Dar ol-Fonun who had studied sociology at Sorbonne and returned to Iran in 1952, at the height of the Oil Nationalization Movement. He remained in the academic world after the coup, and with the help of the empress and other technocrats, engaged in cultural activities.

According to the plan, the city's problems included high density, especially in the city center, expansion of commercial activities along the main roads, pollution, inefficient infrastructure, widespread unemployment in the poorer areas, and the continuous migration of low-income groups to Tehran. To solve these problems, the plan declared the need to change in physical, social, and economic conditions of the city. The plan proposed the redevelopment and improvement of the city to facilitate the decentralization of 600,000 people to new areas. The future city was envisaged to have a linear form, which stretched towards the west, reducing the concentration of activities in the city center. The city would be subdivided into 10 large urban districts (*mantagheh*) each with about half a million population living in high rise buildings, with a commercial and an industrial center…These districts and areas would be linked through a transportation network which included a bus route and a rapid transit route, and high residential density formed around its stops. These solutions, however, had little effect on the immediacy of problems in the city, which needed urgent attention, under pressure from accelerated growth. (2010: 489)

Table 12: Population growth rate in Tehran, Iran and urban areas 1900-1976

	1900-1927	1927-1935	1935-1941	1941-1956	1956-1966	1966-1976
Population of Iran (%)	0.8	1.5	1.5	2.2	3.1	2.7
Urban population (%)	___	___	___	___	5.0	4.9
Tehran Region (%)	___	___	___	___	5.8	4.4
Tehran city (%)	1.0	4.7	8.0	5.4	6.1	4.2

Source: Khatam 1999.

The government set the city's population projection for 1991 at 5.2 million (Tehran had more than 6.3 in 1991). Given the rapid population growth rate, TCP aimed to change the single-centred structure of the city and create different regional centers in two vertical and horizontal corridors in the city. An expansion area, The 25 Year

Development Zone, was defined for Tehran; it tripled the city area—from 180 square kilometers to 600—and pushed the growth of the city westward.

A buffer zone was provisioned to put a cap on Tehran's growth and to prevent neighboring cities from melding. A highway network was provisioned to ease vehicle traffic, and an underground rail system was planned. An area (544 hectares) in the heart of an upscale part of town (Hills of Abbasabad) was designated for development of a new city-center to replace the crowded Grand Bazaar, which was functioning as the center. The westward stretch (west of the Kan River) was set aside for industrial development (Comprehensive Plan Abstract 1992: 7-17). The plan included the addition of 2.8 million new citizens, to be added to the existing 2.7 in the city, being of moderate to high income, capable of acquiring and building houses in large tracts of land. The minimum plot of land was put at 200 square meters, which ignored the existing land parcel size of less than 100 square meters—meaning that that most residential houses were much smaller than the new land parcels (Athari 1996: 25).

Figure 7: Tehran Comprehensive Plan 1968: East-west growth orientation and new centers

Source: Abdolaziz Farmanfarma Consulting Firm. Permission granted

The TCP imagined and perceived the city as a middle and upper class urbanity, with no low-income earners, settling in very low-density neighbourhoods, exemplified in Shahrak Gharb, a residential district developed in the 1970s in the city's west. Between 1937 and 1967 Tehran's population increased 6-fold, and its built-up surface area increased only 3 times (from 60 to 180 kilometers square). The TCP foresaw population growth doubling in the next 25 years and planned for the city area to be increased by a factor of 3.3, aiming to decrease the density from 15,000 people to 9,200 per square kilometer. Tehran was imagined as a city much like its American counterparts, where cars could easily access a network of highways. The TCP land use map marked designated sites for industrial land use in the southwest part of the city. Given the dominant wind direction in Tehran (southwest to northeast), locating industrial sites in the west of the city was disastrous, and put Tehran downwind to pollution. Formed in the late 1950s, this industrial site grew in the 1960s and 1970s and boasted tens of thousands of workers before 1975 when a ban of industrial development was proposed for a 120 kilometer zone around Tehran. Eslamshahr, 30 kilometers from Tehran, exactly where the buffer zone was provisioned, became a settlement for many of these workers. In 1996, few lived in Eslamshahr, but its informal development turned it into a settlement of 50,000 workers within a decade (Khatam 2001).

The approval of the plan was contingent upon the codification of necessary laws and the establishment of an office to supervise the plan's implementation. The graphs of built-up areas prepared for the 1976 census confirmed that TCP did not change the north-south orientation of the expansion of the city in the decade before the Islamic Revolution and this change only took place two decades later during Karbaschi's term.

The Third Comprehensive Plan was drafted for a city that was entering a period of mass consumption. In it, only the demands of the middle class were taken into account. An example of this is the per capita designation of 55 square meters for green areas, which was so unrealistic that in 1971 the municipality requested its reduction by the HCAUP. The plan, of course, had an immense impact on the growth of Tehran. It changed the direction of the city's development; what had been expansion northward and southward over the previous 100 years became a sprawling growth to the west, and

created many unused plots of land between its tight knit center and new developments. The plan didn't pay much attention to the historic part of Tehran, the Bazaar or the city center, and this led to their gradual decay. Its population prediction could be called utopian, not what was probable; the zoning laws and lack of proper provision for low income housing, and the increasing price of land in newly developed areas, led to urban exodus.

Tehran lacked a proper public transportation system. A significant part of the city was not accessible to vehicles; the 1970s had a motto, "every Iranian should have a Peykan" (Peykan was the popular car assembled in Iran), which appeared as a consumer culture corollary to Tehran's transformation from a pedestrian and bicycle municipality to a car city. The French consulting and project development firm SOFRETU (Société française d'études et de réalisations de transports urbains) started underground rail transit planning in 1972 and, as part of their preliminary work, conducted a study of the traffic-related issues in Tehran. Their findings showed that the use of cars was limited to the higher income citizens with only 15 percent of residents owning a car—but this was changing fast. The underground rail system implementation plan stopped with the Revolution of 1979.

Municipal laws were reformed in 1966 and again with the initiation of the Third Comprehensive Plan. In 1968, the "Urban Renewal Law" (URL) confirmed the obligatory purchase of properties for implementing public projects in the built-up areas as well as undeveloped lands. Municipalities were thus authorized to intervene with property rights and land ownership. Tehran Municipality, however, had little role in drafting the Comprehensive Plan and little administrative clout in its implementation. In a compartmentalized and centralized system of government, coordination could only take place in the capital and within ministries. There were no parliamentary or governance systems for regions and cities that could link them to central government activities. The highest ranking government title, the governor, was mainly an executive arm of the Interior Ministry rather than a coordinator of various activities of the ministries under his jurisdiction. Mayors had even less influence. In the 1960s the function of the MPO changed from supervising physical projects to planning for development. Like physical

projects, the MPO ordered private sector firms to produce the plans, including the 1968 Tehran Comprehensive Plan. Even today, Tehran Municipality lacks an organization responsible for matters of planning. The Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning (MHUP) asked private sector companies to prepare plans, and once the drafted plans were discussed with municipality, they would go to the HCAUP for ratification. When it came to implementation, municipalities either did not implement the plans at all, or did so by making subsequent changes. The TCP plan's purview was to come up with policy regarding urban development, land use, zoning, population and settlement density regulations, city services boundaries, regulations, and safety (Haeri 1992: 721).[79]

As mentioned above, the growth of the municipal organization of Tehran in the 1960s and 70s was geared towards the needs of the middle class. Instead of providing the city with affordable housing, the stress was on landscaping.[80] As such, the construction of large and numerous parks was put on the agenda. In 1966 Laleh Park (28 hectares) was built on a horserace tract that belonged to the army. The design belonged to the famous French architect Joffe. In 1971, a plan to relocate residents from the brick factories in the south of Shush Avenue to Dowlatabad, a new district further south of Shush, was drafted and implemented in the same year, but no similar concerns were addressed. The drafting of a Detailed Plan, which dealt with the administrative details of the Comprehensive Plan, took several years to complete; during this time, it became increasingly clear that the Comprehensive plan could not address the city's predicaments.

In 1972, the Greek planner Constantinos Doxiadis was invited to prepare an action plan for the city and guide future investment for easing the city's problems. According to Madanipour (2010), Doxiadis first visited Iran in 1957 and was invited by EMCO consulting firm in Iran as an international partner: "The Plan Organization was in charge of registering and commissioning Iran's consulting firms, and had the policy of

[79] Service boundaries are zones in which construction requires permits from the municipality and for which it is responsible. Legal boundaries have priority but provisioning urban services depends on municipal capacities. In buffer zones no construction permits were issued (Haeri 1992: 721).

[80] For example, the concept of leisure time had become prevalent amongst the middle class and the use of personal cars had increased. As such, separate organizations were needed to provide parking spaces and maintain parks. In 1960, the Office of Gardens was established within the municipality, but since "garden" was synonymous with private property, it changed its name to the more public "park."

asking them to introduce an international partner in major projects, to ensure an international outlook and to improve the quality of standards. Indeed, it was one of the Plan Organization's officials, who had studied in the USA and knew about Doxiadis' work in the Middle East, who recommended him to EMCO" (2010: 486). [81] To Doxiadis, the city's major challenge was its growth. He approached the city as natural processes of competition and survival, and he focused on guiding these processes' growth, rather than limiting them. Madanipour summarizes some of Doxiadis' recommendations:

> At the national level, the key would be a national decentralization policy, which would encourage the development of the rest of the country and reduce growth pressures on Tehran. At the urban level, the main proposal is the creation of West Tehran... without any reference to the city's comprehensive plan, which had been approved four years earlier, the action plan complains about the problems being aggravated, 'because there is no policy, strategy or plan of action to overcome these difficulties and their causes.' (2010: 49)

Two important institutional recommendations of the Plan—the creation of Tehran Development Authority and Land Assembly—never materialized. Interestingly, Doxiadis' Action Plan is not widely remembered or mentioned in Iran (Madanipour 2010: 500).

The Comprehensive Plan remained the main reference for Tehran Municipality from 1968 to 1978, but it was amended several times by Tehran's Article Five Commission (AFC) within the municipality. Finally, in 1975, the Supervisory Council on the Development of the City of Tehran (SCDCT) was formed to oversee the implementation of municipal plans. The SCDCT was comprised of representatives from the ministries and in its short lifespan executed some of the programs that the plans had envisioned, including the Green Belt of Tehran in 1978, which delimited the 25-year boundaries of the city. One-kilometer wide and extending 43 square kilometers, the green belt, part of which is yet to be completed, was designed to prevent the melding of Tehran

[81] According to Madanipour (2010: 486), during the 1960s and 1970s, Doxiadis undertook a number of major projects in Iran. These ranged from the strategy for tourist development along the Caspian Sea to the comprehensive plan for the city of Abadan on the Persian Gulf, from the Action Plan for the capital city Tehran to the National Development Program for Housing.

and Karaj, and the city's extension into the arid areas of its southern regions. The SCDCT's term was brief and finished its work in 1987. After it dissolved, no other supervisory institution took its place to coordinate the activities of various governmental agencies.

Center, Suburb, Periphery at the Threshold of the 1979 Revolution

Tehran's growth slowed in the decade leading up to the Revolution. One of the reasons was a reduction in childbirth, another was the policies of the TCP. During the 1970s, Tehran municipality used forceful techniques to demolish the informal settlements built in the T25 year DZ or inside the buffer zone. Low-income groups would often reach a preliminary agreement to purchase agricultural land on the peripheries of Tehran to build a shack. These townships were often on the precipice of destruction, depending on their proximity to the city and their general locale. For example, houses of the Afsariyeh Neighborhood were repeatedly razed in 1976-77 only to be built again by residents, whereas dwellings of Eslamshahr, an informal town outside the buffer zone, were seldom touched by municipal authorities. With the standardized minimum of 200 square meters of purchasable land, workers and low-income families were unable to acquire land in Tehran. The Comprehensive Plan had suggested suburban developments accommodate the population growth in the city, and as such, licenses were issued to private firms to build small towns around the city. The pressure on low-income families led them to settle on the periphery. Bayat (2010: 104) has argued that "the inhabitants of the over-crowded slums and informal settlements came to form an estimated 35 percent of Tehran's population by the late 1970s." The last census before the 1979 Revolution puts the population of Tehran at 4.5 million and its periphery-dwelling residents at 700 thousand. The peripheral dwellers were mainly in the old town of Karaj (138 thousand residents), the worker-dominated Eslamshahr (50 thousand), the farmer-dominated Varamin (15 thousand), and twelve smaller townships and villages. Greater Tehran increasingly resembled an interlaced network of villages and towns interspersed with large industries, an airport, bus terminals, warehouses, special industrial cities, academic sites, parks, a protective green belt, wholesale retailers, and leisure sites with lakes and recreational parks.

Conclusion: Half a Century of Urban Modernisation under Pahlavi

The majority of researchers who have studied Tehran during the half-century Pahlavi era agree that the increased concentration of wealth and infrastructure aggravated the uneven development of Tehran. The capital turned into a megalopolis and created an artificial environment that precluded the possibility of a more balanced growth for the rest of the country. At the end of this period, Iran had around 370 cities and its rate of urbanity had increased from 11 percent mid-century to 50 percent—Tehran itself comprised 13 percent of the total population. Urban development was an important part of modernization policy and the notion of progress in the country—even as the meaning of progress and modernization went through four political and technocratic periods of change. Modern city-dwelling and planning during Reza shah's reign meant establishing legal-regulatory institutions to better govern, and it meant the creation of order through physical engineering of the city and building majestic structures to establish the state's symbolic power at the center. In the 1940s, and with the empowerment of civil society and nationalist forces, the meaning of modernization became synonymous with the development of urban infrastructures like sanitary water, electricity, and housing. Many neighbourhoods and townships were constructed for the middle and lower-middle class residents. With the 1953 coup, the develop-to-prevent-revolution policy became legion. With "promise politics," the government vowed to create a better life through development planning, including urban planning and the expansion of the public sector in Iran. Some of the criticism regarding urban development that was openly debated during the Mosaddeq era relocated inside the technocracy, which set some technocrats in confrontation with the shah and the court, those who didn't tolerate dissent from within the public sector. The White Revolution was characterized by the failure of planning-oriented technocrats who favored the public sector.

Planning for an expanding and demanding middle class marked this new phase in the life of the city. The policies set out by the 1968 Comprehensive Plan, overseen by Victor Gruen, foresaw the construction of satellite towns for middle and upper-middle class citizens, which eventually led to an accumulation of capital via land appropriation and land grabbing. In this era luxury buildings in Tehran were erected with international

capital, and attempts were made to change the commercial structure of the city by building department stores and planning the city around automobiles. Tehran, on the threshold of the Revolution, was a city beset by economic inequalities, spatial and social divides, but more importantly cultural-political rifts. Cultural rifts separated traditional merchants, clerics, and artisans from the modern middle class comprised of government functionaries, technocrats, and employees of service industries. The expansion of the public sphere was limited and exclusionary. For example, Hosseiniyeh Ershad was turned into an influential center of activity for young and religious dissenters while the University of Tehran became the center of secular opposition. The few urban movements, like the one in Afsariyeh Neighborhood, where residents resisted the razing of their settlement, were isolated. The urban intellectuals debated the armed confrontations inspired by Vietnam or Cuba revolutions, which left hundreds of students, intellectuals, and political activists dead or behind bars. The softening of the political atmosphere prescribed by American democrats who came to power in 1977, when the guerrilla movement had organizationally all but vanished, was again put on the Iranian government's agenda. In October 1977, thousands of Tehranis listened to voices of intellectual dissent, spoken in a series of poetry nights at Goethe Institute in the garden of the Club of Germans in Tehran, convened by the Writers Association of Iran; some of the sessions were too turbulent and led to police raids. These were the beginnings of subsequent popular upheavals (Zandian 2014). With other cities joining Tehran protesters, Iran was in the vortex of a revolutionary mass movement. The main organizer of the masses was the clerical class. The state succumbed to the revolutionaries in February 1979.

Chapter IV: Islamic Revolution, Populism and Provincial Urbanism

> Housing is the main calamity that made our people miserable under the Pahlavi regime. People were after a shelter their whole life… The Islamic government would not tolerate such misery and discrimination. This is a right for anyone to have a shelter. The problem of land should be solved. All poor people should have a shelter of their own. No one in our society should remain houseless. The Islamic state should find a solution for this and others are to support the state in this cause…. I open an account for this in all the branches of National Bank and invite all those who can help to put money in this account. A group of trustworthy and righteous people, least of three- member group of an urban/housing engineer or planners, a clergy and a government representative should be elected in each city to plan for building affordable housing for poor. There should be no payment for land in these projects. I hope all who own large parcels of land, contribute to such humanistic- Islamic cause and grant their better lots in livable areas to these projects. Those who can provide construction materials and their labour are asked to contribute. Government should provide the electricity, piped water, paved roads, transport system, schools, clinics and other public services for the projects. Bonyad Mostazafan (the Foundation for Oppressed) is supposed to contribute by the [confiscated] propertied of Pahlavi…this is a new experience of mobilization of Islamic beliefs for cooperation and struggle to defeat the poverty…I ask modestly all dear nation to join this effort (Ayatollah Khomeini, 10 March 1979- Collection of speeches and statements 1999, vol. 6: 520).

Introduction

The dawn of the Revolution was felt first, and foremost in Tehran. The 18 months of mass protestation and strikes had led to a general collapse of central authority: "There were no secret police, no municipality guards, not even traffic police" (Bayat 2010: 106). The first years of the Revolution marks an extremely important period in the Iran's urban history, more in terms of building alternative perceptions and conceptions of urban citizenry. While the years of the Revolution was later characterized by the media, as the years of anarchy in urban governance and competition among revolutionary groups to mobilize the urban subaltern, scholars like Asef Bayat (1997, 2010a) and Keivani et al.

(2008) studied the agency of the subaltern groups in claiming their right to the city through land occupation. Urban planners who studied the era, have developed a general image of rapid urbanization and disorderly urban developments (Madanipour 1998; Habibi 1996; Azizi 1998; Hessamian et al. 1988). Both studies lack the analytical tool vital for examining the revolutionary urban policy, and its links with urban modernization under Pahlavi and rising worlding urbanism of the post-war period.

To characterize the revolutionary urban politics in Iran, I use the term 'provincial urbanism' which I borrow from Nan Ellin (1999: 44-5) and his debate on how the urban composition, housing types, and sources of European architecture have been reproduced in newly planned suburbs in provincial cities.[82] Provincial urbanism in my usage signifies the urbanism shaped by Islamic egalitarian urban policies in post Revolution Iran, which was combined with a quest for a morally disciplined populace and the revival of traditional forms of Islamic architecture and urban design across a network of smaller and mid-sized cities. I examine the contradictory nature of such urbanism and its rupture with the past, and argue that 'worlding urbanism' was engineered to respond to the crises of governance and governmentality shaped by the "war fundamentalism" in the IRI: once denied the excuse of war, foreign enemies, and sanctions to suspend the "progress" desired by urban middle classes and Islamic elites,[83] the IRI was required to find an alternative, all-encompassing project through which to articulate its social and political will.

Two last sections of this chapter examine the adoption of Asian model of development as neoliberal modernization in Iran and crafting a neoliberal urban governance in Tehran. These sections incorporate insights from studies on the political economy of the economic shift in Iran in the 1990s and economic performance of the IRI in the first decade of the Revolution (Maljoo 2010; Pesaran 2011; Momeni 2007; Behdad and Nomani 2006; Gheissari and Nasr 2006; Ahmadi Amouei 2002; Tabibian 2002; Azimi 2001; Behdad 1995; Amirahmadi 1990; Amuzegar 1992; Karshenas 1990).

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82 The example discussed by Ellin (1999) is Saint-Quentin en Yvelines in western suburbs of Paris.

83 In speaking of Islamic elites, I differentiate between different groups of Iranian upper class who usually are *Muslim* and may expresses their religious identity, and *Islamic* elites, who believe the Muslim identity may collectively re- appropriated as a basis for an alternative social and political project. Such Islamism implies a critique and even a discontinuity with the given categories of Muslim identity; it is an endeavor to rename and reconstruct Muslim identity by freeing it from traditional interpretations and by challenging assimilative forces of modernism" (Göle 2002: 173).

Unfortunately, part of this literature focuses on abstract quantitative research methods, comparing Iran's economic performance against its own historical data, or with neighboring countries. The shortage of analytical and empirical research is what motivated me to consult first-hand documents on the economic debates from the late 1980s, in order to better understand how a wide spectrum of Islamic technocrats resigned themselves to market reform. Examining Iran's transformation from revolutionary redistributive ideals and war fundamentalism, to its adaptation and adoption of neoliberal policies, I look at post-war governmentality crises and new mentalities of developmentalism in the post-Soviet era and discuss the role of economist-technocrats, while exploring the influence of Asian models on Iran's homegrown neoliberal agenda. The chapter concludes with an analysis of worlding urbanism, the spatial expression of neoliberal developmentalism in Iran, and includes discussions covering the emergence of techniques to control population growth, the Municipal Financial Self-Rule Act, planning new towns in Tehran's metropolitan region. The chapter concludes with analysing the mid-1990s political conflicts which interrupted the rapid move to build a neoliberal economy in Iran, while left intact the neoliberal initiatives to finance the municipalities.

Provincial Urbanism

The concept of "provincial urbanism" aims to grasp both angles of class and provincial egalitarianism of the Islamic left and liberals in the early period of the IRI. In the following pages, I examine three characteristics of such urbanism, including "housing the poor" policy, a "balanced" urban network at national level and the massive suburbanization of the TMR. Another important aspect of provincial urbanism under Islamic Republic was moral disciplining and building of a spotless city, which will be discussed later in chapter seven. Such urbanism served to mobilize the urban subaltern, working class and lower middle class to produce a city of their own, at the same time that it excluded the upper elites and new middle class lifestyles from the fabric of the city. This controversial, yet integrated urban politics needs to be examined separately for its enduring impacts on the right to city movements in Iran.

Housing the Poor

While there are conflicting accounts on the role of the organized working class in the 1979 Revolution, there is an overall consensus that revolutionaries targeted the urban subaltern by advocating an equal and just Islamic society.[84] In a climate of political competition with the secular Left, all Islamic groups found themselves committed to providing adequate housing for the poor and disadvantaged. The Housing Minister (1980-83) recounts: "during the Revolution, one of the slogans repeated by the Marxist groups was 'Employment, Housing and Freedom,' so we needed to show that we had a plan for these problems" (Gonabadi et al. 2008). In March 1979, one month after the victory of the Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini confirmed that proper housing would be part of his agenda in building an Islamic society. He opened a bank account, named after him as *Imam's 100 Account* (*hesab-e 100 Imam*), and asked rich merchants to support his cause by making donations to his account. In April 1979 the Housing Foundation of the Islamic Revolution (HFIR) was formed as the executive body in charge of the Imam's 100 Account. Rather than through charity, the HFIR proceeded with radical alternatives for housing the poor. This included confiscating buildings and lands abandoned when their owners fled Iran after the Revolution (Katiraei 2008). Article 31 of the new Constitution, approved in April 1979, declared that each Iranian individual and family has the right to a decent house.[85] Following a five-month period of spontaneous land invasions and arbitrary confiscations, the MHUP claimed that the government should take housing the poor into its own hands. In June 1979, Mostafa Katiraei, Minister of Housing (1979-80) prepared the *Ownership Repeal Act of the Undeveloped Urban Land* and presented it to the Council of Revolution for approval.[86] The IRI lacked the large stocks of

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[84] For a good analysis of the topic see Asef Bayat's discussion (1997; 2010) of prevailing perspectives of 'passive poor',' political poor', 'surviving poor' and 'resisting poor' in the Middle East. He also examines the "quiet encroachment" as the strategy of the poor during the Revolution of 1979 and argues that poor were establishing themselves in and around the cities, benefiting from the halt in the regular activities of the municipalities and governors' administrations during the revolutionary movement.

85 According to Oren et al (2014: 149), Iran is among 24 countries that recognize the housing rights in their constitution. In addition to the Article 31,the Article 43 of the Constitution states the economy in IRI relies on providing adequate housing, food, clothing, medical care, education and opportunity to form a family for people. For a comparative review of the land policy in Iran and other developing countries see Azizi 1998.

86 Mostafa Katiraei had a nationalist background and was affiliated to Nehzat Azadi (Freedom Movement, a Muslim pro Mosaddeq party), while Hadi Khosroshahi, the head of HFIR was an old clergyman with no radical political background before the revolution.

governmental land that post independent states inherited from colonial regimes, so the first year of the Revolution witnessed irregular activities of four governmental and public institutions in possession and preparation of urban lands for housing the urban poor. This included the MHUP, HFIR, municipalities and the Office for Housing the Destitute (*daftar khaneh sazi baraye mostazafin*). The Office for Housing the Destitute, formed by a small group of radical Islamists, was headed by a clergy close to Ayatollah Khomeini. They had armed groups and were involved in direct confiscations of buildings as well as active support for students beginning to occupy empty buildings and hotels (*Etellaat Daily* November 4, 1980). These organizations followed various interpretations of the ownership rights in Islam and adopted different strategies. From within this context, central government's technocrats negotiated the shaping of a legal and institutional basis for the transfer of the private urban land to the public.

The approval of the Ownership Repeal Act in 1979 relies on the Islamic judiciary consensus regarding the Islamic principle that undeveloped (*mavat*) lands belong to the public. According to this principle, the ultimate ownership of the land belongs to God and only work on the land creates private ownership rights. Therefore, the state could rightly acquire all the undeveloped lands for redistribution purposes without compensation (Keivani et al. 2008: 1133; Behdad 1989: 188). The idea of undeveloped land being controlled by the state was not new in Iran, but during the pre-Revolution era, the state issuance of deeds for those lands became a new process. In chapter on urban reform under Reza shah, I discussed he introduced the Land Registry Office to support compulsory land purchases for urban renewal and secure dispossession of lands by elites and shah himself. Land registry practice put the law above the traditional methods of securing land ownership, turning them to "informal" methods of designation of ownership, against the formal, abstract and universal legitimacy of the law to define ownership rights. Cronin (2005: 7) suggests that new Civil Law (1928) strengthened the notion of the absolute ownership of land in Iran and activities of the Land Registry Office in the 1930s accommodated the process of land transfers from customary property titles to government issued deeds, and thereby founded the basis of market land transactions. Iran entered the same process that Egypt and Turkey entered before (Mitchell 2002; Karatepe 2013), while the king and the court in Iran had not monopolized the land

ownership to the extent seen in these two countries.

As other political upheavals that crystallize the nature of the law as a social institution and empower the social actors to ask for legal reforms, almost all post WWII nationalist movements proposed some kind of reform in urban land ownership systems, either by nationalization of the urban land or retaining a limit on individual land holdings (Carruthers and Ariovich 2004; Behdad 1989). Social reformers of the Iran's National Front (*Jebheye Meli* Iran) questioned the notion of absolute ownership of the land and called for reconfiguration of the state's role in land management by providing affordable housing to workers. In 1952, Mosaddeq government ratified a law to keep the undeveloped lands under the control of the state. The law was valid only for undeveloped lands without a deed. As land speculation increased in the 1960-70s, in the form of new urban development, more deeds were issued for undeveloped lands. Land ownership rights changed when deeds were recognized as legal documents as part of court proceedings dealing with conflicts over property ownerships in 1960-70: "Those who had deeds in hand claim their lands are not undeveloped (*mavat*), while they were. Those lands were never cultivated or developed before…the *Ownership Repeal Act* disqualified these deeds" (Gonabadi et al. 2008).

While Bazargan, the Prime Minster of the provisional government and head of Housing Ministry both belonged to a liberal Islamic and anti-left tradition and both repeatedly emphasized the necessity of limiting the size of the state and its interference in the economy, the *Ownership Repeal Act* was introduced under their rule. Conservative clergy would apparently attack the law and defend the absolute ownership rights through its representatives in the Guardian Council.[87] The Guardian Council disputed the legality of the Act, which was ratified by the parliament in 1979, arguing that the Act recognizes only two categories of urban lands--the undeveloped (*mavat*) and developed (*dayer*) lands-- and treats the abandoned (*bayer*) land as undeveloped, while the abandoned land are those lands that were cultivated once then were abandoned. The Guardian Council

87 One of the last cases of such review could be found in special issue of Rah, a monthly journal affiliated to radical Islamists, in November 2008. They interviewed Katiraei and all other figures involved in making laws and promoting radical examples of land policy to support Mahmood Ahmadinejad's odd plan for building one million units of social housing in one decade.

suggested that the owner of abandoned land is entitled to compensation. The intrastate conflicts on urban land policy continued through the first years of the Revolution but its political backlash was not powerful enough to halt the implementation of the law. In November 1979, the provisional government resigned, charged with appeasing the West.[88] The anti-imperialist leftist Islamists took the upper hand in the IRI and one of the HFIR's deputies was assigned as Minster of Housing. This escalated the HFIR's activities in land allocation and building affordable housing for one year. The new Minister consulted with mayors of the Soviet Union for solutions to the housing problem in Iran:

> In my meeting with the mayors of Russia, we discussed the housing question. They told us follow the strategy of small houses to solve the [shortage] problem. They started with 6 or 7 sq. meters built area per capita as a minimum at the beginning. Then increased it to 8 sq. meters. They told us the low-income families should be encouraged to accept the idea that living in big houses is not a sign of welfare (Yahyavi 2008).

Under Yahyavi the unfinished buildings in Tehran and other cities were assigned to developers to be completed and sold in affordable prices. Even the units of new large complexes built by private sector to be sold to middle class households were transferred to the HFIR. Shahab-edin Gonabadi, the next minster (1980-83), was also an Islamic leftist engineer who was teaching in a high school before the Revolution. As the Minster of Housing, he formed a group of committed experts to define a policy of affordable housing. By amendment of the *Ownership Repeal Act* in 1981, MHUP proposes a new law titled *Urban Land Law*. The new law gives the abandoned land a separate status: the private ownership on this type of land is recognized and owners are entitled to develop up to 1000 square meters of their lands (Katiraei 2008). The conservatives increased their pressure on the Ministry to abandon the Urban Land Law. During November 1981, parliamentary conservatives collected enough signatures to impeach the Housing Minster, but under the direct support of Ayatollah Khomeini, the MPs were forced to give him a

88 After holding the power for nine months, Bazargan resigned when university students occupied the US Embassy in Tehran and Ayatollah Khomeini supported the action in November 1980.

vote of confidence (Hashemi Rafsanjani 1998a: 300). The *Urban Land Law* was subject to edits and reedits to satisfy the conservative leanings of the Guardian Council.[89] However, after failed efforts to satisfy the Guardian Council, Ayatollah Khomeini intervened and authorized the law in 1982, using his status as the Supreme Leader.

Gonabadi's strategy was to concentrate the power of the decision-making in the hands of the MHUP and assign the executive tasks to its provincial bodies. According to the Urban Land Law, in 32 large cities and other war-damaged urban areas, the private owners whose abandoned lands were more than 1000 square meters, should transfer the rest to the state at a set price determined by the Urban Land Organization-ULO (affiliated to the MHUP). In other cities, free market transactions were possible on abandoned land. According to the law, municipalities were permitted to keep their lands but they could sell them only in coordination with the MHUP. The HFIR and other parastatal foundations challenged the decision as a shift to bureaucratic methods, but Gonabadi claimed it would control the rising corruption in urban land allocations. The Office for Housing the Destitute was closed and its affiliated armed groups were disarmed in November 1980 (Barseqian 2014).[90] Following the approval of the law, all lands in disposal of different state bodies were transferred to the newly established office of ULO in the Housing Ministry. This included the holdings of the HFIR.[91] By the time of the approval of the law (1982), HFIR's policy of "obligatory renting" in large cities was withdrawn and its intervention was limited to rural areas.[92] Founded initially to provide housing for underprivileged urban residents, the HFIR became responsible for providing assistance for housing and in preparing development plans for rural areas as well as leading the physical reconstruction of damaged areas by natural disasters.

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[89] Prominent figure like Rafsanjani does not support the law (Sahabi 2002:33) and Nateq Noori, then an influential MP argues that government should let charities deal with the welfare issues (Moslem 2002: 212).

90 - Barseqian provides a detailed review on the press interviews of Hassan Karoubie, the head of the Office for Housing the destitute (daftar-e khaneh sazi baraye mahromien) and his opponents in the government in the first year of the revolution.

91 HFIR has a central office in Tehran, 30 general offices in provincial capital cities and over 364 secondary branch offices in other cities throughout the country. This widespread administration network supports the HFIR's rural engineering and construction activities. HFIR is part of less examined interventions to transform the rural spaces under the Islamic Republic.

92 The project relies on local groups to find and introduce the empty houses and HFIR teams to negotiate/force the landlords to rent them.

In 1982, Gonabadi accused the Court for the illegal transfer of public lands to powerful elites, including members of the parliament, bureaucracy, judiciary and others. This led to a four-year fight ending with Gonabadi's resignation in 1983.[93] At the time of resignation, Gonabadi's strategy had been carried out and while he failed to limit the activities of the Islamic Court of Tehran Municipality, other parastatal actors and HFIR activities were under the control of central government. In 1988 and during the first months of beginning my career as an urban sociologist/planner studying on Tehran, I searched the research archive of Tehran Planning Center and read a report on land distribution in Tehran (TPC: Report No 152, 1983). The report indicated that out of 800 hectares of undeveloped land distributed illegally inside the city in the first three years of the Revolution, the Court distributed or confirmed the distribution of 522 hectares. It is worth noting that according to this report, the average size of the lands distributed by the Court was 335 meters, much bigger than ULO's distributed plots. Comparing the information of this report on illegal land distribution (522 hectares) with the total lands allocated to "housing the poor" in Tehran Province (1152 hectares) indicates that dispossession of the public lands by new elites was a powerful parallel process which comprised half of the total land distributed by the ULO in Tehran.

Gonabadi took this illegal land distribution to the Article *90 Commission* of the Parliament. The commission confirmed the accusations against the Court, but no action was taken. In 1983, the Judiciary asked MHUP to issue decrees for the lands distributed by the Court. Gonabadi denied the ruling and was forced to resign in September of the same year. The deputy minister of Housing Ministry later recalled: "Most of the officials had received a plot of land in Tehran, so they were silent or didn't support us. Everyone was infected. They forced Gonabadi to resign" (Gonabadi et al. 2008). The Islamic Court in Tehran Municipality remained active till 1983. In 1986, Ayatollah Khomeini extended the Urban Land Law for another five years to provide cheap residential land for low-income groups.

[93] To read more about the dispute see the interview of the judge of the Court of Tehran Municipality, Tabatabei and Gonabadi with the Journal Rah (Rah, 2008, issue11).

"Even" Development and Balanced Urbanism

The Islamic populist modernization under Khomeini aimed to distribute the commodities of modernity, the proper housing, electricity and piped water among the urban destitute while reverse the political and economic drivers of subnational disparities, through an "even development." Seven out of sixteen institutions created by the Revolution were developmental institutions, mainly focused on underprivileged areas.[94] Iran's Bureau for Deprived Regions was formed a few years later under the office of the president to deliver specific developmental projects in disadvantaged provinces. The MPO adopted a policy of positive discrimination in public expenditure to reduce regional disparities, a policy which for Iran was commended, and identified as a benchmark for other countries of the Middle East. A report by World Bank (2011:16) suggested that transfers from central government to provinces give the priority to disadvantaged areas. The so called balanced urbanism, was supposed to emerge as the spatial landscape of such development, achieved through decentralized public investments in housing and urban amenities (Athari 2014).[95] The populist modernization project was to encourage the out-migration trends from Tehran. Habibi (1996: 8-9) explores the mentality of the revolutionaries and suggests that an anti-urban sentiment in general was prevalent during the revolutionary era, especially against large cities that symbolized the previous regime. He argues that this anti-urban approach changed when cities got involved in the war with Iraq, as some of them resisted for weeks against the invasion of Iraqi troops, some were evacuated and others assigned as "helpers" (*moein*) to those in war zones. Every large city was responsible for one other war-zone city, to provide shelter for its population and supply its hospitals with medical personnel, equipment and supplies.[96]

The hostile approach toward Tehran continued during the war period. In 1984, Hashemi Rafsanjani (1998b: 80), then the speaker of the Parliament, criticized the leaders of the leftist faction for opposing Tehran's subway construction as a luxury: "Some [of

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94 This includes Jahad Sazandegi, Housing Foundation, Mobilization to Fight Illiteracy, Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, Martyr Foundation, 15 Khordad Foundation and Foundation for the Oppressed.
95 To improve the living conditions of 17 million people living in 60,000 big and small villages, a revolutionary foundation, Jahad Sazandegi, was established in villages with 500 population and more, dealing with developmental infrastructure for agriculture and amenities for villagers (Shakoori 2001).
96 Kaveh Ehsani studies (2009) how hospitality emerged as collective behavior of the residents of the cities surrounding the war front. He looks at the inter-migration in Khozestan during the war and cultural dynamics formed by the movement. I studied the building of a small oil-city of Tohid to settle the labour of Kangan refinery, another oil field in the south of Iran (Khatam2012).

the officials] believe they should damage Tehran, to prevent people from coming to the city. What is this? How can they think like this? Any delay in [building] the subway is a cruelty to this people." Efforts to change the Left from its perspective of Tehran as over-privileged, or to counteract the conservatives' disparagement of the city as the epicenter of Westernization, were both controversial and ultimately unsuccessful before the war's end.[97] Academic literature and governmental reports have contributed to this over-simplified portrayal, often citing Tehran as a symbol of a pseudo modernism dependent on oil revenue (Katouzian 1981: 303), the final destination of migrant groups (Alizadeh & Kazeroni 1983), the petro-city (Madanipour 1981) or the product of rapid urbanization triggered by Land Reform (Hessamian et al. 1985: 58).

The concept of "over-urbanization" originated from modernization theorists (Kinsley 1954) attempting to define an optimum rate of urbanization according to levels of industrialization, and became prevalent in Iran since the 1970s.[98] Marxist political economists use the concept in a similar fashion to explain 'dependent urbanism' (Clapp 1978: 16-17; Gugler 1997:114; Davis 2004:10). The mutual relationship of development and urbanism was the topic of interest for a small group of architects and urban planners in Iran in the same era.[99] In chapter 3 on Tehran under Pahlavi, I explained my critique of the concepts of 'slow urbanization' and "rapid urbanization," adopted by this group to divide Iran's urbanization into two periods and attribute their differences to the Land

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97 For examples of literary works produced under Pahlavi to portray the failures of the cities to accommodate a decent life see Mohsen Habibi (2010) *The Story of the City (Qeseh shahr*)..

98 David Kinsley (1954), the sociologist associated with world population projections, invented the term in his study on Egypt urbanization. He claims that there is an optimum rate of urbanization regarding the level of industrialization. In coming decades, the concept is used frequently by the researchers who frame their work in modernization's path. For an example see Gerald Breese (1969) *The City in Newly Developing Countries*, (ed). New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

99 The Urban and Regional Research Group is the most important effort by academia and intellectuals in Iran to conceptualize the urban process in the post-Revolution era. In 1975, Mehdi Kazemi Bidhendi and Guiti Etemad, two architects and urban planners teaching at National University in Tehran established a research group to introduce the Latin American urban literature, which examined development and urbanism in other countries. After completing his PhD in Brazil, Bidhendi dedicated himself to building a critical framework based on the Latin American literature on development to analyze the urban development in Iran. The founders of the group were expelled from the university in 1982 and their collective effort stopped after they published *Urbanism in Iran* authored by Hessamian, Etemad and Haeri in 1985.

Reform of 1963 or the oil boom of 1970.[100] The case presents an unsuccessful example of adopting the general theories of urbanization in the global South to the concrete process of a specific country. Mike Davis (1997) criticizes the same trend among Mexican urbanists, arguing they did not bring 'the particular' seriously into their analytical frame.[101] The same point is true for Iranian urbanists in 1970s and 1980s.

By the 1979 Revolution, the annual economic growth of Tehran Province (equal to Tehran metropolitan region) had dropped from 5 percent to -1 percent. Such negative growth continued into the 1980s, while the national economy grew by 2 percent (Athari 2014:17). Post-Revolution investments in industry were small and infrequent, but they followed an even geographical distribution policy, focusing on less-developed provinces (Azimi 2001). Ahsan (1993) argues that the IRI succeeded in a balanced distribution of higher education and professional medical services in 1980s and early 1990s due to vast investments in small and medium-sized provincial cities. Ahsan's latest study confirms the urban-rural welfare indexes tend to conform in the 1980s, unlike the widening gap of the pre-Revolution era (Ahsan 2007). The economic growth in Tehran province, beginning in early 1990, hit 5.5 percent annually in the 1990s, higher than the national average. However, the contribution of Tehran Province to Iran's industrial production remained around 30 percent in 1998. The province was home to 53.5 percent of the large industries' labour force in 1976. It declined to 35.2 percent in 1992 (Athari 1999:80). The IRI policy of rural development was considered successful in terms of the improvement of villagers' living standards and the increase in land area for cultivation, pushing residents toward self-sufficiency in production of the basic food staples (Schirazi 1988; Hooglund 1982), and thus stabilizing the rural population in 1980s. This was a temporary

100 I discussed that the thesis of 'rapid urbanization' is not supported by the existing data and the conceptual framework ignores the impacts of the industrial decentralization policy realized partly in the 1970s (mainly through industrial poles) and the act of '*Industrial Growth Ban within 120 km of Tehran'* introduced in the 1967. According to the act, no new industrial complexes could be established, and no existing ones expanded, within 120 km of Tehran.

101 Davis argues (1997: 8): 'the existing literature on urban policy and urban politics in Mexico has failed to take seriously both the local and national dimension of the urban development process. The basic problem is that most urban scholars of Mexico are weak exactly where urbanists of the advanced capitalist context are strong: Analysts of Mexico generally ignored the specifically local state and class dynamics of urban development patterns and focused instead on national (or even international) dynamics and determinations."

success, however, as the disastrous environmental consequences of policies to improve agriculture and a shift to strategic staples like grain would unfold in years to come.

The rural population increased from 17.4 to 22.6 million in the first decade of the Revolution, which would not repeat in the following decades; it remained around 23 million in 1996 and then declined to 22.5 million in 2006. In the early 1980s, Iran faced an unprecedented increase in the birth rate in urban areas, attributable to the IRI's official policy to ban the family planning program lunched in mid-1960s.[102] It's interesting to note that the change of policy did not affect the productive behavior of the rural population: in rural areas the birth rate continued to decrease from 48.8 to 42.8 births per thousand during 1976-86. In the same period, the birth rate in urban areas increased from 32.5 to 36.6 per thousand, which spurred the Iranian population to jump from 2.7 percent annual growth to 3.2 percent (Amani 1996:73-4). Table 13 shows the result of the increased birth rates on national population, increasing from 30.7 million to 60 million in two decades (1976-96) led to a jump in the urban population from 15.8 million to more than 36. Table 14 indicates that the number of the emigrants to Tehran did not increase, comparing the period of 1976-86 with five years prior. The annual number of migrants to the region decreased from 216,000 to 202,000, exemplified by the fact that from 1971-76 around 24 percent of migrants moving inside the country choose Tehran as their destination, but from 1976-86 that figure decreased to 19 percent.[103]

Table 13: Iran's Population Growth after the Revolution

Population Growth	1976	1986	1996
Population of Iran (millions)	33.7	49.4	60.0
Urban population (millions)	15.8	26.8	36.8
Iran's annual growth Rate %	2.7	3.2	1.9
Urban annual growth rate %	4.9	5.4	3.2

Source: Habibollah Zanjani 1991

102 In the 10th century Ebn Miskawayh discredited the old discourse of 'larger population brings more strength to the state' and argued that government should carefully measure growth rates (Pakdaman: 343). After the Revolution, the old discourse of population revived as a result of the war and antagonistic relations with neighboring countries. Such concerns added the power of the conservative clergies opposing the family planning program as an intervention in God's affair. In 1980, government stopped the distribution program of the contraceptive pills, the main method of prevention of pregnancy.

103 The table does not include the calculations of the 2.5 million Afghan refugees entering the country and more than one million who left the country in the aftermath of the revolution.

Table 14: Annual Migration in Iran and Tehran 1979-1991

Year	Iran	Tehran Metropolitan Region		Tehran City	
		Number	% From Iran	Number	% From Iran
1971-1976	216,000	61,000	28.1	53,000	24.6
1976-1986	202,000	70,000	34.5	38,000	19.0
1986-1991	330,000	81,000	24.6	54,000	16.3

Source: Khatam 1997.

Three concluding remarks on "balanced urbanism": first, rural areas retained their population and rural-urban migration declined as a result of rural development plans, meaning that the slight increase in urban growth from 4.9 to 5.4 percent in 1976-86 is the outcome higher birth rates; second, the intra-province migration increase versus the inter-province migration was a result of industrial decentralization as well as a more balanced distribution of new universities, higher medical services and so on;[104] third, massive suburbanization formed around the large cities, due to the housing the poor policy.

Land Transfers and Massive Suburbanization in Tehran

By suburbanization, I mean the "combination of an increase in non-central city population and economic activities, as well as urban spatial expansion" (Keil 2014: 9). Any study of suburbanization in Iran should deal with the theoretical as well as linguistic challenges of adapting existing analytic frames to different forms of non-central city urbanisms in the country. Before the Revolution, the formal and rich/middle class suburbs were called "*hoome-h*" or "*shahrak*" (a name for small town) and "*hashie-h"*, which mean poor and/or informal town and city. After the Revolution, many land divisions by the ULO were called "*shahrak*". In some cases, the informal settlements were also called "shahrak" after their self-help municipalities were established and the formalization process was launched.[105]

104 The share of intra-provincial migration and inter-provincial migration to total migration inside the country was 55 to 45 from 1971-76. The figure changes to 66 to 34 from 1976-86 (Khatam 1999: 180).

105 The attempts to theorize the dynamics of peripheral urban development in Iran are vague and controversial. For a long time, the research was focused on studying the rural-urban migration and the informal processes of suburbanism around the primary cities. There are at least two reasons for this: the

The ULO distributed land directly to individuals, housing cooperatives and builders that would construct housing for low-income dwellers. The exact area of lands distributed by all organizations involved in the issue is not clear. According to the ULO data (Table 15), the land acquired by the organization in the first decade of the Revolution was 85,557 hectares (more than the total land area of Tehran in the 1980s, which was 54,000 hectares). The proportion of *developable* land acquired, however, was limited. According To Rafiei (1986: 23) more than half of the acquired land lacked the minimum infrastructure to spur any development. The total designated for development was limited to 16.5 percent of the acquired land, including 12.5 for residential use and 4 percent for non-residential uses. However, the interesting study by Keivani et al (2008: 1836) suggests that the ULO's lands comprised 34 percent of the total plots under housing construction in the period of 1979-1988. Even in some years, the ULO share exceeded that of the private market, which meant that the ULO could radically change the land prices at the market level. During this period, less than half a million (422,864) households received a total land allocation of 10,790 hectares. Around 11 percent of the total land distributed by the ULO was in Tehran Province (1152 hectares). Tehran Province and Tehran metropolitan region in fact refer to the same area, according to Tehran Metropolitan Plan (1998).[106]

The ULO distributed lands directly to households, housing co-operatives and to public and private developers/companies. In the early 1980s, individual households comprised a larger share of the lands distributed. Budgetary limitations or the lack of meaningful incentives pushed many of the land recipients to sell their plots illegally, as land transactions were not permitted. To better target the people in need, the revised

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understanding of the concepts and theoretical frames of suburbanism have been based primarily on traditional observations of North American and European cities and then applied to local contexts in a linear fashion. In addition, the concepts invoked by conventional theories of political economy (like informal suburbia, self-help housing and irregular settlements) are not sufficiently accurate to capture the diverse landscapes and dynamics involved in the suburban environment and process in countries like Iran.

106 In 1995, the Housing Ministry tasked the Center for Architectural and Urban Planning Research to prepare a development plan for Tehran Metropolitan Region (*Majmoe'h shahri-e Tehran*). I was a member of the planning team, responsible for the sociological studies. Approved by the Supreme Council of Architecture and Urban Planning, secretariat by the Housing Ministry, the plan confirmed that the Tehran metropolitan Region is equal to Tehran Province, minus its uninhabitable areas like the mountains. Covering 8,000 sq. km of the province area (13,000 sq. km), the region is linked and integrated through daily commutes for work and residence.

Urban Land Act of 1987 prioritized the allocation of the land to housing co-operatives and joint venture schemes with housing developers. As a result, the distribution of the land recipients changed in the second half of the decade (Madanipour 1987: 184-5).[107]

Table 15: Land distributed by the ULO 1979–89

ULO Land Distribution	Country		Tehran province	
	Hectares	Percent	Hectares	Percent
Total distributed land	14103	100	1534	100
Lands for residential	10790	77	1152	75
Categories of recipient:	---	100		100
- Individual households	6167	57.1	392	34.0
- Co-operatives	3063	28.4	737	64.0
- Mass builders	1560	14.5	23	2.0

Sources: ULO, Annual Report, 1980–89.

According to the law, housing co-operatives could be formed only at the workplace, and by at least seven people from the same workplace. Such restrictions excluded small manufactures and retail units with less than seven labourers (despite the fact that labourers in smaller business are more exposed to poverty) from facilities provided to house the poor. Small business labourers could not get organized in their neighbourhoods, because the law did not permit it. This encouraged the illegal transaction on ULO lands. Recipients of state land, the better-paid and more organized sector of the labour force, would sell its land(s) to the less paid labour in small business and benefit from the price gap in the land market. As the map of Tehran's development over a century shows the post-Revolution land distributions have caused sprawl inside and outside of the T25-year DZ.

[107] According to Madanipour one fourth of the allocation (590 hectares) in Tehran province happened in years 1982-6 and 35,000 households received plots of ULO land in twenty cities around the province (1987: 184).

Figure 8: Development of Tehran in a century 1891- 1996



Source: Tarh va Memari Consulting Firm. Permission granted.

In Tehran the share of co-operative housing was much higher than the national average (64 percent to 28 percent). The province had a much lower rate of public-private developer provision (only 2 per cent compared to 14.5 per cent). This can be explained by the higher level of labour force organization in Tehran. The lands appropriated or under negotiation by the ULO in the same period, however, were ten times more than the allocated lands. The allocation of land to public land usage requires an independent study.[108] The joint venture schemes provided for private individuals and development companies to apply for land allocations under clause 67 of the Act for joint venture activities:

The Act put a limit of 10 units on registered individual builders and 50 units on

[108] Tabeti, the deputy for urban planning in the Housing Ministry (1980-3), claims "the numbers of schools, parks, hospitals and other public utilities built in the four years of the revolution, using the lands appropriated by the ULO, were more than what was built in two decades before the revolution" (Gonabadi et.al 1391/2012).

> legal entities (companies) at each cycle of development from initial allocation to the delivery of units. After the completion of the project, the share that the private builder could sell in the market would be separated, while the government's share would be transferred at pre-set prices to eligible customers who are introduced by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development [MHUP] (Keivani 2008: 1836-7).

Recent studies confirm that families of martyrs of the Revolution, the Revolutionary Guards and other politically linked social groups were the main beneficiaries of the housing units sold at affordable prices by the MHUP (Yazdani 2008). However, the ULO succeeded in keeping average land prices below their pre-revolutionary peak, according to all data sources. According to Keivani et al (2008: 1838-9), the average share of land to housing costs was reduced from over 43 percent in 1976 to an average of 25.8 percent in 1988. The affordability of housing on ULO land, on the other hand, remained stable throughout the period. The fact that much smaller average units were being built on ULO land played a major role in the affordability of the units. The average size of the housing on ULO land was 75 sq. meters while the average size of a unit on private market land was 165 sq. meters. The program, however, had an unbeatable advantage: it was flexible with the construction strategies recipients applied according to their own budgets. They had to complete their housing units within three years after they received the ULO land. Such a timeframe was suitable for the majority of recipients: "while in some cases a small self-help input may have occurred, most of the housing on ULO land was built by professional builders similar to housing on private land albeit with different finishing standards depending on the budget of the beneficiary households" (ibid: 1846-47). The Urban Land Ceiling Act and the ULO did indeed direct land provision and the land market for a decade, and successfully competed with informal markets for land provision.

Populist urban politics led to massive suburbanization of state employees and subaltern groups who purchased the ULO's lands, either directly or indirectly in Tehran. In the first years of development, the subdivisions looked like organized informal settlements in terms of their lack of infrastructure and urban amenities. As legally

developed spaces, they were built to higher construction and material standards and were on the municipalities' and provincial governments' priority list for servicing. In 1986, however, as the TMR social study suggests (Khatam 1998: 128), 36 small towns of more than 5000 populations, growing at average rate of 18 percent per year, were administered by self-help municipalities (*shahrdari-e khodyar*), not regular public municipalities. The formation of self-help municipalities indicates that the IRI followed a policy for formalizing the informal settlements. During 1976-86, the urban network in Tehran province extended from 15 to 23 cities, with 5 of the 8 new cities growing as informal/subdivision settlements.[109]

Table 16: Suburbanization in the Tehran Metropolitan Region 1966-96

Year	Tehran Province population (1000)	Distribution (%)			Growth Rate (%)	
		Tehran province	City of Tehran	Outside	City of Tehran	Outside
1966	3472	100	78.3	23.7	---	---
1976	5321	100	85.1	14.9	4.2	4.4
1986	8095	100	74.6	25.4	2.7	4.3
1996	10343	100	65.3	34.4	1.1	2.9

Source: Khatam 1999 Vol. 4:84.

As the growth rate figures for Tehran and "outside" suggests, the centralizing pattern of the 1966-76 changed to a balanced urbanisation trend since the late 1970s and

109 The estimates for slum dwellers in pre-Revolution era are rough and overlap with households living in poor housing conditions in the regular neighbourhoods. While Bayat (2010a: 104) suggests that more than one third of the population of the city were slum dwellers in the late 1970s, my study for Tehran Metropolitan Plan indicates that at the time of the Revolution, city of Tehran had more than 50 slum neighbourhoods, where 130,000 people lived. This was less than five percent of the population of the city. By the time of the Revolution, most of the slums were removed and their dwellers resettled in new divisions around the city. In 1979 resettlement units were established in two large slums in Tehran, one built in 1960 in the abandoned lands of the brick factories in southern Tehran (*Gowd-haye Jonob-e shosh*) and the other one built in the 1970s along the Resalat Expressway, a west-east axes constructed in the same decade. *Gowd-haye Jonob-e shosh* had 4500 units and 46000 people lived there. The Interior Ministry destroyed the slum and relocated the population (Etellaat Daily 9/10/1358 and 5/6/1359). Part of the residents were sent to the villages (Khatam 1996). Parviz Piran's study on the transformation of Tehran's slums is a pioneer in the topic after the revolution. Unfortunately he does not provide any estimate for the 1970s. He mentions that in 1988, there were 35 small slums in the city, with a population of less than 40 thousand in total (1991:4).

early 1980s. In the first decade (1976-86) the growth rates for Tehran and TP were 2.7 and 4.3 per cent accordingly. In the next decade, the growth of the city dropped from 4.2 to 2.7 percent but the region's growth remained at around 4.3 percent. A decade later, the growth of the city fell to below the natural increase of the population.

Revolutionary "Development"

Unlike the post-development scholars documenting ''the loss of an illusion, in which many genuinely believed" (Escobar 1995: 4), or diffusionist theories arguing that 'capitalism' or 'Westernization' spread outward from the core, I conceptualize the 'progress' or 'development' as activities of 'locals'— including ordinary people, revolutionary activists and leftist and liberal technocrats— who contributed to the construction of an endogenous development paradigm in post-Revolution Iran. My brief introduction on this development paradigm shift in the late 1980s includes an examination of how war fundamentalism attempts to build an Islamic economy weakened the post-Revolution contributions to the indigenous development paradigm, and how the emergence of the governmentality crises in the final years of war with Iraq lead to the rise of 'knowledge-based' developmentalism and 'homegrown' neoliberalism. This brief discussion responds to Frederick Cooper's call (2005: 139) for scholarly discussions of modernity and development to reflect "nuance and historical grounding" and to "foreground the inventions, adaptations and alterations inherent in social change."

War Fundamentalism and Islamic/Even Development

At the time of the Revolution, many members of the Islamic Students Association in Europe and the United States were pulled back to Iran, where they found themselves in a heady state of 'utopian promise.' The Islamic students, who returned from MIT, Stanford, and Universities of California and North Carolina, took over the Ministry of Science, the Central Bank, and the MPO (Najafi 2002). Recognized as the technocratic body of the state, the provisional government of Bazargan (1979-80) was distinct from the Parliament and Judiciary, where the clergy and younger revolutionaries had the advantage and were supported by the Council of Revolution. The efforts to balance and counterbalance the state machine were contemporaneous in the first months: those in the

executive body aimed 'to save the economy from collapse' (Nili 2002:80), to stabilize the new regime in the international scene and deal with urgent practical needs; the Council of Revolution and Guardian Council were drafting the Constitution and designing major strategies. Different social networks, as Hajarian (2012) recalls in his memories of Revolution, would take the second and third tiers of the revolutionary leaders to different foundations or revolutionary bodies.

In November 1979, radical students occupied the US Embassy in Tehran and held its personnel hostage, demanding that the United States extradite the Shah to Iran. "The dynamic of the hostage crisis created a momentum for militancy," and diverted popular attention away from the domestic power struggle, led the population to lend extra support to the government and intensified the hold of "war fundamentalism" on politics (Gheissari and Nasr 2006: 78).[110] The war and hostage crisis framed the leftist anti-establishment efforts as a fight against moderate Islamists (Moslem 2002: 80). A few weeks into the crisis, Bazargan resigned while Ayatollah Khomeini called the incident a "second revolution".[111] Gheissari and Nasr explain, "the struggle for power between fundamentalists and leftists would also push the former to more openly appropriate the ideology of the Left and to match and exceed its claims. In the world of revolutionaries, fundamentalists were determined to be more revolutionary than the Left, to compete with the Left in its own court and win" (2006: 96). Calling themselves *hizbollahi* (i.e., highly religious and still true supporters of the original discourse of the revolution), they alienated others from the political context of the day. Many of the foreign-educated technocrats remained outsiders to the body of the state due to a lack of a network with *hizbollahi* forces. In the spring of 1980, the coalition of radical Islamists launched the project of the Islamization of the bureaucracy. The MPO was regarded as the most suspicious body and was therefore closed down for a few months, both for its major role in developmental planning under Pahlavi and for Harvard University's contribution to its foundation in 1948. The MPO's executive directors left the organization (or the country)

110 Gheissari and Nasr (2006: 78-9) use the term 'war fundamentalism' to discuss the unilateral style of rejecting the authority of international agreements, laws and so on, manifested in the approval of the acts like occupation of the US Embassy.

111 The admission of the Shah to a hospital in New York and a significant meeting in Algiers between Prime Minster Bazargan and American national security adviser, Brzezinski, during the funeral of President Boumedienne was considered as American plot to undo the Revolution and restore the Shah to power (ibid: 94).

by the time of the Revolution, followed by many others with the fall of the provisional government, with eventually all senior professionals being dismissed before the reopening (Mashayekhi 2008). The MPO remained at the margins of government bureaucracy during the war, but Ministries were still required to negotiate with the MPO regarding their budget.

While war fundamentalism ruled Iranian foreign and internal politics for almost a decade in the form of intensified intrastate conflicts, political suppression, the Islamization project and the war with Iraq, the developmental efforts of Jahad Sazandegi,[112] the Movement to Fight Illiteracy and other developmental organizations were changing the economic situation of the rural areas and small cities. Scholars studying Iran's economy usually do not engage in studying the role of developmental imaginations at different periods, however, some like Salehi and Pesaran confirm that "the interventionist policies of the government after the Revolution were partly intended to reverse the rising inequities in the earlier decades. They seem to have directly and indirectly contributed to such a reversal" (Salehi and Pesaran 2009: 195).[113] This reversal took place while "the gross domestic product fell by 1.5 percent a year on average in 1978 to 1988. In 1988 it stood at 1974 levels" (Gheissari and Nasr 2006: 73). In the meantime, oil production fell from 5.6 million barrels per day to as low as 2.2 million barrels at a time when prices of oil also declined sharply. Table 17 includes Iran's GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) for the period 1978-98 (Harris 2013). The index shows the performance of the economy in its international context. According to the table, Iran's economy experienced two downturns: the first arrived at the outset of the Revolution and the intensified when war began in 1980; the second took place in the last years of the war (1986-90), and was mainly caused by the sharp decline in Iran's oil revenue.

112 According to Asghar Schirazi (1993: 194-5) 850,000 hectares of land under Industry and Cultivation complexes were distributed among 220,000 rural households and 10,000 agricultural co-operatives were formed to improve the cultivation and marketing.

113 Salehi Esfahani and Pesaran argue "The longer term legacy of the Revolution for inequality in Iran seems to be a gradual decline in extreme differences—reflected in the income ratio of the top to bottom deciles of the households—while the overall inequality measured by the Gini coefficient has remained unchanged" (ibid).

Table 17: Iran's economic performance (GDP per capita adjusted for PPP) 1978-98

Year	Iran GPDpc at constant 2014 USD	Year	Iran GPDpc at constant 2014 USD	Year	Iran GPDpc at constant 2014 USD
1978/79	3950	1985/86	2495	1992/93	2519
1979/80	3397	1986/87	2176	1993/94	2516
1980/81	2498	1987/88	2126	1994/95	2457
1981/82	2283	1988/89	1968	1995/96	2487
1982/83	2700	1989/90	2033	1996/97	2583
1983/84	2853	1990/91	2263	1997/98	2561
1984/85	2536	1991/92	2480	1997/98	2574

Source: Iran's Central Bank data

While the index for income disparity shows gradual decline in extreme differences in income distribution after the Revolution, the decline in average consumption of the urban household during the 1980s is confirmed by the GDP data, as well as diverse literature produced by social research, biographies and personal histories and memories. In this context, the war with Iraq delays social demands, but popular expectation of recovery in the household's economic status does not disappear. In the mid-1980s, the controversy surrounding Islamic economics is in full swing: part of the technocrats' believe that efforts to define an Islamic economics "in terms of modern economic theories and concepts, with clear distinctions from socialist and capitalist economics, largely failed" (Najafi 2002). [114] But as our review on land distribution practices confirms, the fights on policy issues are not determined by how Islamic Economics is understood or defined in abstract. On the contrary, it is the conservatives' resuming power in the IRI that opened the way for a minimal definition of the term to be accepted: a definition based on the

114 The first years of the Revolution saw several workshops spearheaded by Ayatollah Beheshti. A prominent figure at the time, Beheshti played a leading role in drafting of the new constitution. Shortly after the bomb explosion at the Islamic Republic Party headquarters and the death of Beheshti in June 1981, the Qum Seminary took the initiative to lead such workshops. Led by the ultra-conservative and highly influential Azari Qumi, a Grand Ayatollah, the debates shifted from the limits to private ownership in Islam to the prohibition of usury (*reba* in Persian) and "interest-free banking" (Valadbeigi 1992).

prohibition of usury in Islam (Valibeigi 1992).[115] In fact, rather than a group of economist-technocrats designing the free market reform, the credit for building market reform and an anti-statist economy in the IRI goes to mercantile capital and its representatives who held the economic ministries in the Mousavi government and resisted his leftist policies.

In the mid-1980s Iran was characterized as a post-Revolutionary society, an internationally isolated, fragmented Islamic state, and an economy deteriorated by revolutionary stagnation and long-term war. Iranian society changed dramatically during the first decade of the revolution: "As a result of these struggles, and the initial economic populism of the Islamist revolutionaries, the 1980s brought a degree of class egalitarianism…the populist policies of the new regime went hand in hand with a relentless political and ideological exclusion of secular, liberal and democratic constituencies, as the government began to Islamize society from the top down" (Bayat 2010a: 107-8). Secondary education became part of common schooling in both cities and rural areas (Khatam 2010). The spread of modern communications (governmental TV channels as well as illegal satellite dishes), and the middle class laid claim to standards of education, health and consumption among populations in remote areas.

Crisis of Governmentality and Adoption of Asian Models

In the work of Foucault (1991), the notion of governmentality is linked to the concepts of biopolitics and power-knowledge. Governmentality is the "art of government" in a wide sense, including control techniques of one's self. According to his theory, the production of knowledge and certain discourses can serve to internalize power relations and create new frames for thinking and social conduct (Burchell et al. 1997: 87-9). While some scholars read the political shift in the post-war era through challenges posed by the economic crisis on the state, I argue that such challenges go beyond governance crisis and involve the governmentality in the IRI. To frame the challenges of governance, Gheissari and Nasr (2006) suggest that "As the Islamic Republic felt the pressure of

115 Sohrab Behdad argues (1995) that Iran lacks a grave contribution to the debate of Islamic economics before the Revolution and there is not much written on the topic after the revolution. A Persian translation of the book *Islam and Capitalism*, authored by Maxime Rodinson (1979), published in the same year of the Revolution was banned soon after as the writer argues that Islam is compatible with capitalism.

popular demand, revolutionary politics was compelled to embrace greater pragmatism and to confront the imperative of development and efficiency in state-building" (104). To explore the challenges of revolutionary governmentality, one may note that the communications of an average Iranian household with the outside world had increased in the 1980s, as a result of the emigration of more than 1 million Iranians for political or social restrictions (Nasehi 2009). Dispersed around the world, family and business links of the diaspora with the homeland increased the global links of the average Iranian. In late 1980s, major segments of the Iranian society was alienated from the IRI for political repression, "Cultural Revolution" which targeted the Islamization of universities, and persistent discrimination against women and disciplining of the urban public spaces according to rigid Islamic codes of conduct. By the ceasefire of August 1988, Iranians had suffered half a million casualties in the war and one decade of economic adversity.[116] After eight years of sacrifices, Iran had no victory. The sudden decision to accept the ceasefire and peace with Iraq was received as a failure by many Iranians, including Ayatollah Khomeini himself.[117]

The Islamic Republic Party (*hezb-e jomhori eslami)* and the unitary associations that had functioned as an umbrella to gather together the main clerical and non-clerical Islamic politicians ranging from left to conservative for almost a decade was dissolved in 1988. The intensified intra-state conflicts reflected the emerging crisis of governmentality in the Islamic Republic. In the late 1980s Iran, the IRI constituency was no longer satisfied with Islamization or war fundamentalism. To move out from the deadlocks of war fundamentalism, Rafsanjani aimed to restructure the state to avoid overall skepticism and fragmentations and attain the full mobilization of its capacities. To marginalize the deep-rooted leftist populist politics of the Revolution and war, he realigned with the conservatives, who anticipated a military-economic strategy to buttress the ideological characters of the Islamic Republic. The controversies of such realignment remain unexamined. Center right and conservatives walked out of the war and revolutionary era with different mentalities on "development," "Islamic society," the unipolar world and

116 The official figure for war casualties is 160000 (see Iran Times, 23 September 1988).
117 In his statement of 20 July, Ayatollah Khomeini calls his acceptance of the resolution "more bitter than poison" and went on to say, "had it not been in the interest of Islam and Muslim, I would never have accepted this and would have preferred death and martyrdom" (quoted from Willet 2003: 55). Also see Pesaran 2011: 65.

the IRI's allies and enemies in the global scene. Such diverging imaginaries would grow into conflicting agendas in near future.[118] In 1990, however, the center right and conservative coalition was able to eliminate the left from political power and create a unitary government to overcome the post-Khomeini political tensions. When the task was accomplished, they competed with each other for absolute rule. Due to common anti-welfarist attitudes and different agendas to achieve it, a neoliberal agenda of reconstruction unified as well as divided the two factions. Maljoo (2003, 2012) has suggested that parastatal foundations, controlled by conservatives, have weakened the emerging Islamic private sector and it was the reason that they gathered around the leaders of the center right.[119] The end of the war accelerated the bureaucratization and transformation of the *Bonyads* from Islamic relief institutes (providing services for martyrs' families, people disabled by war, and destitute groups) to powerful economic institutions engaged in competition with the private sector for profitable contracts and projects.[120]

In the post-Soviet era, the center right and its leader, Rafsanjani found no alternative to the capitalist system: "it was not a multipolar world anymore" (Rafsanjani 2013: 80). Keeping the propaganda alive around the motto of the Revolution "Neither west, Nor east, the Islamic republic", the leaders of the IRI knew from their experience of the war with Iraq how much a multipolar world worked to their benefit. The collapse of the Soviet Union was received by the IRI both as the failure of the leftist ideals and the collapse of the bipolar world system. Baffled by the ideological crisis, many of the IRI's elites blamed the secular left for spreading the ideal of justice in the Constitution: Rowghani Zanjani (2003: 142, 144), a radical leftist Islamist and head of the MPO in 1985-1995, asserted that the Constitution was not inspired by the Islamic texts, but

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118 Even the historiography of the leftist and conservative Islamic political thought is richer than the one for the centre right. See for example Abrahamian (2013) and Mirsepassi (2010).

119 According to Amuzegar (1993: 100) all foundations, except the Foundation for the Oppressed, have 400,000 employees. The property of the Foundation for the Oppressed was estimated around 20 billion dollars in 1981 (Abrahamian 2008: 312).

120 Behdad and Nomani (2006) have argued that the decision to keep a huge number of confiscated assets under the domain of 'public ownership' and not as part of the state enterprise put the base of the power of the *Bonyads* (i.e., parastatal foundations), the main financial base of the conservative Islamists after the revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini decides to treat these assets as a religious endowment (*Waqf*) not subject to state audit or control and only at the disposal of the supreme leader. The interwoven network between *Bonyads* and wealthy merchants and leaders of the bazaar in Iran empowers both during the war.

seriously imbued with dominant secular leftist outlooks. For him, "neither the theory, nor those who designed it [the Islamic economists], had any interaction with the real world and empirical evidence…. It was artificial and was alienating us from Iran's real economy and its administrative needs".[121] The Islamic economics and populist discourse of development were under attack by technocrats who shifted their political base from the government to the Third Parliament. [122]

The mid-1980s were marked by a dramatic fall in oil prices and a budget deficit in Iran. This budget deficit played a decisive role in convincing the leftist Islamists to work with the center right to bring the war to an end. Sanctions, damages to oil infrastructures, and the "Tanker War" severely reduced Iran's oil production capacity. In 1985, Iran produced only 2.5 million barrels of oil per day, half of daily production before the Revolution (Amuzegar 1992). The price of oil in the global market dropped from $29 to $8 per barrel between 1985 and 1986 and Iran's oil revenues plummeted subsequently from $14 billion to $5.9 billion. The investment share of the GDP in the 1980s decreased to one-third of the figure of the previous decade and the unemployment rate doubled (Salehi Esfahani 2002: 29). Financing the war, at the cost of $6 billion in 1985 became impossible (Amirahmadi 1988). The factional fight over the character and future of the IRI intensified as a result of these economic difficulties.

The political network of the center right was formed in 1988, as some like-minded high-level executives headed for the Third Parliament (1988-1991). They contributed actively to the economic commission of the parliament charged with the task of developing new economic policies. Networked and organized as a circle around Rafsanjani, the second figure of the Revolution after Ayatollah Khomeini, the center right assisted him in launching the first restructuring state power in the IRI, aiming to

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121 He is pointing to the articles 43 and 44 that have defined a prominent role for the state in the economy and social policy. Article 43 confirms that economy of the IRI is to achieve "the economic independence of the society, uprooting poverty and deprivation, and fulfilling human needs in the process of development." According to Article 43, the state is tasked to provide the "basic necessities for all citizens: housing, food, clothing, hygiene, medical treatment, education, and the necessary facilities for the establishment of a family." Article 44 of the Constitution states "the state sector is to include all large-scale and mother industries, foreign trade, major minerals, banking, insurance, power generation, dams and large-scale irrigation networks, radio and television, post, telegraph and telephone services, aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and the like."

122 In 2013, even the supreme leader called for the adoption of an "economy of resistance" rather than an Islamic economics to resist the US-led sanctions against Iran.

overcome the crisis of governmentality. Rafsanjani pushed for the bureaucratization of factional politics, appeased the conservatives by economic privileges, while offsetting the left-wing leaders by expelling them from power. Reluctant to mobilize the popular classes, the center right remained a circle of elites rather than a party during its years in power.[123] In 1989, Rafsanjani became the first president of the post-Khomeini era, winning with more than 90 percent of the entire electoral vote, while Ayatollah Khamenei succeeded Khomeini as supreme leader. In 1991, they ran a major screening of the leftist candidates for the Fourth Parliament, which stopped 80 percent of the Third Parliament members from competition and casted out the anti-imperialist Islamists who adhered to egalitarian economic principles from the power structure.

Knowledge, Power and Economics

The notion of building an "Islamic developmental state" was a driving force during Rafsanjani's presidency (Gheissari and Nasr: 106), and brought together a range of politicians, industrial capitalists and experts to network and rebuild the center right politics and practice. In this context, new social actors emerged and new roles and functions were defined for existing institutions; the economist-technocrats took refuge in the Management and Planning Organization (MPO) and used its capacity to 'rescue' the economy and popular hope for improvement. The process to prepare the first Development Plan marked a turning point in the relation of Mousavi's leftist government and Third Parliament with Rafsanjani as the speaker in 1987. The first DP developed a language of governance crisis focused on the imbalance between the population increase, the requirements of the economic reconstruction, and limited available resources. Approved in 1989, it targeted a structural reform and an ambitious reconstruction project in times of austerity. Rafsanjani ushered in the new era, recognizing that the technocracy was a source of knowledge and the west the territory of knowledge production when, in July 1989, he introduced the members of his cabinet to the parliament as "highly educated with degrees from American and European universities" (quoted in Moslem 2002: 194). Against the disparaging of the 'experts' in the Revolution, Rafsanjani praised

123 Under attack from conservatives in 1996, the core members of the group form an assembly called *Executives of Construction Party* (ECP) and enter the electoral competition for the Fifth Parliament (1996-99). They elect Gholamhossein Karbaschi, the Mayor of Tehran, as the leader of the ECP.

'knowledge' as the source of 'rational thinking.' To empower themselves with this new source of power, large groups of the IRI's authorities, including members of the parliament, governors, mayors, executives, even executives of parastatal foundations and revolutionary corps commanders, entered/returned to universities. Non-degree holders could occupy no position in the state apparatus anymore.[124] Dezalay and Garth (2002: 80) have pointed to a shift from law to economics in the education of the Latin American elites between 1950 and the 1990s. In Iran, the education of elites shifted from law to engineering, then to economics in the same periods.[125] The key role of engineers in high ranked technocracy was evident from the educational backgrounds of MPO directors. Technocrats running the organization since its inception in 1948 to the Revolution were educated in law and management; the engineer-technocrats replaced them after the revolution; only one out of eight directors in the years between 1979 and 2000 had a non-engineering background. Mohammad Tavakoli (2012) has suggested that the engineering concepts of 'rebuilding' and 'redesigning' the society and the individual, found a stronghold in Islamic politics as a large number of Islamic militants, then politicians and technocrats, were coming out of engineering schools. The formation of the 'engineer-technocrats' was informed also by IRI's hostile approach to social sciences as a western knowledge used to colonize other societies. This might explain the ups and downs of the rise of economist-technocrats in the IRI, and the popularity of the econometrics to package economics as a neutral knowledge. In 1981, Rowghani Zanjani, a faculty administrator with an MA in economics was appointed as the director of the MPO, when senior planners like many professors of economics and social science were fired, retired or forced to leave the country.[126] Converting to free market reform, Rowghani Zanjani remained in his position until 1993.[127]

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124 In 1995, in a small meeting with one of the deputies of Housing Ministry, someone asked why he cared to study for a PhD while he worked as the deputy for some years. He replied "Higher education functions as shield to save us in fights going on in our job. Without the degree it is like you are wrestling without *'lung'." 'Lung'* is traditional Iranian wrestling singlet wrestlers wear when they come onto the mat.
125 Dezalay and Garth argue that the failure of the "Law and Development" movement in building the rule of law led to the replacement of the study of law by the study of economics. This procedure changes the 'gentleman lawyers' into 'state economists' (ibid).
49 Educated as an engineer, Masoud Nili, started his education in economics in 1983. He worked as the director of the MPO's Macroeconomic Bureau from1985-1991. He described the change of his educational field as a result of "his personal interests and the need of the country to economic experts" (2002: 234). Another example, Mohsen Yahyavi, the Minster of Housing in 1979, who studied oil engineering before

The reconstruction project functioned as an umbrella agenda to transform the statist economy and promote state building in the IRI.[128] Reconstruction was an institutional reform that aimed to "rationalize the state" by bringing "various revolutionary bodies under greater state control and in many ways subduing their revolutionary character and functions" (Moslem 2002: 191). Gheissari and Nasr (2006: 105) have suggested that "this turn to developmentalism was anchored in state building concerns that had certain similarities with those that had shaped the Pahlavi state."[129] Ehsani (2006: 80) has observed: "to make the system viable there is no other way rather than to normalize the Islam and reintegrate the population into a 'modern' Islamic system." The bold program of urban renewal in Tehran and the remarkable development in higher education were two main examples of such reintegration.

The IRI has represented itself as a "developmental state."[130] However, in contrast with Asian developmental states or the Pahlavi regime, the economy was not at the forefront of the IRI's agenda at the beginning. Ayatollah Khomeini attacked openly the economic discourse of both the secular left and the liberals in heydays of the Revolution. In his public speech of August 1979, he insisted: "people are engaged in the Revolution

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the Revolution, shifted to political science for his MA and ended up studying Management in 1990s. It is worth noting that the leftist engineer-technocrats expelled from the government usually returned to the universities to study social and political science. For example Saeid Hajarian (MA in Mechanical Engineering from Tehran University and a security executive) and Ebrahim Asgharzadeh (industrial engineering at Sharif University and member of the Third Parliament) both studied political science at the University of Tehran in the 1990s. Both were elected to the Tehran City Council in 1998.

127 Rowghani Zanjani as the head of the MPO presents a secret report to Ayatollah Khomeini concluding the impossibility of sustaining the economy at a level necessary to manage the basic needs of the population concurrent with the financing of the war. He departs from the left and becomes a supporter of the shock doctrine therapy in the mid-1980s. See his interview by Ahmadi Amouei (Rowghani Zanjani 2002).

128 Years later, economist-technocrats recall their effort as a heroic story of wise economists with a lifetime commitment to the free market ideology, fighting the statist bureaucrats (Tabibian 2002). This story includes a distorted historiography of the MPO as the safe haven of free market paradigm and "economic rationality" in times of ideological populist politics.

129 They continue "This did not mean that Rafsanjani government was inspired by the example of 1970s or that it credited the shah's policies – although many bureaucratic managers began looking to the details of planning and decision-making of the Pahlavi period as they sought to address socioeconomic issues" (ibid).

130 The 'developmental state,' as Peet and Hartwick argue (2009: 63-69), was employed in the Third World in post WWII as a parallel conception to Keynesianism, drawing from it but differing in several aspects, following the example of Japan. The concept was supported by 'development economics', which take population, technology and institutions as endogenous factors of an economic system, unlike neoclassical economics that assumes these as exogenous to it. Such conception may seem too simplified, as there are a plurality of 'development economics,' including a neoclassical one, with different perceptions of 'endogenous' and 'exogenous.'

for the sake of Islam, not for economic causes" (1999 vol. 9: 450).[131] Ironically, economic policies make up the core of factionalism in the first decade of the Revolution: "though debates over the foreign policy was restrained and the various contenders did not propose radically different policies, in economic matters the radicals clashed severely with the other two factions over the right to private property" (Gheissari and Nasr 2006:101).[132] From the hot topic of factional debates, 'economics' enters and establishes itself as the main theme of planning debates. The cover page of the first issue of *Taze-haye Eqtesad* (Economics Updates), an economic journal published by Iran's Central Bank in June 1988, signals the government's attention to the centrality of the economy in its decision-making: "this journal is published in a sensitive time, with sensitive tasks. This is the time that no one can ignore the importance of the economy" (1988: 2). Reports on the first DP and interviews with the new president and economic authorities all revolve around the necessity of rapid economic growth. East Asia's economic achievement is frequently discussed. Rafsanjani calls for less government intervention in the economy: "the government should avoid entering into activities which people are able to perform… The rule of capital is different from keeping it active in the economy. They should accord themselves with a fair interest and we should use their capital to improve the economy" (Hashemi Rafsanjani 1988).

The shift coincided with the Soviet Union's collapse, when the capitalist system was regarded globally as a prosperous and sensible way to organize the economy and society. The Islamic technocrats were either allured by the success of the developmental model in Asian countries, or convinced that 'rational thinking' implied joining the global economy. They started to redefine the economic goals of the Revolution: "we need to remedy the undefined concepts we have used since the first days of the revolution. For example, how do we define a self-sufficient economy? What is independence? Or how could a plan support the destitute?" Nili argues that the goals of the Revolution need to be redefined in a 'rational way of thinking' (Nili 1989: 29).

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49 Some scholars even argue that the trust of the conservative clergy in the theory of 'Revolution for Islam' intensified the shrinking economic conditions in the mid-1980s (Hashem Pesaran 1982).

132 In his last will and testament, Ayatollah Khomeini (1999: 80) reconfirms: "Islam does not support oppressive and uncontrolled capitalism…nor is Islam a communist or Marxist regime which opposes private ownership."

Major figures of the Islamist left opposed the proposal of financing industrialization and economic growth by short-term/high-interest foreign loans (Iravani 1989: 19-21). Mohsen Noorbakhsh, head of Iran's Central Bank at the time, recalls how negotiations become contentious in parliament:

> There was a hot debate over foreign borrowing in the second parliament [1984-1987]…. Finally, the parliament concluded that if we were going to implement a reconstruction policy we should go for foreign loans, [but] of course the [Mousavi] government was against the idea. There were two different views on the issue in the government and parliament. The new attitude toward the economy believed in opening up to the international system, regarding the recent change of its [political] setting and the end of the war with Iraq. This meant we should rely on non-oil exports and seriously try to attract foreign loans and investments. Other ideas like privatization and downsizing of the state, which we added to the First Five Year Development Plan resulted from this viewpoint. The other view insisted on keeping the state structure intact and allocating the war budget to investment in reconstruction (Noorbakhsh 2002: 95-6).

Alternative policies proposed by the left, for example to improve the tax system or to improve the technical-industrial training to re-skill labour (Mardokhi 1986: 10), remained at the margins of the public debate. Leftist Islamists were inclined to echo the past rather than face the future.[133] While more traditional figures of the left remained committed to Islamic Economics, the leftist followers of Bazargan organized themselves as Nationalist-Religious Group (*goroohe meli-mazhabi*), and launched their journal, *Iran-e Farda* in 1990*,* covering leftist debates on development and criticisms of Iran's first DP.

Asian Models and Imaginary of an Islamic Developmental State

Using a class lens to analyze the post-war shift to liberalize the statist economy, Behdad and Nomani (2006) argue that Iran's disintegrated bourgeoisie organized itself

133 The adviser of the Ministry of Industry claims that the alteration of the factories' production lines to military equipment production was a long-term strategy toward self-sufficiency in the economy. The austerity of wartime is regarded as a "gift" and a guide toward realizing an equal society (Sheyk Ataar 1986: 9).

and moved to restore its power through re-privatization of the expropriated industries and weakening the hold of the state, *Bonyads*, and parastatal enterprises on the economy. Such a claim needs additional evidence. Studying the details of the economic discourse surrounding the reconstruction project, through articles and interviews published in two new economic journals of the time, *Taze-haye Eqtesad* and *Etellaat-e Syasi-Eqtesadi,* I assert that there is more evidence to argue that the Iranian government manufactured the economic shift to create such a bourgeoisie to rely on in the future.[134] I use the term 'inventing neoliberalism' to address the state's agency in manufacturing a homegrown neoliberal developmentalism in Iran.[135] Such framing does not suggest that the effort is not inspired by other examples or models or new economic paradigms, and does not deny the international pressure on Iran to adopt structural adjustment policy.

In September 1989, the head of Iran's Central Bank participated in the annual meeting of the IMF and World Bank as a member of the IMF management board.[136] Rafsanjani visited China to explore the context of the rapid growth of its economy (Abrahamian 2008: 322). He admired President Mahatir Mohammad as an Islamic leader succeeding to promote a developmental state in Malaysia. The South Asian 'miracle' was understood as performative proof of a global economy and free market paradigm.[137] Even *Etellaat Syasi-Eqtesadi,* the journal published by the leftist Islamists, shared the fascination. The Asian economic model was perceived to be free from the negative aspects of both colonial comprador capitalism and anticolonial populist statism. It

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134 Being weak and fragmented, it is difficult to assume that the Iranian bourgeoisie, lacking the minimum of an organized network, could claim a policy change and put pressure on the post-war government to implement it. The big capitalists fled the country and others were passive. In 1979, a committee in Iran's Central Bank published the names of the 177 millionaire families who had transferred large amounts of money to other countries in months before the Revolution (Katouzian and Shahidi 2007).

135 The concept 'domesticating neoliberalism' may fit better in the contexts where the adjustment policy was received from the outside, but was negotiated by social actors (Stenning et al. 2011).

136 This meeting discusses the repayment process of the foreign debts of developing countries (including Iran) and confirms the application of structural adjustment policy as a condition to prioritize countries that would receive new IMF loans. Negotiations with the World Bank and the IMF end in short-term loans in 1989, which has disastrous consequences

137 Studying the developmental state in South Korea, Chibber (1999) suggests that assuming links between the export-led strategy and the performance of the developmental state (a very dominant approach in Iran) are not verified. As he points out, the developmental state and the turn to export were born virtually simultaneously. It is no surprise, then, that explanations of South Korea's economic success tend to treat these two phenomena together. These formulations tend to overlook other factors, such as the emergence of an alliance of Korean and Japanese firms which gave the former group access to export markets that would otherwise have been inaccessible.

seemed ideal to reinvent a model of developmentalism with no reference to secular or democratic modernities of the west. For liberal Islamists, development and modernity were not synonymous. In an interview in 1989, Nili noted: "we need to know which country we want to be similar to." Mohammad Ali Najafi (2002) discusses the topic in more direct way:

> [The adjustment policy] was successfully implemented in many countries. The high economic growth of countries like Malaysia and South Korea was recently introduced in Iran. We were surprised and at the same time we wondered about and were embarrassed by their rapid growth... What we understood from the international community was that they succeeded because they employed adjustment reform. Of course some of these theses were correct and some not (80).

Tasked to design the First DP in 1988, the MPO was not only drained of its most experienced experts (i.e., those who had been involved in the design of the previous developmental plans) but was also deprived of the influential academic development critics at universities[138] Despite opposition to foreign borrowing, the liberalization of prices, and subsidies cuts, the plan was approved in the Third Parliament after 21 months of challenging debates (ibid: 255).[139] The first DP proposed the oil and gas industries to be the main economic sectors of state investment in the short term, while assuming the private sector investments in non-oil sectors should increase rapidly; an annual economic growth of 8.5 percent was predicted during the years of the plan, along with non-oil exports aimed to increase by 2 percent and provide 13 percent of the foreign currency sources. Further, self-sufficiency in essential resources was to be accomplished, the electricity coverage in rural areas was to increase from 22000 to 32000 villages, and the

138 In an interview in 2002, Rowghani Zanjani explains he was appointed as the head of the MPO in 1981, when none of the experienced managers and cadres of the organization survived the Islamization of the organization in 1980 (Rowghani Zanjani 2002: 149).

139 The draft of the plan prepared under Mousavi prioritized the improvement of national military strength, reconstructing war-affected areas (and welfare for martyrs' families), and the technical training of the work force. The final version prioritized industrial development, investment in oil and non-oil exports, and support for the private sector. The report of the negotiations of the parliament, along with major related articles indicates how most of the politicians and technocrats were desperate for alternative ways to approach the economic crisis. The condition is perhaps best captured by the notion presented by Sonntag et al. (2001: 243) that "neoliberalism is narrowing what is imaginable."

domestic use of natural gas in place of oil as the main fuel, was to increase from 100 to 180 cities. The plan also envisaged an industrialization project based on the Iranian economy's comparative advantages, aiming at building petro-chemical complexes, a new refinery and different steel plants. Enormous investments were to be made in building new dams and hydro plants around the country.[140]

The estimates indicated that the investment of 20 billion USD would be necessary to implement the plan. Investment through short-term loans available in the global credit market became the plan's Achilles heel. As Najafi mentions, Rafsanjani decided to receive such loans (under the condition that structural adjustment policies would be adopted by the state) rather than downsize the first DP: "we decided to use foreign capital in the international system…. policies of privatization and making the government small, which were added to the first DP later, were the result of the first decision." He later notes: "to have access to foreign long-term loans, we needed to prove that we share the same economic policies and improved our political relations. It was not possible for us to do so in the short term… We were under pressure by the IMF to develop a better relationship with the US. This was an important condition to get the extension of the loan repayments approved, and receive new loans" (Noorbakhsh 2002: 95-110).[141]

The government integrated more entrepreneurial and business-affiliated figures into its leading posts to create a bridge to the foreign investment market. Mohsen Adeli, Iran's ambassador to Japan was one of them: assigned as director of the Central Bank, Adeli played a major role in creating the 1993 hyperinflation. "We needed experienced people like Adeli to introduce us to the global market… I suggested Adeli as the head of the Central Bank because he had a large international network to work with" (Noorbakhsh 2002: 106). The performance of the Central Bank in opening unlimited credit for the private sector to receive lower prices for foreign currency and unregulated foreign borrowing, generated huge public debts, and is considered as the main contributor to the failure of the whole plan. In the chapter on Navab, I discuss how the Navab's

140 Once Nehru, India's Prime Minister said: "dams are temples of modernity" (quoted in Bakker 2013: 284). The metaphor works even better for dry countries like Iran, where the formation of large cities like Tehran were not possible without such technology

141 The details of Iran's negotiations with the IMF are never released.

bonds, set by Adeli at a high interest rate interest of 25 percent, led to the Tehran Municipality bankruptcy in 1998.

Homegrown Neoliberalism

To examine the urban policy of the post-war reconstruction project, I look at different studies that assess its accomplishments as an economic reform. The IMF report of 2007 held the Iranian reform in high regard and suggested that Iran's experience "offers a remarkable example of ownership of reforms" (IMF 2007: XIV). The report claimed further that, "despite years of economic isolation, Iran has remained open to advice and technical assistance from bilateral and multilateral sources, although the solutions to its specific economic problems have been largely home-grown" (ibid.). The IMF terming the reform "homegrown," pointed to the fact that Iran's economic shift was partial, lopsided and unarticulated. However, as scholars studying the reform have confirmed, it failed to achieve its declared goals, while succeeding in destroying the rules, institutions and rights established by the post and pre-Revolution development efforts. Put into effect in 1989, the first DP targeted interventions to liberalize all markets including the labour, commodity, capital and foreign currency markets, to privatize state enterprises and downsize and decentralize the state.[142] Iran removed price controls in 1990. To remove the multiple pricing of foreign currency, first a dual pricing system was introduced. This involved a controlled, low-priced currency for industries (with unlimited credit opening) and a market rate currency for other applications. The result of applying dual pricing was largely destructive as industrial firms tripled their profits by selling the cheaper currency at black market prices. Demand for industrial credit increased beyond currency reserves and inflows. The controlled pricing returned as government failed to supply the demand: "opening unlimited credits for companies generated a large public debt, as the government accepted to provide the difference of market and fixed currency

142 Interventions are usually implemented in seven fields, namely: 1) the establishment of the market rate of currency exchange and tight monetary policies; 2) the privatization of state enterprises; 3) the liberalization of capital markets and trade; 4) the deregulation of private economic activity; 5) labour market reform and reduction of regulations and protections; 6) the downsizing of the state apparatus and decentralizing decision-making powers; and 7) relying on free markets in both capital and tradable goods and services (Harvey 2005; Parpart and Veltmeyer 2009).

rates to the banks…" The value of the Iranian currency against US dollar dropped eleven times in the black market (Rowghani Zanjani 2002: 215-6).[143]

Privatization of the public industries lagged behind other policies, as it triggered fights over who got more benefits from the project. In 1994, the privatization project was hit by the new parliamentary law mandating the sale of state enterprises to those who devoted themselves to the war effort, including the prisoners of war, and the families of the martyrs. While they were allowed to pay in cash or long- and medium-term instalments, it was obvious that war veterans and most of the martyr families did not have the financial means to buy these enterprises.[144] Thus, the law in practice would recognize the parastatal organizations (*bonyads)* as their representatives (Saeidi 2004). The *bonyads* benefited mostly from the outsourcing of state and municipal activities. Deregulation of the labour market was carried out by forming private recruitment agencies that mediated between labour and government in major industries such as oil (Maljoo 2012). In 1999, small workshops were excluded from the scope of labour law.

The First DP failed to stimulate non-oil exports even to a level close to the predicted goals. The state financial commitments reached $34 billion in 1994, while the postponed debt amounts reached $20 billion. The amount of the country's deposit toward its debt was only $1.5 to 2 billion. Negotiations for a new moratorium secured more commitment to IMF policies. Similarly, the Second and Third DPs did not materialize the dream of building an export-oriented industrial economy.

Mitchell (2002) has argued convincingly in his study on Egypt, these failures prove that solutions from East Asia did not provide a model for other third world countries. Judging from the relative economic performance of large swaths of the South over the last 40 years (based on their GDP per capita as a percent of the OECD's GDP per capita, table 17), Harris (2013) has argued:

> The East Asian region as a whole shows a trajectory very different than either the Latin American or Middle East story…South Korea's spectacular rise, when compared to other countries, is hard to believe. It was already closer to the OECD in 1975 than Iran. But from this we can see that South Korea is the exceptional

[143] In 1995 each dollar was exchanged for 900 toomans instead of 80 toomans

case, not the developmental rule: In sum, Iran's economic trajectory replicates – though perhaps in more dramatic form – the story of many poorer countries outside of East Asia. (3)

Table 18: GDP per capita as % of GDP per capita of OECD countries

Countries	1965	1975	1985	1995	2007
OECD area	100	100	100	100	100
Iran	9	13.2	7.7	5.9	7.2
Egypt	5	4.1	5.7	5.4	6.1
Turkey	-	16.6	14.8	15	17
MENA	7.5	8.4	7.3	5.8	6.3
Brazil	14.3	19.2	17.4	15.2	14.2
Argentina	53.9	47.1	32.1	30.3	31.4
Mexico	28.5	27.6	26.3	20.6	22
Latin America and Caribbean	21.3	21.1	17.7	15.5	15.4
China	0.9	1	1.5	2.8	6.1
India	1.8	1.5	1.4	1.6	2.3
South Korea	11.9	16.5	22.9	38.6	48.9
East Asia and Pacific	1.3	1.4	1.9	3.1	5.5

Source: Harris 2013, based on World Bank- World Development indicators

Crafting a Neoliberal Urban Governance

The end of the war in 1988 contributed to the rise of Tehran as a site of transformative debates and actions to shift urban governance. The centralized governance of the cities, shifted to decentralized market-driven reforms, pro-growth governance and a competition to match the 'global standards' of "cityness". Administratively decentralized, Tehran was expected to be an iconic example of the success of the 'developmental state' in the IRI's plan to build a 'progressive society.' I discuss this process as 'neoliberal worlding urbanism.' Urban planning of the Rafsanjani era was part

of the 'worlding practices' of his government, to exit the 'particularism of the Islamic Revolution' and to become part of the 'global community' again. Such 'worlding' could not be understood merely as a globalization imposed by the west on the rest. Formulated by Roy and Ong, the concept of 'worlding practices' was to address the limitless dreams regarding exhibitionary spaces and demarcating buildings like Burj Khalifa in Dubai, a mega project that "has become a symbol of the hyper-development that is Dubai" (Roy 2011: 320). The term points to distinctive practices of "inter referencing, and the forming of new solidarities that collectively seem to raise an *inter*-Asian horizon of metropolitan and global aspiration" (Ong 2011: 5). Such a form of inter-referenced urbanism has been brutal and violent, because it is the production of an Asian urban capitalism that self-consciously presents itself as Asia. But it has made possible the transformation of urban disorder, the dystopia of the global South, into civic order and postcolonial pride.

The ceasefire of 1988 put an end to unsympathetic accounts against Tehran among the IRI's political factions and the authorities that defined the 'reconstruction' as their main concern. In their literature, they usually imagined Tehran as a sick body in need of a cure: over-populated, scarred by the Revolution and the war. While Tehran was not directly affected by the war, except for the period of the "war of the cities" that involved sustained rocket attacks to Tehran, the reconstruction of the city was regarded as a priority.[145] Tehran was to play an important role in framing 'development' and 'progress' at the national level, while acting as a laboratory for building neoliberal urban governance and urban renewal, to be replicated in other cities. Gholamhossein Karbaschi, the architect of Tehran's 'reconstruction' (1989-98) framed his 'worlding practices' as a cure for the scars of war fundamentalism and modernization efforts to provide the city with different infrastructure. In 1988, a severe earthquake in Roodbar, a small city on the road between Tehran and the Caspian Sea, complicated the image of the city as a sick body and linked it to an ecology of fear (Davis 1998). The earthquake recalled the fact that Tehran is located in one of the world's high potential seismic zones and only the concerted and focused supervision of its built environment could save it from a disastrous

145 During March 1987 to March 1988 Iraq launched over 150 SCUD-B missiles against Tehran, to which Iran was able to respond with around 50 (Parker 2009:110; Jonobi 1391/2012). As a result of damage to hydro infrastructure and transmission lines, large cities were faced with 3 hours of electricity cut-offs per day in the same year.

collapse in the future. The earthquake contributed to forming a controversial governmental rationality that was "programmatic" and at the same time market-oriented.

Municipal Rationality

The new municipal "governmental rationality" was programmatic. Governmental rationality, in Foucault's definition, refers to the "right manner of disposing things" in pursuit of "a whole series of specific finalities" (Burchell et al. 1991: 95). Tehran's reconstruction, like Haussmann's grand project to regularize Paris, was informed by concerns over health and welfare of the population and better performance of the economy.[146] Achieving such goals needed "efficient decision-making processes," Karbaschi argued, that were granted to local governments by decentralization:

> In addition to the inadequate resources due to the war-related recessions, city management in Tehran prior to 1990 was suffering from many other problems, including the extreme centralization inherited from the Pahlavi era, insufficient authority due to high dependency on governmental funds, lack of integration and long-term planning, and on top of all, the inefficient decision making processes… all the above-mentioned problems declined during the 1990's as Tehran Municipality underwent an organizational reform transforming this organization from a dependent and centralized structure to an independent and decentralized one. As the result of this transformation, decision-making processes improved dramatically (135-6).

The increased authority of the mayors, as will be discussed in the next chapter, was one of the strategies to render the population and the space manageable in the new era. Other strategies, including family planning, re-mapping of urbanism through new town planning and large-scale infrastructures, a geographical balanced expansion of higher education, welcoming the policy of détente on the international scene, and

[146] This is based on Foucault's observation on eighteenth century architecture: "The point, it seems to me, is that architecture begins at the end of the eighteenth century to become involved in problems of population, health and the urban question. Previously, the art of divinity and might manifest. The palace and the church were the great architectural forms along with the stronghold. Architecture manifested might, the sovereign, God. Then, late in the eighteenth century, new problems emerge: it becomes a question of using the disposition of space for economico-political ends" (Burchell et al. 1991: 148)

curtailing the Islamization of everyday life, all affected the processes of post-war urbanism. As Mitchell (2002: 52) has reminded us: the logic of government emerges in "an unresolved and prior combination of reason, force, imagination, and resources." The government rationality did not precede them "as pure forms of thought brought to bear upon the messy world of reality", but rather emerges from the interrelationships of actors and forces, manufactured in the processes itself. Such a rationality was shared by state and economic institutions alike, rather than merely an economically-driven shift in the balance of power from state to market (Ong 2007).

Calculation and Family Planning Policy

Among the modern practices linked to programmatic governmental logic, calculation was central to the formation of practical knowledges required for the formation and materialization of such rationality. The Islamic Republic's first DP was full of alarming indexes about the country's high growth rates, Tehran's over-population and insufficient infrastructure. Iran's population increased from 35 to 49 million and the annual growth rate jumped up from 2.7 percent to 3.2 percent in the first decade of the Revolution. Technocrats of the MPO started to negotiate with influential members of the clergy to restart the policy of family planning, abandoned in 1979 for its prohibition in Islam. In 1987, the first population conference was held in Mashhad, Iran's second religious city to involve the clergy in the challenges of ever-growing birth rates of the urban population. The apocalyptic warnings about population growth became the favorite fodder for the demographic panic-mongers in the period of economist-technocrats' rise: they projected Iran's population would increase from 49 to 160 million by 2021 and Tehran would hit 11 million in 2011 (Rowghani Zanjani 2003: 189-90). Tehran became the focus of attention, as the worst-case scenario for population growth. In 1989-90 numerous articles were published in daily newspapers and professional journals on the subject of "over-migration" in Tehran. While there was significant supporting evidence for the increase of the city's birth rate,[147] migration became the target of severe state control. The earlier flexibility in approaching Afghan immigrants turned to severe regulation and deportation policies: "illegal" Afghani refugees would be on the

147 The number of the registered infants increased from 147 to 228 thousand in Tehran from three years before to three year after the Revolution (55% increase) (Khatam 1376/1997:112).

government's radar for deportation.[148] In his article on social and political movements in Iran, Bernard Hourcade *(*2006) notes that renewed support for family planning by the government was positively received by larger groups of women, due to their background of political activism in the Revolution and their agency to change their domestic roles. Such agency could be traced to an increase in the female literacy rate from 35 to 67 percent in years 1976-1991. In the 1990s, girls attended school longer than boys and, for the first time, the number of female university students surpassed the boys. Women's efforts to gain control of their reproductive practices preceded the start of the family planning programs by government.[149]

Deregulation of Urban Finance: Municipal Financial Self-Rule

The neoliberal rationale disembodied government from the political constraints and the regulatory environment created by the development practices before and after the Revolution. The Municipal Fiscal Self-Rule Act, proposed by the Interior Ministry and approved by the government in 1987, targeted the cut of the national budget for large municipalities for the first time in Iran. The Act was too odd to be implemented in its first two years, considering the centralized taxing system in Iran and the minor role for municipal taxation, and the state's ownership of oil—the country's largest source of wealth. The policy was carried out under the banner of downsizing the state and decentralizing political power. In 1989, with Karbaschi in office, Tehran Municipality began to outsource its services on the basis of cost-benefit calculations. In 1995 urban planners were tasked to add a financial balance sheet (*traaz-e mali*) to master plans, showing the costs and prospects of implementation of the plan during its 10-year span. Left to choose between cuts in their services and increase in the fees and taxes levied on the construction sector to finance those services, Tehran municipality chose the latter. While Tehran experienced a negative rate of economic growth in the1980s, the construction sector revived the economic growth of the city and fixed it at an average rate of 5.5 percent annual growth during 1990s.

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148 Out of 1.5 million Afghan refugees that came to Iran in the first years of the revolution, only 100,000 entered Tehran.

149 Since the 1950s Iran's age structure resembles that of a typical fast growing population. With almost half of the population under age 15, the share of children to total population decreases from 44 in 1976 to 23 percent in 1996.

Informality and Mapped Urbanization in New Towns

Until 1985 the ULO distributed raw land, but afterward was tasked to provide the basic infrastructure for lands to be allocated. The process of land distribution became more centralized when Rafsanjani formed his government in 1989. This meant the site selection, negotiations with developers over agreements, and design and finance for land appropriations and divisions, were done by the central office of the ULO (Azizi 1998). More centralization in decision-making aimed to bureaucratize the political conflicts over land issue. To suburbanize urban growth, the ULO was transformed into a land production machine. Land distribution by the ULO increased from 1500 hectares/per year in the first decade to 8000 hectares/per year in 1989-93 (Table 18). Almost 20 percent of these lands were concentrated in the construction of the new towns across the country, the share belonging to the private sector in the land market remained around 55 percent, and the land distributed in Tehran comprised 7 percent or 2250 hectares of the total public lands distributed in 1989-1992.

Table 19: Land distributed by public and private sector 1989-93

Distribution		1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	Total
Public Sector	ULO	5710	5920	6120	6360	6580	30690
	New Cities	1850	1910	1980	2060	2130	9930
	Total	7560	7830	8100	8420	8710	40620
Private sector		9250	9580	9900	10280	10640	49650
Total		16810	17410	18000	18700	19350	90270

Source: MHUD, 1992:34.

In 1992, the second period of the enforcement of the Urban Land Law ended. The dramatic increase of the land allocated in the second term targeted the needs of the middle classes, who would sell the lands to those in need with free market prices. The more organized and centralized land distribution led to the exclusion of precarious labour, as housing cooperatives were workplace-oriented and could be formed in the workshops with 7 members or more. Such regulation limited their ability represent the needs of government employees and large industrial units. From 1990 onwards, land and housing policy in Iran was increasingly influenced by supply-side policies (Athari, 2003), and the targeted groups of policies shifted to the middle classes. The New Town Project (1989)

was one of the examples of the shift: the bigger size of the lots, the higher prices of the land, and buyer's obligation to build the whole unit at once, were among factors that excluded the low-income households from becoming clients of Iran's new towns. Such exclusion slowed down the towns' construction process in different ways: the most needy people were not able to buy the land; those who can buy can't afford to build the house; part of the middle class families buy the land to benefit from added value in the future, but not as a result of personal need for shelter. For example 1988, in Tehran Province four new towns were designed to accommodate Tehran's overspills, but ended up accommodating less than 100,000 in 1996.[150] The housing situation in Iran worsened from the 1990s onwards, going through several boom and bust cycles. This reached a crisis in 2006 and 2007 when the press reported rises of about 80 percent in the price of housing in Tehran (*Financial Times*, 2007).[151] The disciplining of construction activities in the city and its buffer zone during Karbaschi pushed informal housing activities further into the metropolitan region. Table 19 shows that more than one third of Tehran Province's (TP) population was living outside the city in 1996.

Table 20: Population Distribution in Tehran Province 1976-

Distribution of population	1976	1986	1996
City of Tehran	85.8	77.4	65.3
Established cities	7.3	9.5	12.5
New suburban/peripheral settlements	3.5	10.3	19.1
Centers classified as rural	3.4	3.8	3.1
Tehran Province	100	100	100

Source: Khatam 1999 Vol. 4 Table 14.

Approved in 1999, the Tehran Metropolitan Plan suggested that established cities of the TP (15 cities formed before mid-1960) grew slowly in the 1966-76, while many

150 Hashtgerd, a new town on the west axes of Tehran, is the largest new town in the country and at the same time the worst example of its type: in 2006, the residential plots were completely sold out. The area should accommodate 200,000 people. At the time only 40 percent of the plots were built and half of the built units were occupied. As a result, the number of the population who lived in the city was less than 20,000.

151 The government maintains its provision of undeveloped urban land. It has shifted towards commercial allocation and full cost recovery, reduction of individual land allocation and an increase in reliance on mass housing provision by private developers (Keivani et al: 1832).

new suburban and peripheral centers were experiencing rapid growths (table 18).[152] The construction in peripheral communities during this era was considered 'illegal' by urban planning regulations, but owners still held land ownership documents confirming they had paid for the land, despite their lack of legal legitimacy or recognition.[153]

Table 21: Suburbanization/peripheralization of social groups in Tehran during 1976-96

Households that can afford to live in Tehran	1976 (%)	1986 (%)	1996 (%)	Change (%) 1976-1996	Change (%) 1976-1996
Mangers & Experts	94.4	90.6	87.3	-3.8	-3.3
Big and small Entrepreneurs	92.0	86.1	81.7	-5.9	-4. 4
The guild and retail self-employed	84.3	77.7	70.3	-6.6	-5.4
Teachers, clerks and technicians	94.8	79.9	73.2	-13.9	-6.7
Skilled and semi-skilled workers	84.4	72.0	85.5	-12.4	-13.5
Unskilled labour	91.8	76.4	59.7	-15.4	-16.7

Source: Khatam 1999: 345.

Studies of the Tehran Metropolitan Plan confirm that suburbanized/ peripheralized groups were mainly from working class families.[154] Table 21 shows that unskilled workers living inside the city were constantly and increasingly settling outside the city in the years 1976-97, resulting in their proportional decrease from 92 to 60 percent over the same time period. The second highest suburbanized social groups in terms of population includes teachers, clerks and technicians, most of them working for

152 The dual categories of peripheral (*hashieh*), meaning informal settlement, and suburb (*homeh*) as planned middle class communities ignores other forms of socio-spatial formations in between them. In studying the Tehran Metropolitan Region (1999), I used these categories for a general quantitative study of growth rate in different settlements. However, the typology of the settlements is diverse, showing different histories of people moving in and out in the region. For example, the small subdivisions built by housing co-operatives (usually called 'shahrak') are different from new towns in terms of investors, residents and quality of everyday life.

153 The respect for ownership rights in Islam makes occupation as a form of tenure in Iran an exceptional act. It is believed that daily prayers should be done only on owned or lands leased by the consent of the owner. As such, the legalization of the informal settlement was considered a bureaucratic process.

154 The method employed for the class/spatial analysis of the Plan, looks at the total jobs in Tehran Province, categorized in six major socio-occupational groups, and follows their place of residence (divided to Tehran/non-Tehran) in three time slots.

the government and eligible to receive the ULO's land and housing units. As discussed previously, the suburbanization/peripheralization processes intensified in the second decade under study.[155] The map below shows the growth of Tehran and its suburbs/peripheral centers from 1921 (top left map) to 1996 (bottom middle) and the projection of Tehran Metropolitan Plan for 2011 (bottom left). Locations of the new towns are marked by red star in the last map.

Figure 9: Tehran Metropolitan Region in1921-1941, 1963,1979,1996, projection of 2020



Source: Tehran Metropolitan Plan, MHUP 1998- Permission granted.

Worlding against the Islamic Fundamentalism

Iran's Central Bank's program to unify the exchange rate in 1992 removed government subsidies for imported basic goods. The inflation rate hit 50 percent in one year, and by 1993, a full-fledged economic crisis emerged in the country that diminished the coalition of the conservatives and the center right. Riots in the peripheries of the large cities like Tehran and Mashhad marked the first urban political crisis emerged in the IRI.

155 The pace of suburbanization is not the same among the six groups in 1986-96: while four groups moved out in slower trends, the unskilled workers move in in more numbers to suburbs/peripheries of the city. A reverse trend of settling in the city can be seen among skilled workers in 1986-96. I am not aware of the factors that may cause such a shift.

When municipalities increased their efforts to stop irregular developments at the margins (based on Article 100 of Municipal Law that held them responsible for demolishing illegal constructions), subaltern groups protested. Informal settlers in Mashhad marched to the city, ransacking all the banks and governmental buildings in their path. The residents of Akbar Abad, an informal settlement in the south east of Tehran, closed the road heading to the city in protest against the increase in electricity prices and the lack of public transport. The protests escalated into riots, and police began frequent patrol of the informal communities to arrest participants, followed by erecting Basij units engaged in daily patrols across the communities. The media did not cover the riots, however, any meeting on the topic of informal settlements—new subject for panels and conferences in the MHUP and municipalities in coming years—would start with a short video montage showing footage of burning buildings while an informal neighbourhood is pictured at the background. In Mashhad, the government expelled the municipal authorities for their mismanagement of the problems.

In 1994, the MHUP was tasked to research the factors involved in shaping the informal land market and settlements around large cities. As one of the research groups invited to different meetings, we were asked to discuss alternatives to prevent the growth of informal settlements and to transform the existing ones.[156] The urban riots were one of the factors pushing Rafsanjani to retreat from his economic policy. Going against criticisms made by extremist neoliberals recommending the policy to be pursued, he set a stabilizing policy in 1996.[157] In the coming years, almost all technocrats who were involved in planning for the economic shift confirmed its failure. They most often blamed the parastatal organization and mercantile capitalists for not investing in the industrial project and for preferring easy commercial money making activities.[158] In general, however, across a large spectrum of the middle and upper classes, both Islamic

156 In 1976-7 a research group headed by Kamal Athari (1996) lunched policy research on informal settlements in Iran, studying two large informal settlements of Akbar Abad and Soltan Abad in TMR. Their study suggests that urban planning is responsible for de-citizenising the poor by unaffordable land and zoning policies.

157 Parvin Qassemi's MA thesis (2010, Tehran University) and her documentary movie on 50 families she interviewed from more than 1000 households relocated from Zoorabad-e Karaj, at 30 kilometers west of Tehran in 1990s, examines the controversies of being suburbanized for the poor living informally in the centre.

158 To diagnose Iran's economic problems, Payam Emrooz, one the journals run by centre right faction blames the largeness of service and commercial sectors for under-industrialization. See Moslem 2002:187.

and non-Islamic, there remained a 'common-sense' consensus on the free market reform, due to the polarization of conflicts between center right--representing a liberal politics with a neoliberal economy and society-- and conservatives who support a military mafia capitalism fortified by cultural fundamentalism.[159]

The coalition of the center right and conservatives broke down in 1993-94, due to the fact that political society was differentiating rapidly after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. The post-Khomeini era was marked by apparent competition over different agendas about the future of the regime (*nezam*). Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the new supreme leader, leaned toward the conservatives to consolidate his power position against the senior clergies who would challenge him for his inadequate religious authority.[160] Backed by the supreme leader, the socially heterogeneous conservative camp mobilized its forces around militarist strategies to avoid the IRI's transformation from the inside and consolidate its power in the region.[161] Looking at the regimes of Eastern Europe, collapsed by elections and peaceful protests, the pre-emptive strategy in Iran relied on Basij, mosques, Friday prayers and the media to save the public culture from the Western cultural onslaught (*tahajoom farhangi*). Such a strategy would turn the public spaces of the large cities into a platform of constant confrontations between the moral police and women and youth. An economic model that would rely on the oil revenues and trade--the Dubai model--has supported the conservative political and social agendas. Bahonar, one of the leaders of the conservatives once noted (1994) that Iran has as exceptional a capacity for commerce, as it does not for industrial development.

The political gap in government opened the political atmosphere. Dissident youth, women and ethnic provincial peripheries as well as large metropolitan cities made their mark through two major elections to determine the result of the factional politics: the

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159 Almost all the pro-reform economists involved in shaping or recommending structural adjustment policy now believe it failed, citing its abandonment under political pressure. Critical of the method by which reform was adopted, the institutionalists, as disciples of the developmental state perspective, explain the failure of the reform through its unrealistic notion of the market or its Utopian marketism' (*bazaar-garai takhayoli*). Marxist economists, however, argue that the economic shift was successful as it has intensified the commodification of labour.

160 He was not a grand clergy before becoming supreme leader. Actually he was called Ayatollah overnight.

161 The conservative camp, then, is composed of the high ranked militaries, war martyrs' families, Basij activists, the high and main body of the clergy, well-connected mercantile capitalists and numerous forces of the Islamic Associations in all public institutions. They were represented by different political organizations led by the Society for Militant Clergy and Society for Islamic Coalition.

Fifth Parliament election of 1996 and the presidential election of 1997. The supreme leader invited the left to participate actively in both elections. Conservatives hoped that by having the left on their side for issues like social justice and anti-Americanism, they would destabilize Rafsanjani's power and the new capitalist class and elites supporting him.[162] They attacked the "foreign-educated cabinet" for ignoring the ordinary people, and Rafsanjani retorted, "how long we should praise a kind of economy [that relies on] buying and selling (*dalali*) of others' products?" (Moslem 2002: 198-9). Against all odds, the left aligned with Rafsanjani and focused its electoral campaign on democracy and tolerance in Islam. The youth and women played a major role in the campaign for democracy, as the IRI's attempt to reshape their everyday lives along monolithic moral guidelines politicized them. By the mid 1990's, the vast majority of young adults were literate, urban, and had professional and middle class aspirations. Severe unequal competition for higher education and employment brought them to vote for change. The electoral box played an unprecedented role in giving voice to the dissidents in the IRI. Mohammad Khatami, a new figure on the left now called 'reformist' (*eslahtalab*), rose to Presidency by an unprecedented vote of 20 million (70 percent of the electoral votes). The result of the election shocked the IRI's political system and halted neoliberal transformations.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the shift that emerged in the IRI's urban politics in the late 1980s. This gap divides the first decade of the Revolution into two movements of mutual construction and destruction. In the first movement, the revolutionary concept of progress and development and of provincial urbanism is imagined, presented and practiced by leftist Islamists. The construction relied on the Revolution and its unique destructive power. The crisis of governmentality that emerged in the mid-1980s fuelled the intra-governmental conflicts and social movements, led to the consolidation of the center right and its development agenda in the IRI, targeting an economic "take off" through opening the economy in Iran to the global economy. It adopted a liberal cultural policy to

162 Shakori Rad, one of the reformist leaders, claims that both the Society for Militant Clergy (Majm'a Rohaniuon), and Tahkim Vahdat, representing radical students, received letters from the Supreme Leader to participate in the fifth parliament election (2011).

marginalize the conservative Islamists and mobilise the support of the middle class publics. I have argued that such shift was a break with and, paradoxically, a continuation of the revolutionary past: the liberal cultural politics and neoliberal economic policy broke with egalitarian provincial urbanism as well as the spotless city of the Khomeini era. Rafsanjani's reconstruction project, however, was a continuation of the founding efforts to build an Islamic developmental state. He initiated structural changes in urban governance that impoverished the working class households, at the same time his cultural politics weakened the conservative hold on urban spaces and cultural life. Such controversial processes sparked resistance from subaltern groups in the peripheries of the large cities, but at the same time it precipitated the outbreak of demands for democratization and calls for urban reform. The comparative study of two different episodes of Tehran's suburban development confirmed the fact that physical and infrastructural connectivity were not the main factors that determined the intensity of the integration/disintegration of the metropolitan region. Comparing the balanced urbanism created by the housing the poor policy with the suburbanism of the 1990s, created by neoliberal urban process, this study suggests that both of these processes have led to the integration of non-urban to the urban (Brenner and Schmid 2015), but such integrations were not socially neutral. Popular political agency has created a more integrated urbanism in terms of social configuration of the residents during the 1980s.

The important role played by the Iranian technocracy in shaping the shift from an anti-imperialist developmentalism to a neoliberal one, is comparable to the role they played in building the developmentalist state of the 1960s, regarding the political contexts accommodated such agencies. Conflicting in the nature of the reforms built by these agencies and their results, they suggest that in governments characterized by intrastate conflicts and a lack of strong political organization, the role of technocrats in organizing the political society around different social agendas is significant. Against the hostility toward the expertise and technocracy in Iran, in the late 1980s technocrats pushed the leaders of different factions to incorporate their own outlooks and build distinctive agendas to mobilize their constituency. The three chapters to follow will look at Tehran's 'urban reconstruction' under Karbaschi, and the Navab Project and Enqelab Street as illustrative case studies.

Chapter V: Worlding Urbanism in Tehran in a Neoliberal Era

> Post-war reconstruction meant two things: first, to reconstruct the physical damage to the infrastructure in the war zones; second, to reconstruct economic relations that deviated from the norm during the war. These deviations usually occur when governments intervene in the economy during the war…. In the five-year period of running the Central Bank, I tried to find new economic resources, rather than the traditional ones of the government….Half of the 1500 cities and 11000 villages were affected by war. Tehran was a symbol. Tehran could provide a model to reconstruct them all. Fortunately we had an innovative and bright figure like Karbaschi to carry the burden of running the city at that time. He was open to any new idea (Adeli, then head of Iran's Central Bank 2009: 269).

> All [the reform] started with the needs of the large city [of Tehran] with 10 million populations. We could not run such city like a town of half a million population, where people commute to the main traditional bazaar for their daily needs. When city grows and becomes a large city, a metropolis, authorities of the city have to provide the citizens with the welfare of the modernity. All the developments of the 1990s aimed to promote the modernity in the city. Whoever the mayor was, had to accept the coming changes… At first, bazaaris [merchants] opposed the building of the commercial malls, but then they found it to their interest to come out of the traditional bazaar and present their commodities in the malls. They have turned to the main builders of the today's large malls… City Hall was pioneer at that time and spearheaded the modern reforms everywhere that was necessary; (Karbaschi 2008).

Introduction

In 1989, the first issue of a new economic magazine (titled *Taze-haye Eqtesad*) published an article featuring an illustration of a patient lying on stretcher so bloated with illness that the medics carrying him were wearing gas masks—this body was titled "Tehran". In the years following the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) economist-technocrats frequently invoked this medical metaphor of an ailing body in their descriptions of

Tehran. Their intention, in doing so, was to represent Tehran as requiring official intervention for its cure. The representation of Tehran as a sick body, and the position underpinning it, aimed to counter the view of Tehran as a site of moral decay and corruption as a result of having been the epicenter of the Pahlavi regime—popularly referred to as the *taghut-i* (affiliated with false gods) regime. This latter view generally disregarded Tehran as deserving of further development and renovation. Indeed, so prevalent and strongly held was this rejection of Tehran during the heights of the Revolution that Rafsanjani had a hard time legitimizing his government's decisions to refinance Tehran's abandoned projects, including Tehran's rapid transit system (Tehran Metro). The image of Tehran as a sick body in need of medical attention informed the understanding and mobilization for an urban reform,[163] a complex and multilayered transformative process that eroded Islamic revolutionary urbanism and composed processes of neoliberal worlding urbanism. As a subject of study by urban scholars inside and outside the country, researchers have often argued that the modernization of Tehran in the 1990s was a response to the needs of middle class citizens, a challenge to the power of central government, a mobilization against conservative politics, or/and a solution to the municipal financial crisis. Madanipour (1988), for example, argues that the move toward Municipal Financial Self-Rule was initiated at the local level and Karbaschi, the Mayor of Tehran, initiated the local autonomy of the Tehran Municipality. Karbaschi, who pursued his PhD under the supervision of Madanipour, argues (2013) that the empowerment of local government was the cornerstone of his agenda as the Mayor of Tehran. He adopted a local lens to examine the shift to "empowered municipality", and did not engage in the broader government's move toward the free market economy and neoliberal rationality. There are numerous studies on the unsustainability of Karbaschi's urban management, a system that largely relied on construction fees and taxes as the main sources of income for Tehran Municipality (Athary 2008; Zonooz 2007). The keystone of this kind of policy is 'selling extra-density,' meaning the municipality would increase the permitted construction density (floor area per meter land) of the residential and commercial plots, higher than the limits set for the region, for extra payments by

[163] Seeing the city as subject to pathological disorders is common in other countries when modern urban planning is in rise (Kostof 1992).

landlords and developers. Fariba Adelkhah (2000: 26-27) examines the political consequences of the local sources of finance and argues that maintaining the local parks with local taxes during Karbaschi's mayoral term provided a foundation for a new citizenship in Tehran: conflicts over Karbaschi's performance mirror the conflicts of interest between "the world of the old city of guild" with the "new idea of citizenship." Asef Bayat (2010a: 110) focuses on the broader transformations of gender and youth movements and emphasizes existing social mobilizations for change. He calls Karbaschi the architect of the post-Islamic city: "Karbaschi stripped from the capital its earlier revolutionary and exclusionary character, transforming it into a post-Islamist metropolis of pluralism and mélange—but one still sensitive to pious sensibilities". These illuminating views on different aspects of the urbanism under Karbaschi still fail to explore such processes like elitist modernization intertwined with the dramatic shift in urban governance in Tehran. This shift is formulated by Karbaschi himself as a "comprehensive transformation of the city from traditional condition to the modernity" (2007: 110).

Because petro-dollars were not circulating in its mega projects and built environment, neoliberal worlding urbanism in Tehran was different from Dubai and other large cities of oil exporting countries in the Persian Gulf (Roy 2011; Davis 2006; Kanna 2010). It was also different from the classic examples of the early 20th century capitalist urbanity in Europe. As David Harvey observes (2010: 23) such urbanism was "a reaction to the new conditions of production (the machine, the factory, urbanization), circulation (the new systems of transport and communications), and consumption (the rise of mass markets, advertising, mass fashion)". The neoliberal worlding urbanism in Tehran shared the logic and challenges of the of Robert Moses' modernizing intervention; it applied the same logic of dealing with the population's "welfare" and better economic performance, and faced the same "tension between the public nature of the nineteenth-century urbanism and the privatized nature emerging from the car-oriented Fordist era of mass consumption and new middle-class aspiration" (Gandy 2003: 151). In this chapter, I will examine these tensions through discussing how was the population's welfare debated in the image of the "sick body of the city," and how did the urban reform aimed to improve

the mobility, cultural life and environmental conditions of the city ended up in explosive speculative growth of the city.

Tehran: A National Symbol of Post-War Reconstruction

While studies of Tehran in the 1990s confirmed that Karbaschi had engineered a break from the post-Revolution urban governance and built new forms for governing the city, the theoretical efforts to reformulate such a controversial shift in an integrated analysis has remained underdeveloped. Even the language used to discuss the issue reflects some aspects of this challenge. The concepts usually used to describe urban changes under Karbaschi include architectural and planning terms like "urban renewal" and "redevelopment of the city" rather than more social and economic terms such as "urban modernization", and the issue of urban governance is almost missing from the language entirely. I prefer to talk about "neoliberal worlding urbanism" as a way to point to the broad and multifaceted aspects of the urban process intended to make Tehran an excellent symbol of the IRI's post-war reconstruction era. Unlike what Karbaschi has claimed then and after, the concept of modernism and modernization and decentralization does not explain how urban governance was restructured in this era and how such urbanism is different from the type of urban modernity of the Pahlavi era. While Tehran in the 1990s breaks with revolutionary Islamic urbanism, it does not follow the urbanism under Pahlavi. While urban politics in both cases are elitist and authoritarian, they depart from each other with respect to the way they perceive the urban improvement/development as well as the inclusiveness of the results. Looking through the lens of worlding practices, the practice of marketing the urban projects vs. comprehensive/master planning of the 1960s and mayor-centred decentralization vs. centralized spatial governance in the Pahlavi era reflect the circulation of two different urban models. Rather than applying abstract ideas of modernity and modernization that are applicable to all interventions discussed in the last three chapters, neoliberal worlding urbanism allows me to address three intertwined sides of Tehran's reform. The term addresses the "will to improve" (Li 2007), the adoption/invention of neoliberal practices, and the unique cultural and political democratization efforts, reflecting the broader process of post-Islamism—normalization of political Islam—in Iran.

Worlding urbanism in Tehran was to symbolize the end of the "destructive phase" of the Revolution and war as well as the IRI's transition to the reign of reconstruction (Adeli 2009; Karbaschi 2007).[164] The new perception of development, an urban-based, export-oriented and elitist economic growth agenda, re-granted Tehran leadership in national development. The urban reform in Tehran was framed by the broader reconstruction project, and contributed to frame and symbolize it.[165]

Diagnosis of the Sick Body

By the time Karbaschi took office, Tehran had a population of 6.3 million in 20 urban wards, within a legal municipal boundary of 600 square kilometers. The metaphor of the sick city, as the image of *Tazeh-haye Eqtesad* shows, was illustrated in the form of a *bloated* body. The metaphor addressed the dominant debate on Tehran's defects and abnormal physical expansion. An MPO report in 1987 argued that Tehran's built area had gone under major changes as a result of unregulated land distribution. In 1989, in a talk during the Population and Development Conference held by the MPO in Mashhad, the deputy of the Interior Ministry (Tabatabaei 1987) noted that Tehran's area had increased from 225 to 520 square kilometers since the Revolution. Karbaschi and many scholars including Madanipour (1980) and Bayat (2010) have repeated these figures uncritically. The expansion of the city is usually linked to the expansion of the informal/illegal housing inside the T25DZ. The aforementioned expansion of the city, more than double its pre-Revolution size, is not an accurate figure, because it does not differentiate between the built-up area and legal borders of the city. The 225 square kilometers is the built area of the city in 1976, while the 520 square kilometers denotes the legal boundary for municipal services, applied to Tehran's 25 years Development Zone (T25DZ). Comparing these figures was/is misleading, as major parts of the expanded area remained undeveloped until the early 1990s. As I mentioned in chapter IV, the total illegal plots of land distributed by the Tehran Court was around 8 square kilometers. In fact, the decision

[164] Unlike Baghdad, no war memorial symbol was built in Tehran. Only recently a war museum was opened in Tehran.

[165] Studying Tehran's Book fair, Kaveh Ehsani suggests that post-war reform in Tehran revived the fundamental question of where the spatial symbol of the Islamic Revolution in the city might be. Could it be the renovated Grand Bazaar? Or Tehran's prayer compound (*masala*) built for Friday prayer? (Ehsani 2006: 15).

to expand the legal area of the city to TDZ was a political decision to integrate the communities that survived the demolishing practices during the 1970s, rather than to prepare new developments.[166] Regardless of the controversy, in order to extrapolate meaningful inferences from Tehran's expansion, an accurate estimate is required.[167]

The estimate of the real expansion of the city's built area can be taken from the increase in the Tehran's housing stock in different censuses. Tehran's housing stock increased by 85 percent in the 1960s and 77 percent in 1970s. The city's area expanded by only 40 percent in the first decade, meaning Tehran was becoming more densely populated. The same calculation does not give the same result if the legal city area changes by political decision. In the 1980s, Tehran's housing stock increased by 77 percent and its legal area by 106 percent, but it did not mean a 40 percent drop in average density in built areas. Table 22 shows the official data on Tehran's population, housing stock and city area for 1966-2002. My estimate for the built-up area in 1986 is 422 square kilometers, showing it grew by 67 percent since 1976 (an increase of 170 square kilometers in the decade of the Revolution). According to this estimate, the built area grew under Karbaschi to 152 square kilometers and its increase is close to that of the decade preceding him, meaning the city experienced another revolution in physical expansion during his term.[168] In addition, Karbaschi expanded the legal border of the city from 600 to 700 square kilometers (100 square kilometers around Kan River in the west), to be built in the years after him. Development was prohibited within this zone, defined by the 1968 Comprehensive Plan, and became the 21st and 22nd wards (TGIS 2005: 63-4). By 1996 Tehran grew to 6.7 million, while the population lived in the metropolitan area was 8.1 million (including Tehran).

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[166] The informal communities in Tehran include 140 settlements (Karbaschi 2013) all with less than 500 households, meaning their total population was around 300,000.

[167] To estimate Tehran's built-up area in 1980 and 1986, I assumed that construction patterns did not change much during this period; the data on construction permissions before and after the Revolution confirms that half of Tehran's housing units in both times were built by inhabitants, in the form of one or two story buildings for personal use (Madanipour 1998).

[168] My estimates rely on the information of the construction permissions issued in these periods and existing information on informal constructions. The map of Tehran's built-up area prepared for the 1986 census was also useful. For other years, the data of construction permissions issued by TM has been used.

Table 22: City size and density in Tehran in 1966-2002

	1966	1976	1980	1986	1996	2002
Population (millions)	2.718	4.530	5.400	6.038	6.754	7.278
Legal City Area (km^2)	180	252	520	600	700	700
Estimated built-up area (km^2)	180	252	330	422	574	700
City area per person (m^2)	66	56	61	70	85	96
Estimated new built-up area (km^2)	----	72	78	92	152	126
City wards	10	12	20	20	22	22
Number of housing units (1000)	354	656	960	1154	1480	1700
New housing unit/year (1000)	----	30.2	76.0	32.3	32.6	36.7
Ownership of the housing (%)	55	-----	-----	69	65	63

Like others in Iran, Tehran's mayors were assigned by the Interior Ministry. Half of the municipal budget was financed by the central government (Nozarpour 2007). Due to the housing the poor policy, home ownership increased to 69 percent in 1986, the highest rate in the history of the city. The city's rapidly growing population had little access to parks and other recreational facilities. In 1989 Tehran had 180 parks covering an area roughly around 4 million square meters (Karbaschi 2013:118). The large parks were mainly located in the northern part of the city, trees lining the streets and alleys were the main greenery in many neighbourhoods, except those areas in the north that were surrounded by the private gardens once planted as part of nobility's summer residences. The park space per capita was 2 square meters in the city. Tehran suffered from negative economic growth, due to national capital flight and noninvestment in the city. The population of the inner city decreased as land was distributed around the city, providing the chance for home ownership to low-income tenants living in these neighbourhoods. The boundaries between formal and informal constructions were blurred, especially in new constructions in Tehran's buffer zone, a surrounding boundary with nearly 1800 kilometers (TMRPC 2001). The renewal of buildings was slow. A study done in 1989 by JICA (Japan's International Cooperation Agency) on earthquake hazards

in the city (with a population of 6 million) projected the fatalities of an earthquake to be between 200,000 to 383,000, with damages to 480,000 to 875,000 housing units in different earthquake scenarios. Almost 80 percent of the fatalities and 57 percent of building damages were projected to happen in the central and southern wards of the city (JICA-Tehran Municipality 2001).[169]

The MHUP did a comprehensive study on alternative sites for the ministries and other state functionaries to relocate, however, the economic-technocrats were deeply opposed, arguing that the project would be expensive, even unfeasible. The estimated cost of building a new capital made it insurmountable: *Taze-haye Eqtesad* published an interview with one of the directors of the MPO discussing its unfeasibility (Fouladi 1989), and in another article the writer rejected the idea, arguing it would result in the relocation of 50,000 government employees or 250,000 people—a proverbial drop in an ocean of 7 million (Zoqi 1989). The idea of relocating the capital to a safe place to save the government from the hazards of the earthquake was soon rejected. Karbaschi and a group of government technocrats traveled to Brazil to visit Brasilia and talk to the authorities involved in building the new capital: "we went there and understood that relocation of the capital would fail, without correcting the structures which produce the problems in the first place. The cost of building Brasilia in the 1960s was estimated at 95 billion dollars, the World Bank gave them the loan to do that, then they paid back the [World] Bank 125 billion dollars for loan and its interest". He concludes: "almost everyone involved in the problems of managing the city would suggest the relocation of the Capital. The 'relocation' was a way to blame an abstract actor [earthquake] for our problems, an actor you could not take to the court" (Karbaschi 2014: 2).[170]

The Mayor-Centered Decentralization

The urban reform of the 1990s was supported by a state rescaling process aiming at escalating the power of Tehran Municipality against branches of the central

[169] JICA's estimate for fatalities in Tehran's earthquakes included the deaths caused by collapse of the buildings, but not all the deaths that happen during the relief process or epidemic disease caused by the earthquakes.

[170] Morteza Alviri, then member of the parliament, mentions (2013) that while they were working on the first DP, the idea of relocation of the capital was raised and cities like Arak, Khomein and Khoramabad were studied as alternative places to become the new capital, the idea was not feasible and other countries' experiences were not successful, so it was abandoned and forgotten.

government in Tehran. A mayor-centred decentralization was crafted through assigning the municipality a fiscal local autonomy and removing the central supervisory bodies dealing with urban issues. Tehran Municipality is not responsive to the central government anymore, as the process of decentralization took another step in the late 1990s by electing the city councils in Iran for the first time and turning them to a weak and marginalized body incapable of dealing with many aspects of municipal activities. Central government actively contributed to this process by retreating from its supervisory tasks in municipal administration, and fostering irregularities in urban finance by cutting central budgets without providing alternative financing options for the Municipalities. Tehran Municipality welcomed the shift as the "arrival of a new era of active management of the city" (Hamshahri Book 1997).

Tehran's reform was manufactured step-by-step. The most contested component of the reform was its cultural policy to marginalize political Islamism. Tehran Municipality launched a liberal newspaper named *Hamshahri* (Co-Citizen) in1992. The establishment of the Municipal Culture and Art Organization (*Sazeman-e farhangi-honari shahrdari*) was an aggressive move, given that up until that point, culture fell under the purview of conservative ministers. The move was followed by building 26 cultural centers, several new movie theaters and other non-Islamic cultural venues in Tehran. The Municipality created different art projects to involve diverse groups of artists and cultural elites in municipal activities around the city. What Karbaschi later called "a comprehensive plan to accomplish the transition from tradition to modernity in Tehran" (Taheri 2008), in fact never went through planning procedures in traditional terms; nevertheless, the interventions led to a comprehensive change in the landscape as well as social life of the city.

The Comprehensive Plan of 1973

In the same year Karbaschi was appointed, A-Tec, an experienced urban planning firm was contracted by MHUP to update the Comprehensive Plan of 1968 for another ten years. It was an effort to revive urban planning in Iran, first and foremost in order to cure Tehran's disorders, but not being in line with broader processes of dismantling the planning habitus of the Fordist developmental state, it was abandoned in the first decade

of the Revolution. The urban planning habitus formed by Pahlavi in the 1960s, and in place during the first decade of the Revolution, relied on compulsory land purchase for the provision public services and urban amenities, centralized budgeting for planning and implementation, centralized supervisory practices, with urban planners acting in place of central government advisors and contractors. The urban planning system began to change as its constitutive institutions which were formed in the 1960s began to change: Tehran Municipality began to finance all its urban projects and claimed a planning role by discrediting the urban plans designed by the central government for the city. Tehran Comprehensive Plan of 1992 is the prime example of such process.

Later called the TCP 1992, the new comprehensive plan was ordered by central government in 1990 and prepared by A-Tec planning firm. The plan fixed the borders of the city to T25DZ (700 square kilometers) and supported suburbanization in the metropolitan region.[171] The plan confirmed the fact that Tehran suffered from a severe shortage of public space, lacking streets and spaces for social services. In response, it set average density regulations for each ward in an effort to balance the population with existing and attainable open spaces and public land. TCP 1992 projected a population decrease in five central wards as compensation for the shortages in open space. The limits placed on built-up areas in central wards pushed planners to launch a vast redevelopment project to free part of the residential land for public land uses. The density codes were also supposed to guarantee a quality of the life through the "standardization" of the city, on paper. The TCP projected a new city center to be built in ward 22. The plan also confirmed a 3000 hectares site in ward 21 for industrial use, along the Tehran-Karaj corridor, a site already playing an important role in the economic life of the city. At the same time TCP proposed a relocation of 20,000 jobs from Tehran (Athari 2014). The ambiguities involved in the practicality of adopting such codes and regulations to save

[171] Regarded as a process motivated by upper class lifestyle in the 1960s, suburbanization expanded its meaning to incorporate middle and lower class lifestyle in the 1980s. A journal named Armaghan (The Gift), published one of the first accounts on suburbanization in Tehran in 1961. The writer described the process negatively and argued: "The old city remained ruined as people left it to go to outer parts and bought properties with large beautiful buildings in 'Greater Tehran' with pools and etc. These days, people are talking about 'Greater Tehran' VS 'Small (old) Tehran.' While other countries are spending their money on production of the wealth, we [Iranians] spend it on buying land…. We need to remove the term Greater Tehran from our vocabulary" (Mokhber 1961: 260-1).

neighbourhoods from intensified growth, led to the weakening of the plan. The TCP established the guidelines along which the detailed plan to be prepared by Tehran Municipality.

Though approved by the central government (AUPSC), Karbaschi ignored the TCP 1992 in practice, and chose rather to attack it on different occasions: he criticized its fixity and top-down method, its rigid regulations and traditional planning ideas, and instead made a case in favor of deregulation processes. Creating his own action plan (named Tehran 2000), Karbaschi selectively integrated some of the projects proposed by 1968 TCP with his own projects. The practice can be described as neoliberal urban planning; the term seems awkward, as planning may be seen as something that should be rolled back or totally abandoned through neoliberal practices. Karbaschi's approach, however, entailed an uneasy cohabitation of urban planning and a belief in the superiority of market mechanisms to organize land use. In her study on urban planning in China, Tasan-Kok (2011: 80) confirms that while "neoliberal planning may appear to be a total surrender of state planning to market superiority" or "a mere facilitator of market forces in the city" such definitions are too rigid to explain the cases where developmental states are exercising their power on marketization processes.

At least three major projects signify the shift of public investments toward Tehran's infrastructure in the early 1990s: new investment in water supply systems by the Ministry of Energy to improve the quality of water in Tehran's new developed areas; governmental investments in an underground rapid transit system; and the construction of the International Imam Khomeini Airport—contemporaneously, mega-projects were initiated to support urban development around the city. To decrease overpopulation pressures on the city, four satellite towns were designed and built in Tehran's Metropolitan Region (TMR) between 1989 and 1992. Freeway development and construction facilitated the commute between the core city and major cities in the TMR. Modernism and neoliberalism were two main strategies employed by the municipality in an attempt to cure the city's sick body and to integrate its fragmented population.

Karbaschi and Myths of Modernity in Tehran

Son of Ayatollah Karbaschi, Gholamhossein Karbaschi, trained as a clergy at Qom religious seminary and served in senior executive positions in the IRI from 1981, when he was 28 years old. He shifted from seminary to a secular university to study mathematics before the Revolution. Rafsanjani appointed him as the mayor of Tehran in 1989, and later the governor of Isfahan, the old capital of Iran and the second industrial province since the 1960s. Karbaschi was recognized as an innovative and audacious technocrat; his experience as governor, dealing with inflamed factional conflicts in Isfahan, holding the city as the main support center for the war, all the while accomplishing new urban and industrial projects in the province, served as evidence of his capability to excel under difficult conditions. He recalled Rafsanjani asking him to develop Tehran as he developed Isfahan, with big ideas rather than big money (Karbaschi 2007). He became the most influential figure within the circle of technocrats working with Rafsanjani in the critical years of economic reform—at that time called the 'Reconstruction Era'—or period of transition from defense to construction (*az defa'a be sazandegi*). It was during this period that Karbaschi, a second-tier political elite, became the first local authority of Iran with any real power, enough, in fact, to transform the Tehran Municipality from an administrative extension of the Interior Ministry to an autonomous local government and a contentious scene for factional politics in Iran. Karbaschi, like other influential young figures of the IRI in the first decade of the Revolution, had the asset of being known and trusted by Ayatollah Khomeini himself.[172] Karbaschi was authorized to carry out major responsibilities by Ayatollah Khomeini, and thus became accountable to him, rather than the government. In the years of his service, he prided himself in disregarding 'public opinion' as a factor in his decision-making. He avoided the media in his ten years as Mayor of Tehran and did not accept any interviews or discussions, which many consider a sign of his pragmatism (Karbaschi 2007). While the death of Ayatollah Khomeini weakened the position of some of these younger

[172] Ayatollah Khomeini trusted young Islamic revolutionaries who obtain their experience of government in the IRI more. The most famous example was IRI's prime Minster in the first decade of revolution, Mir Hossein Mousavi, who remained in power against all odds.

politicians, others established their positions by joining Rafsanjani, the most powerful figure of the IRI after Khomeini.

Karbaschi earned a reputation for recreating the tourist attractions of the historic city of Esfahan during the hard times of the war with Iraq.[173] The confluence of Karbaschi's personal history and the demanding conditions of post-war Iran may help to explain why Tehran witnessed the emergence of a modernist/developmentalist Mayor, confident and ready to shape the 'take off' phase of the transformation of Tehran to a modern city. His critics have asserted: "Karbaschi acted like the government's bulldozer. He implemented every decision he made according to his own understanding of what was good for the city while enjoying the full support of the government" (Heidari 1998). The structural changes that emerged in the state-municipality relationship during the late 1980s paved the way for the rise of arbitrary decentralization in Tehran. The flow of money progressively declined from state to municipality due to the financial crisis caused by the fall of oil prices in the international market in 1986. Municipal financial self-rule came before recommendations for decentralization from international agencies. City councils were introduced for the first time after the Revolution when Khatami was elected as president in 1997. Before that, the Interior Ministry appointed all the Mayors, including the Mayor of Tehran. Municipalities were then regarded as the extensions of the central government and mayors were only responsible for allocating the municipal budget—which came mainly from the central government—to basic urban services such as garbage collection, building and running urban facilities like parks, roads and public transit, and making sure that all construction activities were carried out in accord with regulations and planning documents. Comprehensive and detailed physical plans were proposed and approved by the Housing and Urban Planning Ministry, while municipalities were involved only as consultants. Studies of the history of Tehran Municipality indicate that popular figures or prominent experts were never appointed as the Mayor of Tehran, except during a short period after the Constitutional Revolution. Some of the Mayors were dismissed and even arrested for corruption, after using their

[173] The Zayandehrud river restoration is one of these projects that revived the touristic function of the river and its two old brick arch bridges. Zayandehrud and its bridges function as symbol of Iran, after Azadi Tower. Esfahan, the capital of Safavid, is Iran's first tourist site. The image of these bridges represents Iran in global art and architecture history books as well as world tourism map.

power to accumulate wealth through land speculation (Naseri 1388/2009). During a revolution, running a public organization like a municipality was difficult in economic terms and frustrating because of the constant conflicts with both the populace and other government bodies. Eight people served as the Mayor of Tehran in nine years after the Revolution (1979-1988). Tehran Municipality was an unpopular organization, known to be responsible for the lack of sufficient urban services and facilities, and to be bankrupt as a result of its imbalance between its costs and revenues. Karbaschi turned the Municipality to a rich organization in his first years in office, and for the first time in Iran, Tehran's Mayor joined the regular meetings of the cabinet in 1990. According to a poll (conducted by his political opponents in 2006) asking how the last three Mayors of Tehran (Karbaschi, Ahmadinejad and Qalibaf) fulfilled their tasks to develop Tehran's infrastructures, provide services and improve the poor neighbourhoods, the majority of the respondents confirmed that Karbaschi was the most successful Mayor (Hamshahri 1385/2006).

Karbaschi founded Iran's first full-color daily newspaper *Hamshahri* (Fellow Citizen) in 1992. Published by Tehran Municipality, *Hamshahri* had Iran's highest daily circulation of 460,000 copies (Mer'at 1999:35). Karbaschi was (and still is) a political practitioner, and while he was not regarded as intellectually sophisticated as Mohammad Khatami (the Minister of Culture at the time and future president), his connections with the reformist intellectuals in Isfahan and Tehran contributed to his approach to urban modernity.[174] Furthermore, Karbaschi was influenced by the vision of democracy and modernity that Ata'ollah Mohajerani and Mohammad Khatami were promoting in Rafsanjani's cabinet.[175]

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[174] The Isfahan Comprehensive Plan and The Isfahan Regional Plan, prepared by Hadi Mirmiran, the prominent architect and urban planner in Iran, were ratified when Karbaschi was in charge in Isfahan.

[175] Mohajerani, the reformist writer and politician, was Rafsanjani's deputy in Parliamentary Affairs. According to Vahdat (2005), the discourses of modernity by the post-Revolutionary Islamic intellectuals in Iran have their roots in the paradigm of "mediated subjectivity" formulated by Ayatolleh Khomeini and Shariati before the Revolution. In this paradigm, people's power is not a direct power but a mediated one because "humans acquire power only through God, by a provisional appropriation of some of the Divine characteristics such as omnipotence, omniscience, and volition" (651-5). Vahdat argues that in the discourses of Islamic reformist intellectuals "one can observe how they, each in his own way, have expanded the idea of positing of human empowerment and its democratic implications and notions of human rights and developed the concepts of citizenship rights (and in the case of Soroush, the important idea of the individual as the carrier of these rights)."

The Islamic left had supported the suppression of secular forces and the liberal provisional government of Bazargan during the first decade of the Revolution, however, they shifted to a more liberal stance in the mid-1980s and developed the idea of a political reform in the IRI to ensure the fulfillment of the individual freedoms, human rights and coexistence with other cultural attitudes and life-styles in Iranian society. Morad Saqafi (1999), the editor of *Goftogu*, a journal credited for its serious efforts in facilitating the dialogue between secular and Islamic intellectuals in Iran, explained the importance of the shift for the formation of a democratic discourse among revolutionary Islamists in Iran:

> There were two overlapping but profoundly separate phenomena in the Iranian Revolution: the popular versus the religious legitimacy of the new political order. These were both initially embodied in Ayatollah Khomeini. With his passing, the end of the war with Iraq and the dire economic situation, the separation of these two forms of legitimacy became a fact… Immediately following Khomeini's death, we confronted new "rules of the game." It became clear that the "Left" faction was being denied the chance to run its candidates, during this competition it became clear to the Left that it needed to separate and distinguish between these two spheres of legitimacy, the Republican and the Islamic, and to clarify their interrelation. At this point, some Islamist forces began to formulate a democratic discourse. This effort began theoretically in 1987, and culminated in Khatami's election. We have an intellectual Islamist force articulating a democratic discourse, with Khatami as a spokesperson… Islam has been continually tempted to modernize itself. (Saqafi 1999: 47-8)

Neoliberal Urban Governance

Empowering local governments and liberalizing urban finance were considered two broad strategies of transforming the state-centred urban regimes into models of competitive urban governance in the global south. Studies show that entrusting more

power to local governments has been accompanied with the elimination of the central budgets/subsidies to the municipalities concerned. Scholars who have studied this process have argued that the competitive balance between municipalities for payments has led to increased uneven urban development in these countries (Shami 2010; McCarney and Stren 2003; He and Wu 2009; Heinrich et al. 2011). In Iran, central budget cuts came as a result of war and budget deficit in the 1980s. Back then, the Interior Ministry was assigned to provide a plan for cutting the central budget for local governments within a three years span.[176] The Ministry was not able to make a proposal. According to Morteza Tabatabaei (1987), the Mayor of Tehran before Karbaschi, the budget allocated to Tehran was twice the combined annual budgets of two large provinces in the years 1966-68. Comprising 55 percent of municipalities' budgeted revenues before the Revolution, financing from the central government dropped to 10 percent of municipalities' revenues in the mid-2000s (Nozarpour 2007).

Karbaschi started his work at the time that the Municipality was bankrupt. In 1988, the plan bearing the title "Municipal Financial Self-Rule was introduced and caused large municipalities to lose access to government revenues generated from taxes (which are very centralized in Iran) and governmental oil revenues. Instead, municipalities were required to resort to renting and selling their properties and services. The act was introduced by the Supreme Council of Architecture and Urban Planning (SCAUP), the main governmental council directed by the MHUP and 22 members from the cabinet (almost all the ministries had a deputy in the council). Tehran was the pioneer city for the Municipal Financial Self-Rule Act, already in place when Karbaschi came to office in 1988. Financing for Tehran's urban reform came from mobilizing speculative capital floating in the city's shadow economy and extracting fees and taxes from developers in exchange for exemption from zoning laws.[177] Here, I discuss in more detail the

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[176] See Municipal Budget law 1362/1983, Article 52.

[177] In 1979, the revolutionary government amended Article 100 of the Municipal Law to permit the municipalities to fine property owners who failed to comply with construction regulations instead of forcing them to meet the regulations. The change also included buildings that never received construction permits: "In these cases, if the technical, health and urban planning measures are met, the commission [of Article 100] is authorized to fine the owner" (Salehi 1386/2007:5). While the change to Article 100 took the first step to formalizing the informal settlements in Iran, it opened the opportunity for municipalities to collect money by fining cases of law and regulation violations in the construction sector. These fines remained a minor source of the income in the first decade of the revolution, but subsequently sparked new forms of de-regulation with more revenues for City Hall.

transformation of the local finance and urban planning which shaped a neoliberal governing system in Tehran under Karbaschi.

Commercializing the City: Municipal Financial Self-Rule

The "Municipal Financial Self-Rule" created an institutional fix as part of a qualitative reorganization of the mode of social regulation and a re-articulation of the state with the economy. As Peck and Tickell (2000) note, the state offers up part of its own domain as a new institutional space for colonization by private capital. According to "Municipal Financial Self-Rule," state subsidies were to be eliminated within four years. Government budget cuts led municipalities to finance urban projects mainly by de-regularized fees and taxes obtained from the real estate market and commercialization of the city. Karbaschi emphasized that reducing the role of the state in economic and cultural spheres would create possibility for increased participation. The first non-central payments to obtain construction permissions in Tehran Municipality took the name 'self-help payments' (*khodyari*)[178], with the public-private partnership entitled 'people participation' (*mosharekt-hye mardoomie*). Neoliberal financing tended to exist in a kind of parasitical relation to the modernist urban reform of the 1990s. This hybrid context naturalized economic reasoning as the main logic for approving policies and projects proposed by planning and technocratic bodies. Karbaschi shifted to the outsourcing of municipal services (including garbage collection, improvement of green areas, etc.) to the *Bonyads* and semi-private agencies. This shift turned the municipality into a large contractor institution. In 1990, an article was added to the existing 'terms of reference' for preparing master (comprehensive) plans requiring that all the plans be accompanied by a financial balance report to explain potential investments for proposed projects.

Karbaschi had to choose between asking city residents and property owners to accept substantial tax increases, and relying on the profits from construction investments. He chose the second option. January of 1991 saw the ratification of a verdict by SCAUP, permitting municipal governments with populations over 200,000 to extract further fees and taxes from developers and increase their construction density by 25 percent in order

[178] During his trial in 1998, for the first time reformist journals criticized the Municipal policy under Karbaschi to collect irregular fees titled *khodyari*. For an example, see *Gozaresh* Monthly Journal, issue 87.

to encourage high-rise building construction. Karbaschi broke with the convention of increasing construction density by 25 percent and allowed for the increase in construction density by 400 to 500 percent. According to Alviri, the mayor succeeding Karbaschi, Tehran's Article Five Commission had approved the policy of "selling" extra density but the judiciary (*Divan-e edalat-e edari*) canceled this permission (Alviri 2002). Despite this setback, Karbaschi continued with the policy, counting on the strong support of Rafsanjani and the majority of the cabinet members.

Municipal revenues increased tenfold between 1990 and 1998; three-fourths of this revenue came from levying new fees on the extra residential and commercial construction gained through increased density permissions (Zonooz 2007). The municipality financed its projects through the privatization of the urban skyline, first in the north of the city where the profit rate on real estate was higher, and then in all parts of the city. Selling public land on the market and forming public-private partnerships were other important policies in the transformation of urban public finance into market finance.

The term 'self-rule' (*khodkafaei*) in urban finance connoted an opposite meaning to its anti-imperialist and agricultural usage in the 1980s. The increased cost of living in Tehran, largely due to the construction boom and the dramatic increase in housing prices, was formulated later as an effective means for furthering decentralization policy. In 2009, a senior economist of the MPO, supported the commercializing of the housing and public services in the city as a tool of the decentralization policy. He argued that 'proper' pricing of the housing, through transport accessibility of the residential areas, leads to the adding of the total costs of traffic jams and other pollutant factors to the prices of the land, and at the end will work as an anti-immigration policy for Tehran. Karbaschi repeated the same argument, bringing examples from cities around the world to show that such a strategy was not limited to Tehran:

> The [growth of the] first decade was to continue. We had two ways to face the developments around Tehran; first, we could use all preventive administrative, military, security and economic tools to stop immigration; second, we could think that it is not necessary for the poor to come to Tehran and receive what they need in the Capital. Tehran should have no financial attractions. I believed

> it should have even negative attractions; like all other Capitals around the world. London's living costs are so high that many prefer to stay in small towns; this does not mean they don't care about their low-income population. (Karbaschi 2009: 290)

Expert-Consultant-Contractors in Tehran Municipality

Backed by Tehran Municipality's financial power, Karbaschi set in motion his policy to reduce the central government's supervisions of the capital. He aimed first to dismantle the central government's supervisory power on Tehran Municipality. Then, he moved to broaden the tasks and functions under his responsibility over the city, against the authority of local ministerial administrations in Tehran. Such agency would not emerge unless strong political support consolidated the Mayor's position against a factional rivalry. The Mayor of Tehran participated in meetings of the Cabinet for the first time in 1989. This process continued while Karbaschi was in office. Such political capital worked in favor of restructuring the scales and levels of decision-making regarding cities in Iran, which replaced long term planning tools with short term physical engineering projects.

Karbaschi replaced Tehran's supervisory councils with consulting councils and turned the consulting members, usually individual experts, heads of professional firms and university professors, into his partners and contractors on municipal projects. My research on Navab Highway examines in more detail the new roles defined for experts in Tehran during the era. The dismantling of supervisory bodies and the weakening of provincial governments, combined with a lack of regional administrations capable of voicing the regional conflicts inherent in the processes of (sub)urbanization, contributed toward ideal conditions for "improving" the living conditions in Tehran by pushing to the margins what was considered to be residual to Capital: namely, the low-income people, the polluted industries, the mega infrastructures and so on.

A reverse process of institution building emerged. The institutions and processes formed in the years after 1968 to promote urban planning in Tehran were subject to reorganization. This included the Renewal Law, endorsed by the parliament in 1968. Complementary to the Municipality Law of 1960, the Renewal Law tasked municipalities

with the implementation of renewal projects proposed by comprehensive plans. In 1972, the Supreme Council of Urban Planning and Architecture (SCAUP) was formed to establish the general urban development and housing policies and regulations, and order the preparation, oversight and approval of comprehensive plans and other major urban programs. SCAUP was headed by the Prime Minister and included representatives from the MHUP, the MPO and the ministries of the Economy, Interior, and Energy (MHUP 1999). One of the major actions of the SCAUP was forming a supervisory council to oversee Tehran's development in 1973. Called the Council for Supervision on Tehran's Development (SCDCT), the organization was tasked to implement decentralization policy and prevent the geographical concentration of the population and economic activities in Tehran, through inter-sectoral collaborations.

In July 1987, the Article Five Commissions (AFC) formed in all municipalities according to 1972 Law and were tasked to examine and approve the detailed plans. Like comprehensive plans, detailed plans in Iran are prepared by private planning firms, so the role of AFCs are vital in defining how public and private interests are defined in the planning process. They are not permitted to change the maps and the guidelines of comprehensive plans, but are expected to verify the correct adoption of the detailed plans and projects in their connection to the comprehensive plans. The representative of the MHUP local administration contributes to the AFC in each city. A major decision came along in 1988 that shifted the balance of power to the benefit of Tehran Municipality. With Karbaschi as mayor, the Council for Supervision on Tehran's Development (SCDCT), the influential coordinating body at national level, conferred its power to AFC in Tehran. It is has been suggested that the proposal came from the Minister of Housing and the Mayor of Tehran (Tabatabaei), and was approved by the Prime Minister, though the Interior Minister and the head of the MPO opposed the decision (Moeini 2006: 35). Karbaschi suggests (2013: 84) that the government intervention in local issues through SCPUA and SCDCT weakened the power of municipalities: "formation of the two councils had in fact diminished Tehran Municipality from the highest authority in Tehran-related decision making processes." Such restructuring of state power was completed by steps to utilize urban planning experts as consultants. Relying on his own managerial capacities and experiences, Karbaschi looked for "rational" proposals offered

by consultant architects, urban experts and professional elites. The Rafsanjani government embraced a similar elitist ideology. Tehran AFC turned into a kind of rubber stamp for Tehran Municipality and promoted the Mayor's policies against all odds, and the commission's violation of laws, regulations and plans became routine. All the main agreements between Tehran Municipality and developers—changing zoning regulations, land use changes, density increases and major shifts in public projects—were verified by the AFC. Interviewed for this research, Mehdi Moeini (1386: 38), the urban deputy of the Municipality after Karbaschi explained that Tehran's AFC was working directly under supervision of the Mayor in the 1990s and even his urban planning deputy had no authority over the commission.

Following the path of Ali Akbar Davar seventy years ago, Karbaschi believed that the mission of progress/development is self-evident. Davar argued that there were plenty of good ideas, plans and imaginations for Tehran, but what was missing was a capable Mayor/Shah to find the ways to implement them, to do the actual work, to construct, to build. The main institution Karbaschi added to Tehran Municipality was the Technical and Engineering Organization (TEO). A multi-function body, TEO simultaneously did planning for different activities, prepared the designs, contracted the consultants, developers and contractors, and supervised and evaluated the results. TEO remained the most powerful body of Tehran Municipality during the 1990s. The organization supervised all kinds of infrastructure constructions and developmental projects. Though they recruited engineers with varying skills, the organization relied on the planning expertise of a consulting committee named Tehran Professional Committee (*shora-ye takhasosei shahre Tehran*). Formed in 1992, the Committee had memberships from private architects and managers of planning firms (nine members), university professors (six members), and directors of municipal organizations (five members). They gathered every two weeks to discuss policies or projects proposed for Tehran. The Municipality had no obligation to follow what was discussed or suggested in these meetings. I have studied the committee meeting annual reports which were prepared and published internally for 1994-5. It would be difficult to convince an outsider that these relaxed brainstorming meetings were part of the decision making process in Tehran Municipality. During the two-year period that the committee convened, one or two sessions were

allocated to each major project running in the city. Many of the members of the Committee were invited to work with the Municipality as designers or contractors for architectural and urban projects. Karbaschi praised the engineering skills of the architects, rather than their taste for the style and their concerns for cultural heritage (Karbaschi 2007: 7):

> While in other countries architecture is part of the science or polytechnics, in our country the discipline is part of fine arts academy. That [education] has led to a artistic and delicate approach to the career being dominant among our architects. We need a scientific and technical approach to the architecture and urban design, otherwise we are not able to use them to solve people's basic needs. [For those with artistic taste] samples of the traditional architecture could be saved as a museum.

Worlding Practices and the "Will to Improve"

Mono-functional use areas, movement systems based on private cars, tower blocs and the increase of green space characterize urban modernism around the world (UNHSP 2006: 46). Karbaschi was determined to adopt such an urban strategy, while taking into account the specific characteristics of Tehran as a post-Revolutionary city with a demographic majority defined by moderate religiosity.

In the presidential campaigns of 2009, Karbaschi, interviewed as the spokesman for the center right, used Tehran's reform in the 1990s as a reference to explain what kind of 'progress' and development their camp were able to achieve. Repeatedly naming the reform a symbol of modernity, Karbaschi used the metaphor of "modern" to distinguish their candidate from the conservatives, who failed to implement any reform during two mayoral terms (Ahmadinejad 2003-5 and Qalibaf 2005-2014). He argued that none of them had the courage to break away from bureaucratic routines or had any utopic vision. He would remind his audience of the conflict of conservatives' doctrine and practice on the policy of 'selling extra-density' in Tehran: even though the Housing Minister, Abbas Akhondi, and his colleagues documented the illegality of the extra-density policy to

condemn Karbaschi in late 1990s, the conservative leaders in the City Council and City Hall applied the same policy in the years that followed.

In his remarks, the "modern" was constructed through an interaction with a "constitutive outside," which was the "urbanized world." Portraying the "modern" as a linear development phase of cities, Karbaschi did not refer to the West as the main image or model of modernism. In his definition, modernity emerges as an inevitable technique for governing the complexity of contemporaneity, a representation which promotes a particular image of the spatial order. Mitchell (2000), in his important argument on "impossible universality" of modernity, discusses how 'representation' contributed to the building of Eurocentrism as well as "alternative" perceptions of modernity. He argues that the logic and movement of the modern has always been produced by displacing and discounting what remains heterogeneous to it. In doing so, the latter plays the paradoxical but unavoidable role of the "constitutive outside." Looking from the lens of urban reform in Tehran, the 'constitutive outside' is not perceived in terms of the non-West cast by the West, as Mitchell (2000) argues.[179] In the discourse and practice of constructing the 'modern urbanity' in Tehran, the geographical representation of the modern moves from the fixed boundary of the West to include part of Asia, Latin America, and probably the pre-Revolution Iran. However, the worlding of the "modern" has functioned as a counterattack to the conservative's allegation that the center right, including Karbaschi, was pursuing a westernized modernity. After Karbaschi was arrested, Naqdi, a commander of *Bassij*, argued that his lavish spending on luxury recreation facilities and his loose cultural policies had marginalized the destitute and the committed Islamists (Naqdi 1998).

Assembling the Reform

Karbaschi targeted the populist image of the Revolution by portraying its urban policy in Tehran as an endless disorder. The politics of calculation spread into the immediate past and critical reviews addressed the hundreds of hectares of urban lands

[179] Mitchell (2000: 23) argues: "Once one places at the centre of an understanding of modernity the process of representation and insists upon the importance of displacement, deferral, and delay in the production of the modern, the non-West emerges as a place that makes possible the distance, the difference, and the time lag required for these forms of displacement."

that were ceded to co-operatives and urban subalterns for free or at cheap prices. The representation of the land policy of the first years of the Revolution as 'disorder' aimed to facilitate the reformulation of urban land policy in the IRI. The Third Development Plan of 1999 approved the Housing Ministry and municipalities' sale of public land under their ownership according to market prices. To 'order' the city, Karbaschi took actions against informal developments.[180] In the 1990s, the demolition of unpermitted new buildings around the city became the basic task of *polic-e sakhteman,* a police force of 4000 members hired by the municipality in the late 1980s to interdict of new illegal construction.[181] A diagnosis including symptoms of overpopulation, earthquake risk, and *harj-o marj* (the condition of being ungovernable*),* provided legitimacy for the discourse and policy of vast, rapid and decisive Municipal interventions in different aspects of city life.

Tehran's worlding urbanism incorporates four main axes: 1) environmental reform; 2) high-rise building and density intensification under the rubric of extra density; 3) transit system reform; and, 4) cultural-political reform. Such multilayered reforms dramatically changed the everyday life of Tehran's citizens as well as the physical landscape of the city.

Environmental Reform: "Our City, Our Home"

Environmental reform was started by the beautification of the city. It was then followed by sanitary practices and ended with an industrial relocation plan. The first year Karbaschi was in power, Tehran saw the arrival of flower boxes in the streets around the city. Having seen flowers predominantly in their private yards, people in Tehran were encouraged by 'the public flowers' to domesticize the city, and to spread the feeling of belonging. In months to come, Tehranis saw the words "our city, our home" on the

[180] A documentary film named *Shahrak Fatemieh* by Rakhshan Bani Etemad, a leading Iranian female filmmaker, shows how Tehran Municipality supported the relocation of a small slum located along a major road to Tehran in 1994. These attempts aimed to remove the signs of the poverty from the city. Rakhshan Bani Etemad received the best screenplay award for her film *Tales* at the 71st International Venice Film Festival in 2014.

[181] The reactivation of the demolishing units of the large municipalities, as mentioned in chapter IV was a major cause of urban riots in Tehran and Mashhad in mid-1990s. These unites were aggressively demolishing the illegal constructions inside buffer zones, while increasing prices of the urban land and housing pushed low income families to move to the margins of the cities.

billboards along the streets. Modaress Highway, a north-south highway in the middle of the city, was the first highway to have green walls and parks built alongside it. Landscape design continued with wall paintings, coloring the exterior of the old buildings and greening the city with new trees, shrubs and flowerpots. Signs of the Revolution and war on city walls were cleaned up and all the shops' steel shutters in the main streets were painted in the same color. Tehran was diagnosed as having a lack of green areas; in two years, all the vacant lands in the city, whose landlords escaped from the country in the early 1980s, were turned to small public gardens: "nearly 500 parks were built within the years 1990-1996 in an area of 1130 hectares" (Karbaschi 2013: 126).

Tehran's green belt was a child of the Revolution. In 1978, the Council for Supervision of Tehran's Development passed the Green Belt Act, which authorized Tehran Municipality to build a green belt of 1 kilometer by 43 kilometers around the city to prevent growth in the south (TPC: 1982). In 1988 Tehran had 4250 hectares of forests, mainly in the city's southeast border. TCP 1973 ratified the completion of the green belt, this time approaching the green belt as a barrier to further developments between Tehran and Karaj. The Green belt was intended to protect the development of ward 22 joins the developments around Karaj, a city of 2 million populations in Tehran Metropolitan Region. In the 1990s, the green belt policy was strictly enforced as a means to control illegal construction around the city. Tehran's forests increased to 25,000 hectares in 1997 (Hamshahri Yearbook 1997-8: 703).[182]

The sanitary policy started with the fight against urban rats. Open culverts functioned as collectors of surface water and were used for watering the street trees, but also provided an ideal habitat for urban rats in Tehran. The culverts were cemented and street side tree paths resurfaced with concrete. Daily garbage collection was rescheduled for night-time collection: people were asked to put the garbage out only after 9 pm, and the mechanized garbage collectors were to collect the refuse after 9 pm. The schedule denied cats, rats and other vermin the opportunity to feed on the garbage. While improvements in collecting and dumping the garbage made Tehran one of the cleanest cities around the world, the war against urban animals still extended to homeless cats and

[182] The green belt project includes Hessarak Forest Park, Khojir Forest and Southern Greenbelt.

dogs. Homeless dogs disappeared from the city in two to three years; they were poisoned in large numbers.[183] Other sanitary projects included Tehran Conductivity of Surface Water in the T25DZ, established to protect the city from flooding risks as well as to decrease the pollution of surface water. This project included a system of 400 kilometers of tunnels and watercourses (half of the project was built in the 1990s). In 1994 Tehran Municipality received a 25 year loan from the World Bank to build the sewage system and purification facilities for Tehran.[184]

The industrial relocation, proposed by TCP 1992, aimed to relocate 200,000 industrial jobs from Tehran in a ten-year plan to decrease industrial pollutants in Tehran. Considering the total number of the city's industrial jobs (540,000 in 1991), TCP targeted the relocation of more than one-third of city's industrial labour force. The plan, then called "transfer of disturbing industrial units" (*Enteqaal kargah-haye mozahem*), also conflicted with the interests of medium and small industries and would have been impossible to implement without full support from the central government. In December 1990, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the industrial relocation policy and authorized Tehran Municipality to prepare an action plan and implement it. In the same year the Organization for Regulation of the Polluted Industries (ORPI) was formed in Tehran Municipality, with the task of classifying Tehran's polluted industries and scheduling their relocation according to the severity of their pollutants. The ORPI categorized 33 types of industrial activities as 'pollutant' and announced that they should shut down or be prepared for relocation (Razavi 1991).

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[183] Karbaschi (2013: 118) has described the situation in dramatic terms: In Tehran, 6000 tons of garbage was collected off the ground daily. However, due to a lack of technical facilities, garbage was still scattered on the city passages. A major part of this scattered garbage was moved into the streams and surface water lines, thereby polluting the surface water. A part of the scattered garbage also remained on the city's small and big passages due to various reasons, including people's carelessness, the delayed arrival of the municipal garbage collectors, and the activities of domestic animals (e.g. dogs and cats). The garbage which the municipality transferred to the outer city, was scattered on a narrow space in southern plains, making the underground water polluted. The polluted underground water smelled very bad most of the day in all seasons, and was particularly bad in the summer. This problem existed in a wide area of Tehran's southern parts.

[184] Tehran's Sewage Company was established to design, implement and operate the system. The system includes 9000 kilometers of canals and 9 million connecting branches. In 2014, only half of the households were linked to the sewage system and 37 percent of the wastewater was purified for reuse in agriculture. Daily water usage in Tehran is 3.5 million square meters and the system will be able to return 70 percent of the wastewater to the city.

Tehran Municipality's reports were not specific about the number and conditions of industrial relocations and have merely described the new industrial sites. The new sites were constructed 30 kilometers or more from the city center, mainly along Tehran's southern corridor, where water sources are very limited. According to Hamshahri's yearbook (HB 1997: 730-31), Tehran Municipality prepared 5 sites to relocate 8,000 industrial jobs.[185] This increased to 17 sites, with no information on the kinds of jobs relocated to them (Karbaschi 2007). Different guild associations were negotiated to assist the relocation process, but they had no other choice and could not influence the procedures much, given the weakness of labour associations and those representing the small manufactures in Iran. The manufacturers complained that the ORPI took no responsibility for the costs of relocation or interruptions of work (Razavi 1991). In my interview with Ghamar Fallah (November 2011), an urban planner who worked for a company planning one of the relocation projects, she explained some social aspects of the relocation projects. Fallah was a team member working on the Shahid Rajai site in southern Tehran, where hundreds of stone, ceramic and other construction material manufacturers were located since 1970. Most of the industry moved to Sangshahr, an industrial site 30 kilometers south of Tehran. In the first years, Sangshahr was not equipped with facilities required for industrial activities. Workers were laid off in most of the units, as owners decided to cease their activities while waiting for water and other facilities to get ready. Some of the owners closed their workshops and shifted to other businesses. Tehran's industrial relocation could be compared with the deindustrialization process in Mumbai, where the industrial force declined to one fifth during one decade of 1980s, with the resulting shift from an industrial to a commercial city (Weinstein and Ren 2009).[186]

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[185] These included Sangshahr for ceramic industries, Ahanshahr for molding and plating, Charmshahr for the leather industry, and so on.

[186] Other important projects implemented by Tehran Municipality included: expansion of Tehran's Fire and Safety Services; the development of Behesht-e Zahra Cemetery from 314 to 434 hectares, reorganizing it as a modern funeral and burial organization; the building of Shahrvand department stores; the establishment of 47 produce markets throughout the city serving almost one million costumers per day; two main intra-city traffic terminal centres on the western and eastern edge of the city, and one in the centre north (Arjantin Square); and, all transportation agencies moved to these terminals (HB: 1997:702- 746).

The High-Rise Building and "Extra Density Policy"

Seeking to boost the real estate sector as the engine of the urban economy, the government launched policies to encourage the construction sector. In 1987, while Tabatabei was still in office in Tehran Municipality, a tax reform eliminated the tax on land, vacant units and luxury buildings, seeing them as non-practical policies (Salehi 2007). The explosion of housing projects in Tehran unfolded in three distinct processes: the high-rise projects; the boost of construction in undeveloped lands in new wards established during two city border expansions in 1980 and 1990; and, the intensification of density in the inner city.

Figure 11: Tehran 22 wards in 1996



Source: Atlas of Tehran Metropolis
http://www.irancarto.cnrs.fr/record.php?q=AT-030227&f=local&l=fa

In Karbaschi's first years, the city saw policy placing high-rise buildings in more expensive and larger residential lots in the northern part of the city. In 1987, only 0.2 percent of all properties in Tehran had buildings over 10 stories high, making the city one of the flattest metropolises in the world (Abadi 1995). Constructing 80 percent of the towers and high-rise complexes in Tehran, foreign capital was the major contributor in the design and building of the high-rise complexes before the Revolution. Most of these complexes were built with public investment.[187] The number of high-rises reached 1091

[187] Ekbatan with 17,000 units and Apadana with 2,900 units are two main examples of this type. The private sector invested in the small complexes like Eskan, Aftab and Saman or ASP. ESKODA was one of the foreign companies active in pre-Revolution Iran.

from less than 100 in the 1990s. Unlike the high-rise buildings in 19th century America, the high-rises in Iran were built for residential uses rather than commercial or office uses. Almost 70 percent of the high-rises in 2000 were residential and 13 percent had mixed residential and commercial land use. They were located in the northern part of the city, with 80 percent in wards 1 to 6 (Safavi 2001).

According to TCP 1968, high-rises could be built in five regional centers in the city, including the regional centers in the north, south, west, east and center. Karbaschi set no limits for issuing permissions and all plots larger than 300 square meters, regardless of where they were located in the city, could receive a construction permit for a 10-story building. Many high-rises built in northern neighbourhoods were above the altitude line of 1800 meters, one of the prohibited construction areas for earthquake hazards (Saeidnia 2005). The last but not to be overlooked aspect of the high-rise building in Tehran was the feeling of pride among engineers who built these complex constructs without adequate training and proper material. In 1995 Behrooz Ahmadi discussed the questions that occupied his mind when he was involved in building one of the first high-rises in the city in 1990—2 Bokharest building. He explains (Abadi 1995) that many architects were asking themselves whether they should start building high-rises with no prior experience, in conditions where most of the difficult technical problems had to be solved on site. There was no regulation to check the resistibility and safety of the buildings. Many architects answered positively to these questions.[188] Building high-rises became a profitable business. For example, a plot as large as 300 square meters, with a permission to build a 10-story building instead of a 2 or 3-story, would increase its built-up area from 360 to 2160 square meters, or 6 times more.[189] The fees paid to the Municipality never went beyond the 10 percent of the average per meter price (Yazdani 2006). In the year from 1992 to 1993, the share of 20-units or more (mainly included 10-story or more buildings) increased from 13 percent to 22 percent of the permissions

[188] Taraneh Yalda, one of the planners of Tehran Comprehensive Plan, then a colleague of Ahmadi, explained to me that they were proud to be able to see and point to his Bokharest building from different neighbourhoods in Tehran.

[189] According to the construction regulations in Tehran, buildings are not allowed to occupy more than 60 percent of the plot, and are built at a consistent distance from the plot's borders; as a result the buildings form rows, and are structured in such a way that windows between them do not look in on one another. Buildings are usually constructed in north-south direction to make the best use of sunlight.

issued by the Municipality. The *Bonyad Mostaza'fan* became the Municipality's foremost customer in getting the permissions for high-rise buildings. Supported by conservative factions, it was one of the main contractors of urban infrastructure along with commercial and residential development projects in Tehran. Imam Sadegh University also invested in malls and residential projects. Between 1987 and 1997 private investment in the construction sector increased 15-fold. The Municipality's activities certainly provided the construction sector with the necessary political stability to attract substantial assets circulating in Tehran's unregulated and speculative circuits (Ehsani 2006).

The second project of construction boosterism included the building of mid-rise apartments in the undeveloped land in outer areas of the city. The project expanded the new property regime to all land holders. Building highways such as the Hemmat Highway, Niayesh Highway, Sadr Highway and extending the Resalat Highway, and all east-west highways, facilitated the development that took place in wards 4, 5, 2 and 22 with huge vacant lands. TCP 1968 proposed the construction of major national and regional centers in the western part of the city. Especially in ward 22, the zoning of the vacant plots turned to residential, as military and other powerful organizations ignored the MHUP, or MHUP allocated the lands to influential co-ops. In general, co-ops were consisted of the workers and the public employees co-ops. In mid 1980s, the workers co-ops consisted 20 percent of the total members of the co-ops in Tehran. Madanipour's study on Tehran confirms that only 12 percent of the co-ops could get subsidized land for their members before 1985. MHUP's turn toward co-ops in 1990 shaped a severe competition among them. The more educated and socially prestigious groups of employees had better chances to receive lands through their co-ops. Numerous new neighbourhoods emerged in the west and northwest of Tehran, with new residential complexes and individual buildings. For years these neighbourhoods remained unfamiliar to other residents, and difficult to commute through. In the mid-1990s, the number of undeveloped plots available for construction in the outer wards was reducing dramatically. In response, the third project of construction boosterism began: the infusion of low-rise apartment buildings into the old central neighbourhoods of the city. Such was the backdrop to the influx of residents that older neighbourhoods were soon to experience.

While for two decades the inner city population was on the decline, the issuance of 'extra density' made it profitable to demolish the old buildings and reconstruct new ones.

Table 23: Construction permissions for the different wards of Tehran 1991-2005

Wards	Permissions		Housing Units		Built area of Units	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Total	242209	100	1960262	100	111880.7	100
Inner city wards	141737	58.5	1117227	57	64622.1	57.8
Outer city wards	100472	41.5	843035	43	47258.6	42.2

Source: Construction Permissions, Tehran Municipality Report

This dramatic change in density, called 'extra density', deeply affected the property rights in the city. We know from sociological research on inequality that unequal ownership of certain kinds of property engenders other inequalities. Carruthers and Ariovich (2004) suggest property rights matter most for wealth inequality: the inequalities in property ownership tends to be more extreme and stable than income inequalities. Secure title over land allows it to function as collateral for loans and hence generates access to credit. The landlords in Tehran benefited from the 'extra density' policy according to the size of their plots. That meant the larger plots received more 'extra density' and increased their wealth accordingly by building more. The policy worked against the very small landlords and tenants; the landlords who owned plots smaller than 60-70 square meters, were not allowed to reconstruct their buildings, unless they merged their plots with their neighbor's to make larger plots. Even with merging, they didn't get much extra density. The policy condemned the small landlords to live in their old units until their collapse. Tenants were the main losers, as they didn't have the status of the landlord in the first place.

The construction permissions issued in the period of 1991-2001 for new buildings, reconstruction of the old, residential and commercial buildings, reached a total of 99,000,000 square meters of built area. The existing built-up area in the city is estimated to be around 200,000,000 square meters, meaning almost half of the city was built or reconstructed in one decade. In 2002, more than 40 percent of the GDP produced by the

real estate sector in Iran, was produced in Tehran, while only 30 percent of the industrial GDP in the country came from Tehran's industries (Athari 2005). Construction boosterism led to three big jumps in housing prices in one decade. In 2001, the average price of the residential land in Tehran was ten times more than 1991. The land price variance declined in the city, meaning the prices of the housing in the southern neighbourhoods became closer to the prices in the center and upper neighbourhoods, acting against low-income groups. Table 24 shows how the minimum, average and maximum prices of newly built units in the upper, the center and the lower neighbourhoods changed in Tehran between 1991-95. The higher growth of the minimum prices and the lower neighbourhoods confirm that intensified use of the urban land through 'extra density' policy has declined the diversity of Tehran housing market against the poor.

Table 24: the increase of the newly built units in Tehran's housing market 1991-95

Housing Units classified by prices			Neighbourhoods classified by income		
Minimum	Average	Maximum	Upper	Center	Lower
34%	16%	25%	18%	6%	21%

Source: Report on Land and Housing Prices, Iran's Center for Statistics

The 'extra density' policy turned the construction sector to the engine of the economic reconstruction, against all efforts to shape an industrial 'take off' in Iran by development plans. Morteza Alviri (1998), the Mayor of Tehran after Karbaschi, points to the economic shock which emerged by sudden halt in Tehran's construction activities in the 1998: "Karbaschi's trial harmed the economy by 700 billion Tooman". The special 1975 fall issue of *Abadi* (a journal published by the MHUP) on high-rise buildings brought architects and urban planners to discuss openly the risks of building high-rises without first establishing the proper construction techniques, materials, expertise and regulations, and supervision of the projects. In 1998, MHUP reported to the court Karbaschi's constant violation of the comprehensive plan and Tehran's zoning regulations.

Efficient Private Transport

Tehran's transit was based on private automobiles since the 1970s. The study done by SOFRETU, a French consulting firm, showed that in 1970 almost 60 percent of the urban trips occurred in light vehicles, including autos and taxies.[190] In 1979, the Mayor of Tehran, Tavassoli, invited another group of international consultants, this time from Japan, to study the transit in the city. Their report confirmed the imbalance between the number of vehicles and existing roads in Tehran. They argued while the number of vehicles in Tehran was 1.2 million (equal to Tokyo), only 10 percent of the built-up area was allocated for roadways, in comparison to 25 percent in Tokyo (TPC: 1981). Another study by Tehran's Traffic Organization done in 1979 suggested that out of 7 million trips in a day, 46 percent occurred in autos and 22 percent in taxis, meaning that bus transit contributed to only one fourth of the urban trips (ibid). No transit study was conducted in Tehran during the war, however, the situation after was worse than before the war, a result of the lack of investment.[191]

Karbaschi prioritized the construction of the new highways, while Rafsanjani had mentioned in several occasions that building the subway system in Tehran was essential. He even discussed the subject in one of his Friday sermons in 1984, in an attempt to break the opposition among revolutionaries regarding the investment. The lead-time between investment and return played an important role in Karbaschi's decisions, and he probably found the delayed returns on a subway system financially irrational. He instead opted to increase the area attributed to roads and highways in order to directly combat the imbalance between vehicles and roads.

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[190] The study by SOFRETU indicates that in 1970 Tehran had 106500 private cars, increasing annually by 28 percent. 26 percent of the households had at least one automobile. The City had 3.6 million populations, which means one private car for each 33 persons.

[191] Karbaschi (2013: 108) describes the situation: "Thus, the public vehicles were limited to old buses and mini-buses, which were inadequate in both number and quality. The majority of buses were working in an overload state, becoming worn out early, because of the large North-south slope. On the other hand, the Tehran Taxi System was also inefficient. A high percentage of registered taxis were dilapidated. They had been in use for over 10 years, needing to be scrapped and substituted with new ones. Such a poor public transportation system had encouraged people to use their private cars for travel, causing the unnecessary transportation of more than 750,000 private vehicles in the city".

Figure 12: Highway network in Tehran 2002



Source: Tehran Comprehensive Plan 2006- Permission granted

New highways could address the traffic jams while they supported the development of the new wards. Some of them aimed to make the south more accessible for northern Tehranis, as the International Airport, the city's only cemetery, Ayatollah Khomeini's tomb, and many other major destinations were located in the south. 30 kilometers of highways, all proposed by the TCP 1969, were built in 9 years. More highways were built around the city as the first ring and second ring (Karbaschi 2007). Tehran had 6.2 kilometers of highway before 1990. Private traffic was restricted in the old center and around the Grand Bazaar, while "the public transportation fleet grew by 50 percent" (Ehsani 2006: 25).[192] Only one of Tehran's Metro lines was active then. The investment in the system increased when Alviri replaced Karbaschi (Alviri 2008).

[192] Karbaschi suggests (2013: 125) the number of active buses and mini-buses were 200 in 1990 and increased to 4000 in 1999: "providing assistance on running a system and particularly radio station called "Traffic Radio", with live 24-hour programs. 13 air-quality monitoring stations were installed across the city, particularly in the most polluted areas, to monitor the quality of air at these areas".

Cultural and Political Reform

The worlding urbanism under Karbaschi was not totally about physical and material types of interventions. During his service in Esfahan, he worked with Ayatollah Taheri, a reformist popular clergyman in the region. Mohajerani, a religious intellectual and Minister of Culture in Rafsanjani's government had some influence on Karbaschi. In the early 1990s both reformist and center right figures were contributing to a discourse of 'cultural tolerance' in an effort to deal with internal and external political conflicts, and to provide an alternative to the 'cultural onslaught' proposed by the conservatives. The idea of the 'cultural onslaught' or *tahajoom farhangi*, claimed the Western countries were using their cultural influence and non-Islamic lifestyles to invade Iran, now that the military invasions (Iran-Iraq war) had stopped. Drawn from their cultural projects, both reformists and center right engaged in debates on how Muslims should encounter the west and the world in general. The proposal by Mohajerani to negotiate directly with the United States in 1991 met with strong opposition from the Supreme Leader and increased the conservatives' pressures to dismiss him. Khatami (2000: 106) suggested: "a culture that is unable to reflect on itself and takes all of its past as sacred and not amenable to questioning, is stagnant and dead".

Karbaschi supported the 'culture of tolerance' initiative by forming an independent organization to manage cultural activities in the City. Conservatives attacked him arguing that cultural activities should be supervised by the Ministry of Culture, and that municipalities did not have the competence to get involved in them. Despite these criticisms, Tehran Municipality's push for cultural reform materialized in a sudden expansion of cultural spaces in Tehran. During the 1990s "10 large cultural centers, 50 cultural houses in all districts, 40 libraries, 23 photo galleries, and 30 special social-cultural centers" were constructed in the city (Karbaschi 2013: 130). These spatial configurations were intended to make the city more accessible and inviting to women and youth from different classes. Some of the revolutionary graffiti was removed from the walls of the city. Cultural activities that had been forbidden (like playing musical instruments) or, that were not officially sanctioned were revived. The "modern" city in this perspective was not synonymous with moral pollution and social decay. Tehran was imagined and emerged as a site of cultural activity.

Some of the industrial properties were transformed into areas for public use after being bought by the Municipality. Tehran's slaughterhouse is a prominent example of such a transformation. The slaughterhouse in the south of Tehran was turned into the Bahman Cultural Complex, the largest cultural center of the city. The inclusiveness and positive impacts of the cultural center on the working class families living in the surrounding neighbourhoods have been studied by Amir-Ebrahimi (1995). The Bahman Complex attracted a young population to its concerts and classes put on by famous artists of the time, and for the first time, it shaped a population flow from the north to the south of the city.

Figure 13: Distribution of Tehran's new cultural centers



Source: Tehran Comprehensive Plan 2006-Permission granted

Tehran's annual Book Fair, created in 1988, was another example of the growing cultural activities in the city. The Book Fair was held at the Tehran International Exhibition Complex (TIEC), a site designed and established by TCP 1968 as part of a master plan to make the city a global destination. Ehsani has studied the role of the Book Fair in political life of the city:

> Throughout its history, and regardless of its location, the Book Fair has been widely used by the public, not just to acquire books and cultural commodities, but also for a variety of other cultural and everyday practices, including, on

> occasions, for a more active enactment of citizenship in public…. Soon after it was launched in 1988, the Book Fair became Iran's largest public event, attracting more than 2 million visitors a year on average, similar to the number of annual Hajj pilgrims! (2014: 6)

The fight in the cultural field continued through physical symbols that fight back the worlding practices of the municipality:

> To reaffirm Tehran's Islamic identity, in 1995 they [the conservatives] put forward a $100 million project for the 'world's largest mosque'. In 1996, the national Council of Public Culture and Ministry of Housing discussed a proposal to develop a vision of an 'Islamic city', though nothing came of this…A giant mosque was erected just across from the City Theatre (Teatr-e Shahr), to subdue this emblem of modernist culture that had remained from the high-society Tehran of the Shah. (Bayat 2010: 114-115)

Crisis of Worlding Urbanism in Tehran

The worlding urbanism in Tehran was economically exclusionary. The housing commercialization through 'extra density' policy declined the diversity of the housing market against lower income population. The construction boom was guided toward luxury condos and apartment buildings for the middle classes. Changes in zoning laws allowed for intensification in vertical construction, and the conversion of previously banned areas into high-rise and commercial building plots. The speculative activities rampant in the housing sector caused three jumps in housing prices: in 1991-94, the average price of one square meter of a new apartment building in Tehran increased by 50 percent; in 1994-95, that price jumped another 30 percent; and, in 1995-96, a 75 percent price increase almost killed the market. In 1998, the year Karbaschi left office, the average price of one square meter of a new apartment building was quadruple 1991 prices (Figure 11): "property was more and more appreciated as a pure financial asset, as a form

of fictitious capital whose exchange value, integrated into the general circulation of capital, entirely dominated use value" (Harvey 2003: 125).

In 1996 Tehran settled 65 percent of the province's population, compared to the 77 percent of the mid-1980s. What distinguishes the suburbanization of the wartime and Revolutionary decade from the post-war era, is the exclusionary nature of the latter process. Comparing the suburbanization of unskilled labour in those two decades (15 and 16 percent respectively) with suburbanization of the teachers, clerks and technicians (15 and 7 percent) confirms the success of the policy in making the city less attractive for low-income groups.

Figure 14: Price of one square meter new apartment building in Tehran 1990-99



Rafsanjani's retreat from cultural and political reform, to reduce the conservative's pressure on his economic project, was a failure for the center right and increased the pressures on Karbaschi. In 1995 the first public critiques of Karbaschi came from a grand Ayatollah, Khazali, accusing him of a lax cultural policy. The board of Imam Sadeq University, who invested in the construction of malls in Tehran, took him to court for asking irregular fees for construction activities. Abass Akhondi, Minster of Housing (1993-97) lodged a complaint against Karbaschi for deregulating Tehran's density policy and issuing permits for tower construction (Alviri 2002). Some of the high-ranked managers of City Hall were arrested in 1997 for using public funds for the electoral campaigns of the fifth parliament. In 1998 more than one hundred municipal employees were charged with misuse of public funds, arrested and jailed for one year. Charged with embezzlement of public funds, Karbaschi was arrested and imprisoned in

1998, one year after he supported Khatami in his campaign for presidential election. He took charge of his colleagues and accepted the responsibility of what they did under his command, but never accepted that they committed any offence.

The deputy of Tehran Municipality that I interviewed for this research explained to me how everyone in the Municipality was surprised at seeing the conservatives' attack Karbaschi in mid-1990. He noted: "Tehran Municipality had important contracts with major foundations ruled by conservatives and Karbaschi himself had very good personal relations with those in office in these foundations" (Salami 2011, personal communication). Karbaschi himself pointed out in several occasions that *Bonyads* and other conservative institutions were involved in urban projects considered as illegal intensification or land use change in Tehran.[193] The walls of Tehran acted as a platform for visual communication on his trial; slogans like "Karbaschi, Iran's Amirkabir" (Amirkabir is regarded as a national hero for instigating modernizing reform in 19th century) and "The looter of public money" (*gharatgar-e biet-ol mall)* were seen here and there in the streets (Bashiri 1998: 65). The influential elites like Rafsanjani and members of the Kargozaran party negotiated for his release. Karbaschi challenged the judiciary system for the torture of his colleagues in the course of the trial. An unexpected TV broadcast of the trial publicized his crossing the red-line of the IRI and talking about the torture in the prisons for the first time; millions of Iranians in Tehran and around the country watched his trial and discussed his case.[194] This conflict, however, never turned into a popular mobilization. Eventually, the case was closed with Karbaschi's condemnation for selling five plots of land at twenty percent below the market price (Naseri 1991/2012).[195] Spending less than one year in jail, he wrote a letter to the Supreme Leader, asking for pardon. He was released soon after. The remission was understood as a mutual agreement that Karbaschi should not be publically recognized as

[193] For an example see his interview by Taheri in 2008.
[194] His colleagues in the newspaper *Hamshahri,* wrote an editorial note and addressed the conflict as "confrontation of the moderns and non-moderns" in Iran: "the recent conflict in Iran is fought by the three thousand years old, destructive, and unhealthy trade sector against the new productive and industrial system in Iran" (*Hamshahri,* 8 February 1998: 2).
[195] A high-ranking conservative judge sentenced him to three years jail, ten years prohibition from public service after his release from jail, and fined him one billion rials (equivalent to $ 200,000 at the time).

someone who challenged the system (Bashiri 2000).[196] In an interview in 2013, Karbaschi responded to a journalist's question, asking him whether he would still follow the same strategy, selling extra density if he were back in the 1990s again[197]. Trying to muddy the discussion by defending the intensification in general, Karbaschi replied:

> Sure I would follow the same policy. It [selling extra density] was right. This is the policy of modern urban development, the way to construct a modern city. There is no place for Qajar architecture in a city like Tehran with this level of population, there is no room for artistic taste. In modern architecture you build high-rises to provide the private space and free the land for public uses. (2007: 4)

Conclusion

The "will to improve" was the engine of the redevelopment of the city. Worlding practices both inspired and authorized the changes. The spectacular events, highly technological buildings and structures, and dramatic intensification of residential land use have marked the worlding practices in Asia (Roy 2011). Karbaschi went to different global cities in the west and in the east on different occasions, and was motivated to improve the 'international standards' in Tehran for health, safety, and social services. However, what makes the experience of Tehran unique, compared to other worlding practices embedded in the neoliberal context, is the public investment toward improving deprived neighbourhoods in southern Tehran, and the aggressive cultural reform intended to diminish the conservatives' hold on urban public life. Both forms of municipal

[196] In an interview by Newsweek (10 Feb., 2000) just after his release, Karbaschi complained that Khatami, the reformist president, was not supportive of him in the course of "attack on Tehran Municipality." Once out of prison, Karbaschi resumed his political activities and at the same time returned to university to study what he practiced as mayor for one decade, i.e. urban planning. He wrote his thesis on Tehran's governance during his own mayorship and received his PhD from New Castle University in 2013. Yet, his PhD research has not been published in Persian.

[197] Conservatives relied on the failures of Karbaschi and its devastating effects on conflicts in the first city council to take over the second city council in 2003 election and send their Mayor, Mahmood Ahmadinejad, from municipality to the presidential election of 2005. Relying on unregulated flows of money in the city, all the Mayors after Karbaschi have aspired to become president.

boosterism, the arbitrary decentralization as well as the cultural reform, inflamed the factional rivalry over who held the controls of the powerful Tehran Municipality. Iran's reform movement of 1995-2005 relied partly on bold aggressive cultural and political reforms in Tehran, and partly on Karbaschi's active role in the presidential campaign of Khatami in 1996. The reform movement responded to such support through the first city council election in 1998. Elections formed local parliaments in Iran, though with limited power, and took the first step toward placing the decentralization process on a democratic track.

Tehran had a population of 7 million and its metropolitan area had a population of 10.3 million (including Tehran), when Karbaschi left the office. Compared to 10 other large cities in the Muslim world, Tehran was 8th on the concentration index (the share of national population living in the city), with Cairo at 1st and Istanbul and Jakarta at 9th and 10th (UN Habitat 2000). Considering the ratio of the first city to the second, Tehran was 5th. The city area in Cairo expanded from 200 to 500 square kilometers from 1970 to 1990 (Raymond 2001), the same figures for Tehran were 250 and 520 square kilometers. Tehran experienced less deindustrialization than Mumbai, for example, where the city lost four out of five industrial workers in the 1980s, or Toronto where the city lost 19 percent of industrial jobs between 1981-4. In all three of these cities almost all the industrial sites were turned into residential sites. The peripheralization of the population in Tehran was on the rise, but it is far less than Cairo, where it was estimated to be more than one third of the population. The same is true about gated communities.

Chapter VI: Navab Highway: Worlding and Urban Infrastructure

> Any urban project may cause disagreements; look at Paris 2000, de la Défense, it is a mega project with 2 million square meters of new build up in front of the Champs-Élysées and old Paris. When they built it and opened it up to the public, there was a lot of fracas. The idea of the arc was to symbolize a gate opening to after 2000, but many urban planners wrote hundreds of articles to criticize it for its incongruence with the old fabric of the city. You know the area was a dead cemetery, where the repair workshops were settled and had nothing in common with the old city. Look at the Thames River in London, the part where the fish market and old fishing boats and abandoned factories were located; they built the Canary Wharf there, a 60 storey building surrounded by a designed area of streets, highways and parking up to 1 or 1.5 million square meters. You can find the same thing in New York. The architecture of these sites is eye-catching, while they have always some critics. Navab is the same…. The neighborhood was not an old one. It was not part of the old Tehran. Tehran itself has not a rich history. It is a city of 150 years old (Karbaschi 2009: 283).

> Tunisian Minister of Housing …was surprised by what he saw [in Navab] and told me 'It is not possible to build projects like this in our country. Law does not allow us. Even if we were allowed and we had the capacity to do this, people who lived here would be the first group to settle in the new complex.' To be fair, Navab was a bold project and the Mayor's courage should be acknowledged. However, they ignored the interests of the local people. …. [Opening the way for] the highway was like blasting a path in a field riddled with mines… You are not able to foresee the problems emerging in [a mega] project and that is why there is no interest in mega projects in the world since 1980; because you don't know how it works (Hanachi, urban deputy MHUP 2009:. 325-7).

Introduction

During the years between 1992 and 1995 almost 6,000 small houses, shops, schools, mosques, and other public amenities located along Navab Street were demolished, 50 meters back on either side of the 5.5 kilometer stretch.[198] Half of the

[198] There are different figures for the number of the properties that went through compulsory purchase procedures and demolished in Navab project. Karbaschi mentions the number of the purchased properties in Navab was 6,000 (2009: 293). In a 2005 survey, authorities in the Ward 10 Municipality provided us

demolished area was inside the 'project's freeze site' (PFZ) or *manateq dakhel-e tarh* since 1968, when TCP designated Navab Street, a city street only 15 meters wide to become a highway 45 meters wide. The other half was not inside the PFZ, so owners within the newly designated 45 meter boundary were not ready to engage with the municipality in the 'obligatory purchase of land'. All the neighbourhoods deteriorated over time as none of the property owners in the PFZ were permitted to renovate or reconstruct their sites, and the neighbourhoods were deprived of any public investment. Between 6,000 and 7,000 households were relocated, without any invitation to buy a new unit in the Navab residential complex. Talking with people living in old Navab, I encountered many households who recounted the bitter stories of their neighbors, those who sold their houses to the municipality without being able to buy something new because they received payment for their sales in instalments. Almost all the architects and urban planners involved in the project spoke bitterly about their contributions. "Navab stigma" as one of Karbaschi's opponents put it, was used frequently to condemn Karbaschi's policies and management.

From 2003 to 2005, I was doing a research on the transformation of Baryanak, a neighborhood spreading southwest off Navab Highway. As I moved along the highway and the corridor built by high-rises surrounding it, I thought both about the conditions that forced the residents to move into such an unusual housing complex, and wondered at how Tehran Municipality could build this almost dystopic physical landscape: a residential complex surrounding a large, noisy, polluted tunnel carrying more than 3000 vehicles per hour passing rapidly less than 5 meters from peoples' homes. It did not seem like a 'normal' landscape to me, neither in its design nor in its suitability for living. I started talking with colleagues about the Navab project and looking into Karbaschi's motives behind what was clearly a risky mega project carried out in a period marked by financial crisis and budget cuts—not to mention a challenge that his predecessors avoided to take up. It was, after all, a project planned more than two decades before, only to be sidelined all those years, like many other plans that were designed or started before the Revolution.

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with the figure of 2300 properties demolished at the west side of the street, meaning more or less 4600 properties were bought on both sides. Research from 2013 provides the number of at least 2000 properties. Bahrain and Aminzadeh have not mentioned any figures for the project.

In years after the inception of the project, the main critiques against Navab Highway came from among conservative clergies and politicians. Karbaschi (2009: 282) mentions that the Fourth Parliament opposed the initial proposal of building a 45-meter wide highway. I was not able to find the complete report of the parliament debates on the topic, but it is clear from the annual summary published by parliament that the clergy and conservative members opposed the project because several mosques that fell in the highway's path were to be demolished.[199] In recent years, the critical views on Navab have become more widespread. Some of the planners and professional journals have published their critical views, including the reformist deputy of the MHUP. The media have reflected residents' views several times on different occasions. Stigmatized for its failures, the Navab project would turn into the most heavily criticized and controversial intervention Karbaschi implemented in his grand reform project.

A Highway to the Airport in Tehran Comprehensive Plans

The initial purpose of the Navab project in the TCP of 1968 was to open a highway to provide the city with a major North-South artery. The 1993 TCP confirmed the proposal and saw the Navab Highway as part of Tehran's inner ring, a link to the outer ring of the city and a means for rapid access from the city to its new international airport, as well as the monument grave built for Ayatollah Khomeini, buried in a compound between the airport and Tehran's large cemetery, Behesht-e Zahra. Even some of the critics of the Navab project have argued that Navab Highway was conceived as a cultural object at its time, symbolizing access to the outside world or as a passage for foreigners coming into the country, an important issue regarding the isolation of the country in the post-war era.

Navab Street, built on the back-filled ditch at the western edge of the city alongside the Bagh-e-Shah garrison before 1940, separated the city from the farmlands and linked the old industrial spaces in the west to the new-built Tehran Central Railway Station in the south. The areas around Navab Street soon became a destination for

[199] 10 mosques have been demolished in the Navab project (Etemad 2013:239). According to Islamic codes, you need to build a new mosque before demolishing one. Ayatollah Kani, the conservative leader of the Islamic Cleric Society mentioned in one of his interviews that he cursed the Mayor for the demolition of the mosques.

immigrants coming from Azarbaijan and other Azari speaking provinces in the northwest. Between 1950 and 1960, the undeveloped lands around Bagh-e-Shah garrison came under development, based on the grid network schemes popular since Tehran's Planification of 1936 under Reza shah. Here, land was divided to larger plots and the new buildings that were built in the northern part of the street gradually attracted middle-income residents. Through pre-existing social networks and shared common language (in a city dominated by Farsi speaking locals), immigrants in the area developed local solidarities and sense of belonging. In early 1960s and before the 1968 TCP introduce the idea of replacing it with a north-south highway to ease the commute of the northerners to the airport, Navab Street was an active central street, servicing many neighbourhoods. It was not an entirely new idea; in the late 1950s, a widening scheme was introduced to reduce the congestion of the street, though it was never implemented. The Street Development Law of 1933 provided the legal basis upon which such interventions could effectively be carried out, as it forced landlords to sell their properties to municipalities, if an approved development plan overlapped those properties.[200] I will discuss the outcome of the law as 'compulsory land purchase' in the coming pages.

Figure 12: Navab Highway crossing the center of the city

Source: Tarh va Memari Consulting Firm. Permission granted

[200] Some would say the Street Development Law of 1933 reflects the introduction of the Haussmann's renewal in Paris, as one of its articles sets a fee to be paid by landlords for the 'added value' to their properties, if they benefit from a development project done by municipalities - Tehran Municipality never practiced this law (see Hanachi 2009 and Sadri 2009).

According to the 1968 Renewal Law, complementary to the Municipality Law of 1960, municipalities were tasked with the implementation of the renewal projects proposed by the TCP. The 1968 Renewal Law introduced the term "project freeze zone" (PFZ) or *manateq dakhel-e tarh*, to prevent the increase of the property value in the areas to be purchased by the municipality for developmental projects; in these zones, municipalities were authorized to prevent new construction and renewal projects, which encouraged disinvestment and further deterioration of the neighbourhoods. One decade later, the interest in Tehran's Comprehensive Plan had been largely forgotten in the events of the Revolution. Residents of Navab Street joined the Revolution and old mosques of the neighborhood turned into the political base for radical youth who were unsatisfied with Shah Regime. Existing family ties and friendship networks were reinforced in the neighborhood through collective support practices during the Revolution, and a common suffering through the traumas of the war. A sense of place-based belonging intensified in Navab, like in many other parts of the city, as people named their alleys and streets after their martyr sons, fathers and husbands. Economic stagnation and populist urban politics had marginalized the modernist preoccupation with roads and highways.

A Highway Crossing the "Decrepit" City

While all other highways built under Karbaschi were built in undeveloped lands or areas with small developments, Navab Highway cuts through the heart of the city. Hanachi (2007) mentions that, back then, Navab Highway seemed like an impossible project to everyone, and became possible only through the courage of the Mayor. Such accounts ignore how the confluence of different factors transformed the old neighbourhoods into what Karbaschi (2007: 298) would call "infected tumours" that had no other cure but be removed by surgery. Such intervention was not possible if the discourse of "vulnerable buildings" and "decrepit areas" revived through earthquake hazard assessments did not lead to the devaluation of the old neighbourhoods.

As Kostof (1992) explains, the use of the surgical metaphors in Haussmann's approach to urban (re) development is synonymous with seeing the city as subject to

pathological disorders.[201] The earthquake risk became the stethoscope through which the urban pathologies in Tehran were determined. The concept of "vulnerable buildings" was established as a measurable "objective" feature in the study done by JICA on earthquake hazards in Tehran in 1989. The term "decrepit neighborhood" was later coined for areas where "vulnerable buildings" were the majority. JICA set a typology to classify the building stock in Tehran into representative types and studied the level of the risk for each type. The results were translated into simple measurement criteria applicable to the limited building information accessible through municipality data banks or national statistics. JICA's study confirmed that between 38 to 70 percent of the 1.2 million residential units would be exposed to low to high levels of damage in different earthquake scenarios. A veritable 'ecology of fear', many of Tehran's decision-makers were highly sensitive to these kinds of results, as memories of the Roudbar earthquake (on June 21, 1990) were still fresh in their thinking (1988).[202] After Roudbar, the seismic history of Tehran and cycles of the big quakes in the region turned temporary to one of the priorities of urban policies in Tehran.

The estimated number of "vulnerable buildings" was so huge, and at the same time so vague, that any idea to reinforce the affected buildings' structure quickly became implausible. In planning documents and meetings, the inner city quarters were deemed "decrepit" rather than old; in effect, the politics of renewal emerged at the forefront of urban politics. In Tehran, the politics of renewal relied on encouraging individual landlords and private developers, or a partnership between them, to begin reconstruction projects. The geography of the "vulnerable buildings" was to be explored, and specified zones of intervention mapped out. Maps like 6-3, designated the distribution of the "vulnerable buildings", showing the inner city is the locus of the highest concentration of vulnerability. The red area covers 140 square kilometers or 20 percent of the city area. [203]

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[201] As Kostof (1992) suggests, the massive surgery of Paris between 1850 and 1870, provided a model for cities anxious to meet the needs of modern traffic. These incisions were referred to as cuts, or as disemboweling or eviscerating, suggesting a surgical metaphor in line with seeing the city as subject to pathological disorders

[202] Out of 200 small and large earthquake occurrences each year in Iran, four or five quakes will be larger than 5 on the Richter scale and one around 6. Urbanization has caused more deaths in densely populated areas in the city (Zartab 2008). In 2003, a disastrous earthquake as large as 6.7 on the Richter scale demolished the historical city of Bam in the southeast of Iran, with 40.000 fatalities (Khatam 2003).

[203] Roudbar earthquake sparked the detailed studies of the fault lines and hazard zones, but soon it became clear that many cities in the central part of the country are located on the fault lines as most of the *qanats*

Figure 13: Geographical distribution of Tehran's "vulnerable buildings"



Source: Tarh va Memari Consulting Firm- permission granted

The image of vulnerability was further developed by another factor: the level of neighbourhood permeability. The 'permeability' described to what extent a motor vehicle could penetrate the neighborhood and reach buildings for rescue or relief. This new factor focused on the characteristics of the passages, and became a factor that separated the modern and non-modern spaces in the city for decades, and remained a main focus in urban plans of all kinds, from comprehensive plans to renewal and land preparation projects. The level of permeability changed the solutions proposed, if not the question of vulnerability. Through this lens, the urban renewal should make every part of the inner city accessible to motor vehicles, but was only possible if a mega renewal project restructured the whole spatial landscape. Such projects would guarantee a sustained influx of capital toward the urban core, in search of inexpensive real estate for investment. Aiming to accommodate new real estate projects, the permeability plans eclipsed the objectives of pure earthquake protection in the old neighbourhoods. More than 80 percent of the landowners in the inner city had small properties of less than 100 square meters. Given the unique conditions of urban Tehran, the private sector had neither the means nor the power to shape such a mega renewal project. That is how Navab project came to

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have been built close to the fault lines to canal the underground water which comes from deeper layers to layers on top, where the fault lines appear: " In Tehran, where ever you are, you are standing on one or other fault lines" (Bahrami quoted in Khatam 2008: 80). New knowledge of geology and earthquake reinforced the negative approaches toward the old buildings and neighbourhoods.

be: a highway project that served to reconstruct and renew of the inner city.[204] Karbaschi was fascinated by mega projects around the world: the iconic buildings, the eye-catching architecture, and the large-scale construction that could provide the chance for technological innovation. Old neighbourhoods had the potential to become the setting for such transformations, and Navab followed suit.

'Verticalization' Moves to the Inner City

With Karbaschi at the helm, the "Verticalization" policy in Tehran unfolded in two distinct periods. 1989-93 was characterized by building high-rises in the northern part of the city, as well as in newly developed areas in the outskirts at the west and east. At the time, the population inhabiting the inner city was on the decline, as it was during the war. From the mid-90s, the number of empty plots available for development in outskirt wards was significantly reduced. Such was the backdrop for a second phase of development, marked by the influx of renewal into older neighbourhoods. The inner city had become a metonym for the problem of 'overcrowding' in all Tehran's planning documents – this despite the decline in population shortly after the war. As the policy of urban renewal relied more heavily upon the real estate market in the inner city, it ignored the intensifying effect such a renewal would impose on neighbourhoods already described as 'overcrowded', and the original goal of the renewal—reinforcing older structures to prevent earthquake damage—gradually faded. Eventually, the construction of three-storey buildings was permitted in all plots of the inner city– the areas had been limited to two-storey until this time. All plots larger than 100 square meters would receive permissions for 4 stories or higher.

Re-planning the Navab Highway and Neoliberal Governance

In 1992 efforts were revived to adopt the *Navab Regeneration Project* (*tarh-e nosazi navab*). The governance of the project from its inception exemplifies the

[204] These years to come have seen the renewal politics charged with tension as various groups of people, municipalities, urban planners and real estate investors have vied with each other under its banner. In order to entice development, the municipality has removed potential barriers and subsidized the public tax and fees for construction investors. In effect, residential projects are rendered less risky for investors. Yet, as one member of City Council describes it: redeveloping of decrepit fabric is an inefficient business (*Iran-daily* 2/10/2010).

'institutional fix' I discussed in chapter V as a qualitative change in the urban planning process. The institutional fix included the process of removing/dismantling the central urban planning and supervisory practices, procedures and institutions governing municipal and other local actors practices, and replacing them with practices, procedures and institutions fit in the mayor-centred decentralized municipality. An example of such process is the formation of Technical and Engineering Consultancy Organization (TECO) affiliated to Tehran Municipality, as a technical body empowered to make major decisions about urban projects. The TECO consulted with a group of advisors, who were invited to meet every month as Tehran Professional Committee. The Professional Committee, then largely composed of planner-contractors from private architectural and planning firms (nine members out of 21) with technical authority in the council, depicted a clear case of conflict of interests: The private architects membered in the committee were purposing consultancy for public projects like Navab as a committee and were contracted to implement those decisions individually as private sector companies. Navab project was re-planned by the Professional Committee, while some of its members were contracted to design and build different phases of the project (A-Tec 2009: 236).

Compulsory Land Purchase in Navab

The Professional Committee purposed the compulsory purchase of an area two times larger than the 'project freeze zone' (50 meters instead of 15 meters on each side of the street).[205] The members reminded Tehran Municipality of its right to practice the compulsory purchase of land further than the 'project freeze zone.' According to the article 24 of the Urban Renewal Law 1968 (*ghanon-e nosazi-e shahri*) municipalities can obtain the extended value of the lands adjacent to their developmental projects and use those funds as reinvestment in city projects. This includes the compulsory purchase of land when municipalities have a completed development for those properties. The idea of building a residential complex along the highway seemed feasible through the invocation

[205] Compulsory purchase order (CPO), as Barnes (2014) suggests, is legalized in almost all countries around the world to make acquisition of the land for public projects possible. Countries have different types of compulsory purchase procedures and compensation valuation with annotations as to how the valuations are prepared and built up. The use of CPOs has become less prominent over recent decades, yet a number of high-profile redevelopments, like London's Docklands project and Sheffield's Lower Don Valley have been critically dependent upon CPO (Bahraini and Aminzadeh 2007: 116).

of article 24 of URL 1968, so it was added to the project as a financial strategy. Through the re-planning process, the Navab Highway project expanded to include two components: a profitable residential project and an unprofitable highway project. The minimum width required for the construction of the residential complex was an estimated 27 to 30 meters on either side, tripling the original area to be purchased and demolished.

A-Tec, the company that prepared the TCP 1993, repositioned itself as the parent company for the Navab project's restructuring, adopting new 'decentralized' planning procedures to replace those detailed by the TPC. The general design of the new project included five phases contracted to six architecture and urban planning firms, charged with producing detailed designs and supervising construction process (Etemad interviewed May 2011). From these six firms, four were members of the Tehran Professional Council. They played a vital role in facilitating the process, providing legal and technical advice, bringing about the Navab project.

Figure 16: The site of compulsory land purchase in Navab

Source: Tarh va Memari Consulting Firm- permission granted

Planners pursued the decisions of Tehran Municipality on Navab to an extent never before seen, largely because Karbaschi made all major decisions and could easily ignore counsel that went against his interests. There were three options for designing the highway: either underground, on ground-level, or as an open tunnel, each producing

different results and levels of damage to the surrounding neighbourhoods. Karbaschi was convinced that any other option rather than ground-level highway would be too time consuming, given the extra problems caused by going underground (Karbaschi 2009: 287). These problems were mainly technical issues regarding drainage canals, *qanats* and wells: "we proposed the idea of taking the highway underground to let us to link the neighbourhoods and design some spaces for social gathering on the highway, or even build it like an open tunnel and make bridges linking the neighbourhoods but Karbaschi and Ashouri [director of TECO] opposed the idea. They told us 'any change in the design [1993] takes time and run the project late" (Sadri 2009: 227).

Figure 17: Re-planning the highway and residential complex 1993



Source: Tarh va Memari Consulting Firm- permission granted

The re-planned Navab project required to be approved by the Supreme Council of Urban Planning and Architecture, as it proposed major changes to the original plan. Even if the new proposal carried a minor change, it would require checking and approval from the Tehran Article

Five Commission (TAFC).[206] In response to the claim that Tehran Municipality had TAFC's approval of the new proposal, Pirooz Hanachi (2009), the urban planning deputy of the MHUP, confirmed that TAFC meetings were not convened at the time and that there was no document indicating the TEFC members had signed off on the re-planning of the Navab project. Karbaschi was reluctant if not directly opposed to the outside supervision of Municipal activity, and often ignored counsel from authorized bodies in his planning decisions in Tehran.

Figure 18: Neighbourhoods demolished to widen the Navab Street

Source: Tarh va Memari Consulting Firm- permission granted

Scholars who have studied the Navab project (Bahraini and Aminzadeh 2007; Salari 2004; Etemad 2013) have ignored the role of deregulatory procedures in shaping the project and its failures. Two interviewees with a private urban planner and one of the

[206] In 1988 and in the first days Karbaschi at office, the Supervisory Council on the Development of the City of Tehran (SCDCT) was dissolved as a result of the conflict that emerged between the council and the Mayor. Karbaschi mentions the incident in an interview on Navab in 2009 (see 2013: 279). Some of the tasks of the SCDCT were transferred to Tehran's Article Five Commission, including minor changes of the TCP. The secretariat of the commission is based in the municipality and works under the authority of the mayor.

managers of the Tehran Renewal Organization confirmed that even the new proposal dramatically changed in 1993-4 when the purchase of the properties was in process. The 1993 proposal suggested the building of four storey buildings along the highway. To increase the number of residential units, buildings of 7 to 12 storey replaced the mid-rise buildings, and some of the parks, schools and other public amenities of the 1993 proposal were eliminated to expand the residential and commercial land uses.

New Methods to Finance the Highway

The financial resources for the Navab project included investment profits from the residential and commercial units, the municipality of Tehran, bonds, and the central government. As mentioned above, the re-planning of the project was based on the optimistic view that the capitalization of the space would finance not only the costs of the initial investment (collected through bonds) but also would provide the capital needed to build the non-profit sections of the project (including the highway, schools, clinics, mosques and cultural and sports facilities). In sum, the profits from the residential and commercial units were to finance 75 percent of the costs (Bahraini and Aminzadeh 2007). In the initial reports of re-planning the project, the development of the corridor into a new urban complex was justified for both financial reasons and for providing the space for relocated households and activities (Tehran Municipality 1992a). The estimates for investments to purchase the properties in the PFZ and the construction of the highway were around 13.6 and 27 billion toomans, respectively (in total 40.6 billion toomans or 580 million US dollars (USD)).[207] 130 high-rise buildings with a total of 5,900 units were built along the Highway.

In Tehran municipality, discussion on project financing revolved around two options: giving shares to residents and property owners, or, involving them in the project and pre-construction selling. Hossein Adeli, the new head of the Central Bank and project financial advisor, rejected both approaches. Later dismissed from his position for the high rates of inflation of 1994 caused by policies of the Central Bank, Adeli discussed how turning local residents into shareholders or pre-construction buyers could put the project on a unhealthy economic track:

[207] The estimate for investment in dollar is based on the exchange rate of 70 tooman per US dollar in 1989.

> Tehran Municipality had two important projects with huge needs of funds: Tehran subway system and Navab project. We were working to find proper ways to finance them. Some of the advisors of the City proposed pre-construction selling, but we stopped them…. Studying the bonds published to finance US transnational railways, Germany's subway systems and other countries, and consulting with foreign and local financial advisors, we designed the bonds as a financial tool for Navab…. the rate of interest was important to gain popular trust. The first rate we suggested was 25 percent while the annual inflation rate was 20 percent. (2007:271)

Navab was the first experience of selling bonds for development projects, the 'tool' later used in some industrial projects but never used by Tehran Municipality again. The high rate of the proposed interest for the bonds and public banks' guarantee for the original investment and return on the interest, made the sale of the bonds successful. In an interview about Navab, Karbaschi (2010) was proud to mention that Tehran Municipality could sell bonds with a value of 25 billion toomans (385 million dollars) in only two weeks. Adeli suggested that properties be bought from the owners through purchase instalments and that the required money for the investment be financed through selling bonds for the project.

Interviewing with people who had sold their properties in Navab to Tehran Municipality, I was surprised to learn that owners were anxious and dissatisfied with the purchase instalments rather than the sale price. It was unusual as compensation for properties in Project Freeze Zones (PFZ) is usually below market price. I later understood that, in 1991, the Fourth Parliament somehow changed the land pricing mechanisms which allowed for land owners to put pressure on the municipality for higher prices. Before 1991, a real estate expert representing the municipality would determine the value of the lands under compulsory purchase. The estimate was based on the 'Regional Land Value' published annually by the Ministry of Finance and the baseline of the estimate would be one year before the start of the project. As a result, compensations were always below real prices.[208] In 1991, while Tehran Municipality

[208] Usually the land price evaluations in the Regional Land Values are between 50 to 70 percent of the market price of the lands in different years.

launched different renewal projects around the city, parliament faced hundreds of complaints by landlords forced to sell their lands to the municipality. As a result, the Fourth Parliament passed a law specifying that three experts should work together to determine the price of the lands in the PFZs, one representing municipalities, another the landlords and another the local courts. The residents of Navab had benefitted from the law because Tehran Municipality had to pay more than its anticipated price for the land purchase. Karbaschi (2009) mentions the law as a burden imposed on municipalities as a result of factional conflicts and conservatives' opposition toward Tehran Municipality's renewal and reform agenda. According to Karbaschi (ibid: 291), the compensations increased from 30,000 toomans (430 USD) per square meter of land in 1990 to 1500,000 toomans (5600 USD in 1994).

Figure 19: Navab construction site 1994

Source: Tarh va Memari Consulting Firm-permission granted

Salari (2004) has critically examined the way that the project imposed the costs of the highway construction intended for general use onto the neighbourhoods around it. Iraj Kalantari (2011 interview), supporting a strong municipality capable of further responsibility transferred from central government, would argue that Tehran Municipality never learned to use article 24 of the URL 1968 to promote its projects. He argued that the central government offices made the best use of the law to purchase lands wherever urban plans designated a site to specific public uses connected to their tasks. Iraj Kalantari was a member of the Professional Committee and responsible for phase 3

in the Navab project. He recalls Navab as a bitter experience in his professional career as a planner and blames Tehran Municipality for its failure: “in the history of Tehran Municipality, article 24 was used once in Navab and it failed and lost, while the banking system was supporting them. Our urban management does not follow a long-term policy and method”. Hanachi (2009) suggested that if Karbaschi was able to finish the project without the two-year halt and the over payments on bonds, the project had a better chance at achieving its goals. According to Sadri (2009: 225) Tehran’s Renewal Organization invited Chinese investors to invest in Navab, but the effort failed.

As table 25 shows, the bonds provided only one third of the estimated costs of the project; the source of finance for the other two thirds was to come from selling the units. The circulation of this amount of capital, from production to exchange in the market and then back to reinvestment in the production of the new units was simply not going to happen; meanwhile, the city was paying the high interest on the bonds. The estimated repayment of the principal and the interest of the bonds—valued at 25 billion tooman (385 million USD)—was around 54 billion tooman (540 million USD), on the condition that the project finished on time. The project’s time schedule, the high interest on the bonds, and the financing of two thirds of the investment through sales throughout production—especially for commercial units—were all a fantasy, with no chance of being realized.

Table 25: The finance of the Navab Project

Investment items	Estimated costs		Bonds	
	Million T	US$ 1000	Million T	US$ 1000
Purchase of properties in initial PFZ	13,600	194,000	25,000	385,000
Construction of the highway	27,000	385,700		
Residential complex construction costs	20,700	295,700		
Other	4,700	67,000		
Total in fixed price of 1990	66,000	942,860		
Total including inflation or interests	79,000	1,128,600	54,000	540,000

As Alviri mentioned in his report to City Council in 1998, Tehran Municipality paid 85 billion toomans (850 million USD)[209] as the principal and interest on the bonds, 60 percent more than the estimate.[210]

Rapid Mobility

Navab Highway soon turned into a major highway in Tehran, accelerating the north- south mobility in the city. A surgical cut to the sick body of Tehran, the development of Navab Highway improved the mobility in the city while removed the intersections, squares and pedestrian routes which linked the local neighbourhoods. In 1990 the average number of vehicles passing per hour on the Navab Street was 460 vehicles/per hour (averaged from four intersections). In 2003, the Navab Highway had averaged 2700 vehicles/per hour (6 times more).[211] Table 26 shows the traffic volume per hour on the old street and the new highway.

Table 26: Traffic volume per hour in the old Navab street and the new highway

Locations\ Vehicles per hour	Navab Street 1990 (1)	Navab Highway 2003 (2)
Azadi Street to Dampezeshki Street	830	2350
Dampezeshki Street to Imam Khomeini Street	140	2580
Imam Khomeini Street to Ghazvin Street	330	2870
Ghazvin Street to Helale Ahmar Street	545	3020

Source: Bahraini and Aminzadeh 2007: 120

[209] The exchange rate for per US dollar changed drastically in the period of Navab project. In 1989 one US dollar was exchanged for 70 tooman. It increased to 130 tooman in 1991 and 860 tooman in 1998, or more than 12 times in 1989-1998.

[210] I tried to interview Morteza Alviri in Tehran. He didn't accept, but sent me a report on his talk in Tehran City Council in 1998. In the report explaining his diagnose on Tehran Municipality situation and his priorities to deal with them. The figure on repayment for bonds has taken from this report.

[211] Bahrain and Aminzadeh (2007: 120) mention that many factors decrease the efficiency of the highway, including the number of accidents due to a high number of nodes, the absence of taxi stations in local lanes which forces people to use fast lanes to get on and off, and insufficient pedestrian passes, which causes the passersby to cut through the highway to get to the other side.

While the highway has facilitated north-south access in the city, local trips have become longer as many local streets turned into cul de sacs and the majority of the streets cutting through Navab Highway have become one way. Some of them are not accessible, due to their uneven height in relation to the highway; according to Bahraini and Aminzadeh (2007) a special bus route was proposed in Navab's initial plan, but when the municipality decided to widen the narrow strips of the open space in front of the blocks, the route was eliminated.

Navab Complex: A Residential Corridor

Despite being little more than a failure, Navab Complex is still discussed as a model of urban renewal in the surrounding neighborhood. Karbaschi (2009) suggests that Navab represents the mega model, one of two existing models of residential renewal in the city. He further suggests that anytime the municipality has the budget and the power to implement mega residential renewals, it should take this option. The Navab Complex can be thought of as a modular renewal plan rooted in two myths and one reality: a fast renewal, an independent financial strategy, and potential to restructure the urban. Karbaschi, Adeli (2009) and some of the architects involved in the project (Genoo 2009; Kalantari 2011) continue to defend the Navab's simple financial strategy as a modular renewal plan replicable in all old neighbourhoods in Tehran and justify its failure by the political intergovernmental tensions. For these reasons, it is important to examine what kind of urban redevelopment Navab has produced.

Tehran has large residential complexes, like Ekbatan, called *shahrak* (small town), with more than 5000 units, most often built by foreign technology and capital before the Revolution. All of them were built in undeveloped lands in the west or the east of the city, far from the poor south or inner city. Only during Mosaddeq's reign were some residential complexes designed, built and sold to workers and the lower ranks of government employees in the southern neighbourhoods; Chahar-sad Dastgah ('Four-hundred Units') was one, and is still in good shape. Navab residential complex was to compete with Ekbatan, and not Chahar-sad Dastgah.

Figure 20-: Residential corridor along the highway

Source: Tarh va Memari Consulting Firm-permission granted

The first proposal for the residential complex introduced to the banks in 1992 to gain their support was designed to have 5900 residential units and 4041 commercial and office units (30% commercial and 70% office). These figures suggest that planners had wanted to build a commercial-office center in these narrow strips along the highway. The commercial units were an unequivocal failure, as most of the units remained vacant until 2011. In March 2012, when I was in Tehran for my fieldwork, I was invited to a large meeting in Tehran Renewal Organization to discuss the options for attracting investors and for branding for Navab commercial units. A private planning firm was presenting examples of *bazaar* or lined-commercial projects from around the world to make a proposal to redevelop the Navab's commercial units. Most of the participants, both the private architects and the municipal managers, were listening impatiently. They took the meeting to be another useless effort or just a gesture on the part of the Renewal Organization to show its interest in doing something about Navab. The construction of phase 4 had been stopped years ago and efforts aimed at attracting investors to complete the project in 2001-2 had met with little success (Khorooshi 2009).

Table 27 shows the magnitude of the constructions, comparing the buildings floor area before and after the construction of the highway and complex. The floor area ratio

(the total square meters of a building divided by the total square meters of the lot the building is located on) in the residential area was increased from 130 percent to 774 percent. Calculating the construction density in residential areas usually excludes streets like Navab Street and Navab Highway, as they are considered spaces servicing beyond the neighborhood. Even if our calculation includes the highway, the density increase—from 111 to 431 percent—remains huge.

Table 27: Construction density in Navab before and after the project

	Area under street/highway (sq. meters)	Residential area (sq. meters)	Total floor area (sq. meters)	Density of residential area %
Old Navab	82,500	500,000	650,000	130
New Navab	247,500	335,000	2,591,331	774

Table 28 shows that the number of the units and the magnitude of the construction increases in phase 2 and phase 3, while the sites are smaller. The building range in phase 1 changes from 3 to 8 stories, while in phase 2 and 3 it changes from 6 to 12 storey. As planners involved in the project have mentioned on different occasions, the number of the buildings, stories and units was increased by moving from one phase to the other, replacing the proposed low-rise buildings with high-rises and changing the designations for land use. Navab units are small and medium sized, the average built area is 75 square meters, and ranged from 65 to 95 square meters (Bahreiny and Aminzadeh 2007). In total, 74 percent of the designed plan has been built, totalling around 1.8 million square meters covering 33 hectares, one of the densest areas of the city with the capacity of settling 600 persons per hectare.

Phase 5 of the project was completed in recent years, because it constitutes the highway's northern section, connecting to the Chamran highway and with no residential section. This section of the highway passes through better and more expensive neighbourhoods and major intersections in the city. The highway was designed and constructed by the current Mayor of Tehran, Ghalibaf, as a 2.1 kilometers long tunnel, named Tohid tunnel. The Tohid tunnel, passing under two major intersections in the city,

contrasts the design of the Navab as a ground-level highway. Phase 4 was never built.

Table 28: Residential and non-residential units in Navab Complex (designed and built)

Phases of project	Building	Number of units		Built area (square meters)					
		Residential	Non-residential	Residential	Office	Commercial	Parking and other	Storage	Total
Phase 1	52	1033	676	87385	57838	156641	32444	211714	458837
Phase 2	54	1784	1133	117644	46254	208151	68700	271592	594697
Phase 3	36	1588	452	114122	105165	239222	75447	332032	751866
Total built	146	4405	2261	319151	-----	------	------	-------	1805400
Phase 4	---	1580	1780	103263	77545	235386	123993	349207	786131
Total	---	5985	4041	422414	286802	839400	300584	1164545	2591331

I interviewed some of the households living in different buildings in Navab, and asked them about their daily life in the complex, the history of buying the unit, their relationship with people outside the complex and the problems they faced living close to the highway. Almost all of them told me they were happy to buy their unit, because it was offered below the market price but that they would leave the complex the moment they had enough money to buy a better unit. They felt living in a noisy, polluted corridor had made them nervous and sick, and they suffered from the lack of urban facilities and social services. Many of them bought the units during the final stages of completion, the details and finishing of which were never carried out. The units were sold several times over short period. The survey of 2005 shows that more than half of the units were being rented, while the average number of rental units for the rest of the city was less than 30 percent. Less than half of the owners who were interviewed in 2005 bought their units directly from the producer, and 58 percent bought second hand. These two ratios indicate two processes: one of speculative investment by those who didn't need the unit for personal use and who simply bought to sell, and the other as one of degradation within the complex, as lower income households remained and middle income households left.

Some of the investors have kept their units as rental units to sell them later in better conditions. The rate of the units under rent reached 60 percent in phase 2 and 3, as those units are smaller and there is less distance between the buildings and the highway.

To check the speculative buying in Navab, I examined the ratio of first hand ownership in two major periods of sale in Navab and found out two different processes going on in different phases As table 27 indicates, households who bought the units during the first phase would stay in Navab longer than the buyers of the second and third phases. This means that speculative activities were not at all a significant factor here, as the buildings of the first phase present a better quality and more people chose to stay rather than selling their units.

Table 29: Share of second hand ownership in different phases 2005

Purchase Period	Total	First owners	Second-hand owners
1996-2000	100	83	17
2001-2005	100	29	71
Total	100	67	33

Source: Khatam 2005 Survey on Navab Residents

When I examined the combination of the jobs held by the heads of the household buying the units in different periods, I found out the social fabric also is different. Table 28 shows the results of the survey for 117 owners out of 180 households interviewed in 2005. Government employees constituted 68 percent of the owners in the first period (1996-2000) and their numbers reduced to 34 percent in the second period (2001-2005). These observations suggest that when cooperatives buy residences it actually supports longer stays in the complex.

Table 30: Social groups who purchased Navab units 1996-2005

Purchase Period	Owners Interviewed	Total %	Government employees %	Other jobs %	Not clear %
1996-2000	70	100	68	20	12
2001-2005	41	100	34	39	27
Total	117	100	56	26	18

Source: Khatam 2005 Survey sample

The average rent in Navab is 70 percent of the average rent in the surrounding neighbourhoods. One of the households interviewed in 2011 mentioned that they bought their units for 50 percent more than the initial price paid by the landlord two to three years before the sale. One of the managers interviewed mentioned that they sold 1000 units to the Teacher's Housing Cooperative to attract cultural groups to reside in the project and decrease the tensions between residents of the complex and the surrounding neighbourhoods around, but it didn't work (Khoroosi 2011). However, I heard from planners that I interviewed that sales to cooperatives had only one motive: Tehran Municipality needed money and only the housing cooperatives had a money-in-bulk to offer Navab.

Figure 21: Megaproject of Navab

Source: Tarh-va Memari Consulting Firm. Permission granted.

Relocation without Gentrification

The Navab project has been criticized for dividing more than 20 neighbourhoods along its 5500 meter highway. Bahrain and Aminzadeh (2011) suggest that 350,000 were living in those neighbourhoods. There is no study on the households who were relocated as a result of the project. The financing for the Navab project clearly conflicted with its modernizing goals: relying on extreme intensification of the land use created an inhuman urban landscape. Through re-planning, Navab turned from a modernizing project to an unrealistic profit-making and gentrifying project doomed to failure, as many other disadvantaged neighbourhoods where the lack of necessary rent-gaps in urban lands hinders the gentrification. None of the developmental interventions in the "deteriorated neighbourhoods" could rely on self-ruled project financing, let alone profit-making, except those located in the areas with exceptional rent-gaps guaranteeing gentrification would take hold.

Figure 22: Contrast between old neighbourhoods and new buildings 2009

Source: Khatam

Navab project aimed to be a gentrification project, beyond building an urban highway. It is difficult to assess the achievement of such goal, as the residential complex built by the project turned to a lower class residential, comparing with areas surrounding it. At the same time the project encouraged the speed of the reconstruction of the old buildings

around it. As figure 18 shows, the price of one square meter of a new apartment building in most parts of Navab Complex was lower than the neighbourhoods around the complex in 2009; it confirms Navab Complex was a failed gentrifying project, if we can call it gentrifying at all. Except for phase 1, prices in other parts of the complex were cheaper than in the surrounding neighbourhoods, ranging from 750,000 tooman (500 UD$) to 1,500,000 tooman (1000 US$) per square meter. In this year the minimum price (yellow) was almost half of the maximum price (dark brown). Phase 1 and neighborhood surrounding it were more expensive than other parts, due to the characteristics of the area and better quality of the buildings in the phase 1 of the project.

Figure 23: The price of residential units in Navab Complex and surrounding area 2009

Source: Tarh va Memari consulting firm- Permission granted.

However, no collective resistance emerged against the project, despite the site being held in PFZ for 20-years. It is possible that such a long wait time was influential in the rapid relocation of the residents. Some of them left the area but many bought a smaller unit or rented a house in the same neighborhood. The 2005 survey indicates that none of the owners within PFZ were encouraged, empowered or willing to buy one of the units built in the place of their property. The fragmentation of the neighbourhoods is clear when you see many cut-off structures amidst the sidewalks and streets. Karbaschi (2009) suggests strongly that people benefited from the project as many of them reconstructed their old buildings after Navab Highway was constructed, due to increased value of the land, which encouraged developers to propose partnership shares to them. The reconstruction process could be seen in the neighborhood but it is a common process in all inner city areas. The mega structure that replaced the small single family houses have created overwhelming inhuman walls: "no congruence can be detected between the architectural meanings, the pattern of building composition, size, proportions, colors, shapes, activities, and landmarks, and local cultural context. Although Navab lacks distinct buildings, landscape features and elements that can, as landmarks, create identity and make its modular, standard, and uniform structure legible, the whole project provides a landmark in urban scale, which is mostly due to its sharp contrast with the surrounding area" (Bahraini and Aminzadeh 2007: 121).

Figure 24: Renewal and decline around the project 2009

Source: Khatam

Conclusion

In March 1998, Karbaschi was charged with embezzlement of public funds and was arrested. The Navab construction activities were disrupted for almost two years. In the same year, the Tehran Renewal Organization was assigned the management of the project. Faced with a huge debt on Navab bonds and debt to the banking system that had guaranteed the payment of high interest and principal money, Tehran Municipality was forced to sell the units below the market price to repay stakeholder capital. Housing units were sold unfinished to speed up the return of investment and the repayment of bank debts. To avoid bankruptcy, Tehran Municipality restructured its finances and a phase of austerity started in 1999. Alviri (1998: 8), the successor of Karbaschi, announced that Tehran Municipality was indebted 430 billion tooman (665 million USD).[212] The austerity policy increased the tension between the center and municipal wards, some of them declining to transfer their revenue to the center.

The Navab project exemplifies the inherent conflicts of the neoliberal modernization of the city under Karbaschi. As a public project run by extreme capitalization of the space, and fanciful financial initiatives, Navab shows how modernizing plans, like better highways for cars or reconstruction of "vulnerable buildings" and "decrepit areas," would lead to more catastrophic results when merged with neoliberal governance. Such a mixture creates conflicting conditions, combining the negatives of both systems: the aggressiveness of modernization in designing megaprojects and the disasters of neoliberalism in intensifying the market rule on urban projects. The re-planning of the highway to add a residential complex is an example of such a combination. As a modernizing project, Navab did not follow the line of the gentrification projects of the European and North American cities with careful calculations of the rent-gaps in inner cities. If Karbaschi was to follow the gentrification logic, then Enqelab Street (discussed in the following chapter) was the best area in the

[212] In 1998, when Alviri was appointed as the Mayor of Tehran, the exchange rate was around 650 tooman per US dollar.

city to develop. His focus on Navab recalls the messianic aspects of other modernist interventions in the 20th century and before. However, such messianic intentions turn to farce as he disempowered himself by arbitrary decentralization that would eventually deprive him of governmental support through redistributive policies vital for any improvement in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods of the city.

Chapter VII: Modernization and Resistance in Enqelab Street

> The street is the chief locus of politics for ordinary people, those who are structurally absent from the centers of institutional power. Simultaneously social and spatial, constant and current, a place of both the familiar and the stranger, and the visible and the vocal, streets represent a complex entity wherein sentiments and outlooks are formed, spread, and expressed in a remarkably unique fashion. The street is the physical place where collective dissent may be both ex- pressed and produced. The spatial element in street politics distinguishes it from strikes or sit-ins, because streets are not only where people protest, but also where they *extend* their protest beyond their immediate circle. For this reason, in the street one finds not only marginalized elements—the poor and the unemployed—but also actors with some institutional power, such as students, workers, women, state employees, and shopkeepers, whose march in streets is intended to extend their contention. For a street march brings together the "invitees" and also the "strangers" who might espouse similar, real or imagined, grievances. It is this epidemic potential, and not simply the disruption or uncertainty caused by riots, that threatens the authorities who exert a pervasive power over public spaces—with police patrols, traffic regulation, and spatial division—as a result….Beyond this generality, however, "streets of discontent" possess their distinct sociology, a blend of several socio-spatial features…."Revolution Street" in Tehran possessed many of these distinct socio- spatial qualities [of spatiality of discontents]….The street represented a unique juncture of the rich and the poor, the elite and the ordinary, the intellectual and the lay-person, the urban and the rural. It was a remarkable political grid, intersecting the social, the spatial, and the intellectual, bringing together not only diverse social groups, but also institutions of mobilization (the university) and the dissemination of knowledge and news (the chain of bookstores). (Asef Bayat 2010b: 167-170)

Introduction

In the early 1990s both reformist and center right figures were contributing to the creation of a discourse of 'cultural tolerance.' Their efforts came in reaction to internal and external political conflicts and challenges created in the 1980s by the IRI's cultural policy: suppression of the "non-Islamic lifestyles" inside the country, excluding 'anti-revolutionary' culture and the exportation of the Islamic Revolution around the world, through cultural and political mobilization outside the borders. In this context, worlding

urbanism was perceived as urbanity enriched by cultural diversity and openness to other religions and different interpretations within Islam. As discussed in chapter four and five, urban reform in Tehran targeted spatial redevelopments to create new cultural and educational spaces, part of which included inviting secular scholars to teach at universities and non-Islamic artists to develop art projects in those public spaces. In 1992, the municipality fought back against the conservatives' push in parliament to ban the municipality's involvement in public cultural activities and established Tehran's Culture and Art Organization to support rapidly growing cultural centers in the city. Cultural and scientific interactions with western world were encouraged through the support of Iranian artists' and academics' participation in global movie festivals, book fairs, art leagues, exhibitions and international conferences. Such interactions contributed to the expansion of the art, culture and knowledge industries in Tehran.

This chapter will examine the socio-spatial transformation of Enqelab Street, during its cultural shift from 'spot-less city' of the provincial urbanism toward 'cultural diversity' of the worlding urbanism in Tehran. Host to some of Iran's leading institutions of higher education, cultural centers, bookstores, and publishers, Enqelab Street was (and is) one of the capital's most socially and culturally significant spaces. It played an important role in the revolutionary movement against the Pahlavi regime and the establishment of the IRI in 1979. The street's political importance was revived through the student movement of 1999 and the post-electoral movement of 2009, when Enqelab Street became one of two main platforms for the presidential election results protests, known as Green Movement in Iran (figure 32 Enqelab and Valiasr streets).

In the 1990s, Enqelab Street changed through different mechanisms: the expansion of higher education, the revival of the social science book industry (located along the street since 1930), and the expansion of a new art industry. Such transformations exemplify the cultural importance of the Rafsanjani's reconstruction project, while revealing its contradiction; Rafsanjani relied on universities rather than the mosques to build the desired educated modern Muslimhood, but ignored the democratic potential of the university as an institution and space to challenge the development

agenda. Enqelab Street was remarked as a spatiality of discontents in Tehran through the student riot of 1999—the prominent incident of the student movement in the IRI.

I examine the contested functions of the street in the 1990s by looking at its formation as a symbolic space of modernization under Pahlavi in the years between 1930-50, its transformation to the scene of 1979 Revolution and Friday prayer in 1980, where mobilization for the war front as well as the cultural revolution against secular, leftist and moderate Islamists were broadcast in mid-1980s. The reoccupation of the street by the 'higher education industry' in the 1990s was accompanied by the emergence of a new generation of university students using Islamic student associations to seek democratic change. They challenged both political repression and moral policing and disciplining of the university, which was based on the "commanding of right and forbidding of wrong" (CRFW), the Qoranic verse of *amr-e be ma'rouf va nahy-e az monkar*.[213]

Figure 25: Enqelab Street as a contested public space 1990s



Source: Khatam. Moral police checkpoints (black dots) were set up in the street to control the dress codes and social conducts of the passengers during daytime

While many scholars have described the cultural reform manufactured by Karbaschi as a successful reaction to the extreme Islamization of the 1980s and an inevitable shift to reformist movement shaped by the election of Khatami as president in

[213] This is a Persian expression of the Quranic phrase "*al-amr bi 'l-ma'rouf wa 'n-nahy an al-munkar."* The verse is one of the basic tenets of Islamic jurisprudence and the moral obligation of any Muslim.

1997 (Bayat 2010b; Muslim 2002; Adelkhah 2010), my research on the Enqelab Street transformation in the 1990s suggests that the political activism that emerged in the street was an unintended consequence of the reconstruction project targeting the production of a new class of Islamic experts. The radical potential of the universities both as an institution and as an urban space, was beyond the intended consequences of boosting the higher education industry.

Enqelab Street: A Symbol of Urban Modernism

Enqelab Street dates back to the rule of Reza Shah and his far-reaching efforts to create a modern secular nation-state after World War I. In Chapter three I discussed how the project was an attempt at a clean break with the country's past—both physically and ideologically. As Talinn Grigor writes, it was "underpinned by a modernist impulse to erase the past—a deep desire to change and start over again…The realization of a tabula rasa, a utopian blank slate upon which a new Iran could be conceived 'over again,' was endemic" (2013: 97). Tehran figured centrally in this project, and Reza Shah launched a variety of architectural and urban-development projects across the capital.[214] These projects included the construction of wide, straight boulevards and open squares, the introduction and proliferation of apartment buildings and the widespread demolition of old, residential housing. Collectively, these interventions created a clear spatial division in the urban landscape: while the southern half of the city endured as the "traditional" neighborhood housing clerics, merchants, and older Tehrani families, the northern (previously undeveloped) half emerged as a new, elite area catering to the affluent (ibid: 99-100).

Enqelab Street was born as one of the aforementioned boulevards. Khiaban Shahreza (renamed Enqelab Street after the 1979 Revolution) was one of the four streets built where the walls and gates surrounding Tehran had been.[215] Khiaban Shahreza, which ran from east to west along the city's northern edge, was long and broad. The

[214] Among other reforms, Reza Shah banned women from wearing the veil (*hejab*) in public and forced men to wear western suits and "Pahlavi hats" (which were modeled on the French gendarmes' *kepis*) instead of traditional turbans (Chehabi 1993).
[215] The 1937 "Planification Map of Tehran" was the primary guide to Reza Shah's street scheme for Tehran (Marefat 1988: 19).

surrounding neighborhood was originally poor; however, the area's demographics quickly began to change after the street's construction. Upper class Tehranis flocked there as villas, gardens, and multistory, mixed-use buildings appeared along the street and in its immediate vicinity. Many of these buildings were three to four stories tall and attracted young, upper-class couples who could not afford the new villas but nonetheless wanted to leave the older neighbourhoods in the south (Marefat 1988: 82-83).

In 1934, Tehran University was built on the grounds of Jalaliyeh Garden, a sprawling expanse of orchards located at the western end of the Enqelab Street. The university was modernist in design and extended along several blocks, eventually housing thousands of students, making it the largest university in Tehran. The following decades saw the construction of several other important cultural and educational institutions along the street: in addition to a number of secondary schools, the Roudaki Hall Opera House was built in 1957, followed by the City Theatre in 1967. Collectively, these institutions had a profound impact on Enqelab Street, facilitating its transformation into a cultural and commercial hub replete with printing houses, movie theaters, cafes, and a book bazaar, which ran eastward from Enqelab Square to the intersection of Hafez and Enqelab Street, where Amir Kabir University, Iran's second largest polytechnic is located (ibid: 86). The book bazaar—like the university—played a vital role in developing the street's reputation as the intellectual epicenter of the nation and a haven of political activism.

Publics and Politics in Enqelab Street

Asef Bayat argues that much of the foundational scholarship on the relationship between space and politics focuses on how power (i.e., politics) configures space—that is to say, how spaces and institutions such as the modern prison, the street, and/or the home have been constructed and deployed to discipline the bodies of modern subjects and regulate their morals and behavior (2010b: 162). The "spatiality of discontents" looks at the other side—i.e., at how certain physical and symbolic spatial features allow for and inform particular kinds of activities. He is concerned with how "particular spatial forms shape, galvanize and accommodate insurgent sentiments and solidarities" (ibid). Looking at Enqelab Street in Tehran, Bayat suggests that certain spaces—and in particular,

streets—possess characteristics that make them especially well-suited for political activities. These characteristics include physical features such as centrality, accessibility, and maneuverability, and are thus often transport hubs and home to diverse sociocultural institutions. Yet they also include non-physical features related to their symbolic or historical roles in the collective imaginary (ibid: 168). Enqelab Street is a paradigmatic example of such a space.

The politicized character of Enqelab Street began to develop during the student movements of the 1950s–70s, but it would be the 1979 Revolution's eighteen months of ongoing demonstrations that would solidify its symbolic and practical significance. Prior to 1953, Baharestan Square was the focal point of street and parliamentary politics in the Iranian capital. Located in southern Tehran and home to Iran's first parliament after the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, the square was the site of various political activities throughout the 1940s. It was also the seat of Mohammad Mosaddeq's democratic government (1951–1953) (Bayat 2010b: 169).[216] However, the military coup d'état that ended the Mosaddeq government's rule in 1953 led to a shift in the geography of protest in Tehran. Most relevantly, the post-coup declaration of martial law eliminated civil and political flows around the square. The imprisonment of a number of prominent MPs furthermore made appeals to parliament pointless.[217] This period also marked the first sparks of political and civic activism at Tehran University: in December 1953, students went on strike to protest Vice President Nixon's visit to Iran and the restoration of political relations with Great Britain. The army descended on the university to crush the strike, and in the ensuing confrontation, three students were shot and killed. The event came to represent student resistance to the 1953 coup, and December 7 was named Student Day by the opposition before the Revolution, and commemorated officially as the national Student Day in the years following the Revolution. These observances were tense during the reign of the monarchy, marked by strong police presences along the streets leading to the university, including Enqelab Street. In this way, the events of

[216] Baharestan Square remained the site of Iran's parliament until it was moved from the old parliamentary building to the Senate building after the Revolution of 1979. In 2004, a new parliamentary building was opened in the square and the body returned, reconvening in November of that year.

[217] With Mohammad Khatami's election to the presidency in 1997, the reformist faction of the Fifth Parliament became more active in addressing issues of popular concern. As a consequence, Baharestan Square was revived as a political space, particularly when workers and teachers began using the square to stage demands for wage increases and better work conditions.

December 7, 1953 heralded a shift in the landscape of protest and resistance in Tehran. Tehran University emerged as a critical node of political activity, a source of student activism, and a point of orientation for intellectuals in the opposition. The anniversary of Student Day has brought a heterogeneous public to Enqelab Street, before and after the Revolution, as both religious and secular student activists commemorate the memory of the students killed at the university in 1953. In the wake of the coup, the government worked hard to eliminate all forms of political opposition, cracking down on trade unions, NGOs, and political parties (Bayat 2010b: 163-164).

In the 1960s student activism was limited to "campus politics" or political activities carried out abroad, except for a short period from 1959-63. However, the political situation began to change in the late 1970s as the Shah, responding to American pressure for political reform in Iran, agreed to free political prisoners and allow dissident writers and intellectuals to gather in public spaces. Some of the earliest protests that ultimately led to the 1979 Revolution began with students at Tehran University demanding freedom of speech.

Street of the Revolution

Given this history—and particularly the roles of the university and book bazaar in creating a space for intellectual exchange and political activism—Enqelab Street was well positioned to play a central role in the events of 1978 and 1979. And indeed, the 18 months of massive demonstrations that culminated in the Shah's overthrow saw protestors repeatedly descend on the street to march toward Tehran University. During the days of the 1979 Revolution, Enqelab Street and Grand Bazaar were two centers of inflamed political life in Tehran, where mass demonstrations and strikes were shaping the imagination and administration of the Revolution. The protestors laid claim to Enqelab Street, turning it into a weapon under their feet. Its unique spatiality facilitated this: with numerous junctions and squares, the street was flexible, allowing for easy maneuvers and the rapid assembly of crowds. Moreover, as a mass transit route it drew together large numbers of Iranians from different socioeconomic backgrounds: affluent Tehranis descended from the north while their poor counterparts came up from the south. This convergence of a diverse cross-section of Iranian society proved a critical feature of the

events playing out. As Bayat explains, "in the street one finds not only marginalized elements—the poor and the unemployed—but also actors with some institutional power, such as students, workers, women, state employees, and shopkeepers" (Bayat 2010b: 167). Further, he contends, the street setting allowed protestors to incorporate individuals who had not originally been involved. As he writes, a street protest "brings together the 'invitees' and also the 'strangers' who might espouse similar, real or imagined, grievances" (ibid). Enqelab Street, with its various sociocultural institutions, allowed for just such gatherings to develop.

The street thus emerged as one of the physical and symbolic epicenters of the 1979 Revolution. Unsurprisingly, journalists covering the events often broadcast their news from there (ibid: 164). Likewise, several days after the Shah fled the country in January 1979, the country's high-ranking clerics chose Tehran University's small mosque to host their sit-in demanding Ayatollah Khomeini's safe return. They recognized the symbolic value of the venue: one month before the Revolution, the same place was chosen to host the momentous sit-in of the high-ranking clergies spreading the word of the revolution to the outside world. Tehran University hosted Friday prayers in post-revolution era, even after the huge compound for Friday prayers (*Mosalla)* was erected in Tehran. The changes in symbolic values and practical functions of the street have created multiple geographies and temporalities for communications of active conservative Islamism and marginalized movements of university students and intelligentsia.

The Islamic Piety: Building a Spotless City

The 1979 Revolution was followed by multiple efforts to indoctrinate Iranian society with a state-sponsored ethical Islamic vision, including the Islamization of the education system, the ban of private radio stations and TV channels, and war-related movies produced by government funds (known as Holy Defense Cinema). But two distinct and parallel cultural projects played a specific role in appropriating the social codes of conduct: the *amr-e be ma'ruf*—the shorthand term for public morality—was concerned with the life of the general public; the second project, institutionalized as the IRI's Cultural Revolution, focused on shaping the intellectual, educational, and cultural elite of the country.

Arguments on the legal interpretation of 'sin' have been one of the most controversial debates among different Islamic trends since the Revolution, just as different interpretations of Islam's social codes have been a major debate among religious experts. The debate has intersected with different views on the private-public boundary and Islamic principles/limits in overseeing 'public ethics.' Most of the subjects of moral policing, including women's dress, satellite TVs and youth weekend parties was assumed as 'ordinary' aspects of life in urban areas, especially in Tehran. However, the resilience of this 'ordinariness' has frustrated repeated attempts by conservatives to influence social behaviors through the exhortations of Islamist discourse. Feminist studies on post-Revolution Iran have documented the undermining impacts of the 'ordinary' behaviors and actions of women, including working outside the home, engaging in sports and running for public office, on the power base of the patriarchal structure in Iran (Hoodfar and Sadr 2010; Bayat 2010; Hoodfar 1999). The traditions of *amr-e be ma'ruf and Hesbat* (the medieval practice of evaluating Islamic social codes through the authority of religious institutions in Muslim cities) have been historically maintained on the basis of the rejection of the legitimating authority of *Urf* or what has become *'ordinary'* through time.[218]

It is characteristic of modern social revolutions to seek moral improvement of the population, as well as redress of the injustices of the ancient regime. In 1794, Paris echoed with calls to "righteousness"; in 1917, the Bolsheviks denounced the bourgeois decadence of the czarist era (Brinton1981). For Ayatollah Khomeini and other clerical leaders, the Islamic Revolution, along with its political connotation, symbolized the revival of Islamic morality, which had been systematically weakened by the secular Pahlavi regime. In April 1979, Khomeini ordered the Revolutionary Council to create a morality bureau (*dayereh amr-e be ma'ruf*) that would uproot corrupt pre-revolutionary cultural habits. Initially, this bureau may have held some populist appeal, in that Khomeini hinted it would be a people's watchdog in the corridors of power. In a May 1979 speech, the Ayatollah said: "the morality bureau will be independent of the state, so

[218] In his introduction to an old Islamic juristic text, Ahmad Ashraf points to the duality between '*Hesbat*' injunctions and the practical norms followed by people even in the thirteenth century. See Ahmad Ashraf, Introduction to *Ma'alem al-Qorbat fi Ahkame al-Hesbat,* a thirteenth century document written by Iben Ekhvah as a manual to execute social rules of Islam in Muslim societies. This book was translated to Persian and published by Entesharat-e Elmi-farhangi (1367).

as to monitor it, and no one, not even the highest authorities, will be exempt from its supervision."[219] Indeed, Article 8 of the Islamic Republic's constitution refers to *amr-e be ma'ruf* as a key basis of social relations and a mutual obligation of ordinary citizens and government. In practice, enforcement of *amr-e be ma'ruf* has been directed overwhelmingly at the citizenry—and at women, in particular.

A morality police unit was established in Tehran in 1979. One of its first acts was to demolish the old red-light district of Tehran, removing 2,700 prostitutes.[220] In the ensuing months, thousands of people were arrested for such "moral crimes" as extra-marital sexual relationships, alcohol consumption, gambling and pederasty, and hundreds were executed. More liberal Revolutionary Council members objected to the excesses, as well as the unaccountability of the morality bureau to the Council, and the Revolutionary Court briefly disbanded the bureau, citing unauthorized arrests and confiscation of personal wealth. The bureau was resurrected in 1981, this time as a special court for prosecuting cases of "prohibited activities." In the same year, the IRI mandated that women wear modest, "Islamic" attire. Contrary to persistent myth, the law in Iran has never required women to don the full *chador*, though they are strongly encouraged to do so. In practice, "Islamic" attire has meant a variety of manners of dress, typically a *manteau* covering the arms and a headscarf. The *chador* is enforced, however, in mosques, judiciary buildings and other public spaces, including on some university campuses. Women activists organized a demonstration to protest the obligatory veiling on March 8 1981. They demonstrated on Enqelab Street to gain the support of university students. Ayatollah Taleqani, a clergy close to Bazargan's provisional government assured women that there was no obligation coming from the government to force women to wear a headscarf or chador. The figure 24 shows young women protesting on Enqelab Street, carrying a banner in support of Taleqani.

In 1982, the first Islamic penal law was ratified by Parliament. The law codified the prohibition of "non-Islamic" dress for women. Article 102 declared that women dressed "improperly" in public would receive up to 74 lashes, a penalty only softened in 1996, when it was changed to jail time or a fine. This clause of the penal law remains the

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[5] *Ettelaat*, April 4, 1979.
[220] *Ettelaat*, February 20, 1980.

only legal instrument for implementing *amr-e be ma'ruf*. With codification, the bureaucratic state sought not only to restrain judicial autonomy, but also to construct an Islamic identity through threat of sanction. In the 1980s, the state promoted a culture of self-sacrifice and obedience, and any resistance on the part of women against the strictures of dress was treated as counter-revolutionary treason. Even as the Iran-Iraq war raged, prominent conservative figures took the line that the struggle over moral issues should not take a back seat.[221] Authoritarian enforcement of *amr-e be ma'ruf* created what Roxanne Varzi (2000) has called a "public secret," by which many urbanites hid their "non-Islamic" beliefs and habits at home, while appearing to be properly Islamic in public.

A 'community of believers' in Enqelab Street

While the revolutionary public of 1978 and 1979 was diverse and composed of the secular and religious sections of society, the movement's success led to its homogenization. The shift from the heterogeneous public to a "community of believers" charged with protecting the Revolution was pursued in part through political maneuvering after 1979; however, it was also pursued through spatial practices. Less than a year after the monarchy's collapse, the clerics who had assumed control of the country began a systematic process of regulating and recreating public space—and by extension, the populations that occupied and used it. Regulation of the Friday prayer was critical to these efforts. The practice was revived in the grand mosque of all cities after the Revolution and quickly emerged as the primary venue for disseminating official political positions of the IRI. In Tehran, the Friday prayer was held at the university's mosque—and not, as might be expected, at Shah Mosque in the Grand Bazaar.[222] Publicly, the ruling clerics claim this decision was intended to honor the university and its role in the Revolution. Ayatollah Taleqani, who convened the first post-revolution prayer in Tehran in late July 1979, suggested that the choice indicated the respect the revolutionary leaders

[221] *Ettelaat*, April 21, 1986.

[222] Masjed-e Seyed Azizollah is an important mosque located in the heart of the Grand Bazaar. It served as a centre of pro-Khomeini activities among bazaaris, the market's merchants and employees, before the Revolution. For an insightful analysis of the bazaar's role in the social and revolutionary movements of modern Iran, see Keshavarzian 2007. For an examination of the relationship between place and collective identity among bazaaris and how the Grand Bazaar became a venue for the staging of public dissent, see Keshavarzian 2009.

had for the school as a site of knowledge and struggle (Mortezaeifar 2006). It was more likely, however, that the decision reflected the clerics' desire to integrate the young, educated Iranians who had been at the forefront of the Revolution into their own religious community.[223] The prayer thus became a means for the IRI to address those it perceived as constituting this public while excluding those Iranians with different religious backgrounds and/or views. In short, it was a way to create a consolidated revolutionary Islamist public.

The decision to hold Friday prayers at the university inaugurated a transformation of Enqelab Street that gained momentum with the launching of the "Cultural Revolution" in 1980. Aimed at purging Iranian universities of Western and/or non-Islamic influences, this project had a profound impact on the social and political life of the street. It began with the closure of all universities for a period of three years, relying on the "Committee for the Islamization of the Universities" to expel—often violently—countless students and academics. Eventually the Cultural Revolution was extended to include the monitoring of all cultural institutions and activities. Tehran University was not spared and only re-opened after extensive purges and the formal Islamization of the faculty, administration, and student body. The result of this campaign was the suppression of political and intellectual life both at the university and on Enqelab Street.[224] The moral policing of public space contributed to the further suppression of the Enqelab Street's once-vibrant cultural and intellectual life.

The Iran-Iraq war also impacted the socio-spatial dimensions of the street. During the Friday prayer held at Tehran University, clerics championed the notion of *shahadat,* or martyrdom, which served as a powerful motivator that encouraged tens of thousands of Iranians to head to the front. They used Enqelab Street to perpetuate this imagery, posting pictures of martyrs on walls and kiosks, broadcasting revolutionary songs, and organizing large funeral ceremonies. Collectively, these actions re-inscribed the street as a kind of sacred space. The war further affected the street thanks to the presence of the *Basij*, the

[223] Despite the construction in the 1990s of the Tehran Mosalla compound, one of the largest mosques in the world, the university continues to host Friday prayers in the capital (Ehsani 2015).

[224] In June 1981, three months after the shutdown of Iran's universities, an insurrection of armed opposition groups belonging mostly to the Mojahedin Khalgh Organization took to Tehran's streets (Abrahamian 1989). The revolt ended in a bloody reprisal that escalated over several days. Over the course of the uprising Enqelab Street turned into a space of fear and domination. Many students and political activists were arrested there, and even more were identified and arrested later in the surrounding area.

"People's Militia" established by Khomeini in 1980. After returning from the war, members of the *Basij* often redirected their revolutionary zeal toward the domestic front, where they were recruited by the state to enforce the aforementioned moral policing campaign and ensure that Islamic ethics were observed. Patrolling units harassed and arrested young men and women in the streets, workplaces, universities, and other public places, accusing them of moral misconduct (Khatam 2009). The units of the students' *Basij* would routinely stand watch at university gates, checking for incidents of "moral misconduct"—including such transgressions as lax veiling, wearing make-up, and socializing with the opposite sex, either on or off campus. Such infractions led to public humiliation and, in some instances, temporary suspension. Collectively, these post-Revolution socio-spatial interventions had a radical impact on Enqelab Street. The social and cultural life that had flourished on the street prior to 1979 was decimated and replaced with the state's vision of an Islamic public sphere.

Urban Reform and Re-emergence of the Social Movements

Since the early 1990s the issue of the booming young generation has been placed at the top of the public agenda of the IRI. A national center—the *Youth Organization*—was created for the analysis and the forecasting of problems concerning youth. In part, the youth topic has been cast as a crisis. Iran had experienced a demographic revolution since the 1970's, which led to significant increase in young adults aged 15-24 in the 1990s—from 6.5 million population in 1976 to 9.4 million in 1986 and 14.3 million in 1996. By definition this young generation was in a state of transition to adulthood, entering the labour market and forming independent families. With the voting age set at 15, and with relatively high electoral participation rates in Iran, this population group has been of great political significance. Furthermore, this young generation had been completely socialized under the IRI. The Technocrats of the MPO cast the issue as a looming crisis and framed it in terms of the enormous burden of providing social services for this group of 14 million, or more than twice as many as prior to the revolution. Education was the more challenging problem. Due to the post-Revolution developmental efforts, literacy rates among this age group had increased from 56 percent in 1976 to 93 percent in 1996. Education had expanded universally after the Revolution, but the gains were most noticeable at the primary and guidance levels.

At a critical time in their lives, when they needed to acquire skills and work experience, 33 percent of youth (9 percent of male and 58 percent of female) were neither in school nor at work.[225] In 1996, the official rate of youth unemployment was 19 percent, compared to 13 percent in 1976. While the labour market was under pressure by demographic trends, neoliberal economic reform had constrained opportunities for job creation. The Public sector provided only 23 percent of the new jobs in the 1990s, while it was the main source of employment in the 1980s, having created 80 percent of the new jobs during that time.

The expansion of private institutions for higher education was embodied in the post-war development plans to cover the gap created by youth population growth and job market restrictions. Azad University was established as a non-profit university, with Rafsanjani and other high authorities in its board of trustees. The university opened branches in almost all the cities in Iran and its student population reached half of all students attending public universities in Iran in the late 1990s. Higher education was the most prestigious achievement for urban youth for establishing their future economic status and lifestyle; as a result, the gap between supply and demand for higher education was daunting: in the 1990s, 70 percent of high school graduates took the general university exam, but only 10 to 20 percent of them were admitted to post-secondary studies;[226] in 1996, only 12 percent of urban youth aged 19-24 were university students or university graduates. Student migration to the West and more recently, to Turkey, Cypress, Malaysia, and even Dubai, was an alternative for upper middle class youth. Others had to look for rare, low paid jobs available in the unstable Iranian economy.

Expansion of Higher Education on Enqelab Street

Decentralization policies ratified by the SCDCT in the 1980s prohibited Tehran University from developing its campus on Enqelab Street—a constraint applied to several other large universities as well. The policy was ignored in practice, however, as public and private universities and colleges started to purchase or lease buildings or develop facilities inside their properties in the 1990s. Enqelab Street experienced a high concentration of such redevelopments. My research indicates that half of Tehran's

[225] Public Census of 1996, Country Results, tables: 8, 11 and 13

[226] According to Year Census Book, 552,000 students graduated from high schools in 1996 (including those got diploma or pre university certificate) while admission to BA and college level programs at all higher education centres, was limited to 170000.

higher-education institutes are located on Enqelab Street. They include the old universities like Tehran University and Amirkabir University, and those established in the 1990s, including Kharazmi University (which specializes in training teachers), University of Art, Shahed University (which serves the families of war martyrs), Sore'h University, Azad University, and the University of the Judiciary. My research also shows that almost 100,000 students were studying in one of the universities and colleges on Enqelab Street in 2011. Such a high concentration of students further contributed to its transformation, turning it into a lively and remarkably crowded space.[227] The cultural centers like the City Theatre and Roudaki Hall Opera House resumed their activities after one decade of recession. The expansion of universities boosted the book bazaar and related businesses along the street, bringing about a revival of a socially and culturally diverse space, and the temporal transformation of public activities. Even today, students, artists, and intellectuals occupy the street during the week, on Fridays the space is reserved for Friday prayers; retail centers are closed, checkpoints erected, and the area between Enqelab Square and Valiasr-Enqelab intersection is turned into to a surveilled pedestrian zone.

Youth and the "Cultural Onslaught" in the Post-War Era[228]

The modernization and revitalization of Tehran's public spaces in the early 1990s city was a reflection of citizens' desires—desires that also hindered the implementation of *amr-e be ma'ruf*. The post-revolutionary technocratic elite, for instance, having made fortunes through political connections, wanted to indulge in conspicuous consumption. The generation of youths that had grown up under the Islamic Republic were deeply frustrated by the limits imposed by scarce resources and exclusionary policies. They understood the policies as an effort to marginalize those who were insufficiently "Islamic." Public opinion on cultural values began to fragment. The families of war martyrs, who tended to be of humbler origins, supported the fight to safeguard the moral

[227] Traffic data from July 2012 confirms that some 26,000 pedestrians walk its length between Enqelab Square and Valiasr Intersection during the morning rush hour—a figure that excludes subway commuters traveling the same route (Khatam 2015).

[228] The term "cultural onslaught," used by supreme leader in his talk in June 1992, was added to the revolutionary lexicon.

promise of the revolution as well as their protected access to state-sponsored privileges. Meanwhile, the modern middle classes were eager to make a clean break with the "republic of piety."

The factional conflict in the IRI focused on cultural politics and foreign policies, rather than economics. Back from the war fronts, *Basij* launched the second phase of *amr-e be ma'ruf* in the late 1980s.[229] In order to keep the *Basij's* powerful position within the political structure, the young *Basij* veterans were assigned the role of policing the streets and ensuring that Islamic ethics were followed: "from now on, the mission of the Basij is to implement the *amr-e be ma'ruf*" *(Ettelaat* 24/2/1994). Basij checkpoints in the streets turned from managing security issues to imposing Islamic codes, coming to a peak in 1993 with Ayatollah Khamenei, and the Leader's command to confront the dangers of the "Cultural Onslaught" from the west (along with other secular, non-revolutionary and non-Islamic influences). The target groups of *amr-e be ma'ruf* in its second phase changed from "anti-revolutionary" and secular groups of the 1980's to the masses of urban middle class youth who were born and raised under the IRI, and who supposedly had internalized and been shaped by revolutionary Islamic ideals.

The social and geographical extension of the *amr-e be ma'ruf* activities conflicted with the urban and cultural reforms and worlding practices aimed at redefining the IRI in its second decade: essentially it intensified factional conflicts**.** As the Minister of culture in 1992, Khatami ratified the Principles of the IRI's Cultural Policy (*Osul-e Siasat-e Farhangi*), which became the reformist charter for cultural reform. The charter (Vezarat Farhang 1992) had no reference to *amr-e be ma'ruf*; on the contrary, it called for governmental institutions to restrict the selective imposition of severe religious views upon public life for its negative social consequences.[230] Conservatives mounted their attacks on Karbaschi's cultural centers in Tehran, arguing that they offered improper programs. The term *ebaahe-gari* (meaning to advocate a forbidden practice in Islam as right or not-forbidden) was used for the first time to criticize the cultural centers' activities as well as the discourse of tolerance introduced by Khatami and Karbaschi. The

[229] Even in the final stages of the war, prominent conservative figures took the line that the struggle over moral issues should not take the backstage to the war (Ettelaat 21/4/1986).
[230] In 1999, Tehran University published research on the *amr-e be ma'ruf* proposing that "the political system should avoid imposing too much ideological pressure and restrictive codes on people, as well as exaggerated propaganda on religious principals" (Jahad Daneshgahi 1999: 138).

ascendancy of the reformist bloc in Parliament, and the associated intellectual and cultural ferment, effectively ended the second stage of moral policing in the name of *amr-e be ma'ruf*. From 1996 to 2005 the Basij checkpoints were fewer and further between, the governments telling the bureau that it lacked legal authority for its indiscriminate patrols.[231]

Figure 26: Daneshjoo Park 2012

Source: Azar Tashakor. Permission granted
Daneshjoo Park along with other parks in Tehran was reorganized and its fences removed in 1992

Enqelab Street Re-emerges as Spatiality of Discontents

The student movement claimed its right to collective action and the right to reoccupy the street in 1999, when Karbaschi was in jail. The increased student population did not initially recharge the street's political potential: changes began after Mohammad Khatami won the 1997 presidential election on a platform of reform. Student activism subsequently grew more vocal, with movements reemerging across university campuses. In July 1999 students at Tehran University organized a sit-in to protest the court's ban of a reformist newspaper. Supporters gathered in the streets near the campus and remained with the students for six days and nights in solidarity. The sit-in ended with a brutal

[231] *Sharq*, 8/9/2003

attack on the student dorms by paramilitary groups, including the Basij, and the arrest of some 1,500 students. To crack down on reemerging student activism, police deployed surveillance cameras and campus-based disciplinary units to limit university activity on Enqelab Street; despite this, Tehran University endured as a locus for activism, the disciplinary action simply reflective of broader changes in both the urban and political landscapes.

Figure 27: Green Movement 2009: Enqelab Street (right) and entrance of Tehran university (left)

In 2009, the street became a central node for demonstrations, and a main artery for marches in protests over the results of presidential election, and led to the reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president for second time. In a like manner, the Green Movement brought new spaces to the fore, spaces that both reflected and produced the various social dynamics driving the events: the opposition used Valiasr Street as a site for political mobilization for practical reasons, knowing that gathering there would shield their supporters from the heavy police surveillance on Enqelab Street.

Figure 28: Enqelab and Valiasr Streets two main scenes of protests of the Green Movement



Source: Khatam. Black dots show the main locations build the physical platform of public spaces in Tehran.

Though protests would continue on Valiasr Street, the largest demonstration following the announcement of the election results was held on Enqelab Street. At the behest of opposition leaders, protestors from all socio-economic backgrounds descended on the street for a peaceful and silent march on June 15, many carrying signs that read, "Where is my vote?" Exact figures for this event are disputed, but estimates range from one to three million participants. Those in power had accused opposition candidates of betraying the Islamic Republic and the 1979 Revolution. Their selection of Enqelab Street—particularly because of their unavoidable confrontation with a heavy police presence—suggests that they sought to confirm their solidarity with, and ownership of the Revolution.

Conclusion

Many cities have specific public spaces and/or buildings associated with transformative political events. Across the greater Middle East, citizens have repeatedly turned to places such as Tahrir Square in Cairo and Taksim Square in Istanbul to serve as platforms for collective action. Though perhaps brought to the fore through the recent Arab uprisings, the use of public space as a foothold for political change predates the events of the past five years, and Enqelab Street is one such historical example. It has been a recurrent site of struggle between Iranians and their government and has played a central role in the country's contemporary political transformations. Marked by tangible presence of political history, Enqelab Street in Tehran is a highly politicized platform for collective representation, acting at once to draw in and to speak out: allowing large crowds to gather and disseminate their message during times of turmoil. As with any highly-politicized space, its meaning itself is contested: restricted and disciplined by police violence, appropriated for conservative political functions like Friday prayers, or by redevelopments for the expansion of the higher education industry. Enqelab Street might be understood as a continuation of the Revolution of 1979, but it moved beyond the history of the Revolution by becoming a platform for protests for change in the IRI.

The 1990s urban reform influenced the existing processes of redevelopment in the street in two different ways: first, it revived the street's cultural centrality through supporting major street side art institutes and weakened the Friday prayers' sovereignty on the street; second, it led to the dramatic expansion of the higher education institutes. However, the re-emergence of the social protests in the street in the late 1990s, indicates that modernization project did not change the main characteristics of the street. The changes of the street in reconstruction era revived its original political function, by bringing thousands of students, university staff, print industry laborers, art activists, audiences and costumers to the street and while over-commercialized its spaces, did not change the social nature of the space: it remains the city's main political street and one of its important public spaces, one where universities both as urban space and institution have been able to save their political potential, and where a heterogenous public can gather for different social events.

Conclusion: Political Investments in Modernization of the Capital in Iran

After two decades, the 1990s Tehran's modernizing reform still remains understudied and its contribution to our knowledge of the transformation of cities in the global South and North is unclear, as Tehran is absent from urban studies agendas in major global academic institutions. Iranian scholars who studied the reform have been stuck either focusing on how reform has accelerated the "creative destruction" in Tehran (what is called the Haussmannization of the city), or focused on the contribution of the reform to the political and cultural openings, which continued under Khatami's presidency and effectively changed the cultural and political discourses of the leftist and centre-right Islamists in Iran. Both studies underscored the enduring importance of mayor-centred decentralization, the major outcome of Tehran's reform, and its role in limiting the imagination of socio-spatial "improvement" of the city in future and consolidating the arbitrary rule of the mayors in other large cities in Iran.

I have studied the entwined processes of urban modernization and arbitrary rule over the urban, in three constructive relations: 1) in its historical context and looking for the continuance/break with the past; 2) in its societal context, through looking at technocracy and its role in shaping urban reforms and transformative projects, regarding the state/space relations; 3) by looking at global/national/local dynamics in space-scale interactions.

Continuance/Break with the Past

The redefinition of the concepts of progress and modernization in Tehran's urban reform in the 1990s entailed a distancing from the revolutionary modernization aimed at fulfilling social justice trough more equal distribution of modern commodities. This distancing was a step backwards to the middle class centred conception of modernization in the pre-Revolution era, focusing on physical renewal, the construction of impressive buildings, improvements of private transit access to the city, an increase in the efficiency of municipal administration, and erecting new public cultural symbols, spaces and institutions to mobilize a social base to protect the reform against conservative attacks.

The failure of the IRI to establish a developmentalist state with a welfarist orientation in the 1980s (what was partially fulfilled during the 1960s), led to blind and scrambling efforts among the Islamic left and centre right to shape a modernizing plan. Pro-market neoliberal teachings were widely accepted and incorporated in the modernizing plan of the post-war reconstruction. Thinking in line with modernization theory, economist-technocrats argued that the economy would "take off" if it could attract investments and efficiently channel those investments into industrial activities such that further growth would be self-generating; this economic modernization logic was then applied to Tehran, which meant a focus on proper infrastructure, transportations, parks and other amenities for its existing population. Karbaschi (2009) suggested that extra-density policy is a means to provide the basic urban investments in Tehran and put the city on a path to become modern and developed. The city would not need to continue the intensification policy when this goal was accomplished. It is an irony that municipal reliance on the construction and real estate boom and excessive commodification of urban land in the 1990s left little room for the industrial and service sector's "self-generative" growth. Since then, the speculative construction sector and protected commercial activities have been the only growing industries in Tehran. Extreme growth of land rents (an average of 50 percent of total costs of producing an average housing unit in 2000) hindered growth in other economic sectors and diminished the base of urban planning. This trend was the opposite of urbanization of the 1960s that followed a wave of industrialization in Tehran and the emergence of urban planning. The end of industrialization did not put an end to land speculation in Tehran, but the general plan and designated urban limits nearly stopped runaway construction in the suburbs and curbed land speculation.

The politics of development floated between industrialization and militarization agendas during Pahlavi's rule. Iran's geopolitical proximity to the Soviet Union and its intensified international rivalry in the post WWII era (manifested in the "politics of promise"), turned modernization in the service of industrialization into a priority. This prioritization of industrialization was evident in the land reform undertaken by the shah (distribution of agricultural land owned by large landlords among the rural population in the 1960s), and in the formation and further development of a technocracy in charge of industrial planning. In this specific internal and external political context, the 1960s

technocracy established and empowered many of the developmental institutions in economic, social, cultural, and urban areas. Central planning became the main vehicle to improve Iran's position in the international division of labour through the implementation of imported substitution policies, intended to decentralize Iran's industries and enhance regional development (establishing 5 industrial poles outside Tehran), thereby reducing urban population concentration in Tehran. Tehran witnessed a surge of cultural activities and the emergence of an avant-garde intellectual culture, leading many to consider turning Tehran into the Middle Eastern capital of cultural activities through the construction of theaters, music halls, movie theaters, and regular cultural festivals. This cultural development was a result of state investment, and the growth of intellectual, student, and women's movements as a byproduct of nationalist and leftist movements in the 1950s.

The draft of a comprehensive urban plan for Tehran and a few select cities in the 1960s marked the birth of urban planning in Iran, expressing the will of the state to embark on an organized urban development, to furnish necessary infrastructures, to provide urban services, and to regulate the urban land market. All these activities used to be left to municipalities, which would engage in building new streets and expanding services to newly constructed areas, with little coordination and in a haphazard, disorderly, and spontaneous manner. The new approach entailed larger and more effective public investments in urbanization: urban infrastructure (water and electricity supply through Karaj dam) developed in tandem with urban growth during the 1960s. Construction of Mehrabad airport, urban streets and highways, numerous mass production housing complexes for the middle class that resulted in a decline in urban land value, were all completed during this period. Invaluable experience was accumulated in the industrialization of housing construction. This new approach to urban modernization and development was rooted in the 'policy of promise' of the post-1953 coup that managed to suppress the oil nationalization movement and got closer to achieving its goals in the 1960s. The industrial capitalist class both benefited from these policies and helped them advance. Tehran industrial capitalists built housing for their workers for the first time during this period (Nazarabad town was built by Moqaddam Factory around Tehran). Development strategy during this period displayed the following geographical

and spatial characteristics: it prioritized Tehran's physical decentralization; it showed a keen awareness of the importance of public land provision for urban development (yet, with foresight, this land provision was located within the city's projected 25 year Development Zone); it embarked on mass housing projects and the provision of necessary urban services in tandem with urban growth. It was also elitist, paid little attention to old neighbourhoods, and subsequently led to the decline or destruction of a large part of the old urban fabric. It also aimed at removing all polluting industries from Tehran, without any regard for the impact of this policy on the labour force of small workshops. The 1968 Comprehensive Plan was idealistic in its expectations for economic growth and distribution of wealth in the city. It envisioned the majority of urban dwellers in Tehran as middle class, and that there would be no demand for small tracts of land for lower incomes. At a time that the majority of households lived on plots smaller than 100 square meters, it increased the minimum size of land tracts to 200 square meters. It played a significant role in informal suburban sprawl. It did not encourage public space development. Nor did it enhance participatory urban governance. It left little room for popular participation in the decision making process of municipalities. Municipalities remained a subsidiary of the state and the interests or visions of local players, even strong local forces like grand bazaar merchants and guilds, were not reflected in centralized decisions made for the city. Having a plan and organizational and technical efficiency were considered to be the key to a successful urban 'take off.' In sum, the proposed comprehensive plan encouraged elitist developmentalism.

The 1979 Revolution marked a break with the linear conception of progress and modernization in Iranian history and put forward a new understanding of progress guided by morality and justice instead of rationality, and its urban symbol was a simultaneous policy of housing the poor and cleansing Qal'e neighborhood (red-light district) in southern Tehran. A rapid realization of both goals—namely, a more equitable distribution of land, water, electricity, urban services, and enforcement of moral codes on society—showed its inherent contradictions and exclusionary consequences. The crisis created by the Revolution and war necessitated a new project for the reproduction of social cohesion. How was it possible to save a debunked ideal of modernization and reframe it as a project to create social cohesion? Economic reconstruction was an urgent

priority, but its fruits could only be seen after a long period and would not function as a basis for social cohesion. Urban renewal was both necessary and would give visible results in a shorter time span. The city offered a better symbol of macro level societal renovation. The 1990s urban reform in this context lacked recognition of the underlying institutional and political complexities of the urban planning of the 1960s. A decade of revolutionary upheavals coupled with war and the collapse of governmental institutions and the social technocratic network of the Pahlavi era had created a major rupture in technocracy, making knowledge transfer from past to present experience a herculean task. The official documents, the 1968 Comprehensive Plan in particular, were still available and they could provide a basis for urban reform. Three elements of the 1960s urban policy were excluded from the 1990s reform: decentralization (which was being enhanced by the Revolution in the form of provincial urbanization); public financing of urban infrastructures and services (which was delegated to the municipalities in the form of financial self-rules municipalities); and central government oversight over urban development (for Tehran mayor, the only links between the central government and municipalities were financial and ideological). Karbaschi included those features in the comprehensive plan that emphasized developmental and growth opportunities (expansion of the city in its 25 years Development Zone and network of urban highways), and the elitist elements that focused on the removal of the urban poor and their jobs through industrial relocation and the destruction of their informal settlements. Karbaschi added a few features of his own that reflected his own initiative and the condition of Tehran in the post war period, including a balanced development of public spaces and services across the city. The Revolution and war had brought the poor into the political scene. Ignoring their share from the fruits of urban modernization was simply impossible. New parks and cultural centres established in the south of Tehran turned these poor neighbourhoods into a cultural and entertainment mecca for the rich northern city dwellers.

The 1990s urban reform turned out to be no more than a “technological fix.” Its failure can be attributed to two factors: firstly, a technical, engineering, and elitist understanding of urban renewal that placed the construction of highways, bridges, and automobile underpasses at the core of urban reform and found a vulgar artistic expression in the beautification of outside walls, road blocks, and night lights; secondly, a reliance

on real estate speculation to finance current and developing urban budgets. The imaginary of urban progress and modernization in this period not only did not take a step forward compared to the complex, albeit elitist, pre-Revolutionary imaginary of the 1960s, but returned to the 1920s when progress and improvement was reduced to the construction of streets, parks, and public hygiene facilities. While urban governance restored some level of vibrancy and dynamism to Tehran through accommodating a degree of social diversity and different lifestyles, and providing a basis for political and cultural reform, the idea of urban improvement did not lead to participatory planning of the city or to a resurgence of constitutional ideals of institution building for urban management. Even normal tools of urban management such as comprehensive planning were discarded as outmoded by arbitrary decentralized urban governance, working as an 'institutional fix' for the developmental state and its central supervision and limiting the space for uncontrolled speculations in Tehran. Money making projects were the focus of the 1990s, and technological fixes such as highways and parks proved ineffective to shape the 'take off'. In comparison to the 1960s urban modernization, which relied on welfare planning, a developmentalist state, and public interventions to build urban infrastructures, the 1990s modernization was plagued with the contradictions of a neoliberal model of urban finance coupled with utopian goals of modernization. As a social engineering project, it had an authoritarian aura. As an urban project, it routinely recreated and reproduced "dilapidation" and "obsolescence" by deregulated redevelopments that reached unprecedented dimensions of capitalistic "creative destruction." The average life of a building in Tehran was less than 30 years during the 1990s

Technocracy and Dynamics of State-Space Relation

The state/space dynamic has been systematically conceptualized through processes of planning in different social contexts. However, designating the role of planners in political turning points in different societies remains a challenge. My study on the role of technocracy in shaping elitist and populist modernization reforms in Tehran has addressed the limits to the capacity of technocracy to sustain its power, and its power

to run the government body through political upheavals. I have shown that technocracy accumulates the expertise of planning as an institution, and have a voice in decision making in the government, but its voice is rarely heard separately, rather aligned with political factions or interest groups. I suggest that urban planners are organized along a division of labour between government bodies, public institutions, and private sector planning firms, which is not fixed through time and space. As we saw in our study of major urban reforms in Iran, they take side, according to their ideology and social positions, in factional conflicts inside the government. Technocracy, like any other social institution, is a site of political conflict rather than the accumulation of apolitical knowledge and expertise.

Worlding in the Global-National and Urban Interactions

Worlding practices emerged in the post-war era in Iran as government' initiative to become global, regarding its internationally isolated conditions. While the Islamic Republic did not officially follow the idea of building a global city– a common practice of different political regimes of the global South in the 1990s– transnational models and networks have shaped the urban strategies in Iran since then. Far from globally integrated economies and societies, Karbaschi formulated his strategy of extreme intensification and commercialization of the city by both learning from macro strategic shifts toward self-regulating markets as a mechanism of urban development around the world, and incorporating micro strategies of commercialization of redevelopment projects through best practices and other forms of circulating urban models. Like in many other cities around the world, cranes and bulldozers became symbols of urban improvement in Tehran as building a modern city worthy of the dreams of Islamic modernity was prioritized in the late 1980s.

I examined the dynamics of the space/scale relation which shaped the 1990s urban reform as a worlding practice and discussed how it opened intergovernmental disputes and negotiations on urban problems to discussions on regional and global models, best practices, UN Habitat acknowledgement of the improvements in standards, while building national pride and social consensus around iconic buildings, mega redevelopments and major shifts in urban governance. My research confirms the

interaction of the global, national and local factors in shaping major urban reforms in the global south; urban reform in Tehran emerged in conjunction of a failed quest of the Islamic left to build a democratic and inclusionary urban agenda, globally dominant discourse of neoliberalism and state rescaling through decentralization in the 1980s and an economic bust in Iran, which pushed for financial austerity measures like the cut of central budget for municipalities. While there are many unanswered questions on social agencies influential in changing the urban, physically, socially and politically, my research on four main incidents of one century urban reform in Tehran provides different examples of interactions between global/local and economic/social factors and confirms the role of social actors and social imaginaries on desired change and "improvements" in shaping the change of the urban.

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