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**Economic Globalization and Immigration Policy:
Canada Compared to Europe***

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Abstract

Long-standing immigration policy differences between Canada and Europe moderated somewhat over the first decades of the post-War period, but subsequent to 1989 there was a significant shift toward greater divergence. This paper provides details on the widening policy gap, its post-War context, and the economic, political, and ideological factors which influenced the Canadian policy stance in particular. Canadian immigration policy in the 1990s emphasizes the admission of relatively large numbers of immigrants from around the world as self-financed, "just in time" sources of skilled labor, advanced technology, and entrepreneurial capital. The European attitude over this same period has, in contrast, centered on further efforts to restrict inflows of migrants originating from outside Europe, largely on the grounds that immigrants are threats to domestic employment security. Although these widely different responses to economic migrants have some spill-over effects on other aspects of international migration policy, such as family reunification and asylum, Canadian and European policies remain more similar in these areas. The major immigration policy contrasts between nations arise through significant differences in political ideology, in turn related to the structure of interest groups and power relations in society.

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Developed countries in Europe, North America and elsewhere are facing a number of similar challenges to immigration policy in an era of trade and global transformation of production. Stated briefly, economic globalization has two major impacts on migration process. Firstly, it generates tremendous economic and associated political turmoil in nations around the world, with particularly devastating impacts on incomes and employment in poor countries with weak state social-security networks. In cases of nations where ethnic minorities or polarized social classes struggle over the distribution of scarce resources, the economic effects of globalization tend to increase tensions, conflicts and violent confrontations. The resulting mix of unfavorable economic and political circumstances leads to dramatically rising pressure for emigration from poor countries to wealthy, more stable nations. The movement is generated by a mix of economic and political reasons.

Secondly, globalization also leads to increased job insecurity regarding employment in wealthy nations, and with this a rising fear that immigrants represent a threat to well being. In the face of rising international competition and falling profits, some producers seek to contract cheaper workers, including undocumented migrants and members of ethnic minorities facing discrimination who had few other opportunities. Others lay-off workers and replace them with machines. And still others, close plants and relocate production to other countries. The high levels of unemployment and the threat of job competition from foreign-born workers tends to promote anti-immigrant sentiment, even racism among certain minority factions. The main features of contemporary international migration are therefore strongly influenced by globalization. These features include: developing countries are now a major source of international migrants, both legal and undocumented; undocumented migration is most commonly directed to developed nations which are proximate to developing nations; and unprecedented numbers of migrants are asylum seekers. A fuller history of the affects of globalization would also comment on the migration outcomes from fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the former Soviet empire. These

momentous political events are widely viewed as arising from the economic failure of the Soviet system in a competitive, global context.

Given the similar employment problems and migration pressures faced by developed nations, one might expect a strong trend toward convergence in their international migration policies. There are indeed some signs of convergence, particularly in responses to asylum seekers. But policies in other areas, particularly labor immigration, have shown a more complex picture, including even rising divergence, depending on which countries are examined. Canada, along with Australia and the United States, for example, have tended to maintain relatively high levels of immigration in the recent period, despite relatively high levels of unemployment and at times vocal popular pressure for reducing immigration. The Canadian case is particularly revealing of a state-led, assertive "entrepreneurial" and "elitist" immigration policy, strongly supporting the immigration of relatively large numbers of highly skilled workers, investors and experienced businessmen and women, and of making the immigrants themselves pay a higher portion of costs associated with their selection and admission. European nations, in contrast, have entrenched their views that immigrants are a threat to economic security in a context of unacceptably high unemployment.

Why different countries take such divergent approaches to international migration is a very large question. The present paper is limited to an examination and interpretation of recent Canadian immigration policy initiatives, taking Western Europe as a contrasting case in order to expand our understanding of policy influences. In order to manage even this narrower topic, the analysis focuses on policy developments over the past 10 years or so and interprets these at a "macro" level in terms of general currents in national political ideology and the relative power of different interest groups in society. It is not that specific party politics are irrelevant, it is simply that they are complex and require a different level of analysis. In addition, the macro-level currents of national development ideology in Canada and Europe are rather broad, extending beyond particular parties.

The paper is organized in four parts. Part 1 is a statement of the conceptual approach to the analysis. Part 2 examines the Canadian case, giving particular attention to the way in which immigration policy has been shaped to fit within new national economic strategies as these become overwhelmingly shaped by neo-liberal political ideology. Part 3 provides some comments on broad trends in Western Europe, both to show some similarities with Canadian policy trends, as well as to accentuate the recent differences and reasons for them. Part 4 provides an interpretation of the contrasting cases and their implications.

Part I. Conceptual Approach

Immigration policy is subject to influence from a wide variety of sources, including: (a) law and constitutional rights, (b) national identity and other cultural influences, and (c) state economic objectives and associated national development ideologies that emerge through political (power) brokerage. These are of course not entirely independent of one another, especially over a longer period of time. Of the three, the last is the most dynamic and responsive to challenges associated with economic globalization. Laws and constitutional rights, as well as national identity, change more slowly and serve to moderate policy change.

The term "economic globalization" is intended to refer to an inter related set of forces, including: (a) market trends such as expanded trade and the rapid flow of investment capital around the world to whatever enterprise or market shows the best profit-to-risk ratio; (b) new production processes, such as: decentralization of the production of component parts to the least expensive manufacturing countries, assembly in low-wage and low-tax zones, and global marketing of standardized products; and (c) associated policies of national governments, such as: lowering tariffs on imports, reducing or stabilizing tax levels to improve national competitiveness; and so on.

Economic globalization is driven by the logic of "flexible accumulation" and facilitated by the spread and political acceptance of neo-liberal ideology.¹ From the perspective of neo-liberal ideology, the transformation of the global economic system is not just some "given", nor a set of business-inspired events to be resisted because of their negative employment and other undesirable impacts on the welfare state. Rather the transformation is a positive force from which all nations, societies, social groups and individuals will eventually benefit. The supporting cliché is, "short-term pain for long-term gain." Viewed more soberly, however, it is a process which in the short-term clearly benefits certain nations and classes and social groups within them. The long-term outcomes for those disadvantaged are not clear. Reflections on these trends have led to rising concern from critics, including voices that one would normally associate with more conservative views. These relate particularly to the widening social inequality --between nations, along ethnic and "racial" lines, between the sexes, and between social classes.

The framework employed argues that recent evolution in immigration policies in Europe, North America and elsewhere reflect the significant re-deployment of investment, technology and labour that has taken place in the international system over the past two or three decades. Under the rubric of "adjustment" and "reform", nations and regional trade blocs have promoted the new international system and adjusted to it by pursuing national development strategies emphasizing the generation of wealth through expanded trade, increased exports, and reduced costs for national exports (often implying reduced taxes and a smaller "state" apparatus). Economic strategy in many countries gives particular attention to lowering (or at least not raising) the tax burden on domestic manufacturing

¹ For a review of concepts and issues related to "flexible accumulation" and post-Fordist production, see Part II in David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990. Harvey's approach, like the one taken in this paper, centers on economic determinants but not to the exclusion of autonomous and reactive cultural forces and a strong role for ideology. A theoretical discussion of the approach taken and its relationship to migration theory may be found in Alan Simmons, "Migration internationale et capitalism global: examen critique des théories," in Human Gerard and Victor Piché, eds. *Manuel de Sociologie des Populations*. Montréal: Presses de l' Université de Montréal, 1995.

enterprises, with an eye to export promotion, and lowering import tariffs, particularly with favored trading partners, as a measure to promote economic efficiency. Policy responses also include reducing the national debt (again as a measure to keep taxes under control); the training of national workers for "high end" engineering, product design, and finance employment; and exporting low wage jobs by investing in overseas production in those developing countries which combine political stability and a relatively docile and skilled labor force. The emerging international system is characterized by "just in time" production and assembly of goods for a global consumer market. Such goals and strategies have widespread implications for policy in diverse areas, including employment, health and education, as well as international migration, where the strong "efficiency" values of the system tend to encourage reducing state expenditures, decentralizing and privatizing.

Although the global system creates a broad set of common challenges and pressures for particular kinds of responses to all nations, it also provides options for diverse national responses in particular policy areas such as immigration. The increasing divergence between Canadian and European immigration policies, particularly as they concern workers and other economic migrants, may be taken as a case in point. In both Canada and Europe, economic globalization provides a strong stimulus for policy change and adaptation. But the direction of change is open and subject to influences from legal-constitutional traditions, from culture, and from political forces and associated ideologies. The following hypotheses are relevant.

a. Constitutional and legal traditions have an important impact on immigration policy, particularly with respect to issues related to human and civil (citizen) rights. Certain features of immigration policy are deeply embedded in constitutions, laws and international agreements. This base tends to provide stability for policy in certain areas. It particularly resists new sources of influence on matters related to family reunification and political asylum, whether these be cultural or economic. While there are important differences between countries within Europe and between Europe and Canada in constitutional and

legal status bearing on these matters, it may also be said that Canada and Europe share a broadly similar Western legal and constitutional heritage, with Canada combining both British and French traditions. It is therefore not surprising that there would be an important continuing similarity between Canadian and European views on family reunification and the protection of refugees, and some recent trends toward increasing convergence in asylum policy.

b. Cultural influences, national identity and associated values can also strongly influence immigration policy. For example, Japan is resistant to all forms of immigration except the repatriation of ethnic Japanese. This view reflects a cultural preoccupation, and led the country to solve its labour demand problems over the past three decades by "exporting jobs" through capital investment in other countries, mostly in Asia. Canada is a contrasting case. Along with Australia and the United States--the two other nations where planned immigration remains at relatively high levels--Canada has a multicultural population and pluri-ethnic heritage. Hence, Canada faces adjustment to international economic competition knowing that the nation (or at least important sectors and national political actors within it) is receptive to new economic migrants, provided that they are perceived to cost little and to generate new wealth. Europe seems to fall in a third category. Culturally and socially based opposition to immigration in Europe has been associated with strong expressions of nationalism and the positive value of ethnic/linguistic homogeneity by some political factions. Yet, as a region of nations which accommodate considerable cultural pluralism, general public concern in Europe is largely centered on the perceived threats to job security posed by migrant labor.² European states have therefore opted for cutting labor

²Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, *op. cit.* p. 6-7 present the findings from surveys from various countries to conclude that opposition to third world origin immigrants has been spreading in Europe. In part, the results seem to confirm press reports and reinforce concerns about the racist character of much anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe. Yet the article also offers an extremely important and often ignored finding. When asked whether nationality, race or religion of immigrants are disturbing to them, "more than 80 per cent of Europeans find these characteristics 'not disturbing'...". The results suggest that pluralism may be more deeply grounded in Europe than sometimes thought, and that anti-immigrant sentiment for many is based on other criteria, such as challenges to job security.

migration, both to satisfy wider public concerns and as a way of at least partially cooling the flames of extreme nationalist sentiment promoted by minority political factions.

Ethnocentrism, xenophobia and racism play a role in policy formulation in both Canada and Europe, but it is a secondary one arising from the challenge of small, vocal parties which express anti-immigration arguments based on such sentiments. This said, the role of nationalism is clearly stronger than it is in Canada--differences which reflect the relatively more homogeneous linguistic and cultural background of European nations.

c. Last but by no means least, immigration policies are profoundly subject to influences arising from the relative power of different interest groups in domestic politics, and the formulation of national development strategy and ideology. This is perhaps the most dynamic element in the context of the challenges of globalization. It is also an area in which major differences between Canada and Europe may be observed.

Consider the Canadian side. From its birth as a nation, Canada has always had a strong "outward" looking perspective on national development. Canada saw itself as a small country, dependent on international trade, foreign investment and immigrant labour. While circumstances have changed and Canada is now a small but relatively wealthy nation, it continues to rely heavily on foreign markets, capital and labour. The logic is widely understood throughout the nation and is structured into the state and major institutions.³ It is therefore not surprising that the Canadian response to recent trends in globalization would be to down-play possible negative effects of relatively high immigration, while playing-up the possible positive effects. Further, the traditional counter-weight to pro-immigration sentiment in Canada has been the organized labor movement, but this movement is currently in retreat, under an broadside attack by political forces in the context of high unemployment. This shifts the balance of power in the direction of those

³ The most powerful interests often do not need to speak on their own behalf, under circumstances where the state internalizes their concerns and speaks powerfully for them. For related arguments and a case study of actors, see Simmons, Alan and Kieran Keohane. *Shifts in Canadian Immigration Policy: State Strategies and the Quest for Legitimacy. Canadian Review of Anthropology and Sociology*, 1992: 29 (4) 421-452.

who want immigration, particularly if it can be justified on neo-liberal economic growth/efficiency grounds and at low cost. Equity considerations are increasingly ignored.

Part II. Canadian Policy Trends

Canada was partially insulated from the 1970s oil shock because it is a significant oil producer, as well as an oil importer. However, in the 1970s Canada did enter into a period of very slow economic growth. Income per capita seems to have scarcely changed in Canada from the early 1970s to the late 1980s.⁴ Canada also experienced a serious recession in the early 1980s, closely linked to a parallel downturn in its major trading partner, the United States, and to the difficulty of generating exports capable of competing in alternative international markets.

During the 1980s Canadian immigration policy not only began to converge with European trends, but the basic determinants of this policy trend were also largely economic in origin. In Canada in the 1980s, as in Europe starting somewhat earlier, rising unemployment led to increasing concerns about job security. With the recession, industry had ample supplies of domestic labor and had less reason to encourage immigration. At the same time, state leaders did not welcome any policy direction that might increase the number of unemployed workers on welfare, hence they too were luke-warm on immigration. In consequence, policies were changed to greatly reduce the inflow of immigrants in the "independent worker" category. Largely for this reason, overall immigration targets tended to be lower compared with the previous decades in the post-War period. The fall in immigration targets was particularly exaggerated in the early 1980s when a serious recession and high unemployment combined to reduce independent workers to only 14 percent of all immigration and overall immigration targets to their lowest levels in post-War history.⁵

⁴ Statistics Canada, 1994.

⁵ For a detailed review of the relationship between unemployment levels and immigration targets in Canada over the post-War period, see Veugelers and Klassen's paper in the Canadian Journal of Sociology; 1994; 19(4).

Over the 1970s and the 1980s it seemed that Canada was shifting toward the European policy stance: the inflow of workers was reduced over much of this period and immigration policy focused more on facilitating family reunification and dealing with rising flows of refugees and asylum seekers. Three major elements in legislation over these decades reflect this trend.

(a) The 1978 immigration Act clarified the differences between and the procedures for selecting various classes of immigrants. For the first time refugees were explicitly incorporated into immigration law. In addition, the rules of family immigration and family sponsorship were clarified and made more open. The Act created a legal entitlement for immigrants to sponsor their spouse, dependent children less than 19 years of age, parents and grandparents. In 1980, the sponsorship provisions were expanded to create a special category of Assisted Relatives to facilitate the immigration of brothers, sisters and adult children of migrants who wished to sponsor them.⁶

(b) In the context of rapidly rising inflows of refugee claimants in the latter half of the 1980s, Canada responded with two pieces of legislation. One, Bill C-84 (1989) established the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) as a quasi judicial body to make decisions on inland asylum claims and related immigration appeals. The IRB was given a mandate to deal efficiently with the large volume of new asylum claims, and to clear a backlog of approximately 100,000 claims that had developed over previous years. How to meet this large mandate while remaining fair to the refugees provided a quandary for the government. It was the basis for an intense debate between humanitarian groups

⁶ Relatives other than a spouse or dependent (minor) children had to apply in the "Independent" category, along with workers. Sponsorship gave them bonus points in the assessment of their eligibility. Initially, in 1980, sponsored relatives received between 15 and 30 bonus points, when 50 points were required for entry. The measures were changed in 1985 to provide 10 points, with a total of 70 required for entry. Further changes in 1993 gave sponsored migrants only 5 points.

concerned with refugee rights and state officials concerned with "bogus claims" and the high costs associated with the large inflow of asylum seekers.⁷

(c) A parallel piece of legislation, Bill C-55 (1989) gave the state new authority to stop claimants at the border if they had not previously cleared their claim with a Canadian consulate or embassy abroad; to return claimants to any "safe third country" they may have passed through before arriving to Canada; and to enter into agreements with foreign governments to stop asylum seekers from making simultaneous or sequential claims in different countries.⁸ To date, this Bill has had little impact on practice. Policy advisors were unable to define which "third countries" would be deemed "safe" and this element of the Bill has never been implemented. Claimants have continued to enter Canada and apply for asylum from within, so the provisions of the Bill in this regard did not influence total inflows. Canada is currently exploring agreements that would allow claimants only one review in a community of signatory countries, so this element may come into practice, but only after a long delay.⁹

⁷ Simmons, Alan; and Kieran Keohane. Shifts in Canadian Immigration Policy: State Strategies and the Quest for Legitimacy. Canadian Review of Anthropology and Sociology; 1992; 29(4): 421-452.

⁸ In its original form, Bill-C-55 included a proposal to give immigration officials the authority to interdict on the high seas the passage of boats suspected of carrying undocumented migrants to Canada. While this feature of the bill was deleted by the Senate prior to passage by Parliament, it reveals the depth of concern felt by the state and the lengths to which it was willing to go to control undocumented entry.

⁹ In late 1995, Canada and the United States agreed to an arrangement by which claimants would be prohibited from presenting their case in both countries. Claimants would have to present their case in the country to which they first arrived. The agreement is to be formally signed and implemented in 1996. Its impact will depend on how it is interpreted and applied by the two countries, given that they have at times taken quite different approaches to the admission of particular categories of claimants. About one third of Canadian claimants arrived through the United States. Canadian refugee advocacy groups have expressed concerns that the arrangement could lead to a large number of asylum seekers being refused in the United States on grounds that would not have led to their refusal to stay in Canada. See Canada and US Release Draft Agreement on Refugee Claimants, News Release. Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration, November 27, 1995. Also see: Pact could thwart asylum-seekers. Globe and Mail (Toronto), November 28, 1995: p. A9.

Over the 1970s and 1980s, the immigration policy discourse within Canada turned increasingly to issues of social, economic and cultural incorporation. This was the case generally, and particularly so in Quebec. The predominantly (80 percent) Francophone population of the province of Quebec had a particular interest attracting immigrants able to speak French or inclined to learn it after arrival. In the other provinces, the predominance of English in an overwhelmingly English speaking North America has made immigrant language skills a less central concern, although still important in immigrant selection and the provision of post-arrival language training. Arising from this, there has been a common perception that Quebec's concerns centered on language, national identity and assimilation, while the rest of Canada is more centered on plurality and ethnic relations in a multicultural society.¹⁰ In fact, ignoring the occasional inflammatory statements of some prominent Quebecers, it is clear that formal state policies in that province are strongly pluralistic and very similar to those in Canada as a whole. Through its own Ministry of Cultural Communities and Immigration, Quebec seeks to promote the contributions of immigrants by ensuring their full access to employment and state services, while also promoting integration within a pluralistic framework.¹¹ Quebec, to this point unique among provinces, has taken advantage of provisions in the Federal legislation which permit provinces to take a joint role with the federal government in the selection of immigrants and

¹⁰ Differences in day-to-day public discourse between Quebec and the rest of Canada on these matters, while probably exaggerated in the perception of observers, are broadly consistent with the assumed differences between France and Britain with respect to cultural pluralism. See Weil and Crowley [1994, *ibid.*]

¹¹ The main policy views in Quebec promoting immigration, immigrant integration and cultural pluralism were developed in the late 1980s by the then Liberal government of Premier Robert Bourassa. These same policies were maintained subsequently by the Parti Québécois (PQ) under Premier Jacques Pariseau, with clear indication that they will be maintained under the PQ with Lucien Bouchard as Premier. See Let's Build Québec Together: Vision. Québec: Ministère des Communautés culturelles et de l'Immigration du Québec, 1990. Also: L'intégration des immigrants et des Québécois des communautés culturelles: document de réflexion et d'orientation. Québec: Ministère des Communautés culturelles et de l'Immigration, 1991.

a lead role in immigrant settlement programs.¹² In Canada as a whole, multicultural policies and the Adjustment Assistance Program, covering language training and orientation to incoming refugees and other immigrants, were expanded over the 1970s and 1980s.

In the late 1980s and even more so in the 1990s, several features of Canadian immigration policy began to diverge from the drift it had followed over the period since revisions to the Act in 1978. The new policy directions were either framed explicitly in terms of national economic and fiscal strategy, or else they addressed other matters not far removed from such concerns. The broad thrust of policy change was to give higher priority to (a) the role of international migration in increasing Canada's productivity and (b) lowering the costs to the public arising from all classes of international migration, including family reunion, refugees, and asylum seekers. The specific new measures included the following:

Total immigration. Targets were significantly raised. Since 1989, policy has generally indicated that an ideal number of immigrants for Canada would be in the range of one percent of the total Canadian population (currently about 29 million), but that the actual intake in any year should be adjusted to take into account national absorptive capacity.¹³ To date, the adjustment has always led to a target at least somewhat lower than the ideal. For the period 1990-1995, annual targets were initially set in the range of 250,000.¹⁴ The target for 1995 was later revised to a range: 190,000 to 215,000, while that

¹² The Bill is known the Cullen-Couture Agreement after the names of the two ministers, one for Canada, the other for Quebec, who signed it in 1978.

¹³ This general approach to immigration targets was first put forward by Barbara McDougal, Minister of Employment and Immigration, in 1989. It has recently be reaffirmed by the current Minister (of Citizenship and Immigration, the new portfolio name) in 1994. For the reaffirmation, see Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). A Broader Vision: Plan 1995-2000. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada; 1994., p. 13.

¹⁴ See Employment and Immigration Canada (EIC). Managing Immigration: a framework for the 1990s. Ottawa: Employment and Immigration Canada; 1992.

for 1996 has recently been set at 195,000 to 220,000¹⁵ The latter figures include estimates of the number of refugee claimants who were expected to have their claims approved.

These totals are somewhat higher than the average inflows in the 1970s and much higher than the targets in the early to mid-1980s. They are also high with respect to figures for other immigrant receiving countries. For example, in 1991 Canada admitted 205,000 immigrants, a number corresponding to three-quarters of one percent of its total population at that moment. The equivalent percentages for Australia and the United States were .70 and .72, respectively.¹⁶ Canadian targets are justified on a mix of objectives, including economic prosperity, although it is understood that the latter is primarily related to the subclass of Economic Migrants (see below). The rising priority accorded to Economic Migrants is evident in measures to attract immigrants in this class, and other specific measures to create more space for this class within existing targets.

Economic Migrants. Various policy measures have been introduced to increase the priority to Economic Class immigrants. This class includes independent workers, business immigrants, and entrepreneurs. Policy evolution included the following steps:

(a) The first step focused on independent workers, a class subject to selection through the Canadian points system. In 1992, changes were introduced into the selection procedure to increase the proportion of independent workers who had high levels of fluency in English and/or French, and who had high levels of schooling (beyond high school) as well as occupational skills that would insure immediate employability.¹⁷ In 1995, the Minister announced an intention of further revising the selection procedures for independent workers to give even more weight to knowledge of English and French (20 percent of total points, up from 14 percent), to privileged workers aged 25-35 (rather than those 21-44 as

¹⁵ See CIC 1994, *ibid.*, and CIC, A Broader Vision: Immigration Plan, 1996. Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1995.

¹⁶ See EIC 1992, *ibid.*

¹⁷ EIC 1992, *ibid.*

before), and to give visa officers discretion in assigning 16 percent of the applicant's score based on their evaluation of motivation and "job readiness."¹⁸ These proposals have been put "on hold" in the face of widespread concerns expressed by immigration lawyers and others who feel that the new regulations give far too much discretion to visa officers and to subjective views.¹⁹

(b) A related step involved establishing a separate bureau within the state bureaucracy to facilitate business and entrepreneurial immigrants. The special attention to this class was justified on the grounds that these immigrants have a huge positive impact on the Canadian economy. The official framework for immigration policy planning issued in 1992 stated that immigrants entering in the Entrepreneur Class since 1986 had created 10,000 jobs in the Canadian economy.²⁰

(c) Policies have been established to increase the proportion of Economic Migrants in the total inflow. It is understood that desirable immigrants are very unlikely to come without being able to bring close family (spouses, dependent children, and parents). In 1994 Economic Migrants constituted 43 percent of the total immigration inflow. Under current policies, this proportion is to increase to 53 percent by the year 2000.²¹

(d) Based on concerns that applications of Economic Immigrants may not be sufficient to meet new targets, in the fall of 1994 Canada began an international publicity campaign.²² Advertisements were published in foreign magazines and newspapers extolling the virtues of Canada. The advertisements also made clear what kind of immigrants were

¹⁸ CIC, Canada Changes Immigration Criteria for Skilled Workers. News Release. Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration, 17 November 1995.

¹⁹ Sarick, Lila. New immigrant selection rules put on hold. *Globe and Mail* (Toronto). January 9, 1996: A8.

²⁰ EIC, 1992, *ibid.* p. 18.

²¹ CIC 1994, *ibid.*

²² See the newspaper article by Lila Sarick along with a picture of a typical advertisement: Lila Sarick, "Canada strives to woo upscale immigrants." *Globe and Mail*. Toronto; June 7, 1995: A1.

sought: those who could speak English and French, had high levels of schooling, and skills or experience to contribute to the Canadian economy.

Family Class. In order to create space for a rising proportion of Economic Migrants, policy changes have been introduced to decrease the proportion of Family Class. There are major two sub-classes within the family class: (1) the immediate family consisting of spouses, fiancé(e)s and dependent children of principal applicants, and (2) parents and grandparents. In addition, there is a minor sponsorship benefit for those applying in the "independent" class who have a brother or sister in Canada (they automatically get 5 points for this toward their total score). Some policy measures affect only one of these categories, while others tend to simultaneously reduce the inflow in more than one..

(a) In 1992, the rules were modified to reduce the inflow of dependent children and of parents and grandparents. Over the period 1988 to 1992 when state policies favored family class immigration, never-married children of any age were considered "dependents" and given automatic entry, subject to meeting health and security (police) checks applied to all applicants. Following the hydraulic logic of the system, one consequence of this expanded definition of dependent children was a rather large inflow of sponsored parents and grandparents. It seems that immigrant families seeking the entry of a fairly wide range of unmarried adult brothers, sisters, uncles and aunts organized first to sponsor their own parents and/or grandparents. Once the parents or grandparents had been admitted, they in turn sponsored their unmarried children. To break this chain, in 1992 the rules were changed to limit the definition of "dependent children" to those who were unmarried and under age 19. The result was a decline in the inflow of sponsored parents and grandparents, as well as a drop in the inflow of dependent children.²³

(b) In 1992 the sponsorship provisions for brothers and sisters of landed immigrants were modified to reduce the inflow of these family members. Prior to 1992, brothers and

²³ EIC, 1994: 8-9.

sisters could apply for sponsorship from their siblings already in Canada. If the siblings met the family income provisions of the rules, sponsorship would be approved. Brothers and sisters with approved sponsorship would then receive 10 additional points to those they had accumulated on other criteria (their age, language skills, schooling and occupation) applied to independent applicants. In 1992 the rules were changed to provide only 5 points to brothers and sisters. In partial compensation for this restriction, the 5 points were given automatically to any brother or sister of a Canadian resident.

(c) Following policy measures announced in 1994, the proportion of Family Class (consisting of spouse, dependent minor children, and parents and grandparents that might be sponsored later) in the total inflow is now fixed according to a plan and a priority treatment of different categories of applicants. Under current policies, the Family Class proportion is to fall from its 1994 level (51 percent) to 44 percent by 1997.²⁴

(d) The immigration plan for 1996 includes proposals to increase the conditions that sponsors must meet in order to have a family reunification request approved. Sponsors will have to prove that they themselves have not received any form of social assistance, housing or income support from the state in the twelve months preceding their application. They also have to demonstrate that they have a steady income flow sufficient to meet the needs of their family and those newcomers who they wish to sponsor. Under previous rules, a family of 4 sponsoring a relative would need an annual income of \$34,000. Under the new rules, to be implemented in 1996, this will increase to \$41,000.

The outcome of the above measures will clearly curtail family chain-sponsorship-- that is, a sponsorship process which begins with the admission of one family member who then sponsors others who in turn sponsor still more, until there are no more surviving family members in the country of origin.²⁵ Restricting chain-sponsorship is not stated as a

²⁴ CIC 1994, *ibid*.

²⁵ Sajjad Akbar. "Family Reunification Multipliers for Canada, 1971-86," pp 65-82 in: DeVorets, Don, ed. Diminishing Returns: The Economics of Canada's Recent Immigration Policy. Ottawa: Renouf Publishing for C.D.Howe Institute; 1994.

specific policy goal, but it is a major implied feature of the measures above, when taken together. These various policy changes do not reverse the traditional value accorded to family reunification in Canadian policy, but they significantly reduce it.

Refugees. No major changes have been implemented with respect to Canadian refugee policy as such over the 1990s. As before, official refugee admission targets and selection procedures concern only those admitted through application from abroad. Most are selected from refugee camps in countries of first asylum, with the selection based on what might be called "relaxed" criteria similar to those used for independent workers.²⁶ The big policy concern rests with asylum seekers, a separate class.

Asylum seekers. Official policy continues to search for ways to control and reduce the number of asylum seekers who enter the country as visitors (or as undocumented migrants) and then claim refugee status. As in the past, Canada makes frequent use of visa requirements to control individuals traveling to Canada. In the 1990s several additional measures were taken. Airlines are now subject to paying removal costs for passengers arriving without proper documentation.²⁷ They may also be subject to fines. Canadian officials have been involved in training airport staff at foreign locations in procedures to detect falsified documents.²⁸

Cost recovery. New cost recovery and cost reduction measures reflecting national fiscal priorities were introduced into the immigration system in 1994.

(a) Under the new cost recovery measures, an immigrant family consisting of a couple and two children will pay \$3,150.00 (Canadian) for application and landing fees.²⁹

²⁶ Tanya Basok and Alan Simmons. "Refugees in Canada: A Review of the Politics of Refugee Selection," pp. 132-157 in Vaughn Robinson, ed. The Global Refugee Crisis: British and Canadian Responses. U.K.: Oxford UP; 1993: 132-157.

²⁷ Bill C-86.

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²⁹ Sergio Marchi, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. "Changes to the fees charged for immigration services and changes to the Adjustment Assistance Program (AAP)." Statement (Press release). Citizenship and Immigration, Ottawa; April 15, 1994.

About one third of this is for application fees alone; this part is not refundable, hence only individuals who are fairly confident that they will be admitted are likely to apply. The other two-thirds is payable only by those who are admitted. Refugees (including claimants admitted from within Canada) will also pay these fees. If they can not afford them, the state will provide a loan to be paid after admission.³⁰ The costs are said to be less than actual administrative expenses. Business migrants are charged a fee of \$6,000 (Canadian) to have their business proposal, an essential part of their application, reviewed. This is said to be close to the real cost of conducting such a review.

(b) To further reduce the costs of programs to the state, since early 1994 refugee claimants have been permitted to work while their claim is being processed.³¹

(c) Efforts are being explored to increase the contractual obligations of immigrant sponsorship. The state estimates that social assistance (welfare, unemployment insurance, etc.) paid to sponsored relatives (principally parents and grandparents) costs various levels of government a total of about \$700 million (Canadian) annually.³² According to the sponsorship agreement, these costs should be paid by the family that sponsored these relatives, but the state has no effective way of monitoring the system and ensuring that contractual obligations are fulfilled.

(c) Some settlement programs have been reduced in scope. For example, support for language training and orientation in the Adjustment Assistance Programme (AAP) is now limited to government sponsored refugees, a sub-class within the Refugee Class that is sponsored by the state.³³ The state argues that this programme was originally targeted to

³⁰ Following procedures which have been in place for some years, government sponsored refugees must also pay their own travel costs, though once again they can receive a loan from the state and repay the amount later. This is simply to note that charging refugees for costs related to admission is not entirely a new policy feature.

³¹ Sergio Marchi, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. "Refugee claimants allowed to work in Canada." News Release. Government of Canada, Ottawa; January 24, 1994.

³² CIC. A Broader Vision. *Op cit.*, 1994, p. 15.

³³ Marchi, "Changes to the fees....", *op cit.*, 1994.

benefit government sponsored refugees, such that the ruling is simply a return to the original purpose. Over a period of years, the programme had been expanded by implementing agencies to cover strong local demands from other groups of immigrants, particularly claimants and sponsored kin of independent and other immigrants, who needed similar services. Now these other classes of immigrants will not have access to programmes they would benefit from.

Criminal migrants. In the past year, Bill C-44 was passed to deal with public concern about rising crime among international migrants. The bill gives greater power to immigration officers to investigate fraud and international crime. It also authorizes the removal of immigrants who have committed serious crimes, and prevents refugee claimants who have committed crimes from appealing any negative decision on their original claim. While these measures explicitly focus on the objective of reducing crime in Canada, they also respond to a widespread view among the public at large that jailing "foreigners" was an undue burden on Canadian taxpayers.³⁴

In sum, the ideal Canadian immigrant in the 1990s will be a self-financed, "just-in-time" source of labor, technology or capital for immediate national economic benefit. This ideal is a significant departure from previous Canadian immigration goals. It places a very high value on language facility, current work skills and ability to contribute to the development of advanced sectors of the economy. It reduces the obligation of the state to take a long-term view that would require support for programmes to encourage the acquisition of skills among immigrants and their children after arrival to Canada. It reduces the traditional support for family reunification. And it is more restrictive in tone, if not in fact, with respect to refugee claimants.

³⁴ Public views in this regard have often ignored the fact that the so called "foreigners" facing deportation due to having been convicted of a crime are most often legally resident in Canada. Many are in fact naturalized citizens. Some may have arrived to Canada as children and received all their schooling in Canada.

The current Canadian policy mix should probably be viewed as experimental and subject to change. Pressures for change seem to be built into a series of internal and external contradictions in the overall policy package. For example, the current approach does not address the fact that selection of immigrants in the Independent Worker class based on strong language skills and employability will still not solve the need for language training and skill upgrading for immigrants in the Family and Refugee classes. Cuts to current language training and other programmes will possibly slow the incorporation of many migrants into the labor force, an outcome which clearly contradicts other policy objectives.

Other questions may also arise leading to future changes in Canadian policy. For example, what will the policy response be if immigrants with the right language skills and occupational training do not apply in the expected numbers? Will restrictions on sponsorship of other family members be relaxed to encourage them to apply? Will fees be lowered for certain kinds of priority applicants? Will other incentives be required to insure that desired immigrants apply to Canada rather than to other countries, such as the United States and Australia, that also compete for the same kinds of immigrant talent? And last but not least, how will the public react to an elitist immigration policy in the context of high structural unemployment and rising social-economic inequality?

Part III. West European Policy Directions

The following comments on broad trends in European policy are intended to highlight the distinctiveness of the Canadian case, and to show that the conceptual approach used in this paper applies to the European case, even if the actual policy directions that emerge are often very different Canada and Europe. As European countries reveal important differences in international migration policy between themselves, the analysis focuses on broad trends and policy accords between groups of countries.

Recent reviews of immigration policy in Western Europe have drawn attention to the significant differences between countries, particularly with regard to certain constitutional and legal questions related to asylum, settlement and naturalization.³⁵ Although countries in the European Community do not have a unified policy on international migration, it has been noted that national policies have strongly tended toward "...a broad convergence of approach with a more intense nationalism."³⁶ Different arguments have been advanced on the reasons for this trend. In part the convergence seems to arise from parallel but separate learning-from-experience within each country in the face of similar regional and global circumstances,³⁷ and in part it may be ascribed to joint policies arising through inter-state consultations and agreements.³⁸

The sudden shift in European policies in the mid-1970 is generally ascribed to the spin-off effects of a major externally induced economic shock. Rapidly rising oil prices in the mid-1970s triggered a series of related shifts in national economic and fiscal strategies. A moment of truth had arrived, particularly for inefficient smokestack industries. As the new energy costs forced closures, tax revenues declined and social welfare costs climbed. Associated high levels of unemployment, the struggle for jobs, and rising tensions between

³⁵ Immigration policy differences between European nations are highlighted in Daniel Kubat, ed. The Politics of Migration Policies: Settlement and Integration. The First World into the 1990s. New York: Center for Migration Studies; 1993. Further updates giving greater attention to the tendency toward policy convergence in Western Europe may be found in Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Martin Schain., eds. The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe. Op cit.; 1994.

³⁶ Philip, *ibid*, p. 88.

³⁷ See the views of Patrick Weil and John Crowley. "Integration in Theory and Practice: A Comparison of France and Britain," in: Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, eds. Op cit., 1994: 110-126.

³⁸ Allan Butt Philip. *Ibid.*, 1994. In commenting on the Dublin and Schengen agreements, Philip further notes, "It is ironic that at a time when national governments are keen to [resist]..centralizing trends emanating from Brussels, national governments should find themselves agreeing to cede ground over immigration policy to the Community.." (88).

the public and ethnically distinct immigrant communities soon led to the termination of policies favoring labour migration. 39

Despite economic recovery in many European nations in subsequent years, the economic climate is one in which jobs are viewed as scarce and job-security under threat. These continuing concerns are central sources of influence on the continuing convergent trend in Europe with respect to immigration policies. The broad policy trends for Western Europe may be summarized as follows:

Total inflow. In the 1970s, governments throughout Western Europe sought to reduce total inflow by restricting labour migration from outside the region. This measure led to reduced overall immigration in each of the countries concerned, but the downward trend in overall arrivals was moderated by continuing inflows through family reunion and rising inflows of refugees, many from Eastern Europe.⁴⁰ Some nations tried to further reduce net-inflows in the 1970s and early 1980s by encouraging the repatriation of guest workers from Turkey, Morocco and other developing countries, but these policies did not lead to large numbers of migrants returning home. 41

Labour migration. Although labor migration to Europe was abruptly terminated by new policies introduced in the mid-1970s, some authorized flows of workers, including visa-workers on short contracts, continued. For example, France continues to receive about 50,000 temporary agricultural workers annually, mostly from North Africa. 42

Family migration. Previously established regulations concerning family reunion generally stayed in force in Europe. At the same time, rather large immigrant communities had grown up within Europe over the 1950s and 1960s. When labor migration was

39 See Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, Chapter 1, "Introduction," in their edited book, The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe. Op cit., 1994.

40 Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, Op cit., 1994, pp 2-5.

41 See Proceeding of the Expert Group on Population Distribution, Migration and Development, Hammamet, Tunisia, March 21-25, 1983. New York: United Nations, 1994.

42 Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, Op cit., Ch 1, p 10.

terminated, immigrants used the existing family reunion rules to sponsor kin from abroad.⁴³

Refugees. Refugee admission in Europe, as elsewhere, is largely based on law, constitution, and international agreements. These sources of policy influence are resistant to change, or at least to rapid change.⁴⁴ At the same time, circumstances affecting refugee flows in the world underwent a radical transformation. Large flows of refugees and asylum seekers began to enter Europe, first from developing countries, particularly in Asia, then from Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet empire. Refugees from certain countries entered by agreement (e.g., Vietnam). Claimants, on the other hand, were received with a much more variable and restrictive response. Procedures set in place in Europe to assess claims have typically revealed that three-quarters or more of asylum seekers do not meet acceptance standards.⁴⁵ However, for legal and constitutional reasons, it has not always been possible to deport those rejected and this remains a focus of policy concern.

Illegal migrants. The main focus of policy in this area has been on a particular category of illegal migrants, namely illegal migrant workers. It is difficult to control the entry of undocumented workers for various reasons, including the fact that they are often welcomed by employers looking for cheap labor. Undocumented workers themselves may prefer to maintain an illegal status, at least if this improves their job prospects.⁴⁶ In order

⁴³ Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, *Op Cit.*, Ch 1, pp 2-5.

⁴⁴ In 1993 the French Constitutional Council determined that parts of the Dublin and Schengen Agreements violated the Geneva Convention and certain aspects of the French Constitution. In consequence, France decided to amend its constitution, a decision which provoked divisions in all political parties. See p. 10 in Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, "Introduction," 1994, *Op cit* Chapter 1: 10.

⁴⁵ SOPEMI, annual reports.

⁴⁶ In examining the Italian case, John Veugelers notes an instance where undocumented migrants were offered the chance to get a work permit. Many migrants chose not to accept the offer. Employers are obliged to pay higher wages and social security to workers with legal documents. As a result, some migrants felt that they would be more employable without documents. [John Veugelers. "Recent Immigration Politics in Italy: A Short Story," pp. 33-49 in: Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, eds., 1994, *op cit*.

to discourage employers from hiring undocumented migrants, many European countries have legislated fines and other sanctions for firms who have illegal migrants on their payrolls. A detailed study of these measures suggests that the sanctions are somewhat effective, but still leave large holes for employers who wish to hire illegal foreign workers, largely due to inefficiencies and other problems in state enforcement.⁴⁷

Controls . In addition to the limitations referred to above, European nations have extensively used visa controls to restrict movement of migrants from those countries known to be the origin of illegal migrants and unsuccessful refugee claimants. They have also entered into two well-known collective agreements: The Dublin Convention (1990) to prevent multiple or successive claims for asylum by the same individual in different European countries, and the Schengen Agreements (1985 and 1990) to establish a common frontier for Europe.⁴⁸

Settlement policy. As the communities of ethnic minorities in Europe have grown--first through labor migration, then through family reunification and reproduction--the region has struggled with a paradox. It defines itself as a regional bloc without immigration, in spite of the fact that it receives large numbers of immigrants and contains large and growing ethnic-minority communities.⁴⁹ The politics of immigration in Europe over the past twenty years have centered on this paradox and its relationship to questions of national identity and incorporating minorities. The intensity of the population debate on these issues undoubtedly reflects the fact that nationality and national identity are gripping matters in nation states facing reorganization through the forces of regional integration and globalization.

⁴⁷ Mark J. Miller, "Towards Understanding State Capacity to Prevent Unwanted Migration: Employer Sanctions Enforcement in France, 1975-1990." Pp. 141-167 in Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, 1994, op cit.

⁴⁸ See the commentary on these agreements by Philip, 1994, Op cit.

⁴⁹ The growth of these communities takes place largely through natural increase, in addition to continued immigration.

Although the policy measures and objectives vary from one country to another, Western European nations have by and large developed policies to assure the incorporation of ethnic minorities and immigrants. The policies include the provision of rights to schooling of children and other policies, even in cases (such as Germany) where law makes naturalization particularly difficult. The objectives are generally stated in non-economic goals--to improve "race relations" (the focus in the UK), to facilitate social incorporation (the concern in Germany), or to foster "assimilation" (the objective in France)⁵⁰--but the policies themselves look very similar to those in Canada. The difference is that in Canada the same policies are justified to a much greater extent on economic objectives, namely ensuring productive roles for immigrants and reducing immigrant welfare dependency.

In sum, the various immigration debates in Europe over recent years began with a clear economic concern arising from lack of competitiveness in the emerging global system. The first step was to stop labor-migration on the assumption (undoubtedly correct) that the kind of migrants who had been admitted under the "guest worker" programmes and other mechanisms (mostly laborers and semi-skilled factory workers) were no longer required. No consideration was given to whether immigration of other kinds of economic migrants might have positive benefits. Subsequently, the policy debate and policy development has shifted to questions of humanitarian and legal rights, and to matters of national identity and incorporation. Yet the latter issues have been framed by circumstances arising from economic globalization, particularly by the politics of job-scarcity and social conflict over limited resources. This said, it is not correct to ascribe all social conflict between immigrants and non-immigrants in Europe to job competition between these groups. Schnapper has argued, for example, that the rise of anti-immigrant sentiment in Germany

⁵⁰ For a comparison of incorporation policies in Britain and France, see Weil and Crowley, 1994, *op cit*.

can in part be ascribed to scape goating by a majority community which is itself grappling with questions of identity and belonging, as the two Germanys struggle to come together.⁵¹

Discussion

Taking a broad historical perspective, it might be said that Canada and Europe have very long-standing fundamental similarities in their attitudes toward humanitarian and constitutional aspects of immigration, as these relate to family reunification and refugees. They also have equally long-standing basic differences in their attitudes toward workers and other economic migrants, arising from very different historical circumstances and national development ideologies.

The period from the 1950s to the mid-1960s was one of an increased converge in immigration policy between Canada and Europe. This was due to three temporary circumstances. Firstly, family reunification and refugee movements were largely taking place within Europe, or between Europe and countries of heavy European settlement overseas (Australia, Canada and the United States). The common values and constitutional heritage among Western countries facilitated these movements. Western European countries and the former European settlement countries overseas were all major recipients of migrants from other countries, under rules they all understood and reciprocated.

Secondly, the nations of Western Europe as well as the overseas countries of settlement were all experiencing rapid economic growth and high labor demand. This was a common historical circumstance for Canada and the other overseas immigrant receiving nations. It was however a temporary circumstance in Europe, and soon came to an end. Economic migrants were popularly viewed as job-thieves and threats to welfare and security, as well as to ethnic and linguistic homogeneity.

⁵¹ Dominique Schnapper. "The Debate on Immigration and the Crisis of National Identity," pp. 127-139 in: Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, eds.; *Op cit.*, 1994.

There was also a period of increasing convergence from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s. Faced with the early challenges of globalization and a major economic downturn in the early 1980s, Canada responded by dramatically lowering its intake of immigrant workers. For a period, it appeared that Canada was moving in the direction of European policies after the mid-1960s, but the Canadian policy trend proved to be short lived. By the second half of the 1980s Canada had returned to its traditional policy of admitting relatively large numbers of workers, and small but increasing numbers of investment and business migrants, on the grounds that they would contribute to national development.

The challenges of globalization tended to sharpen the long-standing differences in attitude to immigration between Canada and Europe. They also served to point out some of the limitations of common constitutional heritage when providing a similar treatment for refugees and asylum seekers. The major differences between Europe and the overseas immigrant receiving nations, including Canada, arising from the preceding trends are well known. Europe sought to tighten its controls on foreign job seekers. It also tended to reject a higher proportion of claims for asylum, particularly those from non-Europeans. Contrasting with this, Canada and the other overseas countries of settlement tended to maintain traditional levels of immigrant inflow. They also began to vie with one another to attract overseas entrepreneurs and business immigrants, particularly those from the Middle East, Hong Kong and other parts of Asia.

Within these comparisons, the recent evolution of Canadian policy provides an illustration of the way in which political ideology and historical circumstances combine to promote a distinctively assertive "entrepreneurial" immigration policy. The distinctive features of Canadian policy arise out of the history of Canadian incorporation into the international economic system and the way this history combined with current ideological trends. Canada as a country built through settlement from abroad had to develop strategies for multicultural accommodation. Beginning as a small economy, dependent on capital imports and export-led growth, the nation developed an outward looking perspective in

various matters. The result was the development of a nation with a relatively high tolerance for immigrants and for cultural pluralism. (The term "relatively high" is intentional, to take into account the fact that public opinion in Canada tends to the view that immigration levels are too high, while at the same time specific influential interest groups--ethnic communities, human rights organizations, and business lobbies--encourage immigration related to their interests and, hence, put upward pressure on overall targets.)

In this shifting balance of domestic views on immigration, the Canadian state has historically responded to the expression of powerful national interests favoring immigration, while attempting to placate concerns that immigration will erode jobs and economic security. In this regard, both major political parties of the 20th century (the Conservatives and the Liberals) have tended to take very similar approaches to immigration: generally promoting the kinds of migrants which they felt would benefit the Canadian economy and national development more generally, while moderating the total volume in periods of high unemployment, and incorporating other policies designed to please and help integrate ethnic communities which developed through the immigration process. This so called "tap-on, tap-off" approach to immigration, linking immigration targets to unemployment levels, operated coherently up to 1989. Subsequently, the pattern has shifted to one where immigration targets are established with less attention to annual variation in unemployment,

The 1990s constitute a watershed period in Canadian immigration policy. Over the post-War period until 1989, organized labour and the public more generally tended to balance the "entrepreneurial" side of state immigration policy by demanding that inflows be curtailed during periods of high unemployment. The state accommodated by lowering the intake of workers, while maintaining (or even increasing at times) the inflow in the family reunification category, knowing that this would please certain constituencies (ethnic communities) and indirectly furnish workers and provide for the demographic objectives of policy (sponsored kin, like everyone else, tend to work and to procreate, even if they are not

chosen on criteria related to these purposes). The rapid loss of manufacturing capacity and associated job loss hit Canada in 1989 and which continues (in the face of a still jobless economic recovery) has significantly weakened the power of organized labor, and removed a major moderating force in immigration policy, as well as on policy in other areas. This has led to a fundamental shift in the rationalization of immigration objectives.

Economic objectives currently take a more explicit and dominant place. The impact of immigrants on employment and the costs of state programmes continues to be a policy concern, but the upper limits on inflow are less oriented to unemployment figures while new criteria have emerged. The general guideline, put in place most vigorously in 1989 and subsequently, is that annual immigration should optimally be about 1 percent of the national population and that it should be planned in terms of long-term goals, as well as adjustments to reflect specific circumstances in any given year. Annual immigration targets are adjusted downward from this high general baseline, rather than upward from a zero base. The targets, moreover, are increasingly rationalized in terms of (a) the immigrants' ability to pay for their own admission costs, and (b) the capacity of a downsizing state to select the kind of immigrants it wants and to monitor the conditions of their admission (such as the fulfillment of business-plans and investments or sponsorship criteria). State policy statements and parliamentary reports stress the economic contributions of immigration. These serve to deflect criticism on the increasingly elitist character of the new inflows and the policies which downgrade the role of family reunification in nation building. While the current policies are being introduced by a Liberal government, they are completely consistent with the policy drift and ideology of the previous Conservative government.

Various concerns arise from an examination of Canadian and European policies from the perspective developed here. National immigration policies all seem rooted in ideology. They also reveal deep concerns with maintaining, even reinforcing, established political, power and status relationships in society. Economic ideology is a key factor in the promotion and public rationalization of immigration policies. Since those economic