Epistemic Communities and Conflict Prevention

Reconceptualizing Multilateralism After the Rwanda Genocide

by

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DRAFT MANUSCRIPT

The Swedish government originally asked me to write a paper on reconceptualizing multilateralism and conflict prevention in light of the international response to the genocide in Rwanda. In order to be comprehensive and thorough in my reflections, I ended up writing this book. Based on the book, a paper was submitted to the Swedish government along with the draft manuscript.

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Part I: Preliminaries

Chapter 1

Puzzles

Originally, in the aftermath of my work on the international response to the genocide in Rwanda, I started to write a paper, at the request of the Swedish government, to develop some practical proposals to enable relatively modest middle powers with international concerns and commitments, such as Sweden[1], to contribute to the prevention and management of complex emergencies. I found that I had to think about the issue much more comprehensively and bring together much of the work that I have done through my academic career. The result is this book.

There is a great deal of discussion of theory in this monograph. But this monograph is not a theoretical exercise which is said to characterize the writings of the so-called English school of international relations. Instead, theorizing is embedded in both current events as well as a long historicist overview. What is more, conclusions are drawn from an analysis of events and what various actors do and do not do in history. I have followed the dictum that "one must refuse to position oneself outside of history." (Weber 1995, 9) Further, the purpose of this analysis is to provide a framework for policy.

Though the core of the book is focused on case studies and setting those cases in a historical context, a large part of the the monograph is taken up with theory, and the relationship of policy-making to theory. History and the current context of international behaviour is seen to be a dialectic between a limited number of epistemic communities[2] - defined as knowledge professionals focused on a common problem and broadly sharing a general approach - and a set of parallel policy communities. Each epistemic community has its twin in the policy field. The theoreticians and the practitioners who operate in parallel share a certain way of conceiving the world. Recommendations by a specific epistemic community will generally satisfy one set of practioners (the parallel set) while disappointing many other practitioners. When an intellectual's membership in a specific epistemic community is recognized, the policies recommended will usually fall within a given set of parameters. Are intellectual policy analyses and recommendations mere rationales for a

certain policy-oriented community and could they, in the very literal and traditional sense, be described as pontificating. One of the themes explored in this paper is whether it is possible to recommend or formulate policy outside of this self-reinforcing circularity.

Critics of practitioners frequently point to the incoherence and inconsistencies in policies geared toward conflict prevention, mitigation and management. But the theoriticians are equally inconsistent and at odds. This monograph is concerned with exploring several possibilities. Can most theoriticians dealing with intra-state conflicts and international responses to them belong to a common epistemic community?

Other scholars, especially recently, have focused on the need for coherence among theoreticians. For example, "neo-structuralism aims to bridge the gap between conservative and liberal realism (regime theory) on one side and dependency and world-systems theory on the other into a coherent 'agenda'." (Gills & Palan 1994, 2) However, while they try to build a more comprehensive encompassing theory, this study moves in the opposite direction in two senses: first, building more coherence by including professional decision makers into the program for coherence, and, secondly, by building that coherence through practice and praxis, as a process so that the coherence will arise out of common practice.

Can theoreticians and practitioners belong to the same epistemic community? The concern is not simply with bridging the gap between academics and practitioners (George 1993) and the various schools in each, but in integrating the two communities and the schools in each. This is not simply a matter of theoretical interest. It is critical for policy formulation. For one of the main problems pointed out in the various studies of the international response to Rwanda was the lack of coherence in policy formulation and implementation. The fragmentary result means that most efforts cancel one another out or else are ineffectual.

That is the weak case for creating a comprehensive epistemic community. This monograph makes a much stronger case, arguing that **the** major problem behind the resort to violence in complex emergencies **and** the inadequate international response to dealing with such conflicts is the absence of an epistemic community sharing a common body of knowledge and a set of

minimal values. In other words, this monograph argues that we need better knowledge and analysis of conflict situations, their causes, and strategies for dealing with them not simply as instruments upon which to base better policies, but because the process of developing that knowledge and those analyses provides an opportunity to create a cosmopolitan epistemic community which is the essential missing substantive element in such policies and actions.

Further, in making this stronger case, we will offer an explication of why efforts to provide a more comprehensive coherent framework in the direction of a more encompassing theory (neo-structuralists) not only travels in the wrong direction, but we attempt to explain how the direction taken is but a repeat of the original divorce between theory and practice which relegated the upholders of scientific knowledge **and** universal values to a superego and critical role outside the decision-making system.

This is clearly a constructivist effort in the tradition of a friend and mentor, Stephen Toulmin[3] and the pragmatism of Hilary Putman[4] and Richard Rorty[5]. Just as Richard Dworkin has done in moral theory on domestic and legal issues such as abortion, I am concerned with the shared beliefs that **are already institutionalized. But unlike he and others doing such work[6], I am interested in those beliefs on which there is agreement that they should** inform practices and policies but somehow do not, in particular, the general abhorrence at genocide and the agreements that states have the right and even the obligation to intervene to prevent such actions but do not act on those shared beliefs and agreements. Ronald Dworkin and others attempt to generalize from practices and bring our attention to the formal rules implicit or semi-explicit in the practices to provide an authentic source of authority for the actual formal institutions, such as the Supreme Courts of countries, vested with the responsibility for determining general norms. I am concerned with explaining why the same process does not happen in international relations. Asserting that inter-state relations are characterized by anarchy simply states the same proposition - international relations are amoral - in a different form. It does not explain why this is the case and, given the explanation, whether it should be and how it may be remedied.

I am not concerned with asserting that it should or must be

remedied. I am not on a superego trip divorced from the real exigencies and dilemmas states face. I am open to the possibility that it need not and/or it cannot be remedied. But I am also open to the possibility that it can be remedied and that explaining the source of the problem takes us halfway to the remedy.

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In focusing on complex emergencies, **instead of many studies, this paper is based on the results of only one study - the international response to the genocide in Rwanda - of which the writer of this paper was a co-author. (Adelman and Suhrke 1996) Relying on one case study is admittedly dangerous and has been used by practitioners to arrive at wrong conclusions.[7] The emphasis on Africa is understandable, both in the section on Zaire and the one on Rwanda. After all, in the 1990s we have witnessed the famine and aborted humanitarian relief effort in Somalia, the genocide in Rwanda, the resumption of the civil war in Angola, the civil war between the Christians in the south and the Muslims in the north in the Sudan, the enormous bloodletting in Liberia, the chronic massacres in Burundi, the collapse in Sierre Leone. Given the earlier legacies of Uganda, Mozambique, South Africa and Chad, and the immanent disasters to which large African states such as Zaire, Kenya and Nigeria are now prone, Africa is an obvious choice. Africa accounts for a very disproportionate share of genocides, famines, coup d'états, civil wars, and plagues.**

But why focus on one state in Africa? And such a small one! How can one draw any conclusions based on only one study? If emergencies are indeed complex, and if there are a wide variety of them, how can an analysis of just one case be any guide to future action? After all, is not the foundation of intellectual scholarship, particularly in international relations, the discussion of wars and not just a war, the discussion of genocides and not simply a single one?[8]

In addition to this methodological puzzle, the case itself is puzzling. Why did the international community do virtually nothing when the opportunity was present, the risks were relatively minor, the foreknowledge was available, and one *raison d'etre* of the international system was the prevention and mitigation of genocide? After all, the international community was not faced with a powerhouse like Germany committing genocide during a war. Those committing the genocide of 800,000 people in

less than three months - at a more efficient rate than the Nazis ever accomplished - were a relatively small, poorly armed clique, in a tiny country, Rwanda. There was **an international force present, initially invited by both sides in the civil war. Part of the mandate of the force was the protection of civilians. That force controlled the international airport. The international community had both the capacity and the normative grounds for effective intervention. Yet the world sat back and did virtually nothing as 800,000 men, women and children were slaughtered with machetes in their homes, on the streets, and in the churches where they had sought sanctuary.**

There were many places and factors on which to place blame. Within the doctrine of international coercive intervention alone, they would include:
a) the failure to deploy an adequate and effective international deterrence and/or civilian protection force;
b) the failure to provide the force with an effective mandate;
c) UN mismanagement;[9]
d) the failure to collect and systematically analyze the information they already had collected;
e) UN domination by a single superpower who was disinterested in and disengaged from multilateralism;[10]
f) the failure to provide coordinated, rapid and effective coercive intervention once the genocide began and was recognized as such.

In addition, though there were exceptions, in general the media also can be criticized for its initial disinterest and, subsequently, for the fundamental disinformation spread about the violence, reporting the situation as if Tutsis and Hutus were killing one another in an orgy of ancient hatred, instead of depicting the genocide as a centrally organized conspiracy by a small group of Hutu extremists from the North-West to massacre all the Hutu moderate leaders and kill the entire Tutsi civilian population.

What was not at stake in this case was any accusations that the situation involved undermining a basic tenet of the UN itself -non-intervention in the affairs of others. This point is critical, for it runs counter to the widespread doctrine that the most critical factor preventing effective international humanitarian intervention is the doctrine of the sovereign state or that all international enforcement actions necessarily must entail intervention and a breach of the principle of sovereignty.[11] In this case, sovereignty was *not* an issue;

intervention was. No moral and legal vacuum inhibited action. International and African legal norms existed as well as international ones. They were simply not enforced. (Adelman and Suhrke 1996)

Some commentators believe that human suffering provokes a demand for UN action even though that action constitutes external interference in the internal affairs of a state. (Makinda 1996, 157-8) Whether or not this is correct in general, our report (Adelman and Suhrke, 1996) indicated that it was not so in this case, *even though the action was not a breach of sovereignty* because the UN had already been given the reponsibility of protecting civilians by the legally constituted government, and that permission had never been withdrawn. Human suffering did provoke a widespread demand for action, but only when the refugees crossed into Goma in large numbers when the genocide was almost over.

In other words, the Rwanda case is not only a single case, but a singular case entailing human suffering on a vast scale which did not create a massive swell of international public opinion for intervention even when a breach of sovereignty was not involved and even when it would have been a relatively low risk operation.

If one suggests that it was simply not in the self interest of any state or cluster of states to do anything anyway, so the analysis (Adelman and Suhrke 1996) demonstrated an ignorance of how the international system operates, why then did France launch Operation Turquoise at the very last minute of the massacre? Why did the international community invest 1.4 billion dollars in the first year in an enormous humanitarian relief operation for the refugees, particularly when a significant minority of those refugees were the genocidal killers themselves? This was six times the top estimates of the financial costs of a military intervention to stop the genocide completely, and not just the first installment of an annual cost of a huge relief effort. The Rwanda case seems to defy both our normative expectations and our standard realist alternative explanations.

This takes us into the issue of explaining international action rather than assessing praise or blame for the failure of that intervention. This is particularly relevant in ex-colonial Africa where international factors played a significant role in creating the conditions for such conflicts. I am not simply

referring to the legacy of an inadequately educated population required to run a modern state, or the absence of an adequately developed democratic tradition, or the problem of running states which are multi- multi-ethnic with single ethnic groups occupying both sides of many borders, or many of the other handicaps bequeathed to these ex-colonial African states. Many of these problems were created when geographical sections of Africa were carved up into colonies, ignoring the fact that many different nations might be included in a single colony, and areas occupied by one of those tribes or nations may have been bisected by those articicially drawn borders Rwanda was different. It was a state before it was colonized, a state characterized by precolonial segmentation between Hutu and Tutsi. Thus, although Rwanda was typical in that post-colonial development aid attempted to make up **for previous failures, this was not a case where those previous failures were complicated because of the way the colonial regime drew up the borders.**

But Rwanda was typical in another way. Post-colonial development aid did deform the local economies, creating patrimonial regimes in which the primary source of employment was the state, directly and indirectly. For even in the private sector, the major contracts depended on state largesse, and access to that depended on relationships with those in political power. The subsequent victory of what is usually called liberal realism and the domination of the idea of the market as the prime determinant, meant that programs of restructuring were introduced which undercut the power of the authoritarian or patrimonial leaders.[12] This was certainly the case in Rwanda.

The problem is that these explanations, which involve some combination of catalytic economic crisis brought on by economic restructuring, ethnic segmentation, a weak political authority as a result of both, and an escalation and readiness to resort to violence, does not explain why Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique and possibly Zimbabwe have escaped the same fate.

Substantive causal explanations based on comparative case studies and statistical studies are relevant, as are more immediate analysis of the shortcomings of the instrumental measures used to deal with the problems. This monograph does not intend to travel down either route to focus on underlying causes and intervening variables. Nor will I repeat the analysis on the level of critical theory undertaken in the report I authored with Astri Suhrke.

That study used critical theory (CT) as its primary method to explicate what was known to enable the genocide that took place to be anticipated, and what initiatives were undertaken (or not undertaken) to prevent its occurrence. Critical theory[13] compares norms on which there is agreement to actual practice to explore the contradictions between theory and practice. CT stands in sharp contrast with a very different analytic approach. For example, Ronald Dworkin, in his prolific writings in the sphere of jurisprudence, also began with norms on which there had been agreement, but he went the other way. He constructed his theoretical framework to justify those settled beliefs and then, using that theory, attempted to settle disputes over contentious issues such as abortion.[14]

Critical theory differs from both conservative realism and neoliberal realism or institutionalism in its approach to international studies. Classical realism is an explanatory theory of international relations which is then used to predict the behaviour of the other main protagonist in the anarchic inter-state rivalry to develop the strategy for one's own side. In contrast, neoliberal realist internationalism "is a programme for social reform through structured change." (Goldmann 1994, 198) The object is problem solving, not explanation and prediction, in an effort to explore behavioural effects of structural change. Critical theory, in contrast to both of these, is not wedded to either a program of explanation which directs action, or a program of action to resolve issues, but a context based explanation to facilitate a fundamental critique of the behaviour of all parties, whether their programmes were based on classical realism or neoliberal internationalism. Critical theory does not begin with any presumptions about how the world does or ought to operate, or even that the basic unit of operation is a sovereign state. The primary goal is neither a general explanation nor a general program, but a particular critique and deeper insight and understanding. Critial theory is concerned with 'thick' description rather than the 'thin' descriptions favored by comparative analysis and behavioural explanatory theories. (Cf. Geertz 1973)

Since both classical realism and neoliberal internationalism were theories of international relations developed to deal with inter-state conflict, neither may have a great deal to say about inhibiting intra-state violence. For example, neoliberal "international institution building may have limited relevance for the task of inhibiting intra-state violence - a major function that 'a new world order' must be

able to fulfil, as is obvious to everyone in the mid-1990's." (Goldmann 1994, 204) Critical theory has the advantage of not being restricted in this way.

Though CT links social theory and political practice to explain social processes, it has two serious limitations - a normative and an explanatory one.

Because the critical theoretical method adopted focused on the disjunction between agreed norms and actual behaviour, the analysis could not produce a normative direction. All the analysis could purport to do is hold practices to account according to the norms already agreed to between states in an effort to reinforce existing international moral standards. In concrete terms, the study could only conclude that if you have signed a genocide convention, and if you want to prevent genocide, then the practices followed did not achieve that goal. But perhaps these norms prohibiting genocide were never intended to be enforced? Perhaps they were simply empty rhetoric and proof that states only act when their self interests are involved? What justified the conclusion that if states sign international covenants, they are obligated to keep them? But then why act to help the refugees?

From an opposite perspective, others could argue and criticize the study for assuming that those obligations are simply the consequence of signing a genocide convention. They would claim that they were the foundation for doing so. Obligations do not arise from signing agreements but are the reason those agreements are signed.

Though CT certainly depicts, it does not explain the moral failures in a situation in which there was more than sufficient anticipatory knowledge and a preponderance of legal, financial and military means available to stop a technologically low level, ill-equipped and very accessible genocidal force. Nothing within CT enables us either to explicate the absolute failure to respond appropriately by those who at least purport to uphold the principles of the inviolable rights of the individual and the rights of a group not to be slaughtered simply because they are members of that group. The conclusions can easily be used to reinforce the position that universal moral norms are a chimera and international organizations are the eunuchs of modern civilization, except that the very same international community launched a very effective and reasonably efficient emergency operation to assist 2.6 million refugees resulting from the same

conflict.

In addition to its normative limitations, the critical theoretical methodology adopted also suffered from explanatory limitations. The Rwanda study explained the failures in the particular case through reference to a number of factors such as "noise' (a plethora of other world crises demanding attention) and "shadows" (the inhibiting interpretation of the later phase of the Somalia debacle[15]), but offered no general explanation for the apparently accelerating number of such crises and the features common to them all. This is an inherent limitation of CT since critical theory starts with the presumption that all social discourse is historically and contextually specific; without that specificity, analysis is inaccurate. It is not surprising that the case produced no analysis of root causes, and, indeed by implication, seemed wary of suggesting there were root causes.

This normative and explanatory limitation of the study is captured in one central substantive inadequacy. Unlike other varieties of more idealistic analysis, CT presumes that analysis must originate in and, in the end, address specific social and political **interests**. It suggests that the resolution of a problem should attempt to rise above any one particular interest by incorporating various interests. But if the interest of one party -the Hutu extremists in this case - is exclusionary, how can their interests be included? If the Hutu extremists were ideologically committed **not** to rise above interests, but to exclude the interests of a particular group - the Tutsis – should the interest of that party be excluded? In the Arusha Accords, should the extremists have been excluded, as they were, or coopted as the Americans and French recommended?[16] Restricted to our chosen method of analysis in using critical theory, Astri and I could not come to any agreement on whether, in retrospect, it was appropriate to exclude those who ideologically refused to recognize the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) because they could never be committed even in principle to rising above the interests of each party, or whether the American/French plan of including the Hutu extremists in the planned Broad Based Transitional Governemnt (BBTG) would have been the better course of action. Do you exclude those who by belief exclude others, or co-opt them? Critical theory has nothing in its bag of methodological tricks to answer the question.[17]

If the methodology raises some questions, what about the case itself? I have already indicated how unique the Rwanda case

was compare to the explanatory and normative expectations current in the literature. Further, Rwanda is a tiny, historically and geo-politically marginal country, as distant from the concerns of western developed nations as one can find. We are talking about the outer limits of the developed world. The case is extremely other in an opposite sense. The genocide was enormous in both absolute terms and relative to the population of the group slaughtered. What lessons can be learned by taking a case as distant as one can find from both our self-interest and our normative expectations?

One answer is that such a case, distant as it is from both the interests of the great, declining and middle or small powers, avoids any contamination of the primary focus of analysis on which international theory has been based for the last fifty years - the Cold War or East-West struggle. That distance is not that obvious as we shall see. In any case, I have much deeper reasons for using such a case quite aside from my deep familiarity with it.

In chapter 2, I offer a theoretical explanation in terms of bifurcation points and chaos theory. In chapter 3, I provide an historical explanation in terms of the remoteness of the case from the Cold War given the conventional wisdom that even post-Cold War conflicts must be read in terms of the demise of the Cold War. With these preliminaries out of the way, I then explicate current international relations theory and apply that theory to case analyses of both Zaire and Rwanda, and use those cases to clarify the problems with current theory.

In the final section, I undertake an analysis of both modernity and globalization to explain why an epistemic community is the missing link in explicating violence, and formulate the general parameters of a plan for using western resources to build an international epistemic community focused on the monitoring and analysis of intrastate conflicts.

Chapter 2

Triggers and Bifurcations

One reason for focusing on crises in Africa is because Africa is the place where we find the maximum disorder in the world. Almost half of the civil wars being waged in the world today (16 of 35) with battle deaths exceeding 1,000 per year, and, therefore, half the complex emergencies, are to found in Africa. In addition to Rwanda, the UN Security Council has on its current agenda five other African states - Angola, Somalia, Liberia, Western Sahara, and Rwanda's fraternal twin to the south, Burundi.[18]

But the reality is that Africa, more particularly, sub-Saharan Africa, is the continent most ignored. African countries occupy the lowest spot in the totem pole of states competing for the attention of the greatest power on the globe today, the United States.[19]

On the other hand, in focusing on a small, marginal African country, we can find continuity in African policy since it is largely in the hands of the mandarins or professional bureaucrats. When African issues come to the attention of the head of state, it is generally only when there is a crisis. But that too can be an advantage in terms of action just as the normal bureacratic control can be in terms of analysis. At such critical moments, that head of state is not trapped by current policies, but is able to innovate. When bureaucratic influences are briefly interupted, the "possibility for change in interventionist practices is great." (Schraeder 1994, 50) The more pronounced the crisis point, or what I will call a bifurcation point, the greater the scope for innovation and real change. In Africa, we find both long term continuities in policy and sudden crises which offer opportunities for creative action.

Bifurcation points not only allow policy makers in the developed world the greatest scope for change and innovation, but such points of chaos are themselves subject to very unpredictable patterns. In such situations, what often counts most is not the underlying or root causes or even intervening variables, but the triggers themselves. It takes very little to shift a situation in one direction rather than another.

Brown (1996b, 573), for example, identifies four main

cluster of factors which compare somewhat to and have a large overlap with the four underlying causes I identify: an economic crisis, weak institutions, social segmentation, and proneness to violence. He identifies "structural factors such as weak states, security concerns, and ethnic geography; political factors such as discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group politics, and elite politics; economic/scial factors such as widespread economic problems, discriminatory economic systems, and economic development and modernization; and cultural/oerceotual factors such as patterns of cultural discrimination and problematic group histories." Proximate causes are but the acceleration of the underlying causes as can be seen in the comparative chart Brown (1996b, 577 Table 17.1) provides for which we offer the following abbreviated version.

Underlying Causes   Proximate Causes

Structural factors
- weak states   - collapsing states
- intra-state security concerns   - changing intra-state military
                                               balance
- ethnic geography   - changing demographic patterns

Political Factors
- discriminatory political inst. - political transitions
- exclusionary national ideologies - increasing same
- inter-group politics   - growing inter-group compet.
- elite politics   - leadership struggles intense

Economic/Social Factors
- economic problems   - mounting
- discriminatiry economic systems - growing inequities
- economic development and   - fast-paced development &
     modernization   modernization

Cultural/Perceptual Factors
- patterns of cultural   - intensifying
     discrimination
- problematic group histories   - ethnic bashing and
                                       propagandizing

    Brown generalizes from the very specific conclusion we drew in our own report (Adelman and Suhrke 1996). "(S)tates are especially prone to violence if state structures are collapsing due to external developments (such as sharp reductions in

international financial asistance or sharp declines in commodity prices), internal problems (new, incompetent leaders or rampant corruption)." (Brown 1996b, 576)

However, Brown, in contrast to most theorists concerned with underlying and proximate causes, recognizes the importance of identifying contingent factors. As he noted, there is not enough data on the role of elites and leaders in instigating violence or on the roles of neighbouring states as triggers. This was perhaps the greatest strength of the Adelman and Suhrke report on Rwanda; it identified and characterized the importance of both those factors. Deep description is needed to identify these contingent factors.

> (C)onflict prevention efforts should focus very aggressively on the decisions and actions of domestic elites, who are usually responsible for sparking internal conflicts...Those interested in conflict prevention need to think systematically about ways of neutralizing the ethnic bashing, ethnic skapegoating, hate-mongering, and propagandizing that are often the precursors to violence." (Brown 1996b, 599)

To neutraize the effects of specific leaders. knowledge is needed which goes beyond general causes to identifying what George (1993) calls the role of actor-centred and situational analysis. This is because different nations and groups have different propensities. The classical realism of Thucydides recognized this. For example, it was important to recognize the national character of Athens with its propensity to be bold, innovative and relatively magnanimous while Sparta was conservative, calculating and sometimes viscious. (Johnson 1993, 28) The idiosyncracies of individual leaders can be even more important.

Further, an analysis of endogenous factors is insufficient. Even if the primary causes of violence are internal, exogenous factors are critical. At the very least, they play a permissive role. They cannot be left out of any analysis. It is as important to understand the conceptual and practical constraints of outside actors and the conditions, capacities and motivations which can propel them to act effectively as to understand the internal dynamics within a state and within the region in which that state exists. For, as the Rwanda study makes clear, the role of neighbouring states is critical to understanding the

conflict as well as grasping the best mechanisms for helping to minimize that violence. Understanding the role of permissive conditions and outside actions and their interaction with the triggers which exacerbate the proximate causes of violence is critical to any analysis.

This does **not** mean that the focus shifts from "discrete (ontologically distinct) unities (that is states like Rwanda) to the dynamics of social development within the international system as a whole." (Gills & Palan 1994, 3) In contrast to the neo-structuralist agenda in which the stress is on the primacy of the totality of the international system, my perspective is sceptical of any attempts to assume a god's eye view, to, as it were, analyze a situation *sub specie aeternitatis*. I am wary of creating any distance between theory and history. Theory must be embedded in the details and nuances of history.

Further, as I shall attempt to explain in Part III, the root cause of the divorce between theory and practice is to be found in the mediaeval disposition of theorists in insisting that they represented an absolute standpoint and that from their vantage, those involved with power, but particularly with the accumulation of wealth, were somehow inherently to be identified with the devil's work. Because such theorists no longer use god or devil talk and have totally secularized this perspective does not mean they have escaped the propensities that were involved in that position. While chastizing their theoretical opponents for being concerned with what is universal and timeless in contrast to their own historicist perspective, I argue that they have not been sufficiently historicist for they do not recognize the mediaeval origins of their own work. An important theme of this work is not only to argue that such efforts take us in the wrong direction, but to explain why and how the situation first arose, as well as its critical impact on our current handicaps in tackling the issue of large scale violence. That direction is not only wrong in explanatory terms; it is wrong in moral terms. The common theme of both the mediaeval moralists and our contemporary anti-religious neo-Marxists of various stripes is to equate the key source of the problem with capitalism. In modernity, it is expropriating surplus value which *naturally* belongs to those who invest their labour to produce it. In the mediaeval period, it entailed putting a price on capital and charging interest.

Rather than some general cause, such as the the inherent

dialectic of capitalism for the revolutionary utopians, or the absence of developed and effective global political regimes of authority for most liberal internationalists, or, from the opposite ideological perspective, the inherent conflict between sovereign states, or, in more globalist terms, the clash of civilizations or the clash between civilization itself and nature and, hence the focus on environmental scarcity, this monograph does not concentrate on reconciling the various models of general causes that have been offered. Rather than such powerful mechanisms, we note that relatively minor events can start a chain reaction.[20] In the centre of any system - and the system of states in the international arena is a system - where there is relative stability, one may find a degree of predictability. However, at the outer edges of the system, a small change cannot only have a large impact in that arena, but can profoundly affect the system as a whole.[21]

In conventional international studies, large scale elements - environmental scarcity and the consequences on satisfying needs, population explosions, and illicit economic engagements, for example, are isolated and studied as they are found in various cases. The presumption in **all** these theories is that the causes are proportional to the results. International theorists presume that the mechanical model of Newtonian physics means that any situation continues on an entropic trajectory unless disturbed by an external force (realists) or balanced by countervailing values and institutions (internationalists). But the world cannot be reduced to a simple mechanical model. It is a complex, inter-active system characterized by "chaos"[22] at **key** points of perturbation.[23] Newtonian mechanical models may be appropriate to the analysis of areas which are more-or-less in a steady state of equilibrium. Mechanical laws may dominate in apparently relatively stable periods between bifurcation points of great instability even in areas of crises. Choosing Rwanda entails taking up a case where the crises points are of greatest concern.

The stress in the study is **not** on root causes or prevailing intervening factors, though I do not dismiss any of the accounts which attend to them. The stress is on triggers at criticial bifurcation points, the very elements that mechanical modellers of both the realist and idealist schools tend to dismiss as minor contingent variables which are unpredictable and uncontrollable. In contrast, the study we undertook was a demonstration that a system can be characterized by a relatively

stable regime dominated by forces (realists) or sufficiently assisted by an adequate set of international agencies (liberal institutionalists). But the key point at issue is the trigger, a bifurcation point where a combination of elements come together. At that critical juncture, choices could have been made, actions could have been taken, without which the system spun into disorder. Serendipity is as important as the "normal" governing forces.

Conflict management is concerned with keeping 'chance' from getting out of hand, and to be prepared, if a crisis occurs, to take advantage of the situation to build a system which is even larger and has a greater degree of order. It is in such crises that we can see the missed opportunities and can set systems in place that can in future effect large changes.

This monograph is built on the premise that it is not the underlying root causes or the absence of adequate countervailing values and institutions that are so critical, for those causes will persist and institutions will continue to be inadequate, however many reforms and improvements that are made. But those institutions are best improved, not by an overall design, but by zeroing in on a bifurcation point and taking advantage of an opportunity or a crisis both to mitigate the immanent chaos at that bifurcation point and increase the factors reinforcing stability, not by reinforcing the status quo, but by creating a new situation which reduces the pressure altogether. Bifurcation points are like earthquakes. The tectonic plates covering the surface of the earth are under great stress at the junctures where they meet. The forces will only build up if temporary measures merely postpone the inevitable eruption in the quest for temporary stability.

Readiness and preparation are the key. Complex emergencies are the products of composite systems that evolve to a critical state in which a relatively minor event can start a chain reaction. It is my contention that early warning should be designed to anticipate the bifurcation point, take advantage of that critical event, and introduce novel and more comprehensive systems for increasing order and preventing chaos.

It is, of course, a truism that such crises are also opportunities to reinforce the status quo, to insist on stability in the face of chaos. Realists, in particular, dread chaos and instability. Such policies governed American-Zairian relations in the sixties and seventies. "A critical element of this consensus (maintaining or enhancing US-Zairian ties) was

the firm belief that 'chaos' - meaning territorial
disintegration, regional instability, and ultimately communist
expansion into Central Africa - was the only alternative to
Mobutu's continued hold over power." (Schraeder 1994, 80) As one
confidential source in the State Department put it so
succinctly, "Zaire without Mobutu could entail a Zaire engulfed
by chaos."[24]

Reinforcing the forces responsible for the chaos only
delays the explosion and multiplies the impact. The classical
pattern is to imitate the cosmic serpent, Naga, of Hindu
mythology, and try to reestablish stability and solidity out of
a very fluid situation.[25] Marx said that "All that is solid melts
into air." But when hard core realists are in charge, "All that
is liquid turns into a solid sarcophagus," given common current
practices in foreign affairs, which, like Chernobyl, merely
hides and postpones the turbulence and danger beneath.

However, the reverse can also be the case. The sooner we
are able to intervene in a situation of impending chaos, the
greater control we will have over that situation.
Unpredictability increases with time. The more a situation is
allowed to get out of hand because we know so little about it,
the far greater chance that chaos will result in the greatest
disorder offering the least chance to produce a higher level of
order. Concrete contextualized analysis of particular sutuations
is required to enable us to understand what is happening and why
it is happening.

In addition to an immediate opportunity for creative
action, bifurcation points bring to the fore the contradictions
in international regimes, such as the refugee regime. Thus, in
addition to allowing us to grasp what is happening and providing
opportunities for innovative intervention, such innovations can
have the greatest impact on the system as a whole. Order emerges
out of disordered systems, not via a central control or via
governing laws, natural or man-made. In fact, a lack of central
control makes the system more adaptive because of the use of the
principle of self-organization. Bifurcation points allow a
system to reach a higher level of organization, not by
controlling the chaos, but, as part of the system, innovating at
the pint of chaos to increase the organization and, hence,
equilibrium of the system as a whole.[26]

Historical conjunctures of neo-structuralist accounts are
not bifurcation points, since historical conjunctures are merely

the historical moment where different levels of the system (security, finance, production (versus law), and knowledge meet. They are not measured by their high ratio of chaos and low level of equilibrium. They are not simply static rather than dynamic points of contact; they are abstract points. My argument, in fact, will be that modernity has been characterized by a denial that knowledge can meet with the power, economic and legal levels. In modernity, knowledge is simply instrumental for those other levels or, alternatively, adopts a stance, as the neo-structuralists do, in which knowledge insists on staying aloof from those levels in order to retain both its explanatory and moral purity.

There is another key problem with the neo-structuralist approach. For, although they differentiate themselves from their struturalist parents by denying any focus on **governing** world processes, such as when Mason (1993) depicts capitalism as a play of forces, a 'set of sets' "without an overarching system of regulation to unify it" (98), in spite of such denials, neo-structuralists generally continue to identify 'global governing forces' and the transformative process instigated by these forces at different levels, such as the responses at the level of foreign policy and the efforts of individual states to respond to the constraints and pressures of these global economic forces. International relations is depicted as a *vast transmission mechanism* (the words and italics of Gill & Palan) for state and societal transformation, revealing thereby that the controlling hand of a 'divine' entity is still in the model, and, secondly, even though the model is dynamic rather than static, it is still a mechanical model. Neo-structuralists may be more broad minded in trying to encompass the conservative and liberal realist agendas, but they seem unable to escape a fascination with *mechanical* and *global* and *governing* forces.

As Ilya Prigogine put it so succinctly, "Matter at equilibrium is blind. Far from equilibrium it begins to see." (Prigogine 1993, 20) At equilibrium, we see, but we only see what we have brought to the situation in the first place. Thus, for example, Wallerstein, the brilliant creator of worlds system theory, lays stress on an equilibrium model in which the basic units of analysis are geographical: core, semi-peripheral and peripheral zones in the world-economy.[27] There is a dialectic between the global transformative processes of capitalism and the preservation propensities of states to maintain the status quo while the globalization continually undermines that effort

to produce a new equilibrium level by altering the character of the sub-state units - classes, peoples, and households. Neo-structuralists may amend the model by allowing us to see power and self interest at work as dynamic and not just passive elements. Idealist utopians may point to the absence of an effective international authority. But the real issue may be to allow the forces in play to see themselves. The key may not be providing explanations for those who are victimized or engaged in victimization, but to set up a process whereby they can discover themselves what is wrong.

This is a larger point than the fact that any methodology, including critical theory or behaviourist realism[28], deforms what it grasps simply in the grasping.[29] "Electron's in atoms do not have definite positions or velocities until these properties are measured, and the measurement of an electron's velocity wipes out all knowledge of its position." (Weinberg 1996, 12) This does not mean that we cannot measure what is "out there"; it only means that there is a cost for taking the measurement - what is out there is no longer out there in the same way for us as before we attempted the measurement. Heisenberg's principle teaches us that all descriptions entail a choice of methodology and the questions asked; the answer is profoundly affected by the measure used. As expressed in quantum mechanics, there is an irreducible multiplicity of representations for any system being described, each connected with a determined set of operators. Or, as Niels Bohr observed, in quantum mechanics, objects defy unique and comprehensive descriptions; depicting an object requires diverse points of view. In Hegel's more poetic language, reality cannot be captured "like a bird caught by a lime-twig." If we alter the method to grasp the object of study with greater clarity, the object of study itself is changed. According to Heisenberg's principle, there appears to be an irreducible plurality of perspectives; no divine point of view exists from which reality can be grasped.

Re Heisenberg's principle:

If we attempt to adopt the divine point of view, not by utilizing one method and undertaking a single study, but surveying the results of all studies of complex emergencies in the effort to pick out the best suggestions, in the effort to

find common elements, we miss the unique complexity and opportunities that the study of a single crisis brings. More importantly, we miss the opportunity of setting a system in place which gives vision to the forces in play. Possibly, the quest for identity may annihilate what it is intended to grasp.

This is the micro advantage of examining a particular crisis. There is also a mega advantage. At a bifurcation point, we may see through a glass darkly into a new world because we come to understand the entry point of the modern world we now occupy. It is as if close observation of a crisis in the heart of Africa, in the country where the source of the Nile was discovered by Europeans, we are watching an exploding star at the fringes of the universe and thereby can see in the present the origins of our modern cosmos.

As I pointed out in the first section, critical theorists can be accused of reinforcing the relativism of all values while protesting the separation of fact from value.[30] But this is the crisis of modernity itself. Modernity is characterized by rational calculation. But it does not teach us the norms by which we should live.[31]

> "(M)odernity is characterized by an intensifying clash between instrumental rationality and the realm of substantive values. As instrumental rationality advances, so the spheres of life in which meanings and values are affirmed become both marginalized and given a heightened significance. This tension introduces the fundamental paradox of modernity: in a world characterized by increasing rationalisation in all aspects of human existence, there is no rational way of deciding among an irreducible plurality of value commitments...an account of modernity framed as a universalizing history of (instrumental) rationalisation is simultaneously an account of modernity and a realm of non-rational and criterionless choices about ultimate values." (Walker 1993, p. 56)

The central dilemma of our time, as Max Weber recognized, is to explain the relativity of values, power politics and the recourse to violence despite the advance of reason and civilisation. "(L)ittle that is happening anywhere can be understood without reference to the historical discontinuities produced by the rise of the modern state and modern forms of

power." (Gledhill 1994, 23) We are far more likely to find an explanation at the fringes of our cosmos when a crisis is underway than an analysis of far more central situations and crises.

This is particularly true when the issue is whether or not to intervene in the internal violence gripping a country. For just as the state is the central creation of modernity in the international arena, the issue of intervention is its complementary other half. For an essential prinicple of a sovereign state is, indeed, the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of that state. When we have a case where sovereignty was **not** an issue, but intervention was, we have a rare chance to glimpse the issue of intervention and non-intervention without the issue of sovereignty obscuring our view. It is akin to a chance of observing the sun when it is being obstructed by the moon during a solar eclipse.
After all, "intervention is a moment of of modern political life during which legal, formalized boundaries become politically contested and communities as points of reference - be they 'domestic' foundations of state sovereignty or 'international centers of judgement - are brought into doubt." (Weber 1995, 8) Thus, the attitudes of both the sovereign publics which determine the decisions of states and of the cosmopolitan communities of evaluation are revealed.

This point is critical. For as I will shortly attempt to demonstrate, the bifurcation point at which the Soviet Union imploded was a much greater explosion with many, many more observable effects. It was also far closer to home and easy to observe once the convulsion was underway. But the bifurcation point in Rwanda was much simpler and much more telling. Because it was not a star exploding within our own galaxy, but at the outer edge of the modern universe where the issues of sovereignty and non-intervention were first forged as the basic structural components of modernity.

.... **Chapter 3**

The Cold War - Trigger or Bifurcation

        The end of the Cold War was precisely such a bifurcation point for Eastern Europe. Many have argued that the Cold War was the most important bifurcation that has occurred since the Second World War.
Since a change in one system always impacts on every other one, a change in the system that dominated the globe for the last fifty years would seemingly have the greatest impact. Hence, global rather than local forces, so the argument goes, are the ones that we need to study most, in particular, the impact of the end of the Cold War.

        The end of the Cold War certainly changed the world, particularly Eastern Europe and that part of Asia adjacent to it. The prime *raison d'être* of the western military alliance - the containment of the Soviet military and ideological threat - has self-destructed with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Though it has not disappeared, the twin threats of an invasion of Western Europe or of a nuclear strike launched from Eastern Europe have shrivelled enormously. The West also won on the political front. Moscow's suppression of both its neighbours and its own citizens, its ideological lead in exporting revolution, its military expansionism, its ideological zealotry, have all collapsed.[32]

        It is also certainly true that the African policy of the Western superpower, the United States, was a direct by-product of the Cold War. The Cold War was also probably the main factor that allowed hard realism to dominate international studies in the United States and the American conduct of foreign policy. (Cf. Goldmann 1994, 15) The real question became what would be American policy towards Africa when communism no longer posed a threat?

        If the Cold War has ceased, what does this mean for Africa? Will there be a peace dividend that will enable Africa to recover from its debilitating economic crisis? Or will Africa simply be relegated to the dustbin of history? (Keller 1996, 1)

        There are two views - a descriptive and a prescriptive one. And they are at odds. Descriptively, the post-Cold war period

has resulted in what Michael Clough designated "cynical disengagement." Not just benign neglect, but effective abandonment unless forced by domestic forces to become superficially pro-active. "(T)he end of the Cold War has reinforced the tendency within the US policymaking establishment to ignore Africa in favour of other regions of greater concern, such as Western and Eastern Europe and, more recently, the Middle East."[33] I. William Zartman claimed that this was a policy adopted by America's allies as well.[34]

But the very individual who coined the phrase "cynical disengagement" as a description of US policy, advocated a very different role for the United States and her allies. Micahel Clough insisted that the US could create a new relationship with the African continent now that it was free of the conceptual and ideological shackles of the Cold War. (Clough 1992b, 2) Such a redirection of American efforts were supported by academic scholars who had themselves described American Cold War policy towards Africa in strictly realist terms. "(T)he end of the Cold war offers tremendous opportunities - particularly the possibility of replacing superpower confrontation with a greater sensitivity to a host of development problems in Africa." (Schraeder 1994, 30) America's ex-Cold War rival now gave even stronger sentimental support to that view. Nikolai Krylov, a senior research scholar with the Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of what was then the USSR and is now Russia, gave voice to the belief that the end of the Cold War should produce a peace dividend. "Now favorable conditions exist for the international organization (the UN) to perform its historical purpose, namely 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind'." (Krylov 1991, 94)

The sense of opportunism for a new world order at the end of the Cold War was certainly the predominant view of grotians, idealists who believed that the end of the Cold War provided an opening to invest the international system with a truly governing set of international laws and the institutions to enforce them.[35] As the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali articulated this position, "The end of the Cold War was a major movement of tectonic plates and the after-shocks continue to be felt. But even if the ground beneath our feet has not yet settled, we still live in a new age that holds great promise for both peace and development." (Boutros 1995, para. 5, 6)

This sense that the end of the Cold War offered new opportunities extended especially to those non-realist theorists from schools of international relations that had been marginalized if not ostracized. For some, the end of the Cold War meant an end to their own marginalization as theorists. This was particularly true of those who wanted to examine issues through a normative lens. Some hoped that the realists would give up examining the world in terms of the survival of one versus the survival of the other. "(T)he Cold War put a damper on the salience of normative theory. Most political disputes in the underdeveloped world were immediately subsumed into international politics in Cold War terms...Now that the conflict is over and it is no longer possible to understand world politics in terms of a supposed conflict between good and evil, the way seems to be open for a resurgence of normative theory. " (Frost 1996, 6)

Unfortunately, for some, the rise of fundamentalist Islam (and a resurgence of nationalism) seemed to scuttle this possibility. Others agreed with the thesis of a forthcoming conflict with Islam, but viewed Islam as a source of salvation from American hegemony.

The global economy perspective sees the Third World as a residual, marginal factor, a non-identity. The historical experience and perspective of Europe confronts Islam as a real identity, a different civilisation. Islam returned to Europe's lost origins in Greek philosophy, taught Europe science and medicine, and showed Europe a cultivated style of living, yet remained fundamentally alien and never, unlike Europe, germinated its own capitalism.

The confrontation with Islam is not only external, across borders and the Mediteranean sea. It is also becoming internalised within European societies, in migration and in the responses to migration by such political phenomena such as the Front National in France. The new Europe is challenged to free itself from the residual, marginalised view of the Third World and to confront directly the cultural as well as economic and political issues in a recognised co-existence of two different civilisations.

Europe, in sum, can be a proving ground for a new form

of world order: post-hegemonic in its recognition of co-existing universalistic civilisations; post-Westphalian in its restructuring of political authority into a multi-level system; and post-globalisation in its acceptance of the legitimacy of different paths towards the satisfaction of human needs." (Cox 1993b, 286)

Gramscians placed their hopes for benefiting from the end of the Cold War on the collapse of Stalinist and Leninist versions of Marxism, which they termed pathological, mechanical Marxism (Gill 1993, 3). The implosion provided an opening for an authentic historical materialism. In John le Carré's terms, the time was ripe for them to come out of the cold.

This sense of opportunism pervades idealist thinkers of all stripes.[36] But for some, it is more than an opportunity; it has become a necessity. "Ethical problems were virtually ignored in the bipolar international system, teetering continuously as it did on the brink of nuclear catastrophe. For many people then it sounded grotesque to speak of ethics as opposed to survival. But today the drastic attenuation of international tension not only *allows but also* forces us to turn attention to the moral problems of international coexistence," (Bonante 1995, xiii-xiv) Boutros-Ghali held the same position. "(A)n opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter - a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, 'social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom'. This opportunity must not be squandered." (Boutos 1992; 1995, para. 3, 39)

These statements might bother some of us who worked in the salt mines of international ethical theory during the Cold War on issues not only of deterrence and humanitarian intervention, but on refugees and membership theory. I am more concerned, however, with the **use** of the end of the Cold War to see opportunities and necessities for new beginnings and fresh starts as merely the renewal of the age old hope for the dawning of a new age.

This hope is contrasted with the description above of the decline in American interests in Africa following the demise of the Cold War. The perspectives of the conservative realists are much less sanguine about the possibilities opened up by the end of the Cold War. Or at least, the possibilities they envision

are not positive; they anticipate new sources of trouble and turmoil given their conceptual foundation rooted in power and self-interest. Liberal realists, however, like the idealists, advocate that a more forward looking internationalist policy be adopted.

One of the strengths of any method that requires self-criticism and self-consciousness to be built into the method is that it tends to see our own fundamental conceptions to be as much part of the problem as the solution. Its strength is conceptual criticism rather than the exposure of root causes. Thus, the central motif of many current realist and idealist academic exercises is the conventional wisdom that the end of the Cold War thrust upon us new problems and the potential for new solutions.

Thus, in the idealistic Repression Thesis, the claim is made that the end of the Cold War inaugerated a new era because previous antagonisms repressed by the superpowers for fear of escalation have now been released. In the words of Robert Kaplan, "Although the threat of Soviet arms has receded, the threat of global instability has taken its place." (Kaplan 1990, 113) Or, as Boutros Boutros-Ghali phrased it, "The end of the cold war removed constraints that had inhibited conflict in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. As a result there has been a rash of wars within newly independent States, often of religious or ethnic character and often involving unusual violence or cruelty. The end of the cold war seems also to have contributed to an outbreak of such wars in Africa." (Boutros 1995, para 10, 7)

However, there is little evidence to suggest that the problem of failed states and inter-ethic violence were all problems waiting to surface pending the end of the Cold War, or that such local and regional conflicts were moderated by the superpowers lest they serve "as triggers of a superpower collision," (Hoffman 1990, 116) let alone that the end of the Cold War itself contributed to the outbreak of these wars. There is as much evidence to suggest the reverse was true - the Cold war rivalry exacerbated tensions already present and made them far more dangerous.[37]

Overt antagonisms expressed by the resort to violence over the governing ideology of the state and its ethnic make-up preceded the end of Cold War in former Palestine, Lebanon, Burundi, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, East Timor, Tibet, Burma, Iraq, Turkey, Ethiopia and Somalia, to

take but a few of the many cases of inter-ethnic, religious, and ideological rivalry that have riven states asunder or provided a territorial basis for violence on the demarcations and character of a state. One should be wary of the critical emphasis placed by the END OF THE COLD WAR Argument (ECWA), whether propagated by realists or idealists, for it may be self-serving in fostering their respective tendencies to either reinforce the security apparatus of the state or, alternatively, international institutions geared to global resolutions of problems.

My own conviction, based on my studies of conflict and refugees, is that the end of Cold War was in good part a consequence of much more fundamental underlying changes that are behind the intra-state ethnic and ideological conflicts that appear to be so pervasive now. This does not mean that I concur with Gunther Frank's theory (1994) that the collapse of communism is a consequence of the world economic crisis rather than national ideology or policy because of ongoing and accelerated economic integration and marketization. Those underlying forces were critical. But deterrence, in spite of my opposition to it, and the economic competition in significant part propelled and exacerbated by it, played equally critical roles.

More importantly for the purposes of our analysis, the Cold War itself did not repress traditional antagonisms in the Third World, but utilized them. Even more significantly, the Cold War shifted the awareness of these issues for those preoccupied with the Cold War and provided a sense of exhilaration and renewed optimism for those more idealistically inclined. The end of the Cold War had more to do with a shift of awareness and led to the discovery of the full recognition of the unwillingness to respond to intra-state crises when the interests of developed states are neither threatened nor involved. The unwillingness to respond does not so much decline as become more apparent.

In speaking about becoming more apparent, in opposition to the Repression Thesis about the consequences of the end of the Cold War, there is a contending Revelation Thesis. The terminus of the Cold War revealed a different world than the one with which that war began - one in which national security had lost any meaning. Globalization was the dominant motif. The globe had shrunk along with the threats posed by the Soviet Union. Interdependency was now too great to resort to the single state as the prime actor in the new world order or disorder. The

United States neither had the strength nor the diplomatic clout to act on its own, but had to forge alliances to tackle such problems as the international drug trade, currency regulation, international terrorism, acid rain, etc. In this view, the concept of national sovereignty had become as obsolete as the Cold War.

These two twins - the Repression and the Revelation Theses - have been the dominant motifs of post Cold War idealist internationalist disourse. My position is akin to traditional realists in arguing for continuity in the political circumstances rather than any radical change brought about by the end of the Cold War. But for very different reasons and with very different implications.

Awareness of the fallibility of the End of the Cold War Argument (ECWA) is not very significant since it was more a rhetorical tool than an analytic one, but there are, at least, two implications. ECWA tends both to misread the roots of the problems entailed in complex emergencies and to overlook experience from the pre-Cold War past. Further, ECWA creates a myth of an era of high tension and high stability during the Cold War and a period of low tension and low stability after its termination. But the period prior to the end of the Cold War was not one of high stability. The Korean war period, the building of the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile crisis, the Indochinese War, the Yom Kippur War - not to mention Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 - were all highly destabilizing as well as periods of high tension. Further, pockets of regional instability were pervasive.

Prior to and accelerated by the end of the Cold War, stability has **increased** as the number of democratic states have mushroomed. Nor will hard-headed realists, nor should we, be lulled into complacency in the mistaken belief that critical causes and sources for high tension no longer continue to pervade this globe. Thus, although this paper is concerned with widespread and seemingly endless numbers of states caught up by religious, ideological and inter-ethnic violent conflict, and increasing numbers of refugees and internally displaced produced by such conflicts, it does not deny that the main concern of developed countries will continue to be their own security in the face of other potential threats. In fact, it argues that these relatively peripheral sources of instability can produce a small ripple that eventually can result in catastrophic change. Instability in these regions are the main sources of

threat, not the conflicts between civilizations, states or with the environment, or the contemporary rivalry among China, Japan, a revived Russia, the EEC and the Americas as the five major economic centres of power.

Contrary to the realist Cold War theorists, there is no need to seek a new threat to the West. For the deception is the significance given to the End of the Cold War thesis itself, and not whether it is put forth by idealists or realists. The problems we face are ones we faced during the Cold War. What has radically altered coincidentally with the end of the Cold War is the mode for dealing with those problems. But it is not the end of the Cold War that produced that alteration. For one of those factors, it was the Cold War itself.

The right and contemporary realists defended the arms race of the Cold War as the only means to deter the expansionist totalitarian ideology of the Soviet Union. Using the superior economic capability of the West, a two-track policy was developed. On the military front, the West insisted that it demonstrate a second strike capacity so that if the Soviet Union decided to strike anywhere in the Western alliance, there would always remain enough reserve capacity to destroy the Soviet Union, or, at the very least, deliver an unacceptable level of destruction.

The premises of deterrence rested on the ability **and evident willingness** to inflict unacceptable levels of damage, in part, as evidenced by the expenditure of significant proportions of a country's GDP on deterrence. The practitioner of deterrence must demonstrate a willingness to be able to withstand an enemy's first strike and still retaliate with a devastating second blow. Most importantly, the threat must be credible and a willingness to carry it out must be clearly communicated.[38]

More significantly, there was no equilibrium point that could be reached in this arms race. In fact, disarmament agreements merely spurred the search for new technological breakthroughs as occurred when the 1975 ING agreement banned intermediate nuclear weapons and tactical air-surface missiles were developed to fulfil and exceed the void left by the previously banned weaponry.

What had developed was a mutual murder pact. If one party initiated the murder of the other, the other could, **and would**,

respond and murder the other.[39] In fact, scientists predicted the end of the whole world as we know it and not just the destruction of the two sides.[40] This doctrine of mutually assured destruction, MAD, effectively worked, quite aside from the criticisms we levelled at the doctrine. or, rather, MAD-plus worked, for there was never enough of too much to assure the destruction of the other.[41] The expansion of the Soviet Union was contained and the high risk of a nuclear military accident did not take place, at least during the Cold War itself. Thus, although the doctrine of nuclear deterrence rested on absurd premises, on consequentialist grounds many would argue that it was not an immoral posture. From that perspective, an abhorrent logic may produce ethical behaviour if war is deterred.[42]

One of the ironies of post-war realist theories is that they have supported a deterrence (nuclear based on MAD) that cannot be used. This may partially explain George Kennan's lifelong opposition to nuclear weapons, for George Kennan was a traditional realist, who was both cautious and prudent; he thought that the risks outweighed the benefits, especially since there were real alternatives.[43]

Further, though I have a much harder time admitting this result, the second track of that policy, led by the ideological right as a moral rather than a realist mission to destroy the Evil Empire, also worked. The Reagan foreign policy was based not only on military supremacy, but on a belief in moral superiority and a confidence in that moral superiority. Hence, Reagan was a utopian realist of the capitalist school as opposed to the utopian anti-capitalist realists (gramscians) that I will sketch in the next chapter.[44] Reagan was not a conservative realist, but a utopian, setting his guns on Kissinger in favour of "morality in foreign policy" and the defeat of the "evil empire".[45] For deterrence depends on conveying both capacity and will to use the nuclear deterrent. And the willingness to spend enormous sums on technological innovations is one of the signs of that will. "American security depends on American power and the will to use it." (op. cit. 23)

Thus, it may not have been the Star Wars strategy itself. The prospect of creating an umbrella defence against nuclear missiles available to all had always remained questionable at the very least, if it was not a fantasy or even a quasi-conspiracy organized by the military-industrial complex. The dramatic economic escalation of the renewed arms race at a far higher level of costs, and, more importantly, technology, bankrupted the Soviet Union. The moral revolutionary utopians of

the extreme right, who celebrated and fought for the victory of the liberal and capitalist system against the evil empire, dealt a deathly blow to its adversary, ironically not through deterrence itself, but because of the costs of deterrence.

However, Risse-Kapan (1991) argues that it was not the shattered Soviet economy and the need for *perestroika*, but *glasnost* and the sharing of ideas between Western and Eastern think tanks that led Eduard Shevardnadze and Aleksandr Yakovlev to seek common cause with the liberal institutionalists and create a new regime based on common security. (Cf. Goldmann 1994, 107) My own conviction is that it was deterrence and economic competition that drove the USSR to the wall, and *glasnost* that gave the Soviet Union the way out and the foundation for a new foreign policy as well as internal revolution.[46]

If the military realist strategy of deterrence and the economic competition combined with the moral fervor of the utopian Reganites together worked to create a synergy to defeat the USSR[47], the fact that the Soviet Union self-destructed in the way it did can be attributed in a small part to a fourth factor - the human rights provisions of the Basket II clauses of the Helsinki Accords and the protections provided for the free movement of peoples and ideas, a totally tangential element included in the last minute against the better judgement of the military and political strategists of the West in the 1975 disarmament agreement. The human rights provisions created the democratic ground for the emerging pluralist system in Eastern Europe.

The Chinese dissidents tried to imitate the Eastern European human rights efforts, but even with economic liberalization to assist them, they were squelched without the assist of an international accord to which China was a signatory and in terms of which China could be held to account. In contrast, the military doctrine of MAD, the military-economic competition of Star Wars fostered by the moral ideological mission of the right, destroyed the Soviet Union. But the positive ground for its rebirth was the human rights struggle supported by the Helsinki Accords.[48] This side issue was the tiny ripple with the most telling and long term creative effects.

Victory, however, had come at considerable cost. Those of us who fought for human rights generally pooh-poohed the

extravagances and wastefulness of the military-defence strategy and overwhelming danger of the high risk nuclear arms race. As Lebow and Stein (1994) point out in their analysis of the Cuban Missile crisis and the 1973 Middle East War, the results were frequently pernicious, eliciting the behaviour deterrence strategy was intended to prevent. More importantly for the present, they left an enormous legacy of debt, decaying infrastructure and a totally distorted research agenda, quite aside from the build-up of underground pressures in the kleptocracies fostered in the satellite states of the Cold War. (The example of Zaire will be analyzed in chapter 5.)

However, I am concerned with the moral costs. Not the moral costs to honour and reputation that is of such great and legitimate concern to many analysts as the United States squandered its idealized image as a liberator, upholder of democracy and generous benefactor held at the end of World War II.[49] Rather, it is the cost to our own moral values. Not the values of decency and respect and concern for others so generally associated with humane values, but the importance of the willingness to sacrifice life for a cause, a value too often simply conjoined with military values.

The critics of the deterrence strategy were preoccupied with the horrific danger and not just the costs of the arms race and the strategy it supported. We were attuned to the absurd presumptions of deterrence in a nuclear arms context. For the arms, in contrast to normal deterrence strategy, were only useful if they were never used. "What is perceived as an impossible war has to be perceived as possible if it is to be impossible. On the one hand, a nuclear war entails an unacceptable holocaust for all parties. It is assumed to act as a deterrent from aggression and to render impossible any and every military use of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, deterrence is not credible if these weapons cannot be used."[50]

Their value depended on the credibility projected to the other party that your side was willing to use nuclear arms. The reasoning assaulted our minds as the vision of their actual use shrivelled our guts and the risk of an effectively destroyed world assaulted all our ethical sensibilities.[51] If the deterrence theorists seemed to be participating in an absurdist play based on the premise that nuclear weapons are only useful if they are never used and useless if they have to be used, the missionary ideology of the New Right intent on destroying the Evil Empire itself, and not just containing it, drove us MAD. For MAD-plus itself permitted the development of a capacity to

overkill a thousand times, ten thousand times! (Cf. Art 1985)

But it is not even this immoral risk-taking that concerns me and its costs to the underclass of America. It is the moral cost itself. The combination of fear and insistence on rationality had an unintended consequence. The calumny that we taught people to believe, "Better Red than Dead," was clearly false. But we did believe and teach that the nuclear arms race posed too great a risk to be employed in deterring an enemy, even totalitarian communism. Indirectly we taught a whole generation that some risks were too great, whatever the danger. When this is combined with the military belief that they (the military) cannot be left at the mercy of vacillating politicians as they were in Vietnam, and the their current conviction that only low or no risk wars are worth fighting, the synergy resulting from the combination of all these experiences left a no-sacrifice or a low sacrifice moral legacy. Instead of some risks being too great to risk the sacrifice of all of us, the lesson came to be believed that virtually any risk entailing the sacrifice of our own lives was too great. The sacrifice of even a few was too large a cost. One might not be too many, but hundreds would. The fundamental foundation for any universal morality dealing with upholding principles had been sacrificed with the pursuit of the Cold War. The idealism of both the left and the right was left with no substantive ground.

The policy of not willing to engage in self-sacrifice for a cause, even when the cause is close to home, seems as endemic in Eastern as in Western Europe and North America according to a former American Ambassador in Moscow: "while many Russians retain a sentimental attachment to the vast empire their country once ruled, most are not willing to spend a kopek or risk a single life to resurrect it." Jack F. Matlock Jr., "The Struggle for the Kremlin," *New York Review of Books*, XLIII:13, August 8, 28-34.

We really lost the Cold War because we have come to believe that victory can come without risks. One of the most important factors that has come about with the end of the Cold War is not the revelation of globalization, a new world dramatically at odds with the one with when we entered the Cold War[52], but self-revelation, the discovery of the values for which we stand and the unwillingness to risk our lives for those values. What the end of the Cold War has perhaps revealed most of all is that there is less willingness to sacrifice the lives of the citizens of a nation when there is no direct threat to that state than

some idealists expected, but an enormous willingness to extend our resources financially when the sentiments of a domestic population are aroused, contrary to the beliefs of the realists. The foundations for that moral destruction are to be found in the very premises of both the realist and idealist modes of analyzing international affairs.

Part II: Theory and Practice

4. The Realist-Idealist Divide

There are many ways to approach the analysis of a crisis like Rwanda. One can project a personal sense of realist pessimism or idealistic optimism onto the analysis of our current situation. In general, the tension between the Children of Darkness and the Children of Light has been as much a part of international analysis as the crises in the international arena itself. "Pure idealists [children of light] underestimate the perennial power of particular and parochial loyalties, operating as a counter force against the achievement of a wider community. But the realists [children of darkness] are usually so impressed by the power of these perennial forces that they fail to recognize the novel and unique elements in a revolutionary world situation. The idealists erroneously imagine that a new situation automatically generates the resources for the solution of its problem. The realists erroneously discount the destructive, as well as the creative, power of a revolutionary situation." (Niebuhr 1944, 176)

In Rwanda, the pessimists saw age old atavistic ethnic hatreds to explain Hutus and Tutsis killing one another. Optimists saw inter-ethnic hatred as simply a product of European colonialism and racism; the slaughters were only the result of a small elite, which had been supported by France and which had organized a systematic slaughter. Exogenous factors were the prime explanation.

Is social science merely the projection of our subjective attitudes onto a situation, simply a matter of whether we see a glass half empty or half full? Ernst B. Haas (1983) interpreted the difference between the Children of Darkness and the Children of Light as resting on the mental paradigm as the foundation for the differences in emotional mood observers brought to the analysis. The difference was a product of the prime metaphor brought to the understanding of an international crises, either a mechanical or an organic one, the former viewing the world as conflict-ridden and self-maintaining, the latter as harmonious and self-organizing; one view is pessimistic while the other sees hope.

The mechanical seeks to minimize disturbance in the system and return it to equilibrium; it is focused on self-maintenance. The organic seeks to profit from

disequilibrium in order to assure continued adaptation to a changing reality; it is focused on evolutionary self-organization...

The *mechanical* metaphor is pessimistic. It sees the world in steady state, closed, its future determined by its constituent elements and the laws that govern them. Processes of change occur homeostatically; the return to equilibrium after a disturbance means that the system is programmed toward self-maintenance. It is stable, stationary, and static in the short run. Eventually, however, the system must run down; it is doomed to entropy... Self-maintenance will be hurt and entropy will be ushered in sooner than fated if international processes are permitted to follow the positive feedback processes. Adaptation means learning to live in a finite system...

The hope held out by adepts of the *organic* metaphor is based on their conviction that the processes embedded in their system are essentially harmonious. The system is open, moving, and dynamic. It incorporates growth and development...Disequilibrium, at any given point, means that we have not understood the structure of the system; we permitted the wrong processes to take over. But homeorhetic principles stipulate openeness to learn; we are biologically equipped to evolve into better problem-solvers. (32-33)

Though there is some truth in both of these dichotomies and that the attitude of pessimism or hope provides a quick litmus test of which side of the divide one is to be found, the map of the theory of international relations is, in fact, far more complicated. For example, both idealism, in the form of grotian liberal internationalism, and realism are dominated by a mechanical metaphor. As I argued in chapter 2, my own conviction is that we are not simply bringing to a situation two different attitudes (pessimistic or optimistic) and looking at the system through two different sets of emotional or metaphorical glasses. The explanation, in part, is also found in what aspect of the international system we are examining.

It is no coincidence that pessimists tend to place the blame primarily on unchanging internal factors while optimists have the opposite tendency and place the major blame on exogenous factors and their proxies. For some are indeed looking

at what is (the realists) versus what can or should be (the idealists).[53] For the conservative realists see every node of the system as an effort to establish equilibrium between contending forces while idealists tend to be more concerned with bifurcation points and the potential dawning of a new era.[54] There is a corresponding tendency of conservative realists to vest responsibility on reestablishing the equilibrium of the actors in the situation, whereas the optimists seem to want to rely on exogenous factors, the imposition of international law, the importation of universal human rights standards, or even external coercive humanitarian intervention.

However, the picture becomes more complicated when the liberal realists are put on the theoretical map. For, like the conservative realists, they concur in looking at the effort to reestablish equilibrium, but they focus on the system as a whole rather than on the nodes that make up the system, on international and primarily economic regimes rather than the state nodes that make up the system seeking to preserve power.

It is my contention that we must look at both the processes and dynamics that maintain the system in equilibrium and at the bifurcation points of chaos that open the system up to new levels of organization. Further, in the bifurcation points we find efforts at self-maintenance and the use of disequilibrium in order to assure continued adaptation to a changing reality in a continuuing process of self-organization. The process is not just a destructive one. But if that is the case, if the the prospects for stability and equilibrium are to be found within the nodes of chaos themselves, then we have to begin with a solid foundation in understanding the realist analysis, not just neorealist structuralism, or even more traditional contemporary realism, but the entire historical tradition of realism. The point, however, is not to remain embedded in that realism, but, by understanding its perspective and historicist origins to free ourselves from its imprisoning propensity to determinism or fatalism.

This monograph is *rooted* in realism, but cannot be reduced to realism. Further, it is rooted in classical, mediaeval, modern and contemporary realism (rather than neo-realism) in the following respects. First, it begins with human nature rather than the structure of the relations between states in the international arena. "The greatest division among realists today seems to be between 'classical realists' and 'structural realists,' or between realism and neorealism. Classical realism

supposedly identify with the tradition of E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, and Martin Wright. They explain states' actions through a theory about human nature. As Morgenthau puts it, man is characterized by egoism and *animus dominandi*, lust for power. Human beings are driven by their passions and assumed to be interested primarily in self-preservation and enhancement of their power. Neorealists, in contrast, insist that they differ from classical realists inasmuch as they have a theory that excludes all factors except the structure of the international system itself - how power is distributed within the system. They concentrate on questions of how differnt power distributions might effect or determine the actions of states." (Johnson 1993, 203)

Secondly, like Hobbes, Machiavelli and Thucydides, I take civil wars rather than inter-state wars to be most revelatory about the behaviour of humans in what was traditionally called the "state of nature", though, in contrast to Thucydides, I do not regard civil wars as just the bloodthirsty byproducts of inter-state wars. "For in peace and prosperity both states and individuals have greater feelings, because men are not then forced to face conditions of dire necessity; but war, which robs men of the easy supply of their daily wants, is a rough schoolmaster and creates in most people a temper that matches their condition." [Thucydides 3:82,2-3])

Hobbes views civil wars as events that take place whenever there is no power strong enough to prevent them.[55] I am akin to Hobbes in seeing those passions acted out in everyday situations and not just as a response to the extremes of war, but not because of an absence of controls and the willingness of humans to obey them - i.e. not because of disobedience - but because humans who are not given recognition and respect seek it in destructive ways. The fault is in the social institutions of recognition, not the institutions of control, while recognizing that some individuals, who have never been given any such recognition as children, can develop into psychopaths who can only be handled by controls and the use of coercive force.

Thirdly, for all traditional realists, the key is human *irrational* behaviour and not the self-interested instrumental rationality which is considered primary by structural or neo-realism. The key issues, therefore, are not explanation and prediction of the behaviour of states in accordance with general covering laws, but anticipation of the behaviour of leaders in

specific contexts, and formulating an appropriate response.

But this is also based on rejecting various premises of traditional realism. I reject that:
i) passions determine action, as Hobbes believed, unless controlled by superior force - the only passion attributable to all humans is the desire for power as the one means to obtain any end and satisfy any passion;
ii) passions determine action unless manipulated by a more wily intelligence as Machiavelli believed;
iii) passions determine action unless those same passions are displaced by intelligence, rational analysis and improved character as Thucydides believed;
or, more generally,
iv) that dispassionate intelligence detached from the passions is the salvation from the irrationality of the passions.

Instead, I postulate a classical realism which presupposes that detached intelligence can be as cruel as the unruly passions, or, more pointedly, that the passions are unruly because an intelligent mind takes itself to be divine in the use and manipulation of the passions (versus Hobbes belief that "promptness to hurt comes from distrust of one's own intelligence, so that men who distrust their intelligence are more likely to be victorious in a sedition than those who think themselves wise." (Johnson 1993, 11)

On the other hand, *informed* passions can offset the effects of **ignorant** passions and their destructiveness. Passions are informed by *knowing* the personalities and characters of those driven on a course of violence and destructiveness and the context in which it is occurring, as well as effective patterns of dealing with such destructiveness from past experience and the general conditions which exacerbate such irrational behaviour. For informed passions to outplay ignorant ones, especially when confronting ignorant passions driven by desperation, it is necessary to offset a weakness in determination of passions that are informed. Information and knowledge make us conscious of the fallibility of that knowledge. We tend to err on the side of caution. Uninformed passions can be very determined. Informed passions must compensate for that lack of determination by institutionalized training in the service of general norms and laws.

The most fundamental and common belief of all traditional

western realists is that the danger is to be found, not in the passions per se, as the Augustinian Christian tradition believed, but in passions that are not boundaried by society. In ancient classical realism, those passions are undirected (rather than uncontrolled as Hobbes believed or lacking manipulation by a superior intelligence as Machiavelli believed). However, in contrast to the Greek tradition of Thucydides of believing in displacement with superior sets of values and character, prudence and effective communication, I am convinced that those passions are given bounds by social institutions developed **and preserved** through experience, and reinforced in their effectiveness by superior intelligence. As an example, I note the effectiveness of organized policing in dealing with hostage takers through psychological intervenors rather than brute coercive force or the capacity to develop psychological profiles to capture serial killers.

This sketch of realists in history, and my debt to them in spite of some fundamental differences, must be complemented by a guide map of theories of international relations into which I will fit some great thinkers of the past. First, I divide realism into conservative realists, focused on the primacy of power, and liberal realists focused on the primacy of self-interest. Conservative realists are divided into four categories: classical, pre-modern, modern and contemporary. Thucydides is the archetypal classical realist[56], but one who believes in historical circular laws (versus covering laws) unless humans with sufficient intelligence comprehend those laws and are thereby enabled to overcome their fatal destiny. (cf. Hunter 1973) Machiavelli is the archetypal pre-modern realist.[57] Though not a modern, he was anti-mediaevalist. For Machiavelli opposed the universalist categories of the mediaeval world. Politics happened in history, but not simply to hold onto and expand power. He was, after all, concerned with establishing a political community that aspires to areté or virtue. Hobbes is, of course, the archetypal modern realist.

Contemporary conservative realists are divided into traditional realism and neo- or structural realism. "The school of [contemporary] realism is essentially Hobbesian in that it (1) counts on the predictability of actors' motivation and behavior; (2) equates anarchy with constant fear, struggle, and danger; (3) claims that the national interest, defined as self-preservation and advancement against others, is a dictate of nature - either a state obeys it or it is destroyed; (4) takes all other motivations besides the national interest as

irrational and dangerous and therefore to be counseled against so that such motivations as national pride and ideological or religious fervor cannot be accounted for except as fatal anomalies or covers for power interests; (5) disregards the character of individual leaders as irrelevant, considering the overriding dictates of the international power structure; (6) disregards political rhetoric because it is seen as epiphenomenal; (7) counsels prudent adherence to the realist view of the world put forth by the scientists of the realist paradigm, thus claiming that science is a better source for political wisdom than the cultivation of excellence in leaders and their followers." (Johnson 1993, 70)[58]

The difference between Hobbes and his contemporaries is that Hobbes paid a great deal more attention to the irrational motives rather than rational self interest and the pursuit of power as a significant factor in violent conflict.

Within the contemporary school of conservative realists, the prime distinction is between traditional and structural or neo-realists. "(S)tructural realism or sometimes neo-realism deals only with basic structural features of the international system: the 'anarchical nature of the system, the relative distribution of power, and the importance of the balance of power..and attempts to transform classical realism into a scientific-deductive theory that focuses on the structure of the international system...It avoids questionable assumptions, ambiguities, and contradictions that Waltz and other scholars discerned in Morgenthau's writings with respect to the central concepts of power, national interest, and balance of power." (George 1993, 108)[59]

Conservative realism can thus be broken down as follows:

Classical

Pre-modern

Modern
                traditional
Contemporary
                structural or neo-realists

Realism is used in a generic sense to refer to those who uphold the belief that the international system is inherently anarchic and lacks a central order-enforcing power. (Forde 1993,

63) Further, realists believe in the primacy of self-interest and power as explanatory motives (not necessarily the only ones) in international relations; states have no duties other than to advance their own interests and power.

One species type of realists in contrast to the conservative realists are called liberal or institutional realists who believe that states may agree, even through joint decisions, to cooperate by adopting principles, norms, rules and decion making procedures and even embedding them in international governing structures, provided such institutions, principles, norms, rules and procedures advance the interests of states who agree to cooperate. over the long term. These liberal internationalists of a realist persuasion will be referred to as realist institutionalists or liberal realists.

> Internationalism [realist] as defined here does not obviate the realist diagnosis of the human problematic. It sets out, on the contrary, to devise a solution on realist premises. The difference pertains to a relatively limited issue: whether, given the fact of international anarchy, the structure of the international system can be modified so as to reduce significantly the conflictiveness of international relations. To assert that this can be done is not to adopt an 'idealist' antithesis of 'realism'." (Goldmann 1994, 56)

But the map gets even more complicated when some theories attempt to combine conservative and liberal realism in a common historical dialectic. In world system theory, much is made of the difference and dialectical interaction between conservative and liberal realism, between the conserving tendencies of states and the dynamic changing forces of the increasingly globalized economy as the essence of capitalism. In Wallerstein's three volume account of world-system theory, "the separation of politics (constrained within the individual polities of the inter-state system) and economics (the encompassing global division of labour) is constitutive of the capitalist world-economy and is a functional requirement for its reproduction. (1979: 6, 24, 32, 66; 1984: 7-12, 33-6, 50, 130; Rupert 1993, nt. 21, 92)

"(T)he rise and expansion of the modern inter-state system is held to have been both the main cause and an effect of the endless accumulation of capital: 'Capitalism has been able to

flourish precisely because the world-economy has had within its bounds not one but a multiplicity of political systems.' (Wallerstein 1974, 348) At the same time, the tendency of capitalist accumulators to mobilize their respective states so as to enhance their competitive position in the world-economy has continually reproduced the segmentatation of the political realm into separate jurisdictions. (Wallerstein, 1974, 402)." (Arrighi 1993, 153)

But there are idealists as well as realists, not only realists who attempt to integrate and relate conservative and liberal realism in the historicist dialectic of world systems theory, or idealists who attempt to base their idealism on solid realist premises as in the case of the gramscians and neo-structuralists, but there are idealists who are not realists at all.

The distinction between realist and idealist internationalism made above is necessary because there are two types of liberal internationalists. The realist internationalists must be distinguished from the rationalists of the grotian school[60], a form of idealism which holds that individuals possess and are the beneficiaries of a set of rights which must be set off against the sovereignty of states. Realists of all persuasions reject rights as having any equal standing with the interests of states in the international arena, though states may, for various reasons, contract with one another to uphold such rights, particularly for realist internationalists. Grotians and realists who support joint cooperative decisions among states and the creation of international institutions which embody principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures embedded in structures and organizations are both liberal institutionalists or internationalists. The members of the two schools together are often referred to as pluralists or simply liberals.

Idealist theories include both grotians[61] and moral utopians, and both schools are usually contrasted with realism.[62] Basically, utopians believe that international society should be reorganized to serve fundamental values and norms. A grotian or idealist internationalist, for example, would assert, "If the sanctity of human life is an overriding moral concern, and if altruism is a feature of moral principle, then the case for regarding internationalism as a moral principle has been outlined. Internationalism is a programme for saving human life on a grand scale by setting universal peace and security before

short-term national interests." (Goldmann 1994, 162) A realist internationalist might take moral norms into consideration as an offshoot of national interests, but national interests would always come first.

On the other hand, a utopian would make his fundamental values categorical rather than hypothetical. Kant is the archetypal utopian moralist.[63] For Kant, the global society was a voluntary association of states, united under non-coercive laws, that is, laws of virtue alone. Because the duties of virtue apply to all humanity, the concept of the ethical commonwealth is extended to the whole of mankind. A grotian, on the other hand, would begin with, "If we agree that value A is fundamental, then...." The Nigerian General, Olesugun Obasanjo, revealed himself to be a moral utopian when he asked, "why does sovereignty seem to confer absolute immunity on any government who commits genocide and monumental crimes of destruction and elimination of a particular section of its population for political, religious, cultural or social reasons? In an inter-dependent world, is there no minimum standard of decent behavior to be expected and demanded from every government in the interest of common humanity?" (quoted in Gomes 1996, 41)

However, there are utopian thinkers (in my use of terminology) who are also realists. In the last chapter, we depicted the Reaganites as conservative but moral realists. There are also radical moral realists. Radical moral idealists reject the label idealism or utopianism because they found their analysis on realist premises. Gramscians accept the realist concern with a hegemonic power, but use the concept as a basis for developing a radical critique of hegemony.[64] "One meaning, which is conventional in international relations literature, is the dominance of one state over others, the ability of the dominant state to determine the conditions in which interstate relations are conducted and to determine the outcomes of these relations. The other meaning, informed by the thought of Antonio Gramsci, is a special case of dominance: it defines the condition of a world society and state system in which the dominant state and dominant social forces sustain their position through adherence to universalised principles which are accepted or aquiesced in by a sufficient proportion of subordinate states and social forces (Cox 1983)." This second meaning of hegemony implies intellectual and moral leadership. The strong make certain concessions to obtain the consent of the weaker."

The claimed advantages of a neo-marxist gramscian approach

is that it avoids both a state centred or a global economic approach, and integrates both in terms of the tensions within a state, not only in terms of the ongoing class struggle, but also in terms of the tension between the state and civil society, both given impetus by technological innovations and transfers: "we analytically distinguished three dimensions: the transforming impact Atlantic Fordism has had on economic structures; the articulation of changing class and state structures in state-civil society configurations; and the impact of changing world-order structures on national economic and socio-political developments." (Holman 1993, 234)

Thus, unlike conservative realism or even the realism of world system theory, or even the moral realism of the Reaganites, the gramscian approach problematizes the state and develops a relational theory of the state versus the view of the state as a cohesive actor in which the state-bureaucracy is, at one and the same time, idealized and its powers are exaggerated; instead, the view, explicitly adopted from Braudel, is of the state existing "to preserve inequality". "The state itself is no longer seen as a set of institutions or a cohesive actor but as a type of social relations, an articulaion of class interests within a given territorial context." (Gill & Palan 1994, 6) Instead, the state is viewed as "the heart of political power," the centre of hegemonic stability (Mason 1994, 16),

> (T)he psychology of material interest is controlling in the long term no matter what other elements may deflect attention in the short term, Since these interests are more accutely important to those who benefit or lose most in the economic process, the beneficiaries create social structures to reinforce and preserve their interests while at the same time assuring the repression or at least quiescence of those likely to be motivated by their material loss." (16)

Therefore, politics and the state are "ultimately an artifact of social forces that mold it, not in concrete detail but in underlying direction." That is, the state is an expression of class power. Thus, the gramscian attempt at a neo-structuralist integration produces, in the end, a control model rather than a self-organizing system model. The state is considered to be "a complex play of forces of classes, social forces, institutions, individuals, genders, races, peoples, regions, localities, etc." "To neostructuralists, the 'state'

cannot be a volitional subject; it has no needs, it does not pursue 'power and prestige,' it does not possess a unique agenda. It is not an 'it'." (Gill & Palan 1994, 6) Thus, unlike conservative realists, though power is considered primary, the state is given a secondary role in relation to socio-economic structures within the state and globally.[65]

The following chart may help to keep the terminology straight as I employ the terms to clarify the four schools.[66]

```
                    SCHOOLS OF INTERNATIONAL THEORY


                                              Classical
                                          /  (Thucydides)
                                 Historical - Pre-modern
                                  /        \ (Machiavelli)
                                 /          Modern
                                /           (Hobbes)
          }            Conservative realism
World     }                                          \
          }         /                          \           / Traditional
System    } REALISM                       Contemporary
          }     !    \                               \ Neo-realism
Theory    }Reaganite Liberal realism
          }   moral                          \
          } realism                          \
              !                              liberal internationalism
        neo-structuralists                 /
          & gramscians                    /
              !
              !       Grotians or rationalists
              !    /
            IDEALISM
                  \ Utopians Moralists
```

Post-Cold War realists can also be divided on where there see the next BIG THREAT coming from to succeed the Soviet Union. Is it a renewed, xenophobic, nationalistic and authoritarian Russia or some other state threat[67], the clash of civilizations and the threat of a renewed, militant Islam (Huntington)[68], or environmental degradation and the population explosion (Homer-Dixon, Kaplan)[69]?

But realists, as I indicated above, are primarily divided

on their methodological approach and can be divided into the conservative and the liberal realists.[70] The latter, as I indicated, are also called pluralists or neoliberal institutionalists. Neoliberal realists tend to be less pessimistic than classical or conservative realists, but both groups approach the study of international relations with a mechanical, rational choice model.[71] Both schools assume that states behave like egoistic value maximizers. But the goals of the calculation are different. Conservative realists are more defensive and fearful, while liberal realists or liberal institutionalists attempt to be more opportunistic and internationally pro-active.

> (R)ealists argue that anarchy means that states fear not just being cheated but also being dominated or even destroyed by others. As a result, while neoliberals see states as 'rational egoists' interested in their own utility, realists view states as what I have called 'defensive positionalists' interested in achieving and maintaing relative capabilities sufficient to remain secure and independent in the self-help context of international anarchy. In turn, while neoliberals focus on the problem of cheating for cooperation, realists argue that an equally big problem is the fear on the part of some states that others might achieve disproportionate gains and therby become more domineering friends or even potentially more powerful adversaries. Realists therefore argue that states must solve *both* the cheating and the relative gains problem in order to achieve cooperation." (Grieco 1993b, 303)

Neoliberals or structural realists contend that "International regimes exist when patterned state behavior results from joint rather than independent decision making." (Stein 1993, 31)

There are three other differences between the two types of realists. Conservative realists are usually not just methodological realists; they are metaphysical or substantive realists. They believe that what they depict is reality, and that reality shapes the international regimes which are mere epiphenomena.[72] Liberal realists take a more heuristic perspective. A structure is a pattern or tendency, not a set of laws describing reality, so that, "(I)f there is more law, organization, exchange, and communication among states, this

will reinforce peace and security." (Goldmann 1994, 2) Secondly, liberal realists view human agents rather than the system as dominant.[73] These two taken together introduce a third difference; the system is immutable for conservative realists, but malleable for liberal realists.[74]

Now, as I said, some liberal internationalists are idealists, not realists. They share many of the presumptions of the liberal realists about an anarchic system of states and that the international system is malleable and subject to change by humans. However, for idealist liberal internationalists, the principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures, and the organizational structures in which they are embedded, are not intended merely to be products of the self-interests of states, but are intended to be a higher order of development which will carry authority and the ability to enforce those standards on wayward states. The grotian tradition does not presume that the international system is composed simply of sovereign states in an anarchical relation to one another and motivated by power and self-interest. Sovereignty is relative, not absolute. It is qualified by refugee movements and refugee regimes. Further, states are compassionate as well as fearful and concerned with their own security and survival. Force is not the ultimate or even the primary factor in international relations. Nor, more generally, is egoistical self-seeking. But both are dominant factors, and coercion may be needed by a higher authority to offset egoistical self-seeking if it is destructive to other parts of the system.

Further, for Grotian idealist liberal internationalists, the international system is constituted by cosmopolitan elites who share many principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures which hold the system together.[75] Grotians are less focused on the state per se as a monolithic entity than the individuals and bureaucratic units with their traditional attitudes and practices who actually develop and implement the working of international regimes.[76] In fact, they welcome globalization and the demise of the power of the state as an opportunity to enhance and strengthen a grotian cosmopolitan legal regime.

Nevertheless, grotians and the neoliberal institutional realists generally share a liberal internationalist outlook. Both view the international system as an evolving set of traditions or regimes, the grotians focusing much more on the ethical dimensions while the neoliberal realists depict the

international system in normative but less moralistic terminology. Though in both cases, norms are rooted in the past, in the grotian perspective, they carry some degree of authority in the present that has some connection with the continuity of its transmission from the past rather than simply deriving their authority from their utility in the present, particularly in a world economy dominated by market forces. This does not mean that they are rigid. In fact, the objective is to change our principles to adapt to the problems we encounter. If the method of change involves simply altering the governing norms, we have evolutionary change. If the method of change involves an overturning established norms, then we have revolutionary change.

If realist liberal internationalists adopt accomodationist strategies, idealist liberal internationalists believe the higher organization should have the power to enforce the prinicples, norms, and rules through decision procedures that are the responsibility of a higher body than a state. Realist liberal internationalists are much more content to rely on improved communication and the inducements of participating in exchanges which are mutually beneficial. Realist liberal internationalists are content to leave states as completely self-determining primary units; disputes are settled by mediation, arbitration and the application of international law through agreement and cooperation and not coercion. The difference between idealist liberal internationalists and realist liberal internationalists is the difference between Hugo Grotius (*De jure belli ac pacis, 1625)* and Jermey Bentham (A Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace, 1843).

If one is a post-Cold War idealistic internationalist, then the end of the Cold War will present itself as a golden not-to-be-missed opportunity to fix up the existing system and improve the international legal and consensual framework in order to address a legacy of deprivation, discrimination, and grievances presumed to have been thrust upon the Third World by us.[77] There is a much more dominant moral telos to the idealist internationalist program than the realist one. The missionary message will be that we must not and cannot fail to bring to these countries the benificence of equality and the liberty of democratic government by attending to their social, economic and political deficiencies. In contrast, realist internationalists might conclude that democracy is a sine qua non for a liberal internationalist program to work, but it would not be an a priori determination.

For the post-Cold War realists, the problem is out there, even if its centre of gravity has shifted by the dissolution of the Soviet empire. For post-Cold war idealists, the problem is within us, in our failure in morality and political will, and in our inability to assume our collective responsibilities to increase the resources available to the task of international governance and greater distributive justice.[78] For realist internationalists, political will may be a necessary prerequisite, but the lack of political will is not a moral failing.

In the other direction, grotians share with utopians rooted in the tradition of natural law and Kantian ethics a conviction of universalism, either as a goal which we are striving to achieve or as a preestablished *a priori* universalism rooted in reason. Ought should govern what is. But for grotians, the dominant ethical principles are directive, not constitutive of the very fabric of a human being. They are convictions held by humans which provide a ground for determining expectations and determinations of legitimacy. For utopians, the ethical norms are absolute, not just a matter of subjective conviction; forbidden actions are wrong even if they yield positive consequences. For intentions rather than consequences are the critical factor. For grotians, valuable international norms - such as the Hansen passports for refugees - may have been adopted because states were interested in getting rid of refugees rather than giving them rights; transformations in normative practice may be a product of underlying changes in power relations. Nevertheless, such an international practice is valid and valuable. The practices need to be moral, not the foundation on which they were put in place.

Grotians are similarly more tolerant of the fact that internatioanl intitutionalized patterns and practices may benefit the strong disporoportionately. There is no need to introduce a standard of equity into international norms, though a large "degree of bias may make a considerable difference in a regime's durability, effectiveness, and mode of transformation." (Puchala and Hopkins 1993, 67)

Moral utopians, on the other hand, are not content merely to allow normative issues to play an important role in international theory. They want to settle international issues on the basis of such norms. If they are Hegelian or Marxist dialecticians rather than Kantians, they will argue that such

norms arise out of the contradictions which obsess critical theorists or the forces that preoccupy realists of all stripes. Realists (both classical and liberal) cannot escape having a normative foundation. Thus, classical realism, liberal realism and a grotian perspective generally line up respectively with three different normative approaches: justifications which settle normative issues by stressing the primacy of order (which normatively deny the relevance of norms), utilitarian justifications, and rights-based theories.[79] Thus, all international theories are rooted in fundamental normative outlooks which constitute the basis for the principles, norms, rules, and decision procedures as well as the structures and organizations in which they are embedded.

Thus, for example, Luigi Bonanate (1995) tries to construct a neo-Kantian theory which goes beyond the intentionalist deontology of most Kantians to espouse an ethics of international relations in which "each state has the duty to concern itself equally with all the citizens of the world (subject to practical constraints)...The most important consequence of this formulation is that every state has a duty to 'intervene' even outside its own borders to safeguard the elementary 'rights of individuals, whatever the state of origin." (vi-vii) This does not make the theory naive in ignoring the huge distance which divides the ideal from the real. It means that the ethical theory itself must not be naive, but must deal with states that take themselves to be autnomous and self-contained while they participate to different degrees in a cosmopolitan society. It is in the stretch between these poles of an existing system of states deemed to be anarchic and an emerging cosmopolis that practical judgement must be applied to the international sphere; this is where such a Kantian position must make its impact.

Frost (1996), in contrast to a Kantian approach, tries to construct an ostensibly utopian Hegelian foundation for recognizing the independence of sovereign states while insisting that the legitimacy of those states as authentic independent states depends on a normative framework of an international community which insists on certain minimum standards of behaviour. In other words, there is an international community. Rights are possessed, not as natural or human rights, but as ones recognized to be the possessions of members of that community whether taken on a global or a national scale. Frost (1996) calls this a constitutive theory of international ethics.

I call Frost's theory an ostensible Hegelian theory, for though the final framework is one consistent with Hegel's outlook, the method for reaching it does not. In contrast, Gill (1993) offers a truly dialectical, but a neo-Marxist or gramscian account of a utopian framework for international theory, and, of course, an international political economy, through a historical dialectical form of explanation rooted in historical materialism. The method is Marxist, but the results are claimed to be different because the development of capitalism has reached a different stage. The results must be consistent with the analysis of current conditions. In the Marxist or gramscian approach, an already existing universal culture and normative structure is not the foundation for its analysis as much as a telos, a potential, the realization of which is constrained and frustrated by a hegemonic, self-sustaining, quasi-totalitarian capitalism, a regime of competitive accumulation and division of labour which socializes thought and institutions into subservience to this dominant system and prevents the emergence of universal culture.

That normative telos is stated succinctly by Gill. "(T)he normative goal of the Gramscian approach is to move toward the solution of the fundamental problem of political philosophy: the nature of the good society and thus, politically, the construction of an 'ethical' state and a society in which personal development, rational reflection, open debate, democratic empowerment and economic and social liberation can become more widely attainable." (1993, 25) It is the domination of such normative goals that make gramscian analysis utopian in my terms, even though they would dislike the terminology and even though they take realism sriously.

One perspective that unites the liberal realists, grotians and utopians, as well as the world system theorists and gramscians, and in contrast to the conservative realists, is the emphasis on a global perspective. There is thus an irony, which we will explicate in the next chapter, between this methodological globalism of the liberal realists and their regionalist approach to policy, while the strictly state-centred conservative realists take a globalist approach to interpreting problems in African states.

For a utopian thinker, "nothing in the contemporary world can be fully understood unless it is framed in a global, international perspective." (Bonante 1995, 2) For utopians, however, the global system is not something that arises as a

construct of states. It is the foundation for states, classes, civil society. Since realists accept a world system, but a world system based on states existing within an anarchy, gramscian utopians would argue that this reductionist position rooted in positivism (they dub it objectivist materialism) and a mechanical metaphor is not truly 'realist'. For it fails to take into account the historical-material conditions which produced realist theories in the first place and the hegemonic forces such theories serve in the present. A theory is only truly 'realist' if it is a product of self-conscious critical thought which can offer an explanation, in historical materialist terms, for the origins of its own thinking.

In that sense, therefore, there can be no realist thought per se, that is thought which corresponds to an external and independent reality, since the social world is, in good part, a product of that thought and, in turn, socializes its inhabitants in dominant forms of thought. Cartesian dualism, at least its widespread acceptance, hence, is a construct of that dominant system. So is its corollary - an ahistoricist conception of an unchanging reality which deforms science (Prigigone 1993) as much as social science.

Further, such an approach argues that competing theories are also dominated by normative structures, but normative structures to which the society has been both socialized at the same time as those norms are presented, not as norms, but as scientific givens in reality. The object of a truly scientific utopianism is to expose what Gramsci called the mythological basis of the dominant forms.

For example, gramscians offer an analysis of what they term the 'triple crisis' of capitalism. There is an economic crisis in the terms and conditions for finance, exchange and production while elites attempt to patch the system, but the effects of restructuring continually create deeper fissures as attempts are made to repair the old ones. There is a political crisis undermining the legitimization of the state from within while reducing its importance externally by the creation of servile transnational institutions; yet the power of the state is needed to preserve the political order. Lastly, there is a socio-cultural crisis in which transnational ideas of commodification and consumerism socialize all societies in a common ethic of consumerism at the same time as reactions to this process of universalization constrain and limit the hegemony of global capitalism. The results are evident in the growth of refugees

and illegal migration, the global reduction in the share allocated to labour with the globalization of production and finance, and the sacrifice of the public sector and the environment for the sake of private accumulation. According to gramscians, these provide solid grounds for the realization of a humanist socialism to arise out of the contradictions of the world capitalist system provided humanists raise their consciousness, organize and take advantage of the openings offered.

If the conditions depicted which weaken the power of sovereign states offer a revolutionary potential for utopians, they offer an evolutionary trajectory for grotian idealists, a set of circumstances and conditions which provide an opportunity for liberal human rights principles to be advanced on a much higher and cosmopolitan level.

> Three elements of regionalization and globalization are essential to recognize: first, the way processes of economic, political, legal, military and cultural interconnectedness are changing the nature, scope and capacity of the modern state, as its 'regulatory' ability is challenged and reduced in some spheres; secondly, the way regioanl and global interconnectedness creates chains of interlocking political decisions and outcomes among states and their citizens, altering the nature and dynamics of national political systems themselves; and, thirdly, the way cultural and political identities are being reshaped and rekindled by such processes, leading many local and regional groups, movements and nationalisms to question the nation-state as a representative and accountable power system. Democracy has to come to terms with all three of these developments. If it fails to do so, it is likely to become ever less effective in determining the shape and limits of political activity. Accordingly, the international form and structure of politics and civil society has to be built into the foundation of democratic thought and practice. (Held 1995, 136)

Basically, capitalism has thrown off the shackles of the democratic state and there is now a vacuum. The underdeveloped international political authority allows capitalism to dominate with only the most limited fetters. At the same time, for utopian gramscians or neo-marxists, the results of this absence

of boundaries produces a crisis within capitalism itself. Half way measures, such as controls instituted on state fiscal and monetary policies, keep the system working but show its strains. For grotians, the globalization of the capitalist system produces a **political** crisis and challenge for democratic societies. For both, the division of the world, primarily into sovereign states, which facilitated the emergence and development of capitalism and the Westphalian system of nation-states, releases capitalism from any reasonable boundaries. For gramscians, the crisis produced constraints on capitalist development by preventing the emergence of an authoritative global authority. For grotians, the vacuum offers an opportunity for mechanisms of global governance to advance.

The biggest strain created is in the United States, which continues to insist on acting like a hegemon which is above the laws of the market, insisting that everyone but itself be subject to those laws. Constraints are created through the supranational institutions it controls - the IMF, the World Bank - but the United States resists subjecting itself to those same constraints. As a tiny example, when, in a decision-making procedure of this system, an arbitration panel votes in favour of Canada as part of the NAFTA agreement, the United States, rather than accepting such a ruling, resorts to political tactics - i.e. the tactics of a powerful bully to attempt to get its way.

I have extensively outlined the differences between these various schools of international theory because these are not just academic differences. The theoretical schools can be correlated with significant differences in foreign policy. It is to the practice of these different theoretical perspectives that we must now turn.

Chapter 5

Realists and Idealists in Foreign Policy: The Case of Zaire[80]

I have made these distinctions between utopians, grotians, liberal and conservative realists, as well as the other complex combinations, not because I am interested in adjudicating their differences, but more to understand their connection with actual policy and practice and the efforts to rationalize or criticize those policies. For what we find is the opposite of what I contend should be the case. In periods of crisis, when the leading edge ought to be given to those interested in innovation and propelled by hope, the idealists are in disarray. The hard knuckled realists are dominant and intent on reestablishing the previous equilibrium rather than achieving a new level of stability. When international conflicts have been stabilized and equilibrium prevails, realists ought to be the dominant actors to ensure the maintanance of the equilibrium. Instead, complacency grows and the idealists begin to use the opportunity to plan radical changes.

Grotians grope to introduce human rights, democracy, but primarily principles of neutrality and international law, at the very same time that radical utopian idealists feed the realist propensity to deal harshly with initiatives for radical change. Realists then accuse the grotians of being both ungrounded and inopportune.

I will initially illustrate this proposition by reference to American policy in Zaire over the same period as the Rwanda conflict. If Rwanda is a postage stamp-sized country, Zaire is the size of Western Europe. If Rwanda is of virtually no strategic or economic interest to the West, Zaire is rich in mineral wealth, particularly copper and diamonds. If Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, at the time of independence Zaire had a population of only 14 million.

I take the example of Zaire because the case material is available, it is relevant background to the Rwanda study, and one of Sweden's most illustrious international civil servants, Dag Hammarskjöld, a preeminent grotian[81], lost his life while serving as secretary-general to the United Nations during the initial Zairian conflict. Further, the period covers the Cold War and the use of African countries as proxies in the global struggle. "(T)he Third World served as a proxy Cold War battlefield for U.S. Plocymakers who sought to avoid direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union." (Schraeder 1992,

385) Zaire was one of the foremost outposts of American Cold War policy offering both an adjacent mega-mirror for Rwanda as well as providing a missed opportunity. For instead of innovation and developing new ways to handle and deal with such crises, a sarcophagus was produced. Instead of Zaire serving as a model and locus for establishing stability in the area, it is a source of instability as we wait for Zaire to explode.

Zaire represented America's first major incursion into Africa as part of its strategy of containing communism. Another reason to choose Zaire is that it belies the widespread and often quoted belief that between Korea in 1950 and Iraq in 1990, the Cold War froze the possibility of utilizing peace enforcement: "Until 1989, peace enforcement had been blocked by the superpowers' opposed vetoes in the context of the Cold War." (Augelli & Murphy 1995, 343) Zaire was also a trauma for sub-Saharan Africans who learned from Zaire to be wary of UN interventions. Until the success of UNTAG in Namibia in 1989, this wariness remained. The UN, too, had been scarred in Zaire. It was the UN's first coercive intervention in a civil war. "The new breed of intra-State conflicts have certain characteristics that present United Nations peace-keepers with challenges not encountered since the Congo operation of the early 1960s. They are usually fought not only by regular armies but also by militias and armed civilians with little disipline and with ill-defined chains of command. They are often guerilla wars without clear front lines. Civilians are the main victims and often the main targets." (Boutros 1995, para. 12, 8-9)

However, the UN, which avoided any involvement in Chad in 1981, and even after Namibia, refused to become involved in Liberia in 1990, also never learned from the studies of the Zaire involvement. "(I)n the aftermath of the Congo operation, the Secretariat and more member states were more interested in forgetting than in learning, more interested in avoiding future ONUCs than in doing them." (Durch 1993b, 349)

The story I sketch is of US policy towards Zaire driven by competition between hard headed realists (who also compete among themselves), who dominated Zairian policy and are referred to as globalists because Zaire was simply a proxy in the American anti-communist war. Liberal realists, called regionalists in the context of Zairian policy, tried to take into account the indigenous forces and factors in play, and were more amenable to seeking cooperative and compromise solutions rather than relying solely on coercive force. When Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency, a new, central political element was introduced into

the debate **within America** (it had always been an important element internationally, particularly in the UN and the non-alligned bloc) - a grotian one in which human rights and democratic conditionality were introduced as a dimension of foreign policy in Zaire. The utopians are represented by the revolutionary forces within Zaire led initially by Patrice Lumumba, and in the United States by the radical critics of American policy, none of whom managed to obtain political office or positions in the American foreign policy establishment. (The detailed chronology is provided in Appendix A.)

In the context of the Cold War, and the decolonization efforts underway creating so many new independent nations in Africa, the anti-communist crusader, Vice-President Richard Nixon, following a twenty-two day tour of Africa, recommended that President Dwight D. Eisenhower create a separate Bureau of African Affairs within the State Department.[82] In the *realpolitik*-inspired vision of the international system, power politics, military preparedness, and a resolve to intervene to contain communism remained the dominant motives for US policy in Africa. Economic self-interest was not a determinant of US policy for realists. Self-interest was defined in geo-strategic terms.[83] Further, economic outlays for the realist strategy, in fact, sacrificed American economic interests both in Zaire and in the priorities in budgeting within the United States to these geo-strategic defined issues of power.[84] The realists were also opposed to multilateral initiatives that made America's geo-strategic interests dependent on the UN.[85] Further, they also had few concerns with human rights or democracy, preferring to back a strong leader as long as order was assured.

The conservative realists were in control of American policy when Zaire achieved independence on 30 June 1960 after widespread riots the year before. Patrice Lumumba, a socialist and a nationalist utopian in our terms, became Prime Minister. Kasavubu, an opportunistic realist, was elected President by the Zairian parliament. Five days after independence, Zairian troops mutinied against their Belgian officers and riots and looting spread. Belgium, in a strct conservative realist response, sent in military reinforcements to protect its citizens and economic interests when it could not do so with its control of the civil service. Having ceded independence in a realist doctrine of the autonomy of sovereign states in an anarchic world system, Belgium nevertheless continued to act as a colonial rather than a conservative realist power because Belgium did not request permission from Zaire. Belgium was, in effect, caught between

its colonial heritage and its newly discovered realism which only seemed to lead it to behaving as a colonial power.

The results were predictable. Belgium, a rapidly declining hegemon in that region, was denounced by Zairian politicians and globally by the Afro-Asian bloc for attemting to secure its military and economic control over Zaire. The UN was invited to intervene to defend the independence of a sovereign state against the Belgian invasion. Under grotian principles, coercion must be available to be used to back international law, in this case, the sovereign independence of states. In spite of his disinclination to rely on force to settle conflict issues, Dag Hammarskjöld, the Swedish Secretary-General (SG) of the UN, reported to the Security Council that a threat to peace and security has emerged in Zaire.

In the meanwhile, Tshombe in what was then Katanga and is now the copper rich province of Shaba, declared independence, followed a month later by the diamond rich province of Kasai. Self interest and power were impelling the collapse of a state. Lumumba saw it as the machinations of the Belgians and dithered between UN intervention and inviting the Soviets. When he ascertained that the UN was bogged down in grotianism and the rule of law, and he interpreted that to mean that the UN was controlled by the imperial powers, when the UN would not provide him with the muscle to repress the breakaway reactionary forces in the country, he called for Soviet assistance (which was immediately forthcoming), setting off alarm bells in Washington. Washington overruled its French and British allies in the Security Council (they abstained along with China) and authorized creation of a UN peacekeeping force. However, the peacekeeping force had no mandate to enforce peace or even act to protect citizens. The authorization appeared to make it an adjunct of the Zairian government. However, one objective was the clear: the peacekeepers were to be deployed to replace the Belgian troops in protecting civilians. But it was also equally clear that they were not there in fact to help Lumumba solve his secessionist problems.

This he tried to do himself in an attack against the Buluba, the weaker of the secessionist forces. Thousands were massacred. The CIA, in the meanwhile, had already been plotting Lumumba's overthrow. The massacres provided the rationale. Kasavubu was induced by the CIA to dismiss the Prime Minister. The conservative realists and the revolutionary utopians were at war. And the grotians were trapped helplessly and haplessly

between. The CIA fostered a *coup d'état* by Mobutu. The Soviets attacked Hammarskjöld as a front for the CIA when the UN denied Lumumba access to Zairian radio. On the other hand, when Dayal, Hammarskjöld's representative in Zaire, provided protection to Lumumba from immanent arrest, he was viewed by the Americans as a saboteur of their plans. The man who so believed in civility and the importance of trust, and the role of the UN as a neutral third party in disputes, became the object of venom and distrust from all sides for his alleged partiality.

In January of 1991, Lumumba was murdered just three days before Kennedy assumed the presidency of the United States. The affairs of Zaire echoed with classical precedents. Those familiar with Thucydides account immediately recall the assassination of the populist leader, Peithias in the civil war in Corcyra between the oligarchs who were linked with Sparta and the democrats linked with Athens in the proxy war of classical Greece. However, it was a proxy war only in the sense that the bipolar powers of Ancient Greece fought out their mutual hostility using Corcyra, as Zaire was used in the sixties, but the true cause of war was the factions within Corcyra who used the war between Sparta and Athens for their own purposes.

Peithias, a populist leader, like Lumumba, was initially brought to trial and acquited. Then the populists set out on revenge against those who had had Peithias arrested, but initially through the courts. The oligarchs with their backs to the wall about to lose all their wealth, staged a coup, "banded together and suddenly rushing into the senate with daggers in their hands killed Peithias and others, both senators and private persons, to the number of sixty." (3.70.6) The situation deteriorated into civil war as the slaves of the oligarchs deserted to the party of the people and the oligarchs, like Tshombe, hired 800 mercenaries. But the people's party won.

There was no equivalent to the UN in ancient Greece. Athens tried to play the role of the UN even though the oligarchs distrusted its democratic tendencies, engaged in preventive diplomacy and secured a temporary truce whereby Athens would be the guarantee of the peace. But the populists recruited the crews of the Athenian ships to side with them, and the oligarchs saw in this a plot of the UN in backing the populists, and retreated to a sanctuary, a temple (3:75,5) In the meanwile, the Athenian and Peloponessian cold war turned into a hot one as a battle broke out at sea. When the Athenians routed the Peloponessians, the populists took advantage of the situation to

slaughter their oligarchic enemies. "The charge they brought was of conspiring to overthrow the democracy, but some were in fact put to death merely to satisfy private enmity, and others, because money was owing to them, were slain by those who borrowed it. Death in every form ensued, and whatever horrors are wont to be perpetrated at such times all happened then - aye, and even worse." (3:81, 4-5)

Accounts of the civil war in Zaire evoke the same horrors, only the United States followed Sparta's lead and backed the contemporary equivalent of the oligarchs while the USSR supported the populists. When the Soviets backed the break-away regime of Lumumba's remnant government under Gizenga, the centre of gravity shifted in American foreign policy from conservative to liberal realism and a willingness to engage in cooperative actions.[86] John F. Kennedy was explicit in seeing America's interest in Africa as simply a way of influencing those nations from alligning with the communist bloc.[87] The prime lead, under liberal realist leadership, was still assigned to US allies in Europe under a spheres of influence policy. As George Ball, Kennedy's Under Secretary of State phrased it, the US recognized Africa as a "special European responsibility" just as European nations recognized "our particular responsibility in Latin America."[88] Nevertheless, when America's European allies seemed to lack the adequate capacity and/or will, as in the case of Belgium's handling of Zaire, the US stepped in. On the other hand, "when African plans clashed with policies considered crucial to US security relationships with Europe, Presidents ultimately decided in favor of the Atlantic Alliance."[89]

The United States supported a stronger mandate for the UN peacekeepers. The UN was authorized to **prevent** the occurrence of civil war and to halt all military operations. The US also threatened war against any outside (i.e. Soviet) intervention.
But these two policies were at odds. The United States could not give priority in realist terms to its Belgian allies who were then governed by very conservative realist goals, and, in terms of liberal realism, back a military coercive initiative by the UN under grotian leadership. The Belgians, given their perspective, were appalled. So was the new Adoula-Kasavubu government at the directive to halt all military operations; they wanted the secessionists suppressed. Thus, although Adoula-Kasavubu and Belgium were at opposite sides, they were united in opposing the American solution.

The American shift to liberal realism was made concrete by

the replacement of Ambassador Timberlane, an Eisenhower appointee, by Edmund A Gullion, a career FSO and a liberal internationalist of the realist persuasion. He was a realist and not just a liberal because he believed that if a power vacuum remained in Zaire, not only would Zaire fall to the communists, but so might all sub-Saharan Africa in the African version of the domino theory.[90] To forestall Soviet military involvement, the US could not directly intervene militarily. The UN would be required to carry out the US mission of resolving the Zairian policy while keeping out the communists.

By the summer of 1961, the US was backing more robust miltary
action by the UN against the secessionists in Operations Rumpunch and Morthor.[91] Those operations largely failed. The UN was not given the clout to eliminate the mercenary menace in Shaba. ONUC, beset by civilian-military divisions, the absence of intelligence and a solid operational plan, with very divided political backing, inadequate financing (France and the USSR both refused to pay for the costs of the peacekeeping operation), and totally inadequate administrative, logistic and communications support, achieved more than anyone could believe given that context. But it was still unable to crush the secessionists. And the initiative cost Hammarskjöld his life when he flew to Ndola in Northern Rhodesia to attempt to negotiate a reconciliation with Tshombe who had taken refuge under UK protection. His plane crashed on its landing approach.

Adoula, Zaire's Prime Minister, proceeded to try to negotiate the implementation of a reconciliation accord reached with Tshombe at the end of 1961. A US initiated plan proposed by U Thant was accepted in the summer, but Tshome had no real intention of implementing it. He was too much the machiavellian. Adoula was forced to resort to military means and received very strong backing by the US and the USSR for a final showdown. The wily Tshombe forged an alliance with Gizenga's revolutionary forces, in that marriage of convenience of strange bedfellows, to deadlock parliament. With US substantial military and financial backing, Operation Grandslam was a success. Contrary to the hopes of the liberal realists and the grotians, force was the only answer to Tshome's maneuvers.[92] On 21 January 1963, the wily Tshombe actually welcomed the arrival of the UN troops into Kolwezi.

By then, the importance of force had proven its value. When U Thant resisted the US plans to train and equip the Zairian

military using the UN, the UN itself was abandoned as an intermediary and the conservative realists were once again in charge of Zairian policy. There was a corresponding shift away from an African democratic solution to favour a military one and CIA support for a strong military leader friendly to the West. Mobutu visited Washington and had a private meting with Kennedy on 31 May. When the remnants of the Lumumba faction launched a new insurgency, the US initiated a bilateral military arrangement with the government of Zaire and now backed Tshombe for Prime Minister.[93]

But Kennedy was assassinated in November of 1963. The guerilla insurgency spread. In February of 1994, American Ambassador Gullion was replaced by G. McMurtrie Godley, another career FSO, but more sensitive to Belgian's interests and less concerned with catering to African nationalists. In other words, the process had gone into reverse; a conservative realist had replaced a liberal one. When Tshombe and Adoula continued their rivalry and were unable to get their act together to defeat the insurgents, the US and the Belgians intervened directly to stop the guerilla advance in Operations Red and Black Dragon. The CIA finally won a complete victory and in a CIA backed effort, Mobutu executed a *coup d'état to faciltate the execution of Red Dragon, but only after the American presidential elections were out of the way.*[94]

When there was a real crisis, the CIA won the competitive struggle within the US bureaucracy to control African policy in the crisis area, and resorted to covert action to eliminate parties perceived to be dangerous to U.S. interests. The CIA provided support to pro-American leaders. However, the United States, though a hegemon, could not always control the international institutions it itself dominated.[95] Dayal placed Lumumba under UN protective custody and refused to let Mobutu arrest him, as well as refusing to recognize the legitimacy of Mobutu's rule. The realists were sometimes thwarted by UN grotians and their alliance with US liberal realists. However, with the assistance of the radical utopians, the conservative realists came into their own again and took command of the situation, even though the internal American rivalry ran counter to the conservative realist ideology that all policy results from self interest and power on behalf of each government acting as a monolithic unit. The trials and tribulations of the conservative realists proved that their underlying conceptual schema bore little resemblance to reality, other than the

contention, that in the final analysis, if it comes to a finale, superior force is what counts.

With the CIA victory, the regionalist liberal realists populating the State Department began to resurface, particularly when the policy seemed to invite continuing involvement of the US in the internal affairs of Zaire and when Zaire, against all liberal policy requirements, expropriated first the non-Zairian small business people and then the large firms in the early 1970s.

But a new crisis, the immanent communist victory in Angola, gave the CIA a new lease on policy in Zaire. Kissinger's directive in 1975 granted Zaire "$60 million in Security Supporting Assistance for 1976 (none had been allocated since 1969); a significant rise in military aid from $3.8 million in 1977; and a White House decision to equip Zaire with much more sophisticated weaponry (including 150 armored cars and tanks) to counter a possible Soviet threat from Angola. This increase in military aid, making Zaire the largest recipient of US security assistance in sub-Saharan Africa in 1976, was capped by two visits by Kissinger in April and October 1976."[96] "(O)nce Kissinger perceived the unfolding of an East-West crisis in Angola that threatened to lead to the establishment of a communist, pro-Soviet regime in Central Africa and upset the global balance of power between the US and the Soviet Union, Zaire was suddenly recognized as a regional pillar of US Africa policies."[97]

This policy continued right through the Carter era. In spite of President Jimmy Carter's human rights tilt[98] and a radical shift of American policy to a grotian principled stance opposed by both the liberal and the conservative realists, the position was soon reversed. President Carter did refuse to involve the US in the affairs of Zaire when, on 7 March 1977, seven weeks after his inauguration, 1,500 Zairian exiles invaded Shaba from Angola as the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC). Mobutu was rescued by the French and Moroccans. However, when a much more effective and successful invasion was launched a year later, Carter reversed position, became a conservative realist, and accused Castro, erroneously, of backing the the invasion. US transport aircraft flew 2,500 Belgian and French paratroopers to "rescue" 2,500 Europeans and 88 US nationals. The FLNC forces were once again routed, but 100 Europeans were killed.

Three months after Jimmy Carter had become a conservative realist, he reverted to his grotian principles. On 20 June, Cyrus Vance announced that future US-Zaire relationship would be conditional on economic and political reforms. But then Reagan was elected president. By 1985, the political forces were in place to reverse Carter's conditionality requirements. In July of that year, the Clark amendment (re conditionality) on aid was repealed. US aid was renewed to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA anti-communist resurgents in Angola. And in November, Mobutu visited Washington to request Pentagon involvement in Kamina. But a new rivalry emerged between the covert conservative realists in the CIA and the overt conservative realists in the Pentagon. The CIA managed to scuttle the substance of the Pentagon proposal (Mobutu was the CIA's man), and the Pentagon was left with a token $1-2 million program for joint US-Zaire military maneuvers and selected military construction projects in Kamina.

However, without an immanent communist threat on the horizon, the centre of gravity once again slipped away from the conservative realists to the liberal internationalists under George Bush[99] with their own priority for economic issues and cooperative arrangements, though, "Zaire's critical role as a regional ally in US foreign policy toward Angola resulted in Mobutu being honored as the first African leader to be invited by the Bush administration for an official White House visit."[100] Though Mobutu had a geo-political interest for the United States as a global power, Zaire was not central to American core strategic or economic interests. Further, Mobutu's kleptocracy[101] was an embarrasment to the United States. In addition, the grotian idealists had grown in strength, particularly with glasnost and perestroika. Pressure was used to get Mobutu to recognize press freedom and institutionalize democracy. A struggle for power ensued in Zaire, but Mobutu divided, outwitted and outwaited the opposition and remained in power. His position was reinforced by President Clinton's vacillation between liberal realism and grotian idealism.[102]

In the development of America's Cold War policy in Zaire, the four schools can generally be alligned with support for various contending leaders in the history of post-colonial Zairian development. The hard school of realism alligned with Mobutu at a very early stage. The liberal realists were the architects who created the unlikely coalition of Tshombe, who led the breakaway province of Katanga (Shaba) and the the original President, Joseph Kasavubu and Cyrille Adoula, Prime Minister. They were pragmatists on the lookout for any

combination that would provide stable, apparently democratic and, hopefully, moderate government. The grotians backed whatever was the legally constituted government of Zaire, President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Adoula in the early days, and then, when Mobutu became the dictator, they pushed for human rights and democratic reforms. The utopians backed the rebellious Patrice Lumumba who became the protegé of the Soviet Union until his assassination. Their sympathies then shifted to later rebellious elements, but subsequent radical utopians lacked the legitimacy that Lumumba had gained through elections.

My purpose is not to criticize any of the particular positions per se. Certainly, from a utopian angle, the Mobutu regime is most foul. From a grotian perspective, the Mobutu regime is immoral and fails to serve its own citizens in their basic needs.[103] From a liberal realist position, Mobutu subverts rather than upholds the laws of the market; copper production now is 20% of its conventional levels. And even from a conservative realist position, Zaire has not been an example of order, but of recurring disorder. Mobutu has never been able to defend himself when challenged by relatively small forces, but had to call on outside support. In terms of power, Mobutu is just an empty shell.

The fact is, neither of the ideologies have dominated American policy. The priority of one or the other has shifted, though over the long term, the conservative realists have been the most prevalent, in spite of the fact that the formation of American foreign policy belies their prenise of the state as a unitary actor in pursuit of its own national interests and the preservation of its power, and in spite of the fact that large questions can be raised about how Mobutu serves real American interests and what he provides in added value to American power, particularly in his latest phase when he is engaged in promoting ethnic hatred in order to preserve power.[104]

The major tension in US policymaking circles has been between the conservative realists and the liberal realists with the occasional shift to grotian idealism under Jimmy Carter. In contrast, the centre of gravity at the UN has been the grotian idealists, but they could never reconcile their idealism with their need to resort to real force and to take sides, quite aside from their inability to get their act together administratively, financially, or in any other significant way.

What we observe is a consistency between some theories and

some policies, but parallel conflicts in both the theoretical and the applied areas. From these grounds, a coherent policy cannot be expected from the dominant superpower and from the states governed more by a tension between liberal realism and grotian idealism, when the centre of gravity of the dominant superpower is thrust so much further to the right. Further, any one of the theorists from the various schools will provide different explanations, normative depictions and prescriptions for what has been described. The theoriticins do not seem to be in any position to sort out the contradictions and inconsistencies in the policy field.

What is more, if our Rwanda study pointed out the immediate shadows, such as Somalia, that hung over the policy in Rwanda, the UN experience in Zaire cast a very long shadow. "All in all, ONUC was an operation that a generation of UN officials wanted to forget, or, if not forget, then never to repeat." (Durch 1993b, 316.) Further, "the problems that arose in ONUC remain relevant thirty years later." (Durch 1993b, 342)

Chapter 6

The Case of Rwanda

I do not intend to review the examination of the Rwandan crisis and the international response that is contained in the study produced by Astri Suhrke and myself. Instead, I want to summarize the crisis in terms of a series of puzzles - ones already found in the case, ones that characterized the case and defied the conventional wisdom and expectations, and ones unanticipated by international theory.

Six years prior to the genocide, there were virtually no hints of such an enormous tragedy let alone an immanent crisis. Rwanda was one of the prizes for the international community, demonstrating that Third World countries could have honest and efficient governments combined with the lowest expenditures on arms in Africa. Though discriminated against and subjected to quotas under the guise of equality of opportunity for Hutus, the Tutsis were not persecuted. Under Habyarimana's relatively benevolent authoritarian rule, Rwanda had enjoyed outstanding increases in rates of economic growth.

I do not want to pretend that the situation in Rwanda was idyllic, but, comparatively speaking, it was a place of high stability and relatively low tension. Three factors came together to upset this myth of an approximation to a Garden of Eden that so entranced development agencies. Coffee prices crashed throwing this dependent economy into a tizzy. Secondly, Tutsi refugees from the Rwanda revolution of 1959-62, who had apparently become so integrated into the power structure of Uganda, particularly the military power structure, decided that they would never be integrated within Uganda on a basis of equality; with their military experience as a result of their participation in Museveni's overthrow of Obote in Uganda, they determined to return to Rwanda, by force if necessary. Thirdly, reinforced by the new ideology of spreading democracy and human rights which affected the West's dealing with all development societies at the time (see Zaire above) and the enormous success of the Helsinki Accords, pressures grew from outside donor governments and from within Rwanda for the protection of human rights and permitting multi-party democracy.

A synergy of various factors proved to be incediary - economic catastrophe, social ethnic segmentation with an

unintegrated exile community made up of one of the ethnic
groups, reinforced by open ethnic and regional politics in the
guise of multi-parties, and an authoritarian political system in
which a small elite from one region and the majority ethnic
group ruled as an oligarchy in a patrimonial system extremely
dependent on overseas aid. These circumstances fed the belief
that a military threat could be credible when there was an
unwillingness to defuse it by insisting that international norms
for repatriating refugees be observed. When this was combined
with political leadership within that had lost any broad-based
legitimacy it once had, the elements for a catastrophe were in
place.

Exogenous factors contributed to the passivity. Habyarimana
had a military assistance agreement with France and a friendship
with Mobutu of Zaire. However, he was also aware that Tutsis
were prominently positioned in Museveni's military in Uganda and
he understood the truism that neigboring states "are often
active contributors to military escalation and regional
instability." (Brown 1996b, 572) However, his own military
alliances made him underestimate the force and determination of
an externally well-trained militant opposition when compounded
by strife and dissension within. Further, as a military man
socialized on conservative realism as the foundation for rule
and state policy, there was no internal motivation to establish
a process of reconciliation. Habyarimana and his coterie lacked
a conceptual framework that would or could propel him to seek a
peaceful resolution of the refugee problem. Further, there was
no pressure from the aid agencies at the time partly because
they sympathized with the Hutus as the underdogs against those
they perceived as the old rulers who had historically been
responsible for exploiting the Hutu. Further, since Rwanda was
one of the densest countries in the world, in objective economic
terms there was a general belief that it would be better if the
Tutsis did not return, especially given the authoritarian rule
of the Tutsi minority in Burundi.

Thus, although the lethal combination of potential
destabilization was reasonably well known, little attention was
paid either on the inside or from outsiders. The outlook of this
monograph means paying attention to combinations of ripples
rather than waiting for a tidal wave. The assumption is that
combinations of small, little noticed changes can produce large
effects, including large patterns of behaviour that are
seemingly triggered by one action - in this case the invasion by
the RPF on 1 October 1990.

Second, inattention to Rwanda meant that international norms about both refugees and the obligations to them, and the rejection of the resort of refugees to the use of violence to return were all transgresssed. The plight and desires of a refugee community were effectively ignored, so that, in desperation, they determined to return by force, thereby breaking other norms and rules. This resulted in a displacement of a further 15% of the population in a civil war instigated by refugee warriors. The failure to deal with one relatively manageable refugee problem in a timely fashion meant many, many more refugees were produced.

Three, although Rwanda was well behind in those forces of globalization that redistribute rural populations into cities, creating a foundation for industrialization, it was vulnerable to the new forces of violence *and communication* (fear-mongering on radio) that meant that rural populations fled en masse to become internally displaced or refugees rather than remaining in villages and close to land and the food they consumed to wait out a period of political violence. In sum, the responses to conflict were thoroughly modern even if the economic and social circumstances behind the violence were not.

Four, defying the non-interventionist in civil wars ideology of the nineties, the ideal conditions for peace were created by early Western diplomatic intervention on behalf of the government, positively by France and negatively by the Americans against Uganda. Rwanda, which had never been a locus for superpower rivalry, appeared to be a remnant of an older neo-colonial order. The main hegemonic force was France, a declining power with major power pretensions. France had replaced Belgium as the protector for the Rwandese government. But its interest in Rwanda was more cultural and lingusitic than economic or strategic, although, when the civil war began, the utility of military assistance became critical to the maintenance of the Habyarimana regime. This meant that although France backed the regime, it had insufficient motivation to ensure its continued maintenance, particularly in the face of its non-observance of democratic conventions. On the other hand, superpower intervention (the United States) meant that Museveni's support for the rebels was limited if not cut off as the civil war proceeded. The limited power of a declining power and its shifting emphasis to utilizing liberal realism rather than conservative realism as a basis for its policies, and the global reach of a superpower resulted in a military stalemate,

creating both the conditions for serious peace negotiations as well a the foundations for a dragged out situation where everything began to deteriorate.

Five, instead of regional rivalries between Zaire and Uganda creating the potential for escalation in accordance with conventional wisdom, subsidiarity facilitated a peace agreement, with Tanzania taking the lead as a helpful fixer. The peace accord was signed at Arusha on 4 August 1993 with a very minor diplomatic role played by major players, international organizations or influential elites who are frequently presumed to be crucial by many involved in mediation efforts, including the Carter organization, the Carnegie Group and International Alert.

Six, the substantive elements of the Arusha Accords would be given almost an A+ in a course in international studies, providing as it did for effective military integration and demobilization, disarming of civilian militias, supervision by an international peace force, an integrated broad-based government, and return of displaced persons and refugees. Yet this almost ideal peace accord would provide one of the blinkers that blinded the world to a malevolent force left out of but not disarmed by that accord. And the UN was not up to the task. When the main intervening movers and shakers shifted from the Great Lakes region to New York, this provided a recipe for disaster rather than a synergy to complete the task. The reasons were many: the lack of both detailed knowledge and interests; the same administrative disorganization and civilian-military tension that marked the Zaire operation a third of a century earlier, this time with the absence of any major power high level backing (in the Zaire operation, it emerged; in Rwanda, in the long shadow of Zaire and the immediate dark shadow of Somalia, it dissolved); the absence of assured funding for a clear and strong mandate, backed by adequate transport, equipment (in particular, the absence of armored personnel carriers proved to be critical)-and troops.

Seven, instead of any fear of international intervention, both sides in the conflict took the unprecedented step of coming together to New York to lobby the UN to provide a peace keeping force. Based on the experience in Somalia, the reverse lesson was supposed to be true about the allignment of internal forces: the weak line up with the UN while the strong oppose UN deployment. (Augelli and Murphy 1995, 343-4) In Rwanda, the more effective military force had initially opposed UN deployment,

but when the final stage of the battle, that had hopefully been sidetracked, was engaged, the weaker extremist Hutus both instigated genocide and sought to and succeeded in driving out the UN for all intensive purposes.

Eight, the arrival in New York also reinforced the grotian tendency to be blinded by the belief that a complete consensus had been reached and that peacekeeping in this situation would be "a piece of cake" as General Dallaire was told when he was offered the position of Force Commander. On the other hand, the Security Council, not the parties, a Security Council dominated by realists, watered down the mandate and terms of engagement that made the peacekeepers ineffective in disarming civilians. Partly that was because of ignorance, even if it was the same ignorance that allowed them to become involved in Rwanda and try to forget Somalia in their short term memory and Zaire as part of their long term memory. Whatever the synergy of differences that allowed a common inept decision to be made, as has always been the case, the peacekeeping force lacked any system of intelligence, except one it improvised itself, but more importantly, any system for systematically collecting and analyzing the information they did have to translate that intelligence into strategic and tactical options. What was said about the Zaire operation a third of a century later could be repeated about Rwanda: "Lacking formal intelligence on the evolution of the political situation..., the UN relied on the reports of UN staffers..., on member states' missions in New York, and on the Congo political leadership...Moreover, both the situation in the country and what the world learned about it were subject to manipulation by those powers that had intelligence assets and interests at stake." (Durch 1993, 332)

Nine, of four lessons that should have been learned from the Zaire experience with peacekeeping (or Somalia), only one and a half had been absorbed. In part, this is because the UN lacks an adequate institutional memory and also because there had been a desire to forget everything about the Congo trauma. The first internal lesson was the immanent problem of escalation and the need to prepare adequately for it. For peacekeeping always can beget the requirement for peace enforcement in countries where civil war has undermined the value of life, and where each incident of violence invites reprisals. On the other hand, the other side of the coin had been well learned from Somalia: force, if it "is is not used within limits and with caution, easily degenerates into violence." (Augelli and Murphy 1995, 343) The first half of the lesson had been forgotten while

the other half had been learned all too well. There was a second lesson from Somalia that, however, had not been learned, the significance of the determination of local armed groups. There were also two lessons about exogenous factors that should have been learned from both Somalia and Zaire, but only one was: the volatility of international public opinion. The second had not been recognized, namely that, "**No** (my emphasis) contemporary government is prepared to pay a high price in terms of human losses unless the security or vital interests of the country are at stake." (Augelli and Murphy 1995, 344) It was believed that this was an American problem only, because of three factors in US domestic politics: 1. "First, the conditions that made the new world order theoretically possible - especially the absence of a threat to US vital interests - also ensured that the yearning to address long festering domestic ills...would become greater."
2. "formidable opposition from within the U.S. military"
3. the support of the Un and multilateralism, especially peacekeeping, was a major battle ground between the executive and legislative branches. (Daalder 1996, 463)[105] In fact, it is a condition of modernity.

Ten, in addition to all the complex conundrums about peacekeeping, in the process of implementing the Accords, there were unexpected very positive elements; instead of the expected antagonism between development agencies and security forces, the UNDP, as one example, provided a critical role in planning the demobilization in great detail. The UNDP went even further; it provided the interim financing for the peacekeepers when it took the UN until 4 April 1994 to approve the budget.

Eleven, instead of a widely held presumption that smaller nations fear the exercise of too much power by the Security Council, when the crisis broke out on 6 April 1994, it was the smaller states that cried for a more activist Security Council while the US demonstrated resistance. This was, of course, exactly what happened one-third of a century earlier in Zaire.

Twelve, though the United States and the Secretariat were mutually rhetorically critical and even antagonistic, and even though they faced the onset of the crisis with very opposed presumptions, they opted for the same solution - get out and minimize risks and exposure, ignoring the plight of the civilian population. At least in Zaire, in spite of similar ignorance, chaos, and a radical disjunction between the military and the political, between the political and the bureaucratic, it was

the UN commitment to the civilian population that sustained them and impelled the UN to stay the course. That motivation seemed to be absent in Rwanda, and only emerged in the UN when the genocide was clear and unequivocal and the UN peacekeepers had mostly left the scene. And then it was too late given the tepid response. In the obsession with not getting in the middle of waring parties - perhaps partly as an unconscious legacy of Zaire, they forgot the positive value of the Congo, the real protection rendered to civilians.

Thirteen, instead of mediation, problem solving and the search for consensus, which have become the primary tools that the dominant ideology of international mediation espouses, forceful intervention was required.[106] But the ideology of "neutrality"[107] that plagued Hammarskjöld a third of a century earlier continued. The pressure for continued mediation between the two military forces misplaced the efforts of even the meagre force of peacekeepers left in Rwanda during and after the withdrawal.
It would have been clearly more effective both for saving lives and the UN credibility if the UN had openly taken sides against the genocidal regime.

Fourteen, without minimizing the role of the constructed antagonisms between the Hutu and the Tutsi, the key problem proved neither to be primarily a matter of North-South rivalry let alone vested rivalries of two groups with different cultures, languages and religions. On the one hand, "the 'ancient hatreds' explanation for the causes of internal conflict cannot account for significant variation in the incidence and intensity of such conflict." (Brown 1996b, 573) On the other hand, "ethnicity emerges as a political resource deliberately manipulated by ethnic entrepreneurs for the specific purpose of facilitating their entry into the political arena." (Lemarchand 1994, 5)

Fifteen, the problem was exacerbated by the role of external aid. One unintended consequences of humanitarian assistance is that it feeds both the desire and the means to continue a struggle since it feeds a conflict with resources as well as the motivation to fight to retain control over those resources. Good intentions and good can be a root cause as well as a means for prolonging a conflict and adding to the casualties. The central problem was those willing to take the house down with them to maintain their positions and power in the name of an ideology. With Western aid and the vital

importance of the state sector in financing change, the loss of control of the levers of state power meant a dramatic loss in economic as well as political power resulting in the politics of desperation. "(M)ost major internal conflicts are triggered by internal, elite-level actors - to put it bluntly, bad leaders - contrary to what policymakers, popular commentators, and the scholarly literature on the subjet suggest." (Brown 1996b, 571) When this was combined with the absence of significant interest from any external actor, the chaotic organization and management of the UN, the power of radio both to reach the multitudes and stir up their anxieties and fears, the availability of weapons, and the weakness of the rule of law, civil society and political democratic processes, it meant that there was no one to police those in power, and, at the same time, no motive or instituional mechanism to remove those in power.

Did any of the ideologies outlined in section 4 (conservative realism, liberal realism, grotian neutrality and revolutionary utopianism) and their complementary policy makers have any solutions that were relevant to stopping the emerging crisis in Rwanda and its aftermath? In other words, could the situation have been prevented if we had the proper organization and the intelligence system? or are the problems much deeper than the structural and organizational defects of the current international system? Do they go to the heart of our beliefs?

Conservative realism is easiest to deal with. It would have kept the UN away for Rwanda in the first place. Essentially, as one US State department official, who was bold enough to articulate that belief in clear and unequivocal terms, stated it, 'If they want to kill each other, what business is it of ours?' The United States and even France had no vital economic or geo-political interests in Rwanda. Since Rwanda conflict was both contained and of no economic or strategic interest, therefore was a low probability of UN successful action according to Oudraat's studies. (1996, 523)

One of the ironies is that policy would not have led the civilian population to believe that they could rely on the UN for their protection. They might have done more in advance to protect themselves. But, in the end, other than relieving the UN from blame for a promise undelivered, and blaming the UN for not trying to do anything in the first place, my suspicion is that the result would have been largely the same - a massive genocide. Whatever the case, conservative realism would not have helped at all.

What is more significant, it is useless even in helping to analyze what happened. For though what was at stake was economic interest and power for the elites committing the atrocities, there is no explanation in terms of economic interest and power provided by neo-realists that accounts for diverting one's efforts at violence to eliminating a whole population of another group. Any minimal degree of intelligence would indicate that it would destroy the long term chances of even recovering power and economic clout once the genocide was over, even if here might be some short term gains in eliminating a population base that would support the opposition and stimulating the fears that would facilitate political and military control over the exile population in the camps. From Hitler, to Cambodia, to Bosnia to Rwanda, genocide may have a strong self-interest component, at least in the perceptions of the perpetrators. But for an 'objective' analysis, which neo-realism insists it will provide even if it appears ruthless, there is little supporting evidence that neo-realism can account for what happened let alone provide any policy for mitigating or preventing such genocides.

What about a liberal realist outlook and policy foundation? It is founded on a search for cooperative solutions while recognizing the importance of self interest and power as prime motivating factors? It is concerned with upholding and implementing regime principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, and strengthening the organizations given the responsibility for upholding them.

As Adelman and Suhrke (1996) point out, there were principles and norms covering the rights of refugees. They were to be allowed to repatriate. Failing that, they should be integrated in the country of first asylum. Or they should be resettled abroad. But these were only preferred solutions in order of priority. They were not governing norms or rules. And they were certainly not enforceable. Caught between the politicians of their home state rejecting repatriation, at least in any significant numbers, and the sociology of their host state which limited the degree to which they could be integrated, and in the absence of any offers to settle them abroad, there was neither the self interest nor power of any state to cut through the conundrum. On this level, the neo-realists are correct in arguing that the regime theories of liberal internationalists lack any value added component in explanatory or policy terms to the power and self interest presumptions of the conservative realists. They simply do not

tell how to get through a problem when it comes to the crunch. And where there are no inherent problems problems, as in international regimes for sharing air waves or determining routes for air carriers, power and self interest are sufficient for explanatory purposes. Thus, the refugee warriors resorted to the use of violence, contrary to the norms which forbid refugees from using violent means as a way to return totheir own country.

Let us take a second case. The French and the American advisers to the Arusha peace process, represented by liberal realists, advised that the extremists be included in the Broad Based Government in recognition that they controlled too much power and had too much at stake economically not to be a serious source of trouble if they were left out of the solution. Since there was unlikely to be any countervailing proposed power to neutralize them as a contending force, they were better off within with somewhat diluted authority than left without.

On the surface, this seems like a plausible thesis. Except when you examine most other cases where it has been tried. For example, allowing Mobutu to retain formal state power (the same plan as that devised for Habyarimana) meant that Mobutu and, subsequently, Habyarimana, was in a position to stall and eventually sabotage the accords that had been agreed upon. Including the extremists in the coalition would have made this stall easier. Without supplementary steps to effectively defang such a source of power, this is a high risk strategy.

What is most significant, it fails to take into consideration a factor that most contemporary realists have forgotten about which was an essential aspect of Hobbesian classical realism. For power and economic self interest were not the only factors deemed by the classical realists to motivate humans. The issue of pride, and the recognition associated with pride, was at least as, if not more, important than power and self interest.

For example, Hobbes cited the following **three** factors as the root causes of a quarrel: "in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. The first maketh the men to invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves Master of ither mens persons, wives, children, and cattell; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue." (*Leviathan* 13:para. 6-7)

Economic interest may make us use violence to secure more, and diffidence make us use that same power to provide security and safety, but the ringer in the *troika* is glory and pride and the search for recognition. It is the vain glory of pride that causes madness, self-conceit and self-deceipt. (*Leviathan*, 8:para. 18) This overestimation of oneself and the group with which one collectively identifies impedes reason and blinds men to their true self interests. (*Leviathan*, 8:para. 18-19) In other words, at least Hobbes as a classical realist recognized that there was an irrational component that had to be factored in which could, and was likely to, gum up any proposed solutions based on mere rational, mechanistic assumptions and taking into consideration only self interest and power.[108]

I am not concerned here with determining whether Hobbes' psychological analysis was correct. I merely want to point out that, in contrast with most contemporary realists, both conservative and liberal[109], but particularly liberal realists, Hobbes at least recognized the existence of irrationality as a powerful force which could subvert self interest. In the Arusha Accords, liitle attention was being paid to the irrational. The RPF would not include the extremists because the extremists would not recognize them as a legitimate entity. The extremists were driven to madness by their own irrationality which meant that they were the most dangerous force that had to dealt with one way or another. And the Arusha Accords failed to do so. The liberal idealist proposals to coopt the extremists failed to take into account this non-rational factor in the RPF and its irrational dimensions in the extremists.

In strictly realist terms, "The laws of nature also suggest that once men are in society, the greatest threat to order and therefore to human well-being is not competition caused by self-interest or diffidence caused by mutual fear but the struggle for glory brought about by pride. The laws of nature demand that pride be deflated and *replaced by rational fear* (my italics)." (Johnson 1993, 13) the problem is that none of the realists were realist enough. They failed to take into account the power of irrationality and the importance of countering such irrationality with an effective countervailing overwhelming force that would allow rational fear to displace the domination of the irrational forces.

There was a third failing in the realist position. At

Arusha, the United States and France played very postive roles in assisting the parties to come to an agreement. But the liberal realists were in charge here. The conservative realists would have no part in such a show. That means the process of mediation depended entirely on appealing to the self interests and broader views of the respective parties. Quite aside for the dilemma of a key party not being present, which was not the fault of either France or the Americans, liberal realists are disinclined to use deception to facilitate the respective parties realizing what is in their best interests.[110] The major powers served as facilitators. They did not play the role of, in effect, compelling any of the parties, particularly the RPF, to bargain with them as the third party as well. In sum, there was no Kissinger at the table using a combination of rewards and potential threats combined with charm and deviousness to indicate to each party that a simple compromise would be sufficient to get a deal when that party knew that they would have to use the same ruse to get the other party to compromise.[111]

If the liberal realists had problems, what about the grotians? They come off as the most hapless of all. Like Boutros Boutros-Ghali (sse Appendix 2), they flail in the wind, shifting from erroneous analysis and panicky conclusions urging withdrawal, to total reversals and demands for involvement in a *mea culpa* at the undeniable genocide underway, and then a subsequent cover-up for their own failures to live up to the clear and unequivocal norms demanded as their most sacred duty - that they act to prevent genocide. (See Appendix 2) As believers in trust and good offices and well meaning, they are the ones who are least useful to handle a crisis involving real violence.

Is this fair? Was it not the international consortium of human rights activists who first called the violence in Rwanda 'genocide' as early as January of 1993? Was it not they who had induced their governments to pressure Rwanda to introduce democracy and live up to the principles protecting human rights? Were the grotians not the most prescient as well as most insightful in policy terms in pointing to the need for democratic reform as a precondition for correcting the situation in Rwanda?

The human rights activists were the most prescient. But in their bow to influencing their closest collaborators, that is, in their pragmatic interest in influencing public and elite opinion and not appearing hysterical to liberal realist ears,

they removed the reference to genocide in their official March
1993 report. Further, they continued to address their appeals to
Habyarimana on the assumption (mistaken I would contend) that he
would be influenced by world public opinion; that was a
possibility only isofar as it undermined the support of his
patrons. Finally, one of the tragic ironies is that the
conservative realists were right - the push for democracy
increased the level of destabilization. As Zartman pointed out,
"conflict often occurs in the process or aftermath of
democratization; hence, the opening up of the system leads to
its tearing down. The mass killings in Burundi by both ethnic
groups - Tutsis and Hutus - in late 1993, after the army's
assassination of the democratically elected president, and the
genocide practiced by groups associated with the government in
Rwanda in April 1994, after the authoritarian ruler's plane was
shot down, are the most fearsome examples, but the similar if
lower-scale violence in Congo following similar elections is
another case." (Zartman 1996, 55)

Part of the problem is the fundamental reliance grotians
place on their foundational belief in trust and consensus. It is
not simply that they do not believe that actors are motivated by
self interest and power. Rather they believe those short term
interests can be (unfortunately this is too often translated to
mean that they will be) overruled by a higher rationality which
takes long term interests into account. In this case, the RPF,
if it had been rational, would not have resorted to violent
means and an invasion because the RPF would recognize that their
violation would set the precedent for other actors, particularly
the government, also to violate international norms (direct
reciprocity). Similarly, the government would not have proceeded
with its own violations culminating in genocide because its
members would recognize that their violation would effect the
possible future violation by others, not necessarily against
themselves (indirect reciprocity).[112]

Secondly, grotians and even liberal realist
internationalists, place a great deal of reliance on the force
of world public opinion. There are three dimensions to this
belief. In reverse of the order in which they are presumed to
act, there is first of all the belief that such political
opinion will influence political leaders. There is a second
dimension to this assumption; they believe that such opinion
will be formed when needed. Thirdly, there is the belief,
because of their own enormous efforts at reporting human rights
abuses and disseminating those reports, that public opinion will

largely reflect the reality they depict. (Cf. Goldmann 1994, 63)

    None of these assumptions appeared to be correct as a result of our analysis of the international response to Rwanda. There was no evidence that Habyarimana, and certainly not the extremist perpetrators of the genocide, were influenced in any way by world public opinion. Secondly, large scale public opinion was not aroused when the genocide was reported, but only when the refugees poured across the border into Zaire at Goma. Finally, much of the reaon for this is that the grotians were unable to penetrate the dominant media in any significant way and alter the prevailing (and eroneous view) that the violence was a product of age-old hatreds between Hutu and Tutsi. The fundamental presumptians of the grotians in the NGOs about the role of the media and public opinion were belied by events. This is true whether the reference is to official or popular opinion. Further, because Rwanda was relatively remote from most countries concerns, the irony was that the most accurate reporting was found in the country which had been supporting the government of Rwanda - France. Thus, while one might expect such a situation to introduce a level of political and cultural bias (Goldmann 1994, 75), the best and most detached, even when couched in strident criticism and advocacy, was to be found in France.

    Even the penetration into the organized opinion of the NGO sector was limited. As will be discussed in the section on media, there is false presumption by grotians "that opinion formation is a rational process." (Goldmann 1994, 69) This was not so much because of bias in the media, but the bias of the type of media (see appendix 3 and the media section) combined with the almost total and fundamental flaws in gathering the news in the first place. (Adelman and Suhrke 1996) What is more, the evidence suggested that organized as well as public opinion largely relied on the media rather than their own information and analysis even when that had been done. The result was that Boutros Boutros-Ghali himself reinforced these erroneous public opinions when he rationalized the withdrawal of the UNAMIR troops on 20 April 1994.

    This does not mean that public opinion was powerless. When television became involved in a massive way with the outflow of refugees, the media had the power to reverse the course of the ship of state. This is the famous CNN effect. The White House reversed the course determined by the security establishment literally overnight in response to public pressure and what I

term sentimental politics at the plight of the refugees pictured on television. Thus, the role of the media undercut the rationalist presumptions of the grotians and the self interest assumptions of the realists at one and the same time as massive aid flowed out to assist the refugees and indirectly the genocidal killers who were also given an opportunity to consolidate their power and create a constituency to fight another day.

When it comes to the rationality of grotians who are in positions of power and authority, instead of trying to influence a situation from the outside, as the above sketch of what happened indicates, they tend to panic at any challenge to their most basic beliefs. In any case, they operate from a context and within a structure that does not permit effective action unless the irrationality happens to be minimal or absent. In such situations, as in Namibia, they will emerge as the appropriate heroes facilitating compromise and the upholding of internationl ethics, principles and international law.

Finally, the grotians fail on the principle of neutrality. But you cannot support the principle of justice and organize resistance to genocide **and** be neutral between two sides in a conflict when one side is planning and then executing genocide. But this was precisely the role the UN assumed well after the genocide commenced - trying to use their good offices to forge a truce between irrational basic realists and utopians. The role of the grotians was a tragic illustration of what Goldmann called the "internationalists' dilemma". (194, 165-171) The UN showed that when it came to making Buridan's choice between upholding international covenants against genocide and promoting accomodation, instead of ostracizing the genocidal killers and declaring them the enemy of the world, they chose empathy and neutrality in the understandable but futile desire to resurrect the peace. They sold their own souls to the devil in the process.

There are also utopians around. Some of the leaders of the RPF we interviewed were clearly utopians. But we encountered them in many positions in IOs in writing our report on Rwanda. For these utopians, what was needed was simply a radical reform of the UN in which American control was reduced, radical reforms be made to the economic financing of the UN, etc. We are all too familiar with the litany and the various combinations of radical solutions proposed which simply fail to take into consideration the existing powers and the economic forces which have very

little interest in promoting any radical reforms. At best, there is a possible interest in tinkering given current shifts in interests and power among the member states. All of these measures are intended to facilitate more drastic intervention whenever there are massive violations of human rights, not taking into account that **no** state, even one such as Sweden where the foreign policy is primarily based on a tension between grotian liberal internationalism and realist liberal internationalism rather than a tension between conservative realism and liberal realism as the prime determinants of foreign policy as in the United States, France and Great Britain. This is true even when liberal realism dominates foreign policy as has possibly been the case recently in both the United States and France.[113]

Without going into further detailed analysis, my conclusion is that none of the dominant theories and their policy correlates and structural reforms would have prevented the genocide in Rwanda by themselves. The problem, as Gramsci so clearly noted, is that realism and idealism see "a radical separation between force and consensus, while, in the real world, these two forms of rule are mutually supportive and often combine in mysterious ways." (Augelli and Murphy 1993, 128)

On the other hand, the gramscians seem totally out of touch with empirical reality when their overall framework leads to generalizations such as the following: "some segments of the Third World become integrated into the globalisation process; other segments which remain outside must be handled by a combination of global poor relief and riot control. Poor relief is designed to avoid conditions of desperation arising from impoverishment which could threaten to politically destabilise the integrated segments. Riot control takes the form of military-political support for regimes that will abide by and enforce global economy practices, and, in the last instance, of the rapid deployment force to discipline those that will not." (Cox 1993b, 285-6)

Unfortunately, the riot police never arrived in Rwanda.

Chapter 7

Using Practice to Undertand Theory

So where does that leave us? Theories seem to dictate how we see the world and then lead to the implementation of a range of policies within the parameters of that theory. Or is theory simply a way of rationalizing what we are inclined to do anyway? On the other hand, could each theory and its policy correlates merely provide a partial grasp of the reality before us?

If we ignore the schools based on combinations, each of the four basic ones correlate with two of the four underlying factors of change: coercive power, economic factors, political and legal regimes (sources of formal authority generally), and morality and ideology. (cf. Mann 1988) The following chart makes the correlations clear.

```
Coercive Power
                    +     }                      Conservative realism
Economics
  (Material Influence)
                    +     }                      Liberal Realism
Formal Authority
                    +     }                      Grotians
Morality and Ideology
  (Intellectual Influence}                       Utopians
```


If a comparison is made with classical factors in the analysis of politics, two categpries are missing from this chart. They are the passions and a higher source of authentic authority: the Forms in Plato, the Final Cause in Aristotle, God in the Hebraic tradition.

For a conservative realist, survival is fundamental, and hence the priority given to power as the willingness to use coercive force against another perceived as threatening one's life or to forestall such a threat. In the anarchic international world, states are artificial persons driven to use coercive force to offset threats and maintain security. Desire - in modernity, the quest for material acquisitions - is important, but not in itself. Material goods are accumulated to ensure survival. If fear of destruction, and the willingness to use force to prevent that destruction, is combined with self-

interest, the motivation to ensure that survival, then, on the
individual level. one finds the motive for acquisitive self-
seeking and the use of force when the capacity exists to foster
that self-seeking. On the collective level, states then have a
rationale for imperial expansion. In this framework, the laws to
which individuals or states agree, whether domestic or
international, are tools of survival, not values in their own
right.

Thus, any moral system or ideology we espouse is but
sophistic rhetoric to gull the masses, unless, as Hobbes
contends, *it is scientifically based.* Words, unless they have
specific material referents, are meaningless. For Hobbes, words
used univocally with specific concrete references and
systematically organized into descriptive laws can be employed
to scentifically manage society. Science is the authentic source
of authority for determining truth. (Hobbes, *Life of Thucydides*,
para. 4) "The fundamental dilemma confronting Hobbes' political
theory can be reduced to the simple question: science or
rhetoric." (Johnston 1986, 61) In Thucydides, the master science
is not physics but history, and the laws are not the mechanical
physical laws of force, but the circular patterns of time which
are doomed to repeat and condemn collectivities to duplicate
their follies unless they learn from the past. Any other use of
words, such as the speeches of the Athenians, is sophistic
rhetoric motivated by self-promotion and an appeal to ignorance
and flattery.

For the motivation for using rhetoric and its appeal is
pride, the third non-rational motivation which, as I pointed out
earlier, most contemporary conservative realists ignore. "Pride
is the one passion that Hobbes considers lethal to civil
society, the one that can make man ungovernable." (Johnson 1993,
10) Humans are not just atomic creatures. They care what others
think about them. They want recognition. One's pride is hurt in
direct correlation with the distance between one's own self-
estimate and that of others. Further, the degree of discrepency
between one's own estimate of self worth and that of others can
be considered "vaine-Glory". The larger the discrepency, the
greater the madness or rage produced. In such cases, rather than
self-interest or material pursits, or even more fundamentally
survival and self-protection coming to the fore, an individual
governed by pride will not be determined by a rational
calculation but will risk all. Pride blinds men to the
conclusions of their own reason. (*Leviathan*, 8: para. 18-19)

The same is true of collectivities. When Bismark edited the Ems telegram in 1879, he played on French 'vaine-Glory' and Pride. The prick to the French sense of honour stumulated them to mobilize against the Prussians and ignore any sense of caution as a result of the knowledge of the superior status of the Prussian military. This gave Bismark just the excuse he needed to declare war on France in order to unite the German states.

Similarly, according to Thucydides, what motivated the Athenians to wage war was a quest for glory. Pericles appealed to Athenian pride and greatness in his rhetoric, promising historical renown even if they die and even if Athens actually lost a war. "For the love of honour alone is untouched by age, and when one comes to the ineffectual period of life it is not 'gain' as some say, that gives the greater satisfaction, but honour." (Thucydides, *History of the Peloponesian War*, 2:44.4; cf. Johnson 1993, 31)

Life or survival is protected by coercive power and served by self-interest, but the rationality of both of them can be subverted by the passion of pride. Social institutions and the inculcation of values can and should be designed to protect individuals and collectivities from the sin of pride so that their rational self-interest and the power serving self-protection can be served and enhanced. According to this rationale, many of the institutions created in the international arena for peace and security - hot lines, for example - exist to prevent the sin of pride (as well as accidents) from destroying existing security arrangements.

This description seems very apt for the Hutu extremist leadership in Rwanda who were willing to use their power to destroy as many innocent civilians identified with the enemy under their control, even if coercive power was being displaced that could have been used to enhance their chances of victory or at least a stalemate. Part of the answer for their actions was their unwillingness to lose their positions and the access to material benefits and power which political control entailed.[114] But these 'rational' goals were subverted into a destructive nightmare rather than any rational calculation of their interests and coercive capabilities by their pride[115], their unwillingness to surrender the honor and recognition bestowed upon them as political leaders. They would rather be leaders in exile, in refugee camps, than thrown out of the spotlight as

central actors in an historical drama.[116] Rational calculation based on fear or diffidence and the competitive quest for gain are inadequate to account for the irrationality of massacres in which women and infant children as well as competitors and potential enemies are killed.

What is not so easily recognized is that the same description could characterize the RPF. For it was their pride as well that insisted at Arusha that they would not deal with the extremists who would not recognize them. It was their pride that blinded them to the risk to which their terms of peace, in part, could be considered responsible for jeopardizing the lives of the innocent Tutsis, in effect, held hostage by the Hutu extremists within Rwanda. It was their pride that blinded them to reading earlier slaughters as simply rational bargaining chips and not as actions that indicated a willingness of extremists to put aside rational calculation if the costs to their pride were too great.

The sense of pride in the antagoistic violence of the murderers is based on their low sense of self-esteem and an effort to wipe out the existence of the other to retain and/or recover their sense of self. The sense of pride in those who fail to recognize the rage in the other is based on the high sense of self esteem that denies the other any independent existence as an individual or group. Thus, the Tutsis in Rwanda denied that the Hutus were anything but other Rwandese, even though the Tutsis, after the July 1994 victory, dominated the political and military in the country. For the first, the ego of the other is so overwhelming that it must be exterminated. For the second, the ego of the other is so inconsequential that it can be fully assimilated in an integrated national identity in a state in which the Tutsi happen to dominate.

> In the last resort, we can say that Tutsi and Hutu have killed each other more to upbraid a certain vision they have of themselves, of the others and of their place in the world than because of material interests. This is what makes the killing so relentless. Material interests can always be negotiated, ideas cannot and they often tend to be pursued to their logical conclusion, however terrible. (Prunier 1995, 40)

The dynamics of this interaction has been commented upon a number of times by one of the most acute observers of Rwanda and

Burundi who rages against the Scylla of most of the popular press and some academics[117] representing the struggle in both Rwanda and Burundi as the expression of the age-old mutual hatred of two tribes, the Hutu and the Tutsi, and the opposite calumny, the simplistic assertion that ethnic hatred has nothing whatsoever to do with the violence which is merely the product of the machinations of a small elite bent on power and securing their economic positions, merely using ethnic differences to spread lies and stir up hatred.[118]

Finally, what is most significant is that there was no source of *authentic* authority to adjudicate these two opposing perspectives. On the one hand, science and/or history seemed to play virtually no role in adjudicating the two diametrically opposite viewpoints of the identity of the self, membership in the state, and the relations between the Hutus and the Tutsis. Rhetoric, not facts, drove the action. Further, there were perceived sources of authority, but, in every case they proved to be false gods rather than establishing their authenticity.

Let me illustrate. First, the source of the information of the attitudes of the Hutus is taken from an excellent anthropological study of Hutu refugees from Burundi which accords with other studies of refugees elsewhere. The conveyance of the world view of the Hutu refugees was projected by rhetorical modes that conformed to standard guidelines for training in sophistry.

> One of the most immediate obvious characteristics of the refugees' telling of their history was its didacticism. Many of the accounts and conversations recorded were characterized by the skilled use of such formal devices as rhetorical questions, repetition, repetition with variation, tonal emphasis...numbers and statistics were used...lists appeared very prominently in the narratives. There were lists oftraits, lists of 'symptoms,' lists of faults, lists of numbered points to be made, list that were like inventories, lists of many kinds. Proverbs were likewise deployed for persuasion and 'proof'. (Malkki 1992, 53)[119]

The stories told inform and explain, preescribe and proscribe. (Malkki 1992, 54) Whatever the tale, they all had one prime purpose - to explore, reiterate and emphasize the boundary between the self and the other, between Hutu and Tutsi, a

boundary identified as the one separating good and evil. The Tutsis were not just constructed as enemies, but as the embodiment of morally deficient characteristics such as laziness, but also, and most importantly, as sources of malevolence and evil. Even the positive qualities of the Tutsis - the famed beauty of Tutsi women - was considered to be a devilish device. The Hutu were defined 'reflexively' in opposition to the characteristics said to be possessed by the Tutsis.

The *weltanschauung* created out of categorical schemata and thematic configurations heroicized the Hutus as a distinct people radically in polar opposition to the Tutsis. Though the construction of the precise bifurcation points in history vary for Hutus from Burundi and Rwanda, both have definitive historical markers or turning points. For the Hutu in Rwanda it will be the revolution in Rwanda when the Hutus took the reigns of power from the Tutsis and now the reversal, the 1994 recapture of that power from the Hutu and their forced exile in the wilderness.[120]

The construction of the narrative has the following themes:
1) the Hutu are an ancient, aboriginal **nation, which gave them historical precedence in the land** (whether Burindi or Rwanda); prior to the arrival of the Tutsi, that nation as descendents of the Bantu, identified as humans, lived in a state of nature which was a paradise of harmony rather than a war of all against all;
2) the Hutu tell stories of the birth of the nation from a single founding father who married a local Twa as well as later bringing his original family from what is now Zaire, hence being father to both the Twa and the Hutu;
3) this story was contrasted with one told by the Tutsi - foreigners', johnny-come-latelies who arrived only about 400 years ago - a story characterized as legend in contrast to Hutu history; the three peoples, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, were descended from each of three children born of a common father who in turn was descended from or related to a sky god; the original son who bred the Tutsi achieved his inherited right to rule (according to the alleged opposing Tutsi legend in contrast to Hutu history) by dint of superior character;
4) Hutu settlement is directly related to the introduction of agriculture, in contrast to the Twa hunters and gatherers and the Tutsi pastoralists;
5) the early discarded pseudo-scientific "hamitic" hypothesis of

colonial "anthropologists" which accounted for the arrival of the Tutsis from the north was woven into the history;

6) the Tutsis tricked the Hutus into indentured servitude[121] through economic inducements - gifts of a cow - or the beauty of the Tutsi women which seduced Hutu men into intermarriage and perpetual servitude;

7) the identification of Tustis as Rwandese or Burundese (that is, as citizens of a state rather than as members of a nation) is designed to trick the Hutus and ensure the continuation of Tutsi hegemonic rule;

8) ironically, the Belgians, who as colonizers evidently institutionalized indentured labor into virtual slavery, and introduced identity cards defining Hutu and Tutsi as racial categories, were regarded as a benign source of impartial adjudication and as protectors against the Tutsi;

9) knowledge (though interpreted as primarily an alchemocal mode of discerning the lies of the rulers and as the key to Hutu emancipation) was provided to the Hutu (which it was in the later period of colonizing), but access was subverted by the Tutsi rulers; when that failed, the Tutsis killed Hutu intellectuals;

10) the body politic was reflected in the physical bodies of the two 'races' in which the stocky builds of the Hutu were equated with a willingness to undertake hard work in contrast to the tall Tutis whose delicate constitutions made them dependent on the work of others;

11) the identification of moral traits with a specific physiognomy to characterize the body politic and one nation – patterns on hands, presence (Hutu) or absence (Tutsi) of calf muscles and ankle bones, squat and fat noses (Hutu) verus straight long noses (Tutsi), etc, - was also reflected in necrographic maps of the bodies of those targetted for genocide and the depicted means of genocide through dismemberment, disfigurement and sexual assault with bamboo sticks penetrating the anus or vagina right through to the head;

12) the explanation of the powerlessness of the majority Hutu population is the possession of superior weapons of violence and organization for their use by the Tutsi and the 'natural' docility of farmers.

Note, not only are the mytho-histories used to radically contrast Hutu and Tutsi, but the stories play on the themes of life and desire, on self interest and power, to explain Tutsi rule - the monopoly of superior forms of violence combined with contrasting economic forms of organization, and the use of one to exploit the other economically. Further, there was a golden

age of harmony before the arrival of the Tutsi and, presumably, after their eradication. Finally, note that these tales were closest to those told by Rousseau, rather than Hobbes or Locke, for there was a general will; a collectivity and fraternité rather than individualism was esteemed as a sublime state.

The Tutsi tales we heard in the interviews for our study were not Hutu modified romantic Rousseauian myths of the past, but utopian Rousseauian visions of the future of one people told by RPF leaders, an ideal based on citizenship and equal membership for all, thus, ironically, complementing the Hutu myth of the Tutsis as intent on destroying the Hutu as a distinct nation. Further, whereas outsiders - France, the UN - were depicted as disrupters, spoilers and totally biased by the Tutsi victors in Rwanda, for the Hutu (as well as for the Tutsi **within** Rwanda prior to the genocide), outsiders were reliable, impartial and neutral intervenors and protectors.

The problem was that these more "sophisticated" accounts of history based on modern ideas and theories could not deal with a) either the dependence of the new post-1994 Rwanda on outsiders economically, and b) the resistance of Hutus to repatriation in spite of all the efforts to guarantee equality of treatment, except for the 1994 genocidal killers.

The result is that the modes of explanation proposed by modern scientific derivatives of Hobbes and Locke, conservative and liberal realism, seem to be mere modernistic variations of mythologies of conflict and inducements to cooperation which produce subservience rather than equality. The contradictions in the theoretical underpinnings of the outsiders are mirrored in their contradictory actions and formal rules which, for example, do not allow refugees to use violence to return, but do not solve the exile of the refugees but merely perpetuate their status. And the ourside coercive power of UNAMIR propagated as the protector of the Tutsis truly turned into a paper tiger which dissolved when only ten Belgians were killed.

If power appears to be for show rather than real, if economic inducements are taken but also perceived as a trap, if formal rules appear to be both unenforced and contradictory, and if the vision of a reconciled community living in harmony is simply seen as being in the service of one side, what resolution can outsiders bring. The realist story is a self-verifying hypothesis and simply confirms that the west has no business intervening where it has no self interest nor the willingness to

use coercive force to back up its efforts.

Thus, although the categories and conceptions of the conservative realists in the full classical version, which takes into consideration irrational factors, the categories of passion and pride, effectively explain the motives and actions of the prime protagonists, inherently they fail to produce a solution. Both physical science and historical science, as understood thus far, offer no basis of higher authority to overcome the dominant and apparently irreconcilable myths.

If power and self-interest are reversed in priority, if the liberal realist formula for cooperation is introduced, does this provide a basis for reconciliation between the parties as well as a role for outsiders through the judicious inducements of development aid.[122] For though both the conservative and liberal realists are both realists and characterize power and self-interest as the basic motives in human nature, for the liberal realists, self-interest, the desire to pursue acquisitions *ad infinitum*, is primary. Humans are driven by acquisitiveness in an even more fundamental way than even C.B. Macpherson (1964) described. For even the motivation for acquisitiveness in John Locke was not an after-product of the creation of money, but the very motive to invent money in the first place. For without money, there could be no acquisitiveness. Acquisitiveness led humans to invent money which, in turn, led to human conflict and the need to enter a social system which could regulate the pursuit of greed. Coercive power was needed to protect the expression of the acquistive instict, or, at least, self preservation if one lacked any capital beyond the value of the labour in one's own body. Using the classical categories, for liberal realists, life is in the service of desire; desire does not exist to foster life.

But mytho-history tells another story, a story of Cain and Abel, of two irreconcilable ways of life, farmers and pastoralists. In the Biblical tale, both economic ways of life offer the best fruits of their labour to earn recognition from God. God, the heavens, favor the pastoralists. The only way the agriculturalists can throw off a pastoral superiority is by Cain murdering his own brother, Abel.

But this is not the liberal realist tale. Instead of two ways of life being irreconcilable, instead of the permanent situation in which the farmers and the cowboys can never be friends, the liberal realists paint a picture of reconciliation

through market forces and a positive sum game of increasing wealth, thus, undercutting the negative sum game of two forms of life competing over the same turf. But this myth only works, as we indicated above in the story of the refugees who avoided the camps and tried to assimilate directly, if the former identity is abandoned and the persona becomes a trickster to disguise his former identity and to construct a new, ambitious, money grubbing individual to conform to the expectations of the market.

There is thus some foundation to the liberal realist alternative even in the mythos of refugees who integrated and stayed outside the camps. (Malkki 1992, chap. 4). For they assimilated by rejecting the old mythos and adopting a self-help, Horatio Alger, or, more accurately, a Duddy Kravitz strategy of survival. "(R)elying on his wits, a young man creates 'something from nothing' and makes a place for himself in the world as he finds it. Other comparisons might be seen in the late-nineteenth century robber barons of American lore, or in the Canadian Duddy Kravits story [Mordechai Richler, *The Appreniceship of Duddy Kravitz*]." Be calculating, (even devious); look after your own economic self interest. Each day, rather than the communal past, offers an opportunity for a new start. The past was to be left behind. So were communal roots.

The problem was, as the Tutsis discovered in their exile in Uganda, economic success did not correlate with political security or equal social status. Rights did not come with economic success. Further, the local population continued to regard the incomers as usurpers of *their* rightful heritage. Assimilation, whether by the Rwandese Tutsi in Uganda or the Burundian Hutu in Tanzania (or the Jews in Europe who became Zionists), seemed to prove to be an unattainable dream. Further, it came at the cost of equivocating on their inherited moral constraints dictating honesty and integrity. Success seemed to be bought, if it came, at the cost of their souls. Thus, they remained vulnerable to appeals to recover the faith and beliefs of their forefathers and to rededicate their lives to service and sacrifice for the collectivity. Like all refugee groups in a dispora, they remained susceptible to ideological and nationalist appeals, to combining the old myths with the new ones of self help and resurrection in their preoccupation with their ambivalent status, the adoption of workable but shallow identities, and the focus on 'making it'. Ironically, liberal realism and pragmatism simply seemed to create a much more

efficacious base for a new round of warfare.

Or does it? Elizabeth Anderson (1995) tries to solve the problem by a strictly rationalist economic inividualist who has only positive attitudes to objects, different individuals having different ways of valuing an object - aesthetics, utility, appeal to nostalgia, etc. Rational actions is simply action based on one's rational attitudes. For both the Tutsi and Hutu Duddy Kravitzes, either they lacked or failed to implement a positive attitude determining that one's action should fit into a coherent neighborhood.If they lack that attitude, then they simply sacrifice their historical soul. If they have it, then they act to preserve it. The only difficulty is that the political mode of preservation entails that the coherent tale into which their story must fit is inherently irrational. In sum, they seem to have two horrific choices, surrender your past self and become an acquisitive individualist who denies his or her history, **or**, recover that past and surrender your rationality. One can argue that the Tutsi refugees in Uganda tried to avoid making that choice when they decided to return to Rwanda under the banner of a multi-ethnic new society which protected everyone's rights. In the third choice, one becomes a conservative rather than a liberal realist in order to provide a ground for liberal realism.

Where do rights come in? For liberal realists, the fundamentals are not just life and property, but liberty as well. If the passion of pride was the fundamental original sin in Hobbes, the desire to preserve and exercise liberty, to preserve and enhance one's autonomy, is the saving grace provided in liberal realist theory. For egoistic acquisitiveness will not on its own yield a positive sum game. If driven only by self-centred acquistiveness, the game of prisoner's dilemma indicates how one can end up with the worst result by not cooperating with others. "(A) frequent problem is that unrestrained competition can harm all the actors. The obvious model is the prisoners' dilemma, in which the rational pursuit of self-interest leads to a solution that is not Pareto-optimal. When this model applies, states will benefit by setting up rules and institutions to control the competition amomg them." (Jervis 1982, 174) However, when freedom is fundamental, acquisitiveness will always be tempered to ensure that the liberties of others are respected in order to ensure one's own freedom. This mutuality will yield cooperative moves which can yield positive sum games and rules which will enhance the material goods for all instead of simply fighting over the division of an already

circumscribed pie.

Thus, unlike greed and the coercive power to defend that greed, rights carry with them the obligation to recognize the rights of others. By enhancing the rights of all, we increase the opportunities available to oneself, at least the acquisitive opportunities in general rather than those acquisitive opportunities that depend solely on their advancement on the use of coercive force. "liberals have always argued that 'the liberty of the strong' must be restrained." (Held 1995, 203) The problem is, of course, one must become the strong first in order to restrain the strong.

In sum, the liberal realist answer is the creation of a government that protects human rights of all the citizens under a rule of law. As we suggested, this is easier said than done. Simply put, there was no social contract in Rwanda upon which to base a liberal polity. For the prior conditions for anyone having any rights in the first place is that each individual be a member of a polity. And the basic conflict was precisely on this point - who could and should be included as members of a community.

Thus, the very contradictions of the two realist positions force us to look at a system of international law with a coercive capability to adjudicate precisly these situations. But the very polities that have ordered their systems on the protection of rights are also the ones who guard entry into membership in their polities so carefully. For within each polis, there is an obligation of each to the collective whole. Rights entail duties. But those duties are freely assumed. They are not imposed. And they are assumed because of liberal realist principles - the result is a positive sum game. No abstract rational duty seems capable of overcoming the inherent self interest and reluctance to take risks entailed in realist foundations. Passionless duties are no competition for fear and desire. If there is no self interest and there is no threat, why risk the lives of "our boys".

And what about the current Hutu refugees, particularly in Zaire? Unless they return, they will continue to be a source of refugee warriors capable of destabilizing whatever degree of stability is created. Why return when one's own stories see no end to the conflict? As one refugee asked,"how do you expect to put at ease these refugees if they are called upon to return to the country? (Malkki 1995, 278) And one need only hear of one

tragic story to paralise the propensity to go home of hundreds
of thousands.

> "One of the saddest cases to emerge from this
> repatriation movement must be the story of a man, a
> 1972 Hutu refugee, who had lived in Tanzania with his
> family for many years, and who was employed by an
> international agency in Dar-es-Salaam. He advised his
> whole family to return to Burundi in July 1993. They
> - there were eighteen of them - went back to Burundi
> in early October, 1993. Only two survived." (Malkki
> 1995, 289)

The international community says it has a duty to protect
defenseless civilians. But the states with the power to offer
that protection are unwilling to take the risks entailed,
particularly after forty years of indoctrination during the Cold
War that risk strategies were associated with global
destruction. So scholars, faced with these irresoluble dilemmas
on both the very local and the global scales, faced with a
viscious cycle of violence and genocide that began well before
the end of the Cold War as these states were de-colonized, end
up with plea for compassion and the introduction of a system of
justice and mercy. Or else they advocate the radical
reconstruction of the global order which will not be based on
the nation state system at all.

Where do these theories go awry? Why did they noy seem to
get us out of each dilemma?

If the chart is recast to divide the motives in human
nature (such as power and greed) from the social institutional
factors designed to provide regulation, the real dispute in
international theory over the basic elements (not the priority
among them) can be seen to be twofold. First are the
'irrational' passions critical, and, if so, what is the
characterization of the irrational passion that disrupts human
order, all of them being variations of the motives behind a
search for recognition? What is also most noticeable among all
the moderns is that their theories are *sui generis*; they do not
appeal to an outside source of authority for their validity.

I will simply summarize my own resolution of this issue. I
begin with the two basic and universal motives in all realist
theory - self-interest and the desire for power. Self-interest
is a concern with survival. But there are two distinct survival

concerns that may sometimes be at odds. One is synchronic survival, the perpetuation of this body, this self. The second is diachronic survival, the survival of myself beyond the death of my body - through the bodies of my children and through the body of my works. The latter may require self-sacrifice. The former may require the sacrifice of others. In exceptional circumstance, choices may have to be made beteen the two versions of survival.

Desire also has two meanings. One desire is to be god, to have absolute coercive **power and** creative power, but not to need to use the coercive power; it entails a desire to be a self without a body. A second desire entails the use of coercion to make other bodies extensions of one's own. Again, the two senses of desire may be at odds, for the desire to be god entails total dedication to one's "soul" and the willingness, sometimes eagerness, to sacrifice one's body for the sake of one's soul.

In contrast, externally directed desire preserves and extends one's body and willingly sacrifices the bodies of others. There is a great complementarity between externally directed desire and synchronic survival - both entail the sacrifice of others for the self. This egoism contrasts with the self sacrifice connected with both diachronic survival and inwardly directed desire.

Realists stress the primacy of egoism. The negative side of that egoism is that one can no longer conceive oneself as constituting all of life, as god. That is why the inevitable accompaniment of the discovery of the ego is profound shame. One does not have to **do** anything to feel shame. One merely has to be, and be seen in one's naked embodiment. Further, there is a willingness to sacrifice one's children, one's future progeny - that is, engage in violent war against the other - for the perpetuation of one's own identity.

There are two immediate (there are other mediated ones as will be seen shortly) to that situation. One can cultivate a belief in self-sacrifice rather than the sacrifice of others. In Socrates version as taught in his lessons to Crito and by example, self-survival is not the highest good and the coercion of others to guarantee that survival is not the valued means to achieve that good. There are higher ends which one can choose to serve.

Or one can claim, as Augustine[123] did, and teach that the

desire underlying egoism - desire directed towards the other, is inherently evil. Humans are born sinners. The source of violence - in international affairs, the source of the competition among nations and their willingness to resort to violence to defend the well-being of their own - resides in this egoistic sense of desire. The universal peacable kingdom entails the repression of self-seeking, the suppression of the sin of pride, and the expression of the self through charity and self-sacrifice for the other. Ideally, not in a coercive sect, but in a sect of voluntary self-surrender. The goal is to create a universal City of God in opposition to the City of Man characteristic of the competitive nations. If charity and care rule the first, cupid rules the second for in the City of Man, humans are governed by their passions "even to the contempt of God," and, hence, must be governed by an authority that commands coercive force in order to regulate and restrain the passions. Conflict can be managed; it cannot be prevented. The only alternative is to love God with all one's being and to bear contempt for the self. Chaos does not necessarily entail subjecting that chaos to repression and a violent ordering, but a search for that peace and tranquility may be found in the eye of a hurricane.

The second direction is not towards repression but towards expression, not towards the recovery of an imagined idyllic pre-egoistic state of being governed by the passions, but the acting out of the passions. With egoism, you are what you do. And you want recognition for it. You put the best of yourself into your works and you disdain survival as a higher sense of desire expresses itself as the desire for recognition by displacing the sense of self-sacrifice onto one's own work. The pastoralist offers the sacrifice of the best of his cattle herd. The agriculturalist settler offers the best of his/her crop. The two sibling systems of economic life, one based on moveable property and the other on fixed and boundaried territories, compete for recognition. It is the age old story of Cain and Abel. In realism, the Augustinian City of God is rejected for the cities founded on Cain's murder of the other.

There is a double barrel to positing society built on violent competitiveness for wealth and recognition. For one barrel, as in the MAD doctrine of nuclear deterrence, can be turned on the self. Not only is greed good, but Augustinian confessions about the sin of wayward desire will be considered the short cut to morality, the direct route to God, literally using the back door. It will be conceived as a surreptitious rather than open exercise of the same desire and will to power. For in order to purge oneself of desire, one must make that

desire transparent. Hidden in that transparency is the dictum that this confessional narrative is the **only** way to truth, light and happiness. It is not just a way to self-discovery; it is **the** way. And with the way will come casting out of those who are impure or infected with the capitalist spirit as the Revolutionary Red Guards declared. Heretics will be ostracized from the social group. In the name of service to the higher good, repression and moral sadism[124] will become the norm. The great leap forward will be an attempt magically to pass through the looking glass into a wonderland of harmony and peace. In other words, what we find is merely perverted egoism. It can have its mild forms in small peaceful sects of Amish and Hutterites. Or it can be exprssed through the Cultural Revolution, the persecution of millions because they dare to be different and, more seriously, to think differently.

Modernity is the refusal to take this escape. Modernity is the rejection of a universal coercive moral order for a competitive order of desire and survival. And the transformation of that level of competitiveness to a higher form of cooperation through the pursuit of rational self-interest. But could not this argument for a universal, for a global economic order be but another method of ostracizing and excluding heretics from a materialist order which claims to be amoral? After all, the reason one gives consent to obey a political authority is to be able to own property and pass that property to one's heirs. If one rejects the vision of a nonviolent kingdom because property is owned in common, does not the regime of private property create and ostracize its own heretics?

No. It excludes by controlling admission and departure rather than the exercise of expulsion or moral conformity. The right to be a member requires overt allegiance to the principles of property. The right to leave requires reimbursement to the collectivity for its investment in yourself as property. That is the nature of the contract in Locke and the basis of consent and right. The right to leave, and, later, the right to asylum will be later modications as the accumulation of wealth would be sufficient incentive in itself not to require a coercive form of retaining members, though a coercive form of excluding members would have to be strengthened at the same time as the coercive retention is weakened.

Thus, the issue of the right to return of the Tutsi refugees becomes a central and telling moral test of modernity. States have the sovereign right to determine their own

memberships. There are no overriding international norms for such determination. On the other hand, ecluded members have the right to return. And no external state is willing to intervene to adjudicate this choice. So civil wars are fought from Sri Lanka to Bosnia and Rwanda. And the international system tries to contain the conflict with as little risk and involvement as possible.

The pradox is summed up in the essential weakness of the grotians. "Their (post-colonial states) arrival reconfirms the importance and indispensability of the sovereign State as the fundamental entity of the international community." (Boutros 1992; 1995, para. 10, 41) But, if on the one hand, "The foundation-stone of this work [of the UN] is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any international progress." On the other hand, Boutros-Ghali then tries to square the circle. "The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good international governance and the requirements of an even more interdependent world." (Boutros 1992; 1995, para. 17, 44) In fact, the problem is that there is no such balance. Recognizing this, states that have the power avoid grotian positions, while states without the capacity to intervene effectively and decisively, ten to support striving for this invisible balance.

But the real question is not why we do not move to some modest grotianism, but why modernity provides no moral standards to take sides in such conflicts. Why does international law hide under the camouflage of a false neutrality first in Zaire and then in Rwanda? "In these situations of internal crisis the United Nations will need to respect the sovereignty of the State; to do otherwise would not be in accordance with the understanding of Member states in accepting the principles of the Charter." (Boutros 1992; 1995, para. 30, 50) And again. "The United Nations is, for good reasons, reluctant to assume responsibility for maintaining law and order, nor can it impose a new political structure or new State institutions. It can only help the hostile factions to help themselves and begin to live together again." (Boutros 1995, para. 14, 9) But what if one of the hostile factions is committing genocide on the innocent civilians of the other. Why cannot the UN intervene to protect innocent civilians and take sides at least on this issue.

This is not simply a matter of peacekeeping, which is based

on trying to maintain a neutral role. "Three important principles [of peacekeeping] are the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence." (Boutros 1995, para. 33, 14) Even in peace enforcement situations, such as when the UN creates safe havens for civilians, neutrality is the rule. "Even though the use of force is authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter, the United Nations remains neutral and impartial beteen the warring parties, without a mandate to stop the aggressor (if one can be identified) or impose a cessation of hostilities."

We have to understand the root of this amoral neutrality in the origins of modernity.

Part III: Knowledge and The World

Chapter 8

Modernity and Intervention

We now must go back to the roots of modernity itself to seek the source of the problem. For in Rwanda and Burundi, the most violent forms of the fundamental contradictions of modernity itself are being acted out. Summarizing a section from the first chapter puts the issue most succinctly. Modernity is characterized by rational calculation. But it does not teach us the norms by which we should live. An account of modernity is both a history of universal instrumental reason and choices about ultimate values without any foundation in an authentic authority to make those choices. How do we explain the relativity of values, power politics and the recourse to violence despite the advance of reason and civilisation? To do so, we have to develop a very critical understanding of the rise of the modern state and modern forms of power.

What is a state and how did it emerge historically and conceptually? Shaba, Quebec, Catalan, Scotland, Kashmir are not states. Norway became a state at the turn of the century. Slovakia and Eritrea, Slovenia and Croatia, became states more recently. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia regained their recognition as states. Costa Rica has been a recognized state for a long time. The key is not size or linguistic and cultural uniqueness, but a desire to be recognized as sovereign **and that recognition**.

A concomitant of each and every state's claim to uncontestable authority was the recognition that such a claim gave other states an equal entitlement to autonomy and respect within their own borders. The development of state sovereignty was part of a process of mutual recognition whereby states granted each other rights of jurisdiction in their repective territories and communities." (Held 1995, 36)

A state is based on "the concept of exclusive control within a delimited geographic area and the untrammeled right to self-help internationally." (Krasner 1983, 18) Herein lies the crux. The modern state depends on others for being recognized as a state. But it only exists as a state if there is effective control and power exercised over the body politic and that polity is capable of surviving on its own. As a body politic, there has to be both centralized coercive control and an economy in place that will ensure survival. As a cognized or mental politic, as a polity acknowledged to be such, it must be recognized by others. "(S)overeignty is taken to mean the absolute authority a state holds over a territory and people as well as independence internationally and recognition by other sovereign states as a sovereign state." (Weber 1995, 1)

At the bifurcation point in the era when the nation-state first began to appear, Jean Bodin saw the singularity of the nation-state as the only answer, because the "mediaeval confusion of un-coordinated independent authorities with residual ties to a distant Pope or Emperor was a recipe for chaos and bloodshed."[125] Overlapping, multiple authorities had disastrous consequences. There was no party that could be held responsible. At the same time, there was confusion in the body politic. A new system had to replace the old order of dual jurisdictions. Responsibiliy had to be given a locus. As Bodin wrote, "what was required in each state was a single and ultimate source with 'the power to give the law to all citizens'."(78)

Dual jurisdiction refers to the conflict between Rome and more local authorities. When did that dualistic authority first emerge? And over what? What was the source of that divided authority? In the tension between town and gown. In the very dual layered system that divided authority at the local level can be found the seeds of divided authority that gave rise to the unitary state characteristic of modernity.

In 1185, the first university was founded at Boulogne. Essentially, scholars coming together from many nations to study had no legal protection for the leases signed for housing because the 'foreigners' were not citizens of the town. Nor, on the other hand, were they strangers en route, for those visitors stayed in inns and were subject to the international protections accorded such wayfarers. These were scholars intent on living in a town and taking up quasi-permanent residence. They needed legal protection for their leases. The Bull of Clement of 1185 gave a group of scholars an independent charter. The corporate charter was not granted by the local municipal authorities. The "university", representing the quest for universal truth and values, could negotiate on equal terms with the corporate municipality and have its legal arrangements upheld by international law. The roots of the division in a singular source of authority is not initially to be found in the reduction in the authority of the Pope by nascent states, but in the reduction in the absolute authority of municipalities over the scholars in their midst. The municipalities suddenly had semi-permanent residents in its midst over whom it had limited legal jurisdiction.

The new universities, first in Boulogne, and then in Paris, Oxford, etc, were not subject to the authority of the local magistrates. The seed of a fundamental dualism in the medieval world were sewn in order to protect the material interests of the scholars. The result, three to four hundred years later, was that the town broke away from the gown as its source of moral and spiritual authority. Societies went to sea and gave up the need for permanent moral moorings.

Further, these scholars were collected together not as individuals, but as nations, grouped according to their home language and place of birth. Thus, the quest for universal knowledge and the particularities of physical space and diachronic origin were given a dialectical unity[126], but only in a context that divided town and gown. In conceptual terms, the division was between the city-state conjoined with particular interests versus the conjunction of nations and universality, the very reverse of our current connotations. Nation now suggests a dedication to particular interests. Nations as part of the nascent universities were identified with universal concerns - truth and cosmopolitan values.

The university was dedicated to the preservation of

knowledge and its transmission. The new universities were not committed to the discovery of new knowledge. It was the city-states in the Italiian peninsula, such as Venice, that would foster exploration and discovery in the search to acquire wealth.

The state arose in Western Europe when the dynamic creativity of the society was directed at change, not stability, at discovery and not simply preservation of order. A combination of factors brought modernity into being, all associated with movement rather than stability. And it was thrust forward by the inability of any one nation to establish hegemony over western Europe. In fact, the variety and competition of cultures fostered the dynamic development of western civilization. "The dynamism of a civilization derives from mutual influence, intermixture, and the friendly rivalry of different peoples." (Masakazu 1996, 110)

It is unlikely that the new institution of the middle ages, the university, would have produced anything new in itself, however, except the preservation and elaboration of existing "knowledge". Nor were the scholars connected with those who controlled coercive force and political power. The universities consisted of scholars and scribes in an era when a man's man would not be seen with a pen in hand, for writing was the stuff of sissies. Real men were warriors dedicated to the preservation of the realm and Christian values. And scholars were dedicated to the preservation of knowledge and the perpetuation and continuation of values who, unlike the monks, imitated the warrior aristocratic class in their disdain for earning a living.

At the same time, it was the merchant class, not the guardians, that needed writing. It was the merchant class that had this commonality with the scribes and scholars in the new universities. Further, the merchants were in touch with distant places with their own traditions for preserving knowledge and transmitting traditions through time. Marco Polo had opened the routes to the Orient.[127] The possibility of new knowledge was created by a number of factors, but most significantly, the invention of moving type and the printing press.

China had invented moveable type centuries earlier. However, unlike China, Western Europe had the advantage of a set of symbols which could represent many different languages. Western Europe was already in possession of the alphabet. An

alphabet allowed the use of a set of common symbols to be used to spell words in different languages, facilitating translation and mutual understanding. Even more importantly, unlike the idiograms of Chinese, the alphabet was perfectly adaptable for use by the printing derivative of the wine press. Who would have anticipated that this synergistic combination of an ancient alphabet from the Middle East and moveable type from the Far East would lead to the conception of knowledge being based on an openness to discovery rather than simply the handing down of received truths. (McLuhan 19)

Other symbiotic factors facilitated this possibility. Western Europe, after all, was just a peninsula with a very long coast line, one of the longest parts being a huge sea which connected three continental land masses - Asia, Africa and Europe. The sea, unlike land communication, opened the traveller to long distances and the unfamiliar versus the relatively short runs and the need for familiar markings to guide one's way in land travel. At the same time, Western Europe was also very remote from the horsemen of the steppes and the periodic raids of these nomads on the agricultural settlements of Europe. Thus, the location of Western Europe provided relative saftey at the same time as the sea provided both access to distant places and a very different conceptiual model of openness.

Other factors helped as well. Though travel introduced to Europe hitherto unknown diseases, including the infamous Black Death of the fourteenth century which wiped out one-third of the population of Western Europe, the result, in the long run, was the homogenization and domestication of infections within expanding communities that followed that death-pervasive period and saved Western Europe from the microparasitic catastophe that subsequently devastated the sendentary empires of the Azteccs and Incas. (McNeill 1976) The Western European exposure, though susceptible to the new disease, was more gradual for they did not face mortal enemies when they were most devastated by diseases in the fourteenth century. They did not suffer catastrophic and sudden collapse as did the sedentary empires.

Enhanced survival and communication skills were complemented by the importation and development of new forms of utilizing coercive force more effectively. Gunpowder benefitted the infantry versus the cavalry of the horse-mounted nomads from the east. Shooting arrows from horseback had held the military advantage for two and a half millenia, an advantage greatly enhanced by the invention of the stirrup. Suddenly the advantage

shifted to the cities of agriculturally settled areas with the
development of the ability to concentrate superior force at a
specific locality rapidly. "(W)estern Europe's political
diversity survived the gunpowder revolution as happened nowhere
else in the civilized world." (McNeill 1992, 117)

This development further benefitted sea-oriented societies
because they no longer had to divert resources to land defences
against marauding nomads from the steppes. More significantly,
the cannon destroyed the effectiveness of the walled and moated
castles as refuges. The foundations for a stable and secure
world order in walled-off feudal castles was no longer possible.
The advantage had shifted to the city. The gunpowder empires -
the Ming and Ching dynasties, the Mughal empire in India, the
Ottoman empire, Portugese and Spanish empires - were developed
in this period. In other words, the new developments in coercive
force, and communications, fostered by the search for wealth,
resulted in the development of new forms of political authority
to ensure stability over large land masses and a wide variety of
people. In the rest of the world, gunpowder empires were the
result. The backwater peninsula of Europe travelled a unique and
very different route.

Only in Europe, with all the diversity of a fragmented and
very diverse geology combined with very rich resources, was
there to be found an absence of a monopoly on mining and metal
production for the casting of guns. A diverse, dynamic, but
relatively secure pluralist system of political entities arose
in the vaccum of the absence of an effective central formal
authority that commanded and controlled the means of exercising
coercive force. They had never been financially dependent of
Rome. The polities of Europe merely needed to be free of the
legal and moral authority of Rome and the presence of that
source of authority in their midst in the institutions of the
independent universities who trained the clergy.

Thus, ironically, the creation of knowledge communities
called universities sewed the seeds of disunity within municipal
legal authorities, which were, after all, the final arbiters of
what concerned most humans in Western Europe, security and
economic survival. It was ironic, for this very division would
susequently turn the tables and allow the local political and
economic classes to ally with the rurally-based military classes
to throw off the yoke of Rome.[128] For it was the universities that
held back the dynamic European societies from breaking their
moral and spiritual boundaries. Divided in two from within by

the split between preserving knowledge versus the quest for security and survival, and weakened from without by the invention of the cannon and the use of gunpowder, the cities, of Europe, nevertheless recovered the initiative and the lead.

On the security front, they developed earth fortifications and the use of crossfire from their own gunned bastions. Europe experienced a renaissance in the development of rival centres for excellence in warfare. With the relative strength of a prosporous agricultural society facilitated by opening up new lands, first to the east, and later in North America, to cultivation, and the reciprocal introduction of new crops - like maize, the potatoe and the tomatoe - to Europe which had higher nutrient ratios, the momentum of growth and expansion accelerated. But it was the improvements in cummunication through the use of moveable type and inventions in navigation that allowed the growth to proceed in a much more highly decentralized fashion in comparison to a command system. For example, business entrepreneurs developed the invention of moveable type to print books and make knowledge far more readily available to much larger numbers of people. These improvements favored an attitude which regarded nature as something to be altered rather than taking nature as it is. This combination transformed nomadism from the eternal threat to a subservient factor in development thus, in turn, allowing the developing market greater scope.

Most critically, for the first time, in the fifteenth century, the nobility began to flock to the universities. In an ironic coincidence, knowledge became accessible to a wider public at the same time as its exploration became an attractive pasttime for the warrior classes. But the aristocrats came to university for the very same reason the leisure classes have attended universities ever since, not because they were dedicated to the preservation of knowledge, but to have a good time. In having a good time, as well as absorbing some knowledge, they discovered a wider field of connections, especially in the "nations" in which they were housed.

This was the context in which Jean Bodin called for a new source of stability. At the very beginning of the modern era, the goal was to find a source of stability in the midst of generally perceived chaos, a singular reference point that was **not** focused on a locale perceived as central to the global order, that is Rome. But the quest for stability was one thing. The new state arose at a time when there was a new openness to

change and the positive value of discovery. It arose when the costs of armaments and warfare required much larger political entities than the traditional city-states were able to provide.

What, in effect, had developed was a competition not only between a wide variety of centres within a relatively small peninsular land mass with very long sea coasts[129], but within each society there was a competition between: a) military (coercive power) that required political units of a larger magnitude than municipalities; b) commerce and industry as sources of material influence which were based in municipalities but had developed cosmopolitan linkages; c) formal authority (bureaucracy and legal systems) at the local level that provided the basis of security and stability as well as modes for adjudicating economic disputes.

Those who held the responsibility for the soul and morality were in the universities and the church. They claimed to represent universal truths and values which came from *spiritually* revealed sources precisely at a time when the world was on the verge of turning to nature, to the material world, for a source of authority. And that authority was found in *impersonal* laws about nature rather than personally revealed laws about human conduct. Further, they stood for a closed system, for a system which insisted fundamental truth had already been discovered and merely needed elaboration and preservation. Directly or indirectly they represented the Pope who had the responsibility for adjudicating international disputes. A much more fundamental division had now been developed between the town and the gown, between the commercial and economic interests and the gown interests geared towards a higher, ostensibly more authentic source of authority in knowledge and who justified their parasitical existence by an appeal to a higher morality.

Machiavelli was one of the first political thinkers to oppose the idea of a centrally directed religious political authority in favour of political power being transferred to the merchant-led city-state, which, unlike the pagan Rome of antiquity as the alternative to mediaeval Rome, was too large and cumbersome to manage human political ambitions. (cf. Sullivan 1996)

Modernity came about by the union of three of these four classes against the epistemic community who were a fifth column representing the Pope within and the Pope himself as a source of

higher authority outside. And it was the universities which provided one of the means to their own irrelevance, their "nations' or houses which grouped students of the same language group together and allowed them to discover a commonality of purpose. Unlike previous students who depended on the university for their future livelihood, these aristocrats were free of the strictures and rewards that success in a university brought. Further, and ironically, their rambunctiousness temporarily increased the intensity of conflict between town and gown. The universities in welcoming the aristocrats and in forming them into nations had sewn the seeds for the nation as opposed to the "universal" becoming central, for the aristocrats learned that the pope was as parochial and self-interested as anyone with concerns with intrigue and the use of coercive power. As well, the obsolescence of the university as it then existed was being undermined outside its confines by the publication of books.

Thus, the situation was ripe for the union of three classes in a wider political entity than the city-state against a purportedly "universal" moral and legal authority. "(T)he primary impetus towards centralization came from international war. Feudal levies were supplemented by professional soldiers, costs escalated, and competition forced states to emulate their neighbours. Mercantile activity came increasingly to depend on the protection of states. But the states themselves depended on loans from merchant capitalists to fund their wars, because their powers to tax were still limited. There was thus a kind of symbiosis between the monarchies and the merchant capitalism, and mercantile interests saw state warfare as economically advantageous." Gledhill (1994) The - coercive orders based in the elite classes of rural agricultural fiefdoms, who were in the process of becoming capitalist[130], the economic class based in municipalities, and the local bureaucrats and legal authorities versed in mundane torts and contract law began to develop a common destiny as their mooring lines to a pier of moral authority frayed. The union was made possible by the invention of a new conceptual universe to which they all could belong.

The nation-state arose at the very same time as a scientific conceptual foundations for reconciling change with stability in a radically new way was discovered. Such a solution was found in the Newtonian schema. One could have development and stability at the same time. Aristotle had defined motion in terms of rest. The circularity of the seasons and of the heavenly bodies was perfect motion in itself because one always

returned to the same starting point. Rest defined motion. Stasis defined mobility. This was the perfect rationale for a permanently settled agricultural society.
Stability was inherent, natural, and represented perfection.

But Newton defined rest in terms of motion; a home base is merely a respite from movement; movement, not stasis, is the norm. Change is prior in both experience and logic. Stasis is merely an equilibrium point in a dynamic, changing system. A state was merely a place of equilibrium in an otherwise chaotic universe. It provided a stable base for dynamic development.

Thus, in the backwater of a relatively small peninsula of the largest continuous land mass on earth[131], in the arena of warring tribes and factions of western Europe which was a centre of barbaraism compared to the Mongul empire in India, the Ming dynasty in China or the Aztec and Inca empires in the Americas, the foundations for a radically different system of international political order emerged. The larger political authority was needed to finance the high costs of armaments, even if the base for warrior strength was still to be found in the countryside. The economic sector gained from the much larger area in which to produce and trade without hindrance in a secure home base from which to extend into foreign markets. Further, the development of moveable type allowed the centres of knowledge to move outside the universities to develop a competing sources of authentic authority in science and in the printed word as distinct from institutional authorities who correctly recognized the subversive potential of the new science to undermine the idea of a singular source of moral authority. The invention of the book facilitated and was correlated with the ability to unite a large group speaking the same language by sharing the same books. The foundation for divorcing the nation from its connection with universality and preservation (not only of knowledge) and associating it with particularity and the dynamics of change was now in place. The coalescence of these factors not only created the possibility of the nation-state. It was the nation-state. And its basic premise had to be that there was no higher source of moral authority than it. There simply was no moral authority in inter-state relations.

Where would authority in the international realm come from. Certainly not from the Pope who seemed a source of conflict rather than a key centre for its resolution. Religious wars were the scourge holding back the new development. Borrowed from economic contract law, the source of authority the state

received was said to come from a social contract made among the members of the state. "(T)he rise of the modern state system from around the sixteenth century took place *in the wider context of the rise of contractual relationships*." (Palan 1994, 48) Between the states, agreements could be made on the principle of equality and mutuality. A higher authority was not needed. The states merely had to recognize one another as equals. Authority would flow horizontally rather than from the top down. They would give one another recognition for the exclusive authorities they held in their respective realms.

As is widely agreed, the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 settled the religious wars by recognizing a system of states in which the authority of each was recognized as exclusive with respect to domestic affairs and the recognition of that exclusive authority by the other states. Thus, independent nation-states were born conceptually by being untied to a fixed international source of moral authority and adjudication.

The nationalization of coercive power strengthened the mandarins in the creation of a command polity. At the same time, it left the economic merchant class freer both of rural control and military parasitism. The new economies of scale in military production meant that the military need not hold the merchant class to ransom. Partnerships of military power, economic entrepreneurship and formal authority produced a new equilibrium. But it was one in which stabilty was the basis for discovery rather than change merely being destined to reproduce the same stable order. Discoveries were not simply made to reinforce stability, even though that is how it first appeared. And nation-states by their very creation had to live on the frontiers of chaos from which their responsibility was to establish a modicum of order. Significantly, they not only lacked moral navigation equipment, but the very history of their creation meant that they were inherently wary of any attempts to create a source of higher moral authority than the state. Morality stopped at the frontiers of the state.

The devil's bargain, they made, was, of course, to ignore the atrocities committed by any one state's formal authorities against its own citizens. The sacred principle of non-intervention was the complementary principle to the sovereignty of the state. That sovereignty was assumed by the authority of the nation, an elite of aristocrats speaking the same language. The centre of this elite was the king who, in one of the two king's bodies, now claimed not only to receive his divine

authority directly from God rather than via his messenger, the Pope, but in his second body to be the embodiment of the people on whom ultimate sovereignty was to be found. Soveriegnty, and hence power, for Hobbes, was rooted in the people (and not God), but transfeered to the King.

But this made the King arrogant and at odds with those who claimed sovereign power resided in the "nation", the group of aristicrats with whom the revolution against the central authority of the Pope had been constructed. Since neither could appeal to a higher authority, they had to forge new alliances to wrestle for control of the state. The barons united with one another against the king and his allies. But when the king and his allies united with a new economic class based in the cities, in the revolution of 1688 in Britain, a new system of governing society was born as the sibling to the nation-state. The union of a soveriegn authority, initially embodied in the king, and "the people", the merchant and trading classes in the city, became a new, creative combination.

That whig state became a formidable power, especially when the military aristocratic classes were sent overseas to exercise their martial arts for the sake of advancing what was basically a commercial empire.[132] Coercive power had been wedded to the pursuit of greed in both practice and theory. But the weakness of the system as well as its great strength was that there was no higher source of moral authority than the state. And there was to be no interventions in the actions of that state within the territory of its own jurisdiction.

This would be a recipe for powerful growth as well as disaster. And the critical development to follow in modernity was how the principle of nonintervention worked in practice, because, of course, no state could resist meddling in the internal affairs of its enemies let alone its rivals. The issue would become the grounds for justifying such intervention as globalization began under the new system of nations-states and the rise of the English, Dutch and French trade empires.[133] "As a result, the modern integration of the globe into a single market-regulated economy was well underway by 1700." (McNeill 1992, 113) The principle was non-intervention, but globalization could only proceed by a systematic and agreed formula of intervention based on socially contracted standards. The behaviour of states had to be regulated to ensure that the behaviour fell within an acceptable range.

At the same time, the sovereignty of the state had to be rooted internally in the sovereignty of a people, initially a small elite, but gradually the whole people. Therefore, the identity and boundaries of that people had to be determined based on historically and culturally inherited patterns of behaviour and national character traits of a dominant ethnic group in relation to the difficulties of assimilating minorities into the dominant culture, and in conflicts and wars with proximate rivals. Britain had to develop and articulate a culture that celebrated and lauded the self creation of the nation - hence the tremendous symbolic stress on the Magna Carta. At the same time, the minoritites in Cornwall and elsewhere in the peripheral regions (Wales and Scotland) had to be assimilated into a single monolithic culture. And the enemy-other - for Britain, it was France - had to be created as the external threat to foster that unity, assisted, of course, by the imperial and economic rivalry of the two centres.

This meant that among the disaffected minorities there remained the potential to get the other from inside. The foundations for intervention were forged in the muticultural heritage of every nation-state. "Nonintervention is taken as the normal state of affairs in international relations. What must be analyzed and explained, as with the behavioural approach, is intervention." (Weber 1995, 20) And in light of the contract for mutual recognition among the states and the absence of a higher authority to adjudicate such disputes, there had to be some cognitive community to which the states could appeal, not to formally sanction actions taken, but to provide a rationale if the Westphalian system was to endure.

> When intervention practices occur, they are accompanied by justifications on the part of an intervening state to a supposed international community of sovereign states. In offering justifications for their intervention practices, diplomats of intervening states simultaneously assume the existence of norms regulating state practices and an interpretive community that will judge intervention practices in accordance with these norms...it is international practice that constitutes the boundaries and capacities of both sovereign states and international interpretive communities. (Weber 1995, 5)

At the same time, the principle of non-intervention and the

autonomy of each state to act domestically without any fear of external challenge meant that state authorities could undertake any action against external dissidents without any concern with the intervention by outsiders. More significantly, if those revolutionaries were not repressed but managed to take power and they were deemed to pose a threat to the peace and security of other members of the club of nation-states, intervention was justified. Thus, the Concert of Europe of 1815 was used as an opportunity by the club to have the revolutionary activities of internal dissidents repressed. As Australian Chancellor Meternich stated, "States belonging to the European alliance, which have undergone in their internal structure an alteration brought about by revolt, whose consequences may be dangerous to other states, cease automatically to be members of the alliance. [If such states] cause neighbouring states to feel an immediate danger, and if action by the Great powers can be effective and beneficial, the Great Powers will take steps to bring the disturbed area back into the European system, first of all by friendly representations, and secondly by force if force becomes necessary to this end." (quoted in Weber 1995, 12)[134]

By the end of the first World War one hundred years later, the grotian idealists rather than the realists were in charge. Rather than intervention being justified to put down revolutionaries, intervention was justified in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 to protect the rights of national minorities within states. This shift from repressing revolutionairies to protecting minorities was necessary if the nation-state system was to be globalized, but in a manageble way. Fifty nation-states were managemable. Even one hundred. Two hundred began to border on chaos. But 5,000 nation-states would create a system impossible to manage.

The Montevideo Convention of 1933 may have formalized the legal criteria for the attainment of sovereign statehood in terms of land (the existence of a defined territory), people (a permanent population in that territory), and an effective government for the state which could demonstrate its capability in enforcing its authority over the territory and the people, and it may have endorsed the principle of autonomy and non-intervention - the power of exclusive control over its own domestic affairs, with the right to take ultimate decisions and actions concerning the lives of its citizens within the territorial boundaries of the state without interference by other states - but that rule was always subject to the very important qualifier, that a member of the club had to be willing

to abide by the rules of the club of states. A state not only was recognized as being capable of entering into relations and treaties with other states while preserving its right of self-defence and retaliation against unprovoked attack, but it participated in the decision-making procedures on second order rules which determined international legal practice, in particular, when intervention was justified. Those second order rules were determined more by practice than formal agreements.

Thus, in the most recent interventions. "As enforcement operations always overlook the principle of consent, they are essentially interventionist forces, where intervention is defined as an attemptto get involved, or deploy military force, in a conflict without the approval of all the parties to the conflict. These interventions (Haiti, northern Iraq, Somalia) appear to have set important legal precedents." (Makinda 1996, 149) These precedents would appear to be determined as well by decisions not to intervene - or to intervene slowly, reluctantly, and inadequately. The protection given to the Kurds in northern Iraq[135] determined that large flows of refugees were threats to peace and security and justified intervention. This was also true in Haiti, though the restoration of democracy was used as the primary rationale. Similarly, when refugees are not deemed to pose such a threat and massive human rights violations of the worst order occur on the periphery of the global system in Rwanda and Burundi, non-intervention carries greater weight than intervention. In contrast, when a tin pot dictator involved in the drug trade snubs his nose at the United States, he can be taken out of Panama by force by the United States and without sanction. Contrary to the wishful thinking of many grotians and utopians, there is no indication that "the UN is probably ready to implement a broader concept of security that, among other things, includes economic development, societal institutions, and good governance." (Makinda 1996, 164) The system of states continues to make the rules for intervention. And massive violations of human rights let alone justice do not appear to be among the criteria.

What institutional precedent is created by Rwanda? Rwanda certainly underlines the fact that western European civilization (including the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) is unwilling to fight for the creation of democracy in a frontier location. The French revolution made military conscription the price of citizenship and thereby created the foundation for putting coercive power in the hands of the people rather than in an aristocratic elite. As western countries now

reject conscription, when normal, healthy positive-oriented good citizens believe that they are idealists in their commitment to being decent and even willing to engage in self-sacrifice if immediate family and friends are concerned, but are unwilling to engage in self-sacrifice or even endure conscription if the fundamental principles of democracy are at stake, the result is military impotence, virtual power but without the very substantive moral foundation that makes coercive power effective.

Rwanda demonstrates that the power of rhetoric has won over the power of science. The belief in tolerance becomes a mere word rather than an expression of a commitment. In Rwanda, we find the victory of paternal capital and the impotence of exchange capital. In Rwanda, the concert of states is more cacaphonic than harmonic.
At the frontiers of civilization where the values of that civilization are worked out, instead of the old frontier thesis of Jackson Turner of expansiveness and freedom being demonstrated, or even the revisionist thesis of the struggle between the extremes of hierarchic coercive authority versus freedom being acted out[136], we find only the proof that might is right. The realist hypothesis seems to be a self-verifying principle.
Even the humanitarian response following the genocide can be interpreted as verifying the realist thesis at the symbolic level at the very least. What really mobilized the world community was the fear of an outbreak of cholera at Goma when well over a million refugees had gathered. Cholera, after all, was the first human disease to have its code deciphered in 1884 so it could be eliminated. The West might have been willing to show it was a paper tiger when it came to militant challenges to its principles of democracy and human rights. But when there was an event that threatened to challenge the superiority of instrumental rationality over nature altogether, a formidable international effort was mounted.

If civilization is a consciously recognized set of principles, values and norms, if culture is the set of physically acquired habits and practices rooted in everyday behaviour of individuals and their unconscious fundamental dispositions, and if states are the mediators between culture and civilization as well as between the past and the future, then the actions of states and the international institutions to which they belong seem to demonstrate that, when fundamental underlying principles are encountered, these states, and the

individual members within it, are wedded to realist practices and are willing to surrender their ideational precepts when encountering relatively minor challenges.

The dream of creating a universal legal order with a degree of coercive power, or, in a more utopian vein, of overthrowing the existing state and/or market driven economic order would seem futile.

Chapter 9

Globalization

Is this pessimistic conclusion warranted? Or has a new set of values for civilization emerged from the decline of the Westphalian system of modernity? "(T)oday and for the foreseeable future, the only international civilization worthy of the name is the governing economic culture of the world market. Despite the view of some contemporary observers, the forces of globalization have successfully resisted partition into cultural camps." (Rosecrance 1996, 45) Has a global civilization been produced? Is the Westphalian system itself in grave risk under the pull of contemporary forces of globalization and the disintegrating forces at work weakening the power of the state? Have the liberal realists won the battle and created a new global order and set of values through the system of the market? Or has the absence of a fundamental authoritative ground for morals and values and an international institution with overriding authority to uphold those values simply come back to haunt the Westphalian system? Is hope only to be found if the disintegration of the Westphalian system is replaced by a new international order based on moral principles and international institutions?

There are still a number of grotian theorists who want to overleap the neoliberal realists and believe that the time and the conditions are ripe for reintroducing a supernational moral **and** coercive authority over the weakened state system. What some now want to do is introduce lofty moral criteria for recognizing a state. Before the community of states grants recognition to any state, they propose that a state be asked a number of questions to ascertain whether that state is worthy of such recognition. Is the state governed by the rule of law? Are minorities given protection? Are there massive violations of human rights? (Bonante 1995, 30; Stern 1995, 218) Some even want to insist that there should me a minimal standard of distributive justice.

The reality, however, is that in the present (and, I daresay, for the forseeable future), recognition of a state does not require that a state live up to any **moral** criteria. It must live up to political criteria. A state cannot provide sanctuary to revolution and terrorists let alone foster such activities. How to ostracize Iran or Libya, assuming they are engaged in

such activities, is another matter. A state cannot and must not persecute its minorities lest the system of nation-states itself be threatened by large outflows of refugees. And, if the United States gets its way in its new unilateral legislation aimed at Cuba, a state not only will be ostracized if it expropriates private property without proper compensation, but outside parties dealing with that state in relationship to those expropriated properties will be subjected to ostracism and legal action.

The majority of states could not pass a test based on moral criteria such as protecting human rights, let alone fostering justice. Only a very few years ago, democracies constituted less than 20% of the membership of the community of states. One state with 20% of the world's population would not pass such a test. Thus, even though there are increasing numbers of proposals to make democracy a test for recognition, for the forseeable future this is unlikely. And if even the issue of property rights in a global capitalist system arouses so much opposition to sanctions, especially the secondary sanctions against firms trading in allegedly "stolen property", what prospect is there for such a proposal?

More fundamentally, one of the basic premises of the Westphalian system is that there would be no such tests. The only test was to be whether a state's behaviour, or even the internal conflicts within that state, were deemed by the other states to threaten the preservation of the state system itself and the security and peace in the relations between states. Given the Westphalian system, there is simply no empirical or logical possibility of introducing such a utopian scheme. It is no surprise that the Marxist utopians have such disdain for their "unscientific" utopian siblings and their grotian cousins.

Even if a moral order cannot or is very unlikely to be imposed on the existing system of states, are there forces presently at work eroding the system itself? Look at the radical changes that have taken place in just the last century as modernistic globalization seems to be on the verge of completing its task. "Among these developments are to be counted the dynamics of a world economy which produce instabilities and difficulties within states and between states which outreach the control of any single polity; the rapid growth of transnational links which simulated new forms of collective decision-making involving states, intergovernmental organizations and

international pressure groups; the expansion and intensification of transnational communication systems; the proliferation of military technologies and arms as a 'stable' feature of the contemporary political world; and the development of pressing transnational problems - involving, for instance, environmental challenges like acid rain, damage to the ozone layer and the 'greenhouse' effect - which do not acknowledge national boundaries and frontiers." (Held 1995, viii)

From historically settled agricultural societies (as distinct from slash and burn ones) in which 90% of the people were needed to produce food and support a small leisure class, in the present in developed societies there are too few farmers (in the recent census in Canada, for example), constituting less than 1% of the population, to be significant as a census category. We have become nations of large urban metropolises, multi-ethnic megacities with a corresponding depopulation of rural areas. Developed states are no longer nation-states led by cities where the vast majority of the population lived in the countryside.

At the same time as the rural areas of the developed countries are being depopulated, the twentieth century has witnessed the largest increase in the human population on the globe, expanding from a total population of one billion at the beginning of the century to a population estimated to be about six billion at the end of the century. In spite of two world wars and genocides like Rwanda, the disease and human disasters that normally create massive die-offs of population have been more than offset by the use of instrumental reason to preserve and lengthen human life, and this in spite of the use of that same instrumental rationality to develop technologies and reinforce a shift in values to placing a priority on enjoying this life rather than perpetuating ourselves through successive generations, with the consequent dramatic drop in birth rates that accompany these changes.

There are clearly fundamental changes at work which allegedly create a radical new context for states, and hence, for those states responding to complex emergencies. These problems are being faced by states in a context of globalization of production, communication, transportation and trade that is accelerating. As globalization proceeds apace, states are alleged to be less autonomous in controlling their own destinies. "States themselves are porous and often unable to satisfy their citizens by relying on their national capacities

alone. State actors will remain the most important ones on the world scene, but their centrality and range of autonomous choice will decline in the face of transgovernmental, transnational, and nongovernmental actors." (Haas & Haas 1995, 257)
This appears to be true of even the most powerful states. As a result, "Centralizing globalism seeks to justify itself through universalizing values...[However,] (a)nother globalizing tendency is thus towards heightened competition and conflicts." (Mittelman 1886, 207)

On the one hand, we have a push towards centralized values and institutions. On the other hand, we have a push towards regionalism, and localism. "We have entered a time of global transition marked by uniquely contradictory trends. Regional and continental associations of States are evolving ways to deepen cooperation and ease some of the contentious characteristics of sovereign and nationalistic rivalries. National boundaries are blurred by advanced communications and global commerce, and by decisions of States to yield some sovereign perogatives to larger, common political associations. At the same time, however, fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty spring up, and the cohesion of States is threatened by brital ethnic, religious, social, cultural or lingusitic strife. Social peace is challenged on the one hand by new assertions of discrimination and exclusion and, on the other, by acts of terrorism seeking to undermine evolution and change through democratic means." (Boutros 1992; 1995, para. 11, 41-2)

Consequently, all states have been subjected to fragmentation pressures which express themselves in different forms depending on the historical trajectory of a particular state. These forces include regional, ethnic and ideological tensions which result in the importance of identity politics in the life of a nation. Powerful states have a difficult enough time dealing with these forces of nationalism, regionalism, and religion. For weak states setting out on the road to development, the problems can easily be overwhelming. The question is then asked whether, "These global changes also call into question the usefulness of the nation-state itself. The key autonomous actor in political and international affairs for the past few centuries appears not just to be losing its control and integrity, but to be the *wrong sort* of unit to handle the newer circumstances." (Kennedy 1993, 131)

Modernity set out to establish a single source of authority based in the congruity between the legal polity, a territorial

and an economic unit. Now there is a lack of congruity between
the territorial organization of political authority and the
subterritorial and transterrititorrial mobilization of social
forces. "Globalisation is generating a more complex multi-level
world political system, which implicitly challenges the old
Westphalian assumption that a state is a state is a state.
Structurees of authority comprise not one but at least three
levels: the macro-regional level, the old state (or Westphalian)
level, and the micro-regional level. All three levels are
limited in their possibilities by a global economy which has
means of exerting its pressures without formally authoritative
political structures." (Cox 1993b, 263)

"One of the consequences (of globalisation) is a process
that can be called the internationalisation of the state. If you
think back to the inter-war period and especially the depression
years of the 1930s, the role of states was primarily to protect
national economic space from disturbances coming from the
outside. The Bretton Woods system moved towards a different
balance. It sought to achieve a compromise: states still had a
primary repsonsibility to safegurd domestic welfare and levels
of employment and economic activity; but they were to do this
within rules that precluded economic aggression against others
and aimed at harmonisation of different national economic
policies. Since the mid-1970s, with the demise of Bretton Woods,
a new doctrine has achieved preeminence: states must become the
instruments for adjusting national economic activities to the
exigencies of the global economy - states are becoming
transmission belts from the global into the national economic
spheres. Adjustment to global competitiveness is the new
categorical imperative." (Cox 1993b, 260)[137]

For the conservative realist who honestly faces these new
threats to the survival and security of the state system, the
threats emerging from the neoliberal push to regionalization and
the openess to population flows must be resisted. Globalization
has produced a life and death struggle between conservative and
liberal realists since, "the idea of neoliberalism centers on
integration in the global economy." (Mittelman 1996, 198) For
the "outward orientation of neoliberal regionalism has meant the
diminution of the ability of both states and interstate
organizations to control aspects of trade and monetary
relations." Further, "(T)he formation of macroregions involves
a vast enlargement in the size of the market, a weakening of
extant political units, and a reduction in the full meaning of
citizenship." (Mittelman 1996, 191)

Globalization has not only produced rapid urbanization and the megalopolis, mega cities in which are concentrated enormous numbers of people from different regions, but urbanization results in a loss of identity for new arrivals and also a sense of invisibility and a freedom from traditional norms which previously boundaried the actions of the individual. Loss of identity is combined with a weakening of the levers which held individuals to account and an exhilerating sense of freedom that anonimity can bring.

Globalization has also produced a global division of labour with two results. The institutionalization of democracy in civil society has declined with the weakening of the trade unions in developed states. Further, the divisions between those who own capital and professionals crucial to the success of the capitalist system, and labourers have widened on a global scale. Suffering from fragmentation on the political, social and economic front, developed states are still involved in providing assistance to Third World states, but at declining levels in terms of both the size of their own economies and the multiplication of needs elsewhere. Further, increasing proportions of development aid are shifted to dealing with complex emergencies.[138] Developed states are economically as well as socially less committed to providing overseas assistance. Yet multinationals grow in strength and power. 70% of international trade is intracompany trade and states are less able to tax global companies since the way they earn their profits are less and less under the control of states. "Restructuring is depriving the state of its ability to regulate economic life, furthering the outflow and internal concentration of wealth." (Mittleman 1996, 209) Global corporations contribute less and less to state coffers, and significantly less when measured against their wealth and power in the economy. The ability of any single state to tax them in relationship to their real earnings further weakens under the pressure of international competition to attract multinationals to different countries and locales. The combination of political, social and economic weakness of developed states means that they are less able to play a role as providers of development aid, especially given the greater need. The result is a weakening of international law and the tools for its enforcement in all but the commercial field, at the same time as those laws themselves and the areas of international concern are multiplying.

In such a context, it is not surprising that the idea of a global consensus for acting in response to complex emergencies is more myth than reality. The situation is not helped when the sources of threat to developed states themselves have shifted from other states to internal dissident and desperate factions and cults, and externally to emerging real and imagined imported medical threats, illegal migration, the globalization of crime and the age-old threat that has always haunted nation-states, revolutionaries and terrorists who believe they are dedicated and scarificing their lives for a higher moral purpose. However, these old and new stresses also compel states to match their participation in economic globalization with intellectual, political, and security cooperation in the field of policing. Thus, new institutional arrangements are also evolving to deal with the **increased** anarchy in the international political sphere arising primarily from small sub-groups rather than states, though those sub-groups may be financed and supported by pariah states.

In such a context, are states, or, at least developed states, evolving into "virtual states". Once the population is concentrated in a relatively limited number of megacities and the state is no longer dependent on the control of vast tracts of territory, do we have an international division between old, obsolete and increasingly weakened Westphalian states and new virtual states?
"In economies where capital, labor, and information are mobile and have risen to predominance, no land fetish remains. Developed countries would rather plumb the world market than acquire territory. The virtual state - a state that has downsized its territorially based production capability - is the logical consequence of this emancipation from the land."
(Rosecrance 1996, 46)

In this vision, the industrial revolution has been superseded by another revolution in production, communication and transportation that has completed the work of globalization begun with the city-states at the beginning of modernity - the end of the tyranny of the countryside over the city, the end of the need to use coercive force to defend a territorial base. If conservative realism was the appropriate ideology to oversee the transition from the Aristotelian stable agricultural polity to the industrial polis, it no longer has any function when the latter, based in nation-states, has been superceded by regional economic systems involved in an interdependent global economy. The nation-state system began by inverting the old equation

(which defined mobility in relationship to stability) by defining stability in relationship to change. The virtual state has discharged stability altogether as unnecessary ballast. "The virtual state is a country whose economy is reliant on mobile factors of production." "Free movement of capital and goods, substantial international and domestic investment, and high levels of technical education have been the recipe for success in the industrial world of the late twentieth century." "The virtual state is an agile entity operating in twin jurisdictions: abroad and at home." (Rosecrance 1996, 47, 59 and 60) Mobility and flexibility in themselves have become the virtues. Research, product design, development, marketing, legal organization and financing as well as highly specialized and customized manufacturing have become the stock-in-trade of the virtual state.

> In Europe, Switzerland is the leading virtual nation; as much as 98% of Nestle's production capacity, for instance, is located abroad....A reflection on how far these tendencies have gone is the growing portion of GDP consisting of high-value-added services, such as concept, design, consulting, and financial services. Services already constitute 70 percent of American GDP. Of the total, 63 percent are in the high-value category. (Rosencrance 1996, 52)

With this vision, the economic realists turn into utopian idealists. They concede that the state will lose its position as the main agent of change to the international market place where "The state will become just one of many players in the international marketplace and will have to negotiate directly with foreign factors of production to solve domestic economic problems." (Rosecrance 1996, 60) But the benefits will be well worth the loss. For the world of an anarchic state system, with the inevitable and inherent conflict between states, will finally and ultimately be eliminated. The era of a peacable international kingdom will be at hand as the market accomplishes what states could never do. "The taking of real estate does not result in the acquisition of knowledge and aggressors cannot seize the needed capital. Workers may flee from an invader. Wars of aggression and wars of punishment are losing their impact and justification... Virtual states, corporate alliances, and essential trading relationships augur peaceful times." (Rosecrance 1996, 58)

The virtual state, according to this theory, has made

Aristotle's dream of a virtuous state unnecessary.

Unfortunately, there are two fundamental flaws in this vision. The virtual state will not be in a position to solve domestic problems and the internal divisions between the haves and have nots. In fact, such a development exacerbates the divisions. Secondly, "As a result of these trends, the world may increasingly become divided into 'head' and 'body' nations, or nations representing some combination of these functions. While Canada and Australia stress the headquarters or head functions, China will be the 21st-century model of a body nation." (Rosecrance 1996, 53) In other words, class warfare will be internationalized and divided among states. Can one envision this split between the head and the body, between capital and labour, between one group of virtual states and another group of old-fashioned Westphalian states leading to a peaceful world. The dream of the economic market place producing a global peaceful order turns into a nightmarish vision.

But perhaps this is merely an extreme view. If we return from the cyberspace of the virtual state down to earth and the role of the state in a globalized economy, is there more promise that the problems of the Westphalian system will be overcome in a completely globalized world economy? If we face the reality on this earth in which the population explosion is a problem in the Third World but, for some, threatens a migratory flood into the First World, or that even within states, the differential growth rates of ethnic and other communities at the bottom of the increasingly differentiated economic ladder threaten the security of the well-to-do, how can a globalized economic order, which finally buries the neo-mercantilist world of nation-states, deal with such problems? Won't there still be a competition for scarce resources, especially in an overpopulated world? Have we not come to the end and the limits of the agricultural revolution wherein population increases will once again increase at a faster rate than the ability of the world to feed itself? As fish stocks are depleted, as forests are cut down, as fresh water becomes scarce in most countries, won't these problems produce greater social and political instability with no governmental institutions in place able to deal with them?

Isn't the state placed in a contradictory position? "As economic interests expand and the domestic economy becomes a derivative of the global economy, the nation-state is placed in a difficult and contradictory position. It must in neoliberal

societies...promote the efficiency of global resource exploitation and at the same time meet an expanding array of domestic responsibilities." (Mason 1994, 17) The global market on its own seems merely to exacerbate the problems we apparently face as no substitute appears able to take over the role of the state, and the state's ability to control even its own monetary and fiscal policies is eroded.

But the problem is even more complex. Globalization itself produces its own destabilizing forces. The mobility of capital in which cash flows, in excess of the GDP of the vast majority of countries, are tranferred daily in milliseconds, creates a radically new source of instability in the international economic system. Automated trading can lead to automated panics and a catastrophic collapse of the international monetary system on which the stability of the globalized market depends. Money, after all, is still a state produced system of representing value. States with international debts are particularly susceptible to these fast shifts in money and the effects of currency speculation.

"Economic globalisation has placed contraints upon the autonomy of states. More and more, national debts are foreign debts so that states have to be attentive to external bond marketsand to externally-influenced interest rates indetermining their own economic policies. The level of national economic activity also depends upon access to foreign markets. Participation in various international 'regimes' channels the activities of states in developed capitalist countries into conformity with global economy processes, tending toward a stabilisation of the world capitalist economy." (Cox 1993b, 262)

If we add to these trends environmental trends, the unpredictable effects of global warming and the deterioration of the ozone layer at the very same time as the population of the world has more than doubled since the end of World War II while in the same period 20% of the topsoil has eroded and 20% of our rain forests have been denuded, then nightmarish scenarios can easily be constructed. This is especially true when the biotechnology revolution is introduced into the equation and one begins to imagine artificially created or mutated organisms producing catastrophic consequences for a population as ill-prepared as the Europeans were when the Black Plague arrived in the fourteenth century in the very first phase of the globalization of transportation, or, worse yet, when the diseases of Europe devastated the Aztec and Inca empires and

wiped out 90% of the population.

What is the answer to these new circumstances? "Sometime in the early 1970s, the world economy entered what I would regard as a new capitalist phase, commonly referred to as *globalization*." One theory posits the withering away of the state making sovereignty obsolete in the face of global flows of commodities, labour, capital and information. In a second theory, the state transforms itself to meet the new challenge. "In a context of a globalized world economy, the *territoriality* of the state is significant not as the source of quasi-ontological needs and desires but because the state is the primary political organizational mechanism of social order and transformation." (Palan 1994, 46) In this theory, "irrespective of the fact that the economy is globalizing, political processes are still very much territorially circumscribed."

The latter answer to globalization harnesses the nation-state living in a competitive anarchic world to the liberal economic vision by taking advantage of the system to benefit your own state as Japan Inc. has done by constructing uniform, high level educational standards in which children attend school almost 20% more of the year than their counterparts in America, quite aside from the 'cramming' and the home coaching they receive. With a high production of engineers and scientists, a significantly smaller proportion of expenditure on law enforcement and lawyers generally, with systematically planned productivity improvements and targetted production and marketing, with a far lower expenditure per capita on consumer goods and huge pools of savings for investment, with very low percentages of GNP spent on the military, and ignoring Japan's shortcomings in its obsolescent domestic distribution system, its inefficient and small agricultural sector, its limitations in ground-breaking innovations as contrasted with technological improvements, the general option presented is that the future will be controlled and directed by states which compete systematically and effectively within a globalized economic system. The warfare between and among states will be fought on the economic rather than the military battlefield.

But this does not answer the question of how such a solution will answer the problem of the have-nots, and the dangers of political instability that these have-nots in the Third World pose to the stability of the First World, or the threats to the global environment that these problems pose for us all as each states tries to improve its comparative advantage

relative to other states. Is there not a need then for a new or strengthened global political system whcih can tackle these problems directly without all the handicaps of the anarchic Westphalian order?

> The meaning of power, authority and accountability has to be sparated from its traditional association with states and fixed national borders, and that the conditions of its successful entrenchment depend on an international framework of political life, given form and shape by what I call 'cosmopolitan democratic law'. (Held 1995, 22)

Some thus argue that a new global, legal system with coercive clout is the only answer.

> Viewed from the prespective of vulnerabilities, the growing density of populations, the expanding complexity of the organized segments of society, the globalization of national economies, the constraint of external debts, the relentless pressure of technological innovations, the challenge of subgroups intent upon achieving greater autonomy, and the endless array of other intractable problems that comprise the modern political agenda, it seems evident that world politics has cumulated to a severity of circumstances that lessens the capacity of states to be decisive and efficient. Their agendas are expanding, but they lack the will, competence, and resources to expand correspondingly. Consequently, most states are overwhelmed, unable to relieve their systemic overload to the point where effective management is possible. And added to these difficulties is the fact that citizenries, through the microelectronic revolution, are continuously exposed to the scenes of suthority crises elsewhere in the world, scenes that are bound to give rise to doubts and demands in even the most stable of polities and thus to foment a greater readiness to question the legitimacy of government policies. (Rosenau 1992, 30)

The only option for citizens will be strengthening the given or creating new international political and legal jurisdictions with the power to do something about these issues. "(A)s transnational and subnational actors in the multi-centric world become ncresingly active and effective, as they demonstrate a capacity to deal with problems that states have

found intractable or beyond their competence, citizens will begin to look elsewhere than the national capital for assistance." (Rosenau 1992, 31)

The problem is that these changes create pressures, but not compulsory forces. Opportunities are opened up and situations that demand solutions, but the creation of global legal institutions with clout are only options. "(W)ith the end of the geopolitical divisions created in the aftermath of the Second World War, a new fluidity has been established in international affairs which heralds the possibility of a new fluidity in political thought. These circumstances present significant opportuniies for the establishment of an international order based upon the principles of constittionality and democracy - opportunities which need to be grasped if the current revival of sectarian politics and of the use of force, evidenced in the resurgence of right-wing politics in Europe, the intensification of racism and the spread of ethnic and political separatism throughout the world are to be checked." (Held 1995, viii-ix)

But Rwanda suggests that the opportunities are as likely, if not more likely, to be passed than taken up, For if the challenge was not met in such a relatively easy case where the consequences were so dire, why would anyone expect that the world will respond more effectively in the future? The main actors are still states. They are being buffetted by globalization from above and fragmentation within. Further, the existing system and efforts to correct it require that those same state actors act in concert and with purpose. But the states themselves are not unitary actors as the premises of the Westphalian realist vision assumed.

The theory of the state as a unified actor is based on a single sovereign embodied in the king. This premise still had much to say for it even in parliamentary systems when governemnt was rather small and foreign policy was determined by a small elite. This was particularly true in democratic monarchies such as the United States and, very recently, France, where the president had virtually exclusive jurisdiction over foreign policy.

However, the theory of the monolithic state as a singular actor has taken a severe critical beating as state bureaucracies have mushroomed and divided responsibilities. The state has become a hydra-headed monster even in the foreign policy area. In such situations, policy seems more determined by the

bureaucratic culture to which a decision maker belongs rather than through a unified executive approach to a problem. As Schraeder demonstrated in American policy dealing with Gibouti, "all four individuals (from the State Department, Defense, CIA and USAID) were representatives of and assessed US policy interests according to their respective bureaucratic cultures and missions." (Schraeder 1994, 19) This is particularly true when the issue and/ or the state or area is of marginal interest to any defined self interest of the state. "(T)he Nixon White House...left the formulation and implementation of the US policy response to the Africa specialists in the State Department's Africa Bureau, almost certainly because the massacres in a region of little strategic concern lacked any hint of communist involvement." (Schraeder 1994, 29) These multiple sources of authority and policy on behalf of the state were contrary to Jean Bodin's (*De Republica 1576)* requirement that a sovereign state act as a singular and ultimate temporal authority in the determination of law and policy. That authority might have shifted from a monarch to a democratically elected president or a parliament in both subsequent theory and practice, but it remained, by definition, singular and ultimate, at least *in theory*. In practice, it was anything but.

The very same situation that presents the opening for a new international legal system with clout to back it up, is the very situation that weakens the only key actor in a position to reform the system. "The rapid growth and maturation of the multicentric world can in good part be traced to the extraordinary dynamism and expansion of the global economy. And so can the weakening of the state, which is no longer the manager of the national economy and has become, instead, an instrument for adjusting the national economy to the exigencies of an expanding world economy." (Rosenau 1992, 27) In such a situation, it is hard to see how the weakened state can forge a coalition to reform the international global polity.

This is particularly true if the source of that new international authority is envisioned as the replacement of the centrality of state by the UN as Rosenau does. The fact is that the UN is not a global government. What is more important, it lacks any potential to become one. It is a coordinating body for states and its current head imitates Machiavelli's vision of a political leader rather than an elected official responsible to and for a specific constituency (See Appendix 3) while espousing the principles of grotian idealism.

This brings us back to the problem of intervention. For it is a reformed UN that is seen as the leader in new levels of such intervention. "(T)his is not to deny a real, powerful tension in the UN between its constitutional prohibitions against interference in the domestic affairs of its member states and the turbulent circumstances that encourage its interference. It is only to assert that the trendline depicts the tension being increasingly resolved in the favor of interference." (Rosenau 1992, 39-40)

But our analysis suggests the reverse. If the sovereignty/intervention boundary is where we locate the state today (Weber 1995), we must attend to the justifications for interventions.

> When intervention practices occur, they are accompanied by justifications on the part of an intervening state to a supposed international community of sovereign states. In offering justifications for their intervention practices, diplomats of intervening states simultaneously assume the existence of norms regulating state practices and an interpretive community that will judge intervention practices in accordance with these norms...it is international practice that constitutes the boundaries and capacities of both sovereign states and international interpretive communities. (Weber 1995, 5)

It would seem, then, that in addition to the old threats from revoltionairies, terrorists and self-righteous cults, the new threats to peace and security are not deemed to come from massive human rights violations but from large flows of refugees into neighbouring states. It is the threat to other nations, not the self-destruction within a nation that seems to justify intervention. The international legal order as it is being formed in practice is not the legal order envisioned by the grotians. It is one where the UN demonstrates it incapacity to protect civilians.

Perhaps we have to look at more radical, utopian solutions. Certainly, in their rhetoric, the leaders of the UN did not see the UN simply as a grotian legal system with coercive clout to make the inter-state system more effective. Most were utopians, envisioning the UN imparting and upholding universal moral values. Javier Pérez de Cuellar in April of 1991 claimed that

there was a "shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defence of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents." (UN Press Release, SG/SM/4560, 24 April 1991) Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued that the UN's coercive role was intended "to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression." *Boutros-Ghali's key document continued: "It is possible to discern an increasingly common moral perception that spans the world's nations and peoples, and which is finding expression in international laws, many owing to the work of this Organization." (Agenda for Peace para 15)*

In other words, the UN was not simply a legal system but a moral teacher. International law merely refected that morality. But unlike the Pope in the sixteenth century, the source of authentic authority did not come from God, but from a shared set of values held by the people in the world. The UN was, in fact, a modernist institution that obtained its claimed quasi-sovereign authority from the will of the people.

This suggests that the real source of reform is to be found in the consciousness and value of people themselves and their assumption of responsibility. "(D)evelopment in international norms and practice appear to be shifting the focus of sovereignty from the government to the people of a state, from the Westphalian precepts to popular sovereignty." (Makinda 1996, 151) The people acting directly through NGOs and new transnational organizations that bypass governements will bring about the new world order. But these organizations lack both economic clout and coercive power. In the global scheme, it appears as if an army of ants is being sent to do the job of an elephant. And there is absolutely no evidence for a global system of values being in place as claimed by the last two Secretary-Generals of the UN. Again, in Hobbes' phrase, empty rhetoric has replaced scientific analysis.

Utopian historical materialists agree that a radical solution is required. And they base their claims not on utopian rhetoric but on precisely such empirical analysis. They suggest that the changes in the globalized system has indeed brought about a radical change in consciousness, that is the way we experience and understand the world. "(W)e now live in a world which is characterised by the growing global integration of production and financial structures, complex communications grids, the rapid innovation and diffusion of technology *and the*

possible emergence of associated forms of consciousness (my italics), as well as changes in security structures and strategic alignments." (Gill 1993, 7)

What we need to attend to then is the way globalized media are changing counsciousness and influencing political decisions. For just as the invention of the printing press was critical to the creation of the Westphalian system and the dawning of the modern age, so developments in media are bound to have profound influences of the future. This is particularly true if the process of globalization has breached the radical divide between domestic and international politics. "Westphalian sovereignty is currently undergoing a reinterpretation and that the boundary between domestic and foreign affairs is being eroded." (Makinda 1996, 154)

Perhaps we need "to seek theories that integrate both spheres, accounting for the areas of entanglement between them." (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996, 261) for "We will never breach the inside/outside wall as long as theoretical discourse begins with the premise that global politics is dominated by the interaction of Westphalian state polities." (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996, 263)

For the contemporary media, there is no wall between the inside and the outside. It is to the media and the role in played in Rwanda that we must now turn and the implications on how knowledge and consciousness impacts on policy.

Chapter 10

Media, Knowledge, Knowledge Institutions and Mitigating Violence

"I suppose that the first landmark of human ecological history was the advance of our remotest ancestors to the apex of the food chain. This was almost certainly the result of the acquisition of language and of the superior coordination of human behavior that language allowed." (McNeill 1992, 76) What was done with language -writing, printing, electronic transmission - mark key turning points, because they not only allow greater discrimination, and skills to be transmitted, but they actually change our consciousness, that is, how we see the world. If we switch from oral to written culture, we establish an abstract fixidity of reference separate from land markers and their recollections in songlines. With moveable type and the printing press, a dynamic mode of consciousness, of concrete change which can be represented by these abstract symbols. With electronic transmission of nformation, time and apace seem to evaporate or, at the very least, become compressed. When televison is added to the equation, the difficulty in preserving information as private becomes very difficult. The premium then shifts from the data to the quality of analysis of that data **or** the emotional projection of the image or icon left as a shadow of an event rather than the details of the event itself.

In the contemporary period, globalization has proceeded apace with the decline in **relative** importance of print media so critical to the spread of modernization. The printing press is an industrial mechanical mode of making numerous, completely identical reproductions of original copies of newspapers and books by mechanical means. It has correctly been called the first mass product of industrialization and the modern world. Just as copying books by hand were critical to the perpetuation of the ancient Egyptian, Hebrew, Greek, and Roman civilizations, the printing press, combined with the invention of paper, and, most critically, the western alphabet, were critical to modernization. After all, both the Chinese and the Koreans had independently invented the printing press much earlier, and the Chinese invented paper to take advantage of it, but did not develop its potential because their printed language depended upon thousands of separate characters rather than an alphabet of 26 characters. The efficiency of the independently evolved western printing presses as an offshoot of the wine press, enhanced greatly by the invention of a technique for casting letters to precise dimensions, and the widespread use of the

invention of paper that had been imported from China, resulted not simply in the reformations and the revolutions and developments of industrialization generally and the nation-state, but, as I said earlier, of modernization itself.

Currently, the twentieth century has witnessed the revolution coming full circle, but at a very new level. For electronic means of reproduction and communication, beginning with the dots and dashes of the primitive telegraph to the digital binary codes of our contemporary period, have meant the development of the telegraph and telephone, radio and, most importantly, movies and television, as new forms of oral and visual communication which resurrected ancient modes of communication in a modern context. Just as the mechanical printing press enhanced certain modes of lineal and logical thinking as well as serial narratives as forms into which to cast our mental processes, the resurrection and transformation of primitive forms of communication by electronic means also meant the enhancement of certain forms of thought.

For example, it is no surprise that the radio is associated with the spread of fear. The 1938 classical radio production of Orson Welles Mecury Theatre adaptation of H G Wells *War of the Worlds* spread panic in many American communities as listeners believed that the imaginary enemies from Mars were real. Radio has been intimately tied to the construction of humans groups as real enemies to faciliate the genocides of the Jews of Europe and the Tutsis in Rwanda.

It is also no surprise that television is so closely associated with the politics of sentiment so that when the American government steadfastly refused to become involved in the genocidal killing in Rwanda, public pressure in response to images of a million refugees crossing the border at Goma in July, forced President Clinton to reverse the decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A decision they made on a Thursday afternoon was overwhelmed by the public response to television images so that by Friday morning, Clinton had overruled them. By Monday morning American airplanes were landing in Kigali airport. The American government became involved in a massive relief effort, a significant proportion of it unintentionally used to reinforce the power of those responsible for the genocidal killing of the Tutsis.

If radio and television resurrected traditional oral and visual modes of communication for a mass industrialized age, and

came to enhance and transform different thought processes, the same can be said of the computer and electronic modes of transmission of the materials produced and stored in computers. The latter has made everyman with a computer the owner not only of his own printing press, but with very cheap access to the means of distribution of the results produced on that electronic 'press". Further, the new electronic modes can combine visual and oral media in multimedia productions.

Simply put, we are undergoing an electronic communications revolution in which certain modes of processing thoughts will be enhanced and given great significance. All of these will, in turn,
enhance the process of globalization and the possible decline of the nation-state as the ultimate and prime source of power, even if for the time being it retains that status, however weaker that role is becoming.

What is most important is that the radical divide between the private and the public, between the interior life of the individual which was presumed to be his or her sanctuary, and the public realm which was the proper business of government, has begun to dissolve. The private is continually displayed publicly. And the public realm offers immediate, instant and relatively easy access to an individual's private economic transactions, and, thereby, much else that was previously considered sacrosanct from the probing eyes of Big Bother.

When this is combined with the other major technological revolution in molecular biology, the traces of ourselves through DNA clues are constantly being distributed through the public realm so that the public, in turn, and as required, has increasing access not simply to tracing one's movements, but to the genetic code which plays such a large part in one's capabilities and constitution.

The combination of the media revolution and the molecular one entails the beginning of the end of the enlightenment paradigm just when it is reaching its apogee. For the invention of the private versus the public interest, and the radical divide between the two, was the greatest invention of the enlightenment. It gave rise to the very idea of the rights of the individual.

Chapter 10

Media, Knowledge and Mitigating Violence

"I suppose that the first landmark of human ecological history was the advance of our remotest ancestors to the apex of the food chain. This was almost certainly the result of the acquisition of language and of the superior coordination of human behavior that language allowed." (McNeill 1992, 76) What was done with language -writing, printing, electronic transmission - mark key turning points, because they not only allow greater discrimination, and skills to be transmitted, but they actually change our consciousness, that is, how we see the world. If we switch from oral to written culture, we establish an abstract fixity of reference separate from land markers and their recollections in songlines. With moveable type and the printing press, a dynamic mode of consciousness of concrete change which can be represented by these abstract symbols was developed.

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Currently, the twentieth century has witnessed the revolution coming full circle, but at a very new level. For electronic means of reproduction and communication, beginning with the dots and dashes of the primitive telegraph to the digital binary codes of our contemporary period, have meant the development of the telegraph and telephone, radio, movies and television, as new forms of oral and visual communication which resurrected ancient modes of communication in a modern context. Just as the mechanical printing press enhanced certain modes of lineal and logical thinking as well as serial dynamic narratives as forms into which to cast our mental processes, the resurrection and transformation of primitive forms of communication by electronic means also meant the enhancement of certain forms of thought.

With electronic transmission of information, the response has depended on the medium used. Where the printing press monopolized knowledge at the same time as the nation-state sought to singularly control violence within its jurisdiction, the use of electronics has fragmented the modes of communication and the aspcts of consciousness with which each medium deals. Each medium seems to have a corresponding emotional correlate.

For example, it is no surprise that the radio is associated with the spread of fear. The 1938 classical radio production of Orson Welles Mecury Theatre adaptation of H G Wells *War of the Worlds* spread panic in many American communities as listeners believed that the imaginary enemies from Mars were real. Radio has been intimately tied to the construction of humans groups as real enemies to faciliate the genocides of the Jews of Europe and the Tutsis in Rwanda.

Radio is associated with the stimulus of fear because it is relatively cheap to communicate repetitive messages and radio leaves much to the imagination. When it was used in advertising - most particularly in the jingles advertising soaps and cigarettes, etc. - it used this repetitiveness. But once the visual imagery of television was avaliable, even at a much higher cost, it was visual imagery that was used to appeal to our desires, not radio. Further, radio is regional, not global. Television and movies are global because the impact depends primarily on the visual reinforced by sound and words.

It is also no surprise that television is so closely associated with the politics of sentiment so that when the

American government steadfastly refused to become involved in the genocidal killing in Rwanda, public pressure in response to images of a million refugees crossing the border at Goma in July, forced President Clinton to reverse the decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A decision they made on a Thursday afternoon was overwhelmed by the public response to television images so that by Friday morning, Clinton had overruled them.[139] By Monday morning American airplanes were landing in Kigali airport. The American government became involved in a massive relief effort, a significant proportion of it unintentionally used to reinforce the power of those responsible for the genocidal killing of the Tutsis.

Television and movie images leave their after-effects. It is not surprising that we speak of the shadow of Somalia overhanging Rwanda; that is, a visual metaphor is utilized. The emotional projection of the image or icon left as a shadow of an event is far more significant than the details of the event itself. That is why advertisements appealing to desire rely on minimalist art and iconography.

Until the twentieth century, international politics did not have to cope with radio or television. When the Tzarist progroms against the Jews became international knowledge and aroused a hue and cry, the number of deaths could be counted in the dozens or perhaps hundreds. Currently, routine slaughters entail hundreds; the memorable ones entail hundreds of thousands and sometimes millions.

If radio and television resurrected traditional oral and visual modes of communication for a mass industrialized age, and came to enhance and transform different thought processes, particularly those associated with fear and insecurity in the case of radio and sentimental compassion in the case of television, the same can be said of the computer and electronic modes of transmission of the materials produced and stored in computers. The latter has made everyman with a computer the owner not only of his own printing press, but with very cheap access to the means of distribution of the results produced on that electronic 'press". The computer gives everyone access to libraries of materials stored on relatively cheap silicon chips. Further, it has made possible for the first time the creation of a truly global epistemic community dealing with the same material in real time.
If radio is gut-wrenching, if movies and television are heart-wrenching, computers and their international linkages are

mind-boggling. The vastness of information available does literally boggle the mind. The problem is not quantity but quality and selectivity. Further, the real issue is analysis. Fortunately, the internet facilitates not only the transmission of information; it also facilitates international conversation using writing. Further, the transmission of both information and analyses is enormously compressed in space and time.

This entails a fundamental qualitative shift. For books were best at recording discoveries about what is (science and nature, and therefore, also what was and will be), and about what was in the humanities and studies of society. The electronic internet, technologically and in the form of communication, relies on codes. Codes - whether of dress or language - are short-cuts to the future by providing simplistic summaries of the past. Time and space seem to evaporate or, at the very least, become compressed. Since, equilibrium in a complex system is enhanced enormously by the efficient flow of information among the components of the system[140], for the first time in the history of humanity, technology makes possible the emergence of a global on-time, on-line epistemic or knowledge community.

Simply put, we are undergoing an electronic communications revolution in which certain modes of processing thoughts will be enhanced and given great significance. All of these, except radio (with some exceptions in providing an oral form of the intellectual internet), will, in turn, enhance the process of globalization and the possible decline of the nation-state as the ultimate and prime source of power, even if for the time being it retains that status, however weaker that role is becoming.

What is most important is that the radical divide between the private and the public, between the interior life of the individual, which was presumed to be his or her sanctuary during modernity, and the public realm which was the proper business of government, has begun to dissolve. The private is continually displayed publicly. And the public realm offers immediate, instant and relatively easy access to an individual's private economic transactions and even medical records, and, thereby, much else that was previously considered sacrosanct from the probing eyes of Big modern technology has rendered territorial frontiers obsolete, altering the esssential nature of space and time in global politics.

When this is combined with the other major technological revolution in molecular biology, the traces of ourselves through DNA clues which are constantly being distributed through the electronic realm, the public, in turn, and as required, has increasing access, not simply to tracing a person's movements, but to the genetic code which plays such a large part in understanding a person's capabilities and constitution, and, hence, future possibilities.

The combination of the media revolution and the molecular one entails the beginning of the end of the enlightenment paradigm just when it is reaching its apogee. For the invention of the private versus the public interest, and the radical divide between the two, was the greatest invention of the enlightenment. It gave rise to the very idea of the rights of the individual.

The interiorization of morality in terms of pure intentions, though ostensibly a way of providing a universal set of values in terms of pure motives independent of the passions of fear and desire, was, in fact, a way of privatizing emotional life and keeping it hidden. Universal codes based on a Kantian categorical imperative was a chimera, more precisely, a modernist shadow of the universal moral codes that were the constant adjuncts of mediaeval empires around the world.[141] They were global, but totally dismebodied, thereby taking abstract universal moral codes to their logical conclusion and allowing them to evaporate in ether.

Internalizing a hierachical universal moral code was a magical act which, in fact, facilitated its disappearance except as a haunting superego. So when the Secretary-General of the United Nations says, "Technological advances are altering the nature and the expectations of life all over the globe. The revolution in communications has united the world in awareness, in aspiration and in greater solidarity against injustice" (Boutros 1992; 1995, para. 12, 42), we know we are dealing with rhetoric and hope rather than any description of reality. For events belie the meaning of these words.

On the other hand, the new electronic communications using internets and computers makes possible a peer-based rather than a hierarchical knowledge community. As I indicated in chapter 2, order emerges best out of disordered systems, not via a central control or via governing laws, natural or man-made, but through a system that is quick, responsive and adaptive based on the

principle of self-organization.

In both the opening chapter and chapter 8, I have stated that modernity has been characterized, deliberately and intentionally, as the effort in the international arena to deny the existence of any hierarchical, overriding moral authority. This was the *quid pro quo* of avoiding religious wars, wars over ideas and beliefs, and instead restricting wars to conflicts over self-interest and the power to protect and defend that self interest.

That gap in modernity has clearly been felt with the failure of one idealist, intellectual scheme after another to recreate a foundation for a new international and universal moral order. Usually the proposal has come from intellectuals and churchmen (not rabbis or imams), though the odd politician has strayed into the fold. The reason, I believe, is that, as I indicated, in the creation of modernity, intellectuals and moral leaders were displaced from their role as moral leaders and arbiters. They were kicked out of their jobs in the adjudication of international disputes. Once modernity was launched in the seventeenth century, the university slipped into a role as an intellectual backwater and an amateur intellectual centre to train students in values suited to the nation in which the university was to be housed. It was not until the beginning of the nineteenth century - specifically in Berlin - that the university was reborn as a centre of intellect and a place to professionally train people who would live up to *methodological standards*. Moral training continued to take place, but it took second place to the professional preparation of historians and scientists, professors of the national literature and mathematicians, the one morally neutral science that had always remained an integral part of the university curriculum.

However, the revival of the university was now based on a Kantian intellectual model. On the one side were the mathematical and natural sciences as the expression of pure reason related to pure intellect. On the other side were the humanities - literature and history - geared to the expression of practical reason and the exercise of the will, specifically the moral training of a "pure" will based on a sense of duty to an ostensible universal moral law. Anthropology, the study of man as the initial social science, was to bridge the gap in the study of judgement and the application of reason in the realms of art and politics.

What happened to this modernist revival of a mediaeval vision? It is no accident that knowledge, particularly in the humanities and social sciences, so quickly succumbed to serving nationalist goals.[142] Among the disciplines themselves, anthropology split into a number of social sciences - communal ones such as political science concerned with the study of power, economics concerned with the study of the pursuit of material self-interest, sociology concerned with the structures within modern society produced by the interaction of power and interest, and anthropology was relegated to the study of non-modern societies. Psychology became the discipline concerned with individuals and the interaction between the rational pursuit of self-interest and irrational forces within the individual that subverted that rationality. Not only did anthropology as the social science dedicated to uniting the humanities and the natural sciences not accomplish that job of union, but it iself fragmented into a number of separate social sciences, and, in turn, each of those social sciences fragmented into schools. This monograph is, in part, an illustration of the different schools into which political science[143] in one of its fragmented cognate areas - international studies - has divided into very different schools attempting to comprehend international relations.

Instead of universality and coherence, chaos and rivalry became the order of the day. I use order deliberately. For there was order in that chaos. In the pluralistic mayhem, brilliant insights and analyses were forthcoming, and the university resumed its place in the training of professional elites for society. As the social sciences became preeminent, the university moved away, not only from its self vision as a Sanctuary of Truth dedicated to training the aristocratic leaders of society in a common set of values, but also from a Sanctuary of Method dedicated to inculcating within each profession a mastery of a body of materials and a given methodology to analyze and deal with those materials. The university became a Social Service Centre in which those elites were trained, not to serve a professional ethos primarily, but society in general. The leader of this innovation in the role of the university was the United States following the American Civil War. The result of that innovation was that each of the disciplines began to cross the boundaries set for it and intervene in the study of material supposedly the body of knowledge of another discipline. When the university as a Sanctuary of Method began to break down - this did not happen in

Canada until the 1960s - the intellectual Westphalian system also began to break down. Disciplinary boundaries were no longer sacrosanct. Social problems, not disciplinary boundaries re materials and methods, began to preoccupy scholars and researchers.

Historians wrote about economics. Sociologists wrote history. Philosophers even wrote about refugees. The gap between social problems in society and the capacities of individuals trained by the university to tackle and resolve those problems was significantly narrowed. In turn, societies began to provide enormous support to the universities and gradually direct half of their young people to attend such institutions. The university seemed once again to be in a golden age, training not just a tiny moral elite, or a larger, but still relatively small professional elite, but virtually the majority of the citizens of a state.

In spite of this breakthrough, there remained a gap between theory and practice in all fields. One of the most significant gaps, however, remained in the field of international theory. Alexander George (1993) has documented the character of that gap very incisively. For within academia, one may find C.P. Snow's division of the intellectual world into the two cultures of the humanities and natural sciences, a product in my analysis of the university relaunching itself on the basis of Kant's misleading mental geographical guide. But between the university and society, the largest chasm probably exists between theory as practiced in the university and foreign policy.

Part of the reason is the standard one applied to any need to connect theory and practice - the abstraction of one and the immersion in the concrete of the other, the need for decisions in practice when there is imperfect information and no time to gather more. But the foreign policy field has special problems. First, in the dominant theories, the relations between states are dominated by the pursuit of rational self-interest and the preservation and extension of the power of the state to facilitate such collective pursuits, or, in Wallerstein's world systems theories, the dialectic between the two as economics is globalized while the realization of positions of power are confined largely within state boundaries. In such a context, the study of power becomes the study of domestic politics, while foreign policy becomes a sub-study of economics - how to promote a country's self interest within a global economy. This is particularly true when the study of the strategic uses of power

outside the country becomes primarily a study of the best use of coercive power in the efffort to advance national self-interest.[144] In that case, the military strategists replace the political scientists per se as the leaders in this area.

One of the results is the relative neglect of whole fields of study which have least relevance to either economic or strategies issues. African studies is a case in point.[145] Secondly, in the policy area, the Rwanda study demonstrated how policy was largely dictated, not by knowledge and analysis, but by ignorance, misleading perceptions carried in the media, and sentiment. When experience was ostensibly used - such as the reference to Somalia -it was based on both a misreading of that experience and an ill-fitting application to Rwanda. And when experience was relevant - such as that from Zaire - it was not utilized.

From the theoretical side, as an example, in the United States, those with knowledge of Rwanda were largely anthropologists and historians, not political scientists let alone foreign policy specialists. There was a simple reason. Rwanda had not heretofore been a primary foreign policy interest of the United States. It is difficult to undertake empirical studies on foreign policy areas where one's own country has little engagement. And where there were many studies of Zaire because of the American involvement, they were overwhelmingly critical - analyses of covert and hegemonic exercises in power politics to advance American interests and engage in cold war politics through proxy wars. If intellectuals cannot be the moral guides of a state, they will inevitably play the role of its superego. This was but a recurring instance of an endemic character of universities. As the university developed, again and again it would create groups of intellectuals concerned with the moral marginality of the university and its failure to resurrect its original mediaeval mission to create and set universal moral standards for society.

There is an additional problem. It is difficult to generalize from historical studies of the agents and issues in a particular setting. The gap between politics as history and politics as social science continues to plague academia so that theory based on scientific abstractions lacked enough historical specificity to be relevant, while the historical details of the events in Rwanda lacked a comparative context or enough generalization to fit current practices within a larger context.

In the Rwanda case, the Adelman/Suhrke report (1996) pointed to the absence of any detailed diagnosis of what was occurring *at the decision-making levels*. There were analyses. In the United States, the State Department had scenario studies. The CIA had undertaken strategic studies. As had Pentagon advisers.[146] The UN had a plethora of information and reports which had not be subjected to systematic analyses. In France, where the best studies had been done and they had influenced a shift in French policy from unqualified support for Habyarimana to support for the peace process, the ambivalence of the shift suffered from both a time lag and the ambivalence of the policy in place. More important than all these gaps in substantive knowledge or the application of substantive knowledge even when it was available, was the absence of a coherent process for obtaining the knowledge and utilizing it.

But there are deeper problems. The conflicts between various inclinations in foreign policy, as I have repreatedly tried to point out, are but correlates to the disputes between different theoretical schools. As long as there is such confusion in conceptualizing the general problem, it is difficult for policymakers to take scholars seriously, other than to use them as rationales for their own propensities.

Thus, George (1993), who has over the past decades demonstrated the greatest concern with the problem of the gap between theory and practice, and who eschews confining himself to concerns with instrumental (he calls it technical) rationality, but is concerned with the broader realm of normative considerations in what he terms *value rationality*, is still a realist. He begins with the assumption that the essential task of statecraft "is to develop and manage relationships with other states in ways that will protect and enhance one's own security and welfare." (xxiv) Thus, policymakers have to clearly enunciate a state's interests, prioritize them, and assess costs and risks in pursuing them.

Though George's framework was far broader than most realists and included America's normative as well as material interests and the role of knowledge as well as power and interest in explicating and guiding political actions[147], there remained two problems. The material and power interest were given priority. Secondly, the key normative interest, the prevention or mitigation of genocide, arose late in the game. Prior to that stage, the priority of material and power interests meant that the intelligence analysis had not been done or, when undertaken, had not risen to the top of the pile.

Committed in one direction, in good part propelled by domestic reactions to the perceptions of the Somalia involvement, it then became very difficult to reverse course, especially when neither the government nor the public were well informed on the issue.

Nevertheless, George's stress on the need for far better conceptualization, especially in relationship to strategic thinking, much greater generic knowledge based on comparative case studies, and detailed analysis of actor-specific models rooted in the detailed knowledge of a specific case is very a propos. Placed in a larger frame as I have tried to do, I would identify the problem as follows:

1. the absence of a institutionalized universal intellectual and moral arbiter of international relations (as distinct from foreign policy) issues;

2. the presence of a plethora of institutionalized source of superego critique and analyses;

3. given the predominance of instrumental rationality modes of analysis, the fundamnetal concern in classical realism with irrational factors in conflicts in international politics has been given a low priority;

4. too few theories attempt to be comprehensive to include not only the analysis of the key component of coercive force and the pursuit of economic self-interest, but the upholding of international law *as already agreed to, and the instantiation of such law by application in specific cases* **and***, what is more difficult, the inclusion of normative criteria on which there is already widespread agreement.*

If these are problems in theory, there are also numerous problems in practice. First, there is the reality that states are not unitary actors but, rather, a playing field for different bureaucracies to compete. Secondly, the problems are so numerous with so many different players, and, since the demise of colonialism, an historically deformed division of labor as its legacy, that accountability and responsibility is so dispersed that states who might be most suitable in dealing with an issue are not assigned primary responsibility for carrying the ball. This leads to the third problem, what is widely touted as the absence of political will, but is really the absence of informed intelligence, the absence of a recognized division of responsibility, and the absence of an effecive strategy formulated on the foundation of that adequate intelligence base. Fourthly, and most critically, those who play the role of universalist moral superegos do so presumptively

without either a state-sanctioned recognized constituency base or. where it does exist in the UN, with a totally inadequate intellectual foundation to undertake that role.

The latter is particularly relevant since new technology allows for the creation of such a base in real time. The internet and e-mail allows an intellectually informed community on an international basis to share information, analyses, reaction strategies, and evaluate them critically and in terms of value criteria to formulate strategic responses. More significantly, it can virtually eliminate the gap between the scholars and the practitioners for they can be exposed to the same information. Selected academics can have access to specific intelligence and information, and policymakers can share the precedents and scenario analysis with academics. Further, academics can be exposed to the political constraints and contending views of all the parties who are involved in the decision making process.

Of course, all the analyses in the world will not substitute for the give and take and trade-offs required in actual negotiations, of the need to respond on the spot to new situations that arise. But as a senior civil servant avowed to us in debriefings following a high level meeting, the sharing of policy making functions with academics provided him with a comfort and security level he would not have had otherwise. It did not give him the answers. Academic analysis is no replacement for diplomatic skill. But it did enhance his performance considerably.

The experts brought to the table expert background knowledge and information, general knowledge about the general effectiveness of different 'sticks' and 'carrots' in different situations. In one case, academics were **not** involved in a very strong stick and carrot game brought to the leaders of a government engaged in a militant policy against rebels. If the government pursued the path of peace, large levels of financial assistance would be forthcoming. If the government pursued its extremist direction, the leaders would suffer a number of ostracizing actions. Western governments conveyed that they were unanimous in this position.

One month later, there was a military coup and the extremists assumed exclusive power. Why had they not bought into the coherent stick and carrot game of the Western governments? Because it meant surrendering their power,

gradually at first, but not very long after that, totally. For they represented only a minority. The sticks and carrots were not at all comparable to their destiny if those leaders agreed to compromise. Based on previous studies, the governments should have been informed that the stick needed to be much bigger, and the carrot had to include an out with long term security and protection for the leaders. This entailed normative issues as well which had to be taken into account. These and other factors may have made the governments unwilling to use a bigger stick or offer a basket of carrots instead of just one bunch.

Clearly, this would have led to different possible policy options, with pros and cons attached to each. But a combined academic/policymaking integrated approach to the issue could have brought the best material together to develop the options so that the choices could be made based on the best analysis of the options given the actions considered to be feasible by governments. Such judgements, which include the effects on other more general policies and priorities, necessarily entail that most judgements are about taking the least worst option rather than making the optimally best choices. For all such judgements are context bound. They are made on earth and not in heaven. Sharing the process with academics provides the policy maker with a constituency that can explain and communicate the rationale for such actions, which bureaucrats have less freedom to do.

Inevitably, there are risks entailed in such decisions. Thus, when the NGOs, UNAMIR, and the government of Rwanda finally agreed to act together to empty the camps for the internally displaced, with a division of responsibilities in carrying out the decision, the plan went awry in the final stage of emptying the camp in Kibeho. (See Adelman and Suhrke 1996) Part of the reason it went wrong was because there was a need for a somewhat higher degree of mutual understanding and cooperation than available at that time. One of the results was that the micromanagement of the plan came off the rails. The military went in too early. The weather was not cooperative, and heavy rains led to chaos, panic, and a large number of deaths. Given the mistrust each group had of the others, the general propensity is for each to blame the other party, thereby undermining the prospects of future cooperation. The presence of academics involved in assisting in the planning, monitoring, and evaluating afterwards could have decreased the degree of remonstrations.

This issue brings up another one – the need to make value choices. The general rule is that refugees must be allowed to be repatriated but may not be forced to repatriate. But when there is alleged force which, in part, influences them not to repatriate, and if their failure to repatriate means they will remain in refugee camps not only for a long period at great cost to the international community, but in a context that will breed warrior refugees and the prospects of renewed militant action against the new government in power, very difficult choices must be made, not only trading off short and long term gains, but different normative principles. Academic analysis will not make the choices, but can significantly clarify the factors that have to be taken in terms of the limited options available.

There is a timimg problem as well. Existing norms and inertia feed the process of delaying a decision in the hope that interim measures or intervening variables will make a hard decision unnecessary. However, delaying a decision entrenches the power of the extremists in the camps and the culture of violence. Academics can remind policymakers that some decisions cannot be postponed.

There are four criteria of this knowledge base which may intially appear contradictory, but are, in fact, complementary. First, the foundation of knowledge must be specialized and area and temporally very specific. It must be rooted in real people and a detailed knowledge of their desires and fears and the reality contributing to appeals to those fears and desires. "Because of the world's growing reliance on the knowledge of specialists, networks of experts as learners and transmitters of knowledge have acquired enormous significance." (Haas & Haas 1995, 257) That signifcance must be translated into an institutionalized form.

Secondly, such knowledge must be interdisciplinary. No single source of specialized professional knowledge is adequate in dealing with these complex problems. Thirdly, the results must break through the fragmentation in both theory and conclusions currently pervasive in the intellectual community. The learning cannot simply be the products of individuals or even small teams; it must be captured in a system of learning and communication. "While ad hoc and disjointed responses to those challenges are likely to occur through most processes of international relations, robust and resilient responses are possible in multilateral settings characterized by well-developed processes of organizational learning." (Haas & Haas 1995, 256)

Finally, though I have indicated why universal values imposed ab extra are utopian and irrelevant, and, moreover, in their most abstract Kantian form provide excuses for the absence of any external, agreed upon contractual basis for a global wide basic agreement on moral norms, this did not entail any opposition to developing such a global wide set of minimal moral values embodied in legal norms and applied to all human social and poltical systems. In fact, the analysis suggested that when the current system developed in order to escape a hierachical international one, the loss was a system of agreed and enforced moral vales. But this monograph takes a distinctly constructivist[148] approach to those values. They are not given in nature. They are not rights inherent in simply being human. They are the products of experience and agreements. They emerge out of the experience, convictions, and commitments of human societies.

That means that the knowledge and case histories on which the extraction of these values are based must be systematically formulated and institutionalized. Further, rather than being a product of academics and moralizers, it must of necessity be a result of commumication and cooperation between and among academics with those in the political and economic sphere, Instead of the gramscian or neo-structuralist apporach which presumes that because many of those in the most visible economic sphere cater to the satisfaction of desires in the sales of their products, and can accumulate wealth in the process, and that because realist politicians are interested in fears and security against those fears, that intellectuals should assume a critical and detached role against the injustices of capitalism and the anarchic state system, this monograph takes a very opposite stand. Those in civil society in the economic sphere, in particular those in corporations concerned with the accumultion of wealth, and similarly those in the political sphere, have been reified by theory which either endorses their isolation from theory and values, or disparages and criticizes it, instead of enlisting the creativity, concerns and insights gained from those spheres of activity.

This has a practical byproduct. The use of such knowledge is made easier. Instead of blaming a lack of political will or narrow self-interests, intellectuals may do their jobs in producing sufficiently qualitative analysis and communicating those results to allow agreements of what is going on and what might be done about it to emerge. "Learning is a political

process whereby 'consensual knowledge' is applied by policymakers to change their policy projects." (Haas & Haas 1995, 259)

But this requires including the policymakers in the process of analysis and those in the economic sphere at least as users of the results. For, as has been seen in the policing of the international sphere, more can often be accomplished with a bad rating in the economic sphere than human rights monitors have ever been able to accomplish with bad ratings in their sphere addressed as superegos to political leaders to reform their ways. If moral reporting is shown to have poor political and economic results, the bottom line can also affect the moral behaviour of states.

There are synergies as well. To avoid the Scylla of academic individualism (George 1993) or the Charybdis of bureaucratic conformity in reporting as evidenced in some American state department analyses of Rwanda, cooperation can take advantage of the skills of academic critique and the bureaucratic search for consensus. This means that critical theory, the ability to engage in self critique as evidenced in the cooperative work that went into the Rwanda report, can be institutionalized. Learning should always include a self-critique of why there was a failure to learn. This is based on the premises of genetic epistemology and the studies of feedback systems. There must be accomodation to reality a the same time as there is adaptation in our conceptual understanding.

This entails institutionalization of the linkages between academia, government and the economic sector and not just ad hoc segmental temporary alliances. There must be an "unimpeded flow of ideas and information 'upward' from universities, think tanks, national bureaucracies, and advocacy groups. Such groups serve as an early warning system of potential challenges to the organization as well as a conduit of new responses." (Haas & Haas 1995, 263)

The institutionalization of knowledge must entail a division of responsibilities based on expertise and an integration of that expertise in a common enterprise. In that institutionalization, such knowledge is worth money. There is no reason that the knowledge community cannot be not only self sustaining, but profitable in the collection, analysis and communication of that knowledge. Money can be generated for fostering such an institutionalized form of knowledge through

capital subscriptions, voluntary contributions and/or user fees. Further, and most importantly, those societies which are being analyzed must be an integral part of the analytic proces, both because the development of such a knowledge or epistemic community is critical to such a society moving away from destructive actions, but also because "learning requires an institutional design that provides for the provision of nonpartisan scientific information about the state of the [physical] environment, the regularized feedback of information regarding activities by governments and firms, and the building of developing countries' capacity to conduct monitoring research and to apply it indigenously to their policy process." (Haas & Haas 1995, 277)

These conclusions summarize the essential principles upon which a global system of early warning to mitigate violence must be constructed. Though there is agreement with the United Nation's efforts to develop an early warning system - "To seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results" (Boutros 1992; 1995, para. 15, 43) - there is not much agreement on its locus or focus. Recently, the UN declared that the the DPA "is now organized to follow political developments worldwide, so that it can provide early warning of impending conflicts and analyse possibilities for preventive action by the United Nations, as well as for action to resolve existing conflicts." (Boutros 1995, para. 26, 13) Our analysis (Adelman and Suhrke 1996) indicated no such thing.

DHA now prvides a distribution of events data on particular crisis areas such as Rwanda and Burundi. But it includes no analysis of the crisis. It includes no policy options. It includes no analysis on the readiness of states to uses and employ certain strategies. It includes little in the way of detailed personality profiles of leaders and site specific contextualized information. It provides absolutely no application of generic knowledge based on past research to indicate the likelihood of various response options working. There is no study of interests and fears as well as readiness to respond to indicate who might be best equipped to lead the action. The presumption is always made that the UN will take the lead.

In recent years the United Nations system has been developing a valuable network of early warning systems

concerning environmental threats, the risk of nuclear accident, natural disasters, mass movements of populations, the threaat of famine and the spread of disease. There is a need, however, to strengthen arrangements in such a manner that information from these sources can be synthesized with political indicators to assess whether a threat to peace exists and to analyse what action might be taken by the United Nations to alleviate it. (Boutros 1992; 1995, para. 26, 48-49)

For example, with respect to the absence of what George (1993) called abstract models of strategies, and if key root causes are identified as economic weaknesses, social bifurcations, weakening political leadership and the availability and demonstrated willingness to use coercive force, what set of conceptual framework for strategy exists to play with these elements to facilitate cooperation and a peaceful resolution of a problem? What generic knowledge re mediation exists? (cf. (Janice Gross Stein). Thirdly, what actor-specific behavioural models exist and what are the key situation-specific variables?

The UN simply lacks the mandate, the organization, the expertise or the capacity to be anything more than a partner in a global early warning system. Its presumptions to leadership reveal precisely why it is ill-equipped to take up such a role.

Thus, there are a number of assumptions which must be made in developing an institutionalized form of knowledge through an early warning system designed to mitigate violent conflict. First, there must be an appreciation of complexity and the importance of integration of various sources of both knowledge and action. Secondly, there must be an involvement already so that there is a prima facie indication of the willingness to make use of available knowledge; that means that states must be integral elements of the collection and analysis of that information to produce that knowledge. Thirdly, structured authoritative information which has been subjected to methodological analysis must establish a track record of respect and value. But it does **not** entail that, "The first quality a good manager must have is the ability to detect these signs and predict events." (Augelli & Murphy 1995, 360) Early warning is about anticipation and responding to prevent likely events from occurring; it is not about prediction.

If it is indeed about taking control of situations, then there must be an assumption of responsibility by agents who take the leadership in directing strategy. This entails states dividing responsibilities among themselves. States may not be the wave of the future, but one should not make the mistake of importing the future into the present. The states still remain the most formidable and effective actors in dealing with such situations. But there are far too many crises for each state to act as an autonomous actor with respect to them all. Such a spread of energy and resources dilutes the focus and makes the assumption of leadership impossible. A preestablished division of responsibilities for leadership in different crisis areas is a prerequisite.

If some states are quasi-sovereign states in the sense that they exemplify negative freedom but not positive freedom in Isaiah Berlin's famous distinction, that is, they are run by governments deficient in political will, institutional authority and organized power to protect human rights or provide socio-economic welfare for its citizens (Jackson 1993, 21), then it is suggested that such states be assigned as de facto (not de jure) responsibilities of states who have achieved positive freedom. Though, "independence and nonintervention (can be characterized) as the distinctive and reciprocal rights and duties of an international social contract between states" (27), as indicated earlier, there all also rules of intervention governing membership in the club of states. These rules of intervention do not have to be be maximax rules, but minimax rules, minimum conditions re protecting civilians to be recognized even as a quasi-sovereign state.[149]

What interventions are envisaged? One of the research areas required is the designation of an apprpriate inventory of responses, most of which will be far short of introducing military forces into a crisis area. Even if peacekeeping or peace enforcement actions are undertaken, they must be based on the intelligence analysis provided by an early warning system. "Peacekeeping operations cannot be conducted without intelligence-gathering and early warning capabilities. Although member states often provide intelligence to the United Nations, this is not the same thing as having independent inteligence assets. The United Nations remains, and continues to remain, handicapped in this regard." Oudraat 1996, 503.

This is not the only UN handicap. "UN efforts to develop more robust early warning capabilities are hampered by the

nature of the UN system - a semi-feudal patchwork of bureaucracies and independent agencies over which the Secretary-General has limited control. Coordination within the Secretariat, between UN headquarters and field operations, and among agencies is undercut by bureaucratic rivalry and competition." (Oudraat 1996, 503-4)
These are but a few of the reasons why I have suggested that the UN can be a partner in the system, but not the repository.

There are other reasons. The United Nations was created based on the power of the nation-states which are its members. First, the League of Nations was created under a paradigm of the supremacy of the nation. The United Nations was created on the foundation of the supremacy of the state. As a federation of states, one might think that power increase as the number of members increase. In fact, that power has been diluted as weak states with particularist agendas have used the UN to attack the strong and sometimes the vulnerable (Israel is an example). It is a forum for debate but not for intellectual analysis, moral leadership, or consensus. And it has itself been severely weakened by the weakening of states in the face of globalization.

This process was not helped by overreach after the end of the Cold War. The Agenda for Peace was far too ambitious for existing UN economic and administrative capacities, let alone the longer term trends eroding its foundation. Further, when states already weakening under the forces globalization are expected to voluntarily undermine themselves further by transferring degrees of sovereignty to the United Nations, it is no surprise that they balk. When that same institution attempts to serve as the moral arbiter of international behaviour at the same time as it is itself a demonstration of moral impoverishment both in the selection of certain leaders - Kurt Waldheim immediately comes to mind - and in its absolute inability to serve as the leader in the prevention of crimes against humanity - genocide being a prime example - then we are witnessing the evisceration of the central organization envisioned to be the foundation for a system of global governance.

The very institution that was to profit most by the end of the Cold War has been its greatest victim. Why? because the Cold War has been central to the existence of the UN. Contrary to the view that the Cold War stunted the possibilities and goals of the UN, the UN was but a symptom of the Cold War. It is,

therefore, no surprise that the leader of the institution is more concerned with defnsiveness than truth, more concerned with prestige and reputation rather than performance. "(T)here is continuing damage to the credibility of the Security Council and of the Operation as a whole when the Council adopts decisions that cannot be carried out because the necessary troops are not forthcoming. The continuing problems with regard to the safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the expansion of UNAMIR in response to genocide in Rwanda are cases in point." (Boutros 1995, para. 99, 36) Or, again, when discussing 'entrusting' enforcement tasks to groups of member states, instead of an analysis of the actual pros and cons of such options, the primary attention is on how "the arrangement can have a negative impact on the organization's stature and credibility." (Boutros 1995, para. 80, 29)

Nowhere does the leader of the UN assume responsibility for any of the errors. The faults are always the responsibilities of the members. The virtues solely accrue to the UN. Instead of retrospective analysis, we find distortions and displacement of responsibilities.

But if the UN is not to take the lead, should it be a hegemonal power. Fortunately, whatever the faults of the United States, it is blessedly a reluctant hegemon in the global arena. "In the absence of a dominant state willing to lead, a strong shared universal vision, or a world government, collective responses to the global problematique depend on international institutional mechanisms." (Haas & Haas 1995, 256) That institutional mechanism must be built through a partnership of like-minded states willing to assume international responsibilities of this type.

But what would be expected of such states? They might partner an early warning system, but, "This study also questions the view that policy failures are invariably to be explained by inadequate or faulty intelligence provided to top policymakers and that the remedy lies in improving the quality of intelligence...the more fundamental deficiency was the poor conceptualization of several of the strategies and inadequate knowledge of the requirements for making effective use of them...The research needed for this purpose requires a particular kind of analytic perspective on foreign affairs and research methods that is more typically possessed by academic scholars than by intelligence specialists. A partial exception is with respect to what I have referred to as actor-specific behavioral models...The challenge here is to find ways of making

better use of the resources and specialists within the governemnt and drawing more effectively on specialists outside the government." (George 1993, 144)

An international early warning system is a necessary ingredient. It is not sufficient. Further, an early warning system should not be restricted to analyzing a crisis, but should attend to the capacities and response strategies for dealing with the crisis. In addition to understanding the situation, the analysis should define feasible objectives, devise strategy options, and propose how the response should be managed. (Augelli & Murphy 1995, 350-358)

There are many dilemmas, of course, in applying this formula to complex emergencies. Because they are complex attending to one element affects all the others. But not attention to some elements means that the solution will neither be coherent nor comprehensive. However, the more comprehensive and complete the analysis is and the proposals to handle them, the greater the difficulty in implementation. Complex emergencies entail complex and nuanced responses. These are the most difficult to execute in contrast to the relative Black and White of the Gulf War. "Nondecomposable problems are those for which effective solutions must take account of all linkages. Partially decomposable problems have solutions that ignore some of the links and concentrate on others. Full decompasability facilitates action, but the action is less and less frequently effective under conditions of complex substantive issue linkage." (Haas & Haas 1995, 257)

There are other dilemmas as well. One of the most critical is that, "international motivations are weakest when options are strongest, and motivations to act are strongest when options are weakest." (Brown 1996c, 615) There is no direct corrolation between efficacious action and motivation. We think early warning dirctly correlates with more effective action. But vagueness allows states to posture forcefully. Specific analysis and assignation of roles encourages waffling because a decision must be made and responsibilities accepted.

Given the wide range of options and the need to distinguish between conflict resolution, conflict management, conflict mitigation and conflict prevention as goals and of utilizing various means including conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance, fact-finding, mediation, CBMs, peacekeeping, arms embargoes and arms

transfers, economic sanctions and inducements, judicial
enforcement measures, coercive force, coercive threats, there
are further excuses to always wonder whether another option
might be more effective, especially when there is any reluctance
to act in the first place. Here, the quality of analysis helps
shut escape doors. "The key lies in understanding the problems
different kinds of actions face and the conditions under which
different kinds of actions are most likely to be effective."
(Brown 1996b, 572)

Crises are inevitably complex and multifaceted. They have
deep roots, so those who accept responsibility must be in for
the long haul. Further, there must be a recognition of triage
(Cf. Adelman and Suhrke 1996) based on the significance of the
malevolence, the high probability of success and relatively low
costs of immediate action relative to the long term costs of
non-action, and where other parties are willing to share the
load, particularly those with direct interests in the conflict,
such as neighbouring states.

In the end, one has to be modest. After all, "the promotion
of peace will, in the long run, depend more on what happens in
the classroom than on the peacekeeping field." (Stedman 1996)
Developing an appropriate global epistemic community is, at the
very least, an institute of advanced studies to feed back into
these classrooms.

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1. Sweden, like Canada and the other Scandinavian countries,
basis its foreign policy on multilateral internationalism or
structural realism (Goldmann 1991) in contrast to the United
States which has a far greater propensity to base its policy
on classical realism as the inheritor of the leadership mantle
of the West and a country that has based its foreign policy
largely on nuclear deterrence focused on the Soviet Union.
Sweden is a member of the neoliberal institutional school of
practicing international relations. This paper recognizes that
as the premise for the study, but it is not the premise of the
paper. Hence, the paper has to be far more extensive in
exploring presumptions before offering any suggestions for a
program of action. The same, incidentally, would have to be
done if advice was being directed at the United states, but

there would be a somewhat different emphasis in the analysis.

2. Epistemic communities are defined as "groups of like-minded professionals, usually self-recruited around some paradigm linking their lore to some aspect of a problematique." (Haas & Haas 1995, 260)

3. Cf. an early work, Stephen Toulmin (1971) *Human Understanding*, Princeton; Princeton University Press, and a much more recent one, *Cosmopolis......*

4. Hilary Putnam (1981) *Reason, Truth, and History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

5. Richard Rorty (1991) *Objectivism, Relativism, and Truth,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

6. There are other who believe we can apply the same methods used domestically to the international sphere. "We focus on the shared beliefs that inform the practices of institutions, thus augmenting attention to the formal rules by which an exogenously determined set of values is authoritatively determined and applied. We regard a problematique as an intersubjective phenomenon and look at the social process by which knowledge informs vision effectively into actual governance. We develop a model to indicate the process by which epistemic communities contribute to organizational learning, and we develop a coding scheme to specify organizational factors that are likely to facilitate the conversion of shared visions into broad patterns of action." (Haas & Haas 1995, 256) My own take is to suggest that this amounts to prescribing a drug for a disease for which we know the symptoms but are still ignorant of the aetiology, physiology or even the precise anatomical location. The recommended medicine may indeed be helpful in relieving symptoms, but we are more likely to be successful if we undersatnd the deeper source of the problem and precisely how and why an epistemic community is needed and why it is generally not used.

7. This misues of a single case by practitioners is evidently standard rather than the exception given "the policymaker's habit of relying on and often misusing a single historical precedent." (George 1993, 13)

8. "Unlike the historian, the student of international society tends to deal with the general rather than the unique - with, for example, wars rather than a particular was, revolutions rather than a particular revolution, sanctions rather than a particular boycott or embargo, the problems of peace-keeping rather than any particular example." (Stern 1995, 4)

9. This was not just the conclusion of Adelman and Suhrke (1996). "(T)he United Nations failed to protect vulnerable populations and fulfill its humanitarian promises; its leading members lacked the will to address the root causes of the conflicts and to use force decisively; they simply treated the humanitarian symptoms of strife, nd did so in a half-hearted manner. The UN's credibility consequently suffered. Equally important, the Security Council's impotence helped to undermine respect for the principles of humanitarina law. Its actions in these cases were not just ineffective, they were in important respects counterproductive." (Oudraat 1996, 501)

10. Again, this was not just the conclusion of Adelman and Suhrke (1996). "(I)n the first test case (of PDD-25), involving the genocide in Rwanda, the administration used its new guidelines to slow the UN response, arguing that the operation proposed by the UN Secretary-General did not have a clear mandate and that forces and financing had not yet been identified." (Daalder 1996, 484)

11. "The debate (on the universality of values, in particular, human rights) is central to the development of more effective humanitarian action by the international community, for at the heart of it lies the authority of sovereignty....The trend...has begun to point the way to a more defined legal framework for humanitarian action even where sovereign approval is absent." (Griffiths, Levine and Weller 1995, 34) As one scholar put it, the attempt to keep peace where there is internal conflict is always associated with intervention and a breach of sovereignty. "As enforcement operations always overlook the principle of consent, they are essentially interventionist forces, where intervention is defined as an attempt to get involved, or deploy military force, in a conflict without the approval of all the parties to the conflict. These interventions (Haiti, northern Iraq, Somalia) appear to have set important legal precedents." (Makinda 1996, 149)

12. **(Cf. Stedman 1996a, 241-243; Callaghy 1987, 87-116.
Calaghy called such states "lame leviathans".**

13. Re critical theory, see Linklater, Andrew (1989) Beyond
Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International
Relations, London: Macmillan.

14. For an attempt to construct a theory in a similar vein to
Dworkin in the field of international relations, cf. Brown
(1992).

15. Our report referred to this factor as the 'shadow of
Somalia'. This factor was widely recognized as critical in
explaining US behaviour. "In the case of Rwanda, where 800,000
people were slaughtered and millions fled to Zaire and
Tanzania within the space of just three months in 1994, the
U.S. military's perspective coincided with that of other
officials in the Clinton administration and members of
Congress: this was seen as a situation in which the United
States ahd no direct interest and it was therefore best
handled by African countries working through the United
Nations. (In our report, we argued to the contrary that the US
sidetracked the desire of African countries to intervene) The
genocide in Rwanda occurred at a time when interest in and
support for humanitarian intervention among senior U.S.
officials had reached a low point. Still fresh was the debacle
in Somalia, where the mission had gone badly off track in mid-
1993 and thirty Americans had lost their lives with one of the
reigning warlords. To the lessons of Vietnam and Beirut were
added the lessons of Mogadishu, which counselled that military
intervention in an internal conflict for humanitarian purposes
should be left to others." (Daalder 1996, 475)

16. Brown (1996c, 622) recommends doing both in a 2-track
policy - coopting supporters with inducements and, if
necessary, "an aggressive campaign of neutralization: cutting
off arms and logistics from neighboring states; search-and-
capture or search-and-destroy missions. Taking forceful action
against militants and extremists is mainly the reposnibility
of national leaders, but there is much international actors
can do to help if they have the blessing of the local
political establishment."

17. Neither do classical realism or neoliberal international

institutionalism for that matter. In fact, the conundrum outlined could be considered a variation of some of the dilemmas which plague the respective theories. For example, Goldmann (1994, pp. 164-171) describes what he calls "The Internationalists' Dilemma" in which there is no basis for choosing between accomodating a party breaking rules in the interest of fostering accomodation and compromise (in our case, the Hutu extremists), and the requirement that principles be upheld so that violaters of those principles (the Hutu extremists) are ostracized.

18. The first is a point Edmond J. Keller makes in his introduction (p. 11) and Donald Rothchild makes in his conclusion (p. 228) of their edited volume (1996). Ibrahim A. Gambari makes the latter point in his article in that volume, "The Role of Regional and Global Organizations in Addressing Africa's Security Issues." (p. 29)

19. "Even under President Carter -recognized by Africanists as pursuing one of the most enlightened policies toward the continent during the post-World War II period - Africa ranked last in terms of foreign policy attention (see Table 2.1). Whereas Africa accounted for nearly 11 percent of the Carter administration's foreign policy behaviour in 1977, the continent still trailed other regions of the world, and in fact decreased in importance by nearly 50 percent over the next three years. Indeed, the personal significance attached to Africa relative to other regions of the world by Carter is portrayed in his memoirs, which included only passing reference to Africa." (Schraeder 1994, 13)

20. Very few international theorists pay attention to what is generally known as "chaos" theory, even though they are preoccupied with crises. One exception is Michael Nicholson (1996) pp. 37-43. "Small changes in the area around the bifurcation point lead to major changes in the system's behaviour." p. 39.

21. This is often referred to as the *butterfly effect.* "If a butterfly flies from one buttercup to another in June in England instead of staying put, the minute change in the climate 'causes' a hurricane in the Caribbean in the following year." (Nicholson 1996, 43)

22. For the best introduction to the chaos theory of the Brussels school, cf. Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, *Order Out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature*, New York: Bantam, 1984, or Prigogine's earlier more mathematical version, *From Being to Becoming: Time and Complexity in the Physical Sciences*, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company. For a model on how these systems produce greater order instead of chaos, cf. the combined work of the Danish scientist, Per Bak and his Chinese colleague, Kan Chen, and their theory of 'self-organized criticality.' (Cf. their article by that same name in *Scientific American*, January 1991, 46-53, or their earlier short version with Michael Creutz, "Self-Organized Criticality in the 'Game of Life'" in *Nature*, 342:6251, 780-2, December 14, 1989. Whereas environmental realists stress the mechanical sub-state (Homer-Dixon), inter-state (classical realists), and larger macro civilizational factors that need to be kept in equilibrium, and idealists and liberal internationalists stress the values and institutions that ought to be put in place to prevent the system from spinning out of control, this theory essentially argues that the factors for producing a higher level of order are to be found within the complex system itself. What is most important is detecting the critical point at which a system can go from relative stability to catastrophe. Let me illustrate this with a simple childhood model. When we as children were fascinated with building sand castles on the sea shore, we pile the sand and introduce water to create a packing effect so that the sand can be carved. But as we pile the sand higher or introduce water into the moat, the pieces of the wall tend to collapse into the moat. The key trick is to continue building larger and larger. We reinforce falls and avalanches as we go, but not to add too much so that the castle suddenly, and irretrievably collapses in a catastrophic event that children actually delight in because it allows them to vent their furies and totally destory the product of their own creativity. But the higher stage is reached when we do not destroy the products of our own creativity, but recognize how to preserve the castle in a critical state, at least until we leave the beach to the vagaries of wind and water. Until that point, we need to keep a wary eye on introducing too much sand or water. The trick to maintaining **relative** stability is to maintain a system at a sub-critical state rather than producing a supercritical state where a single gain of sand can destroy everything invested into a situation. As shall

become clear, I am not a naturalist who is willing to let nature take its course to see if order emerges out of chaos spontaneously as it were. Quite the reverse. Humans are imbued with a spirit, a *geist*, which allows them to increase order by countering the downward trend of entropy. In that sense, I share a kinship with the idealists. But like the realists, I do not believe in introducing values and institutions *ab extra*, but instead see the importance of using elements already in a situation to use a bifurcation point to create a higher level order. Humans, like God, are the intervenors in balancing chance and necessity to create greater order. One final point. The use of scientific analogies is not intended to suggest that international relations can be understood in the same way that the nature of the universe is grasped in the laws of physics. The use of the language of physics is only intended to be metaphorical.

23. Though 'chaos' is used here analogically, it also tries to use the anology accurately in reference to the key elements of chaos theory. Thus, though on the one hand, language is being used metaphorically, hoepefully it is not obscurantist and confusing. For a satire on the misuse of chaos theory to posit a relativist world in which reflection is merely an exercise in subjective projection, see the article by Alan D. Sokal (1996) "Transgressing the Boundaries - Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity," *Social Text*, Spring/Summer, 217-252, and the commentary by Steven Weinberg (1996) "Sokal's Hoax," *New York Review of Books*, XLIII:13, August 8, 11-15.

24. (Schraeder 1994, 107) This was even true of the African pro-active Carter administration. "(D)espite a stated commitment to human rights and the need to decrease ties with authoritarian dictatorships, the Carter administration largely failed to follow through on the promise in 1977 in the case of Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire (see Chapter 3). Rather strong rhetoric in the first year of the administration gave way to inaction and acceptance of a consensus within the national security bureaucracies that Mobutu's fall would yield chaos and instability." Ibid, p. 7.

25. Cf. Kaplan (1996) who, in describing the great temple at Angkor Wat, aptly captures this age-old approach. "(D)warfing human beings out of all proportion, were seventy sandstone colossi, about thirty-five demons lining one side of a bridge leading to the entrance of the medieval city, and thirty-five

gods on the other side. These turbaned sandstone giants, each blotched with lichen, were pulling on the elongated body of the 'cosmic serpent,' or Naga, whch serves as a kind of butter churn - separating out the solid world and is social structures from the mythical 'milk of chaos'." p. 424.

26. Cf. Holland, John H. (1995) *Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity*, Reading: Addison-Wesley.

27. Cf. Taylor (1994) for an analysis of world-systems theory.

28. "If behavioural analysis 'uncovers' or 'discovers' anything, it is its own prespecified, theoretical meaning of intervention." (Weber 1995, 18)

29. "(W)e cannot know the reality 'out there' because our notion of what it contains changes with every twist of the scientific enterprise. Man-the-knower is the victim of his methods of acquiring knowledge and is therefore condemned to settle for successive approximations to reality." (Ernst B. Haas 1982, 25)

30. "Critical theroists argue that science is a social phenomenon which grows up under certain social conditions and reflects the values and power structure of the society in which it is practiced." (Nicholson 1996, 171)

31. "We live in a disenchanted universe. Rational calculation remains possible, but rational calculation offers not one shred of advice about how one should live." (Walker 1993, p. 56)

32. "The Cold War was characterized by uneasy peace, tension, and limited predictability in an international community dominated by rival nuclear superpowers and ideological and economic blocs; it took place from the end of World War II in 1945 until the dramatic political events in eastern Europe of 1989-1990, culminating in the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of the two Germanies..The Cold War was also characterized by political, ideological, and startegic confrontations between the superpowers and by a fissure between the East and the West." (Obasanjo 1996, 15)

33. See Clough (1992). In the policy of cynical disengagement, policymakers are guided by three principles: (1) Do not spend

much money unless Congree makes you. (2) Do not let African issues complicate policy toward other, more important parts of the world. (3) Do not take stands that might create political controversies in the United States. (Cf. Schraeder 1994, 250.) As a result, "The proportion of gross domestic product alloted to development aid by donor countries has also declined, and the global competition for donor assistance has intensified because of the colapse of the Soviet Union." (Stedman 1996a, 264) Cf. UNDP (1994) "*Africa Recovery*, 8:1-2, April-September.

34. "(N)on-African states now have much less interest in intervening in African conflicts, either to benefit from them or to calm them. Apeals to outside powers for borrowed power fall on deaf ears, and this same deafness is found among African states as well. Who then will help Africa manage its endemic conflict and insecurity?" (Zartman 1996, 52)

35. "(W)ith the end of the geopolitical divisions created in the aftermath of the Second World War, a new fluidity has been established in international affairs which heralds the possibility of a new fluidity in political thought. These circumstances present signicicant opportuniies for the establishment of an international order based upon the principles of constittionality and democracy -opportunities which need to be grasped if the current revival of sectarian politics and of the use of force, evidenced in the resurgence of right-wing politics in Europe, the intensification of racism and the spread of ethnic and political separatism throughout the world are to be checked." (Held 1995, viii-ix)

36. A typical statement follows: "The ending of the Cold War set in train a series of changes in international relations, only the outline of which is yet clear. One persistent theme, however, has been the growing emphasis on universality of values - most forcefully expresssed within the context of human rights." (Griffiths, Levine and Weller 1995, 33-34) This description cetrainly suits the grotian perspective of the authors, but I would suggest the growing emphasis on human rights preceeded rather than followed the end of the Cold War. Secondly, the aftermath of the end of the Cold War witnessed the most flagrant, horrific and violent abuse of human rights since World War II in Bosnia and Rwanda.

37. Cf. Lebow and Stein (1994) and Leffler (1996).

38. Cf. Wohlstetter, Albert (1983) for a critique of the
Catholic Bishop's endorsation of a moderate realist policy re
nuclear deterrence. The Bishops claimed that nuclear
deterrence was morally acceptable, but only if there is no
intention to use the weapons and if you are working for
disarmament. Critics claimed that such a stance undercut the
very foundations of nuclear deterrence, and, hence, increased
the chances of war, thus making the moderate realist position
of the Bishops immoral. Cf. "Bishops, Statesmen and Other
Strategists on the Bombing of Innocents," in Charles W.
Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds. (1983) *The Nuclear
Reader*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 58-76. or in *Commentary
(1983) 75:15-35.*

39. Jonathan Schell's (*The Fate of the Earth*, New York: Avon
Books, 1982) includes the apt simile to the rifle with one
barrel turned back on oneself. For an excellent depiction of
the doctrine of mutual kill, cf. Robert Jervis (1989) *The
Meaning of the Nuclear* Revolution, Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.

40. The dysfunctionality of the use of nuclear weapons is
depicted in Kenneth E. Boulding "What Power Do Nuclear Weapons
Give Their Possessors?" in Kegley and Schwab (1991a) 99-110.
Nuclear weapons, if used, are dysfunctional because they
create nuclear winter. Cf. Sederberg, Peter C. ed., (1986)
Nuclear Winter, Deterrence, and the Prevention of Nuclear War,
New York: Praeger, and the earlier, Peterson, Jeannie and Don
Hinrechson, eds. (1982) *Nuclear War: The Aftermath*, New York:
Pergamon.

41. "The Soviet Union...continued its build-up of nuclear
weapons far beyond what was required for MAD. Hence, MAD-plus
was adopted by both sides." (Goldmann 1994, 176)

42. Cf. Paul M. Katteneburg in Kegley and Scwab (1991a) "MAD
(Minimum Assured Destruction) Is Still the Moral Position"
111-120.

43. George Kennan created the rationale and formula for the
containment policy of the Soviet Union, which was designed to
confront the USSR with *sufficient* display of force (I stress
sufficient because he was in favour of moderation, caution,
and prudence rather than overdetermination) wherever and
whenever Soviet ideological or political ambitions threatened

not just American interests, but the maintenance of a stable and peaceful world. He also invented the Marshall Plan, the second punch of the containement strategy, the creation of a strong, viable, and independent Western Europe. Unlike contemporary structural realists who wanted to deal with objective, measurable factors such as the *capacity* of the Soviet Union and the potential and actual displayed force by America, political diplomacy and assessing the enemy persona and intentions based on the past pattern of behaviour - as he demonstrated in his "long cable" from his posting in Moscow in 1946 - were the prime keys to policy. As in Thucydides, force constituted the endnotes, not the preface of international relations. Reliance on force, Kennan believed, would make America as arrogant as Athens, and thrust it into the role of a hegemon for which the United States was unsuited. Further, like his forbears and contrary to his contemporary realists, Kennan knew that the real problem was not competing interests but irrational factors, in particular, understanding the insecurity of the Soviets who were driven by fear *or pride* to undertake foolhardy intitiatives that were in the interest of neither the United States nor the Soviet Union. (cf. George Kennan 1996)

44. Gramscians, incorrectly I believe, depict Reagan as a liberal realist, but a real liberal realist and not a neo-one. "The Thatcher-Reagan model can be treated ideologically as the anticipation of a hyper-liberal form of state - in the sense that it seems to envisage a return to nineteenth-century economic liberalism and a rejection of the neo-liberal attempt to adapt economic liberalism to the socio-political reactions that classical liberalism produced. It takes the neo- out of neo-liberalism." (Cox 1993b, 267) As a counter to this view cf. see an insider's account: Stockman, David, *The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed*, New York: Harper & Row.

45. Kristol and Kagan dubbed Reagan's policy a doctrine of "benevolent global hegemony." Cf. William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy" *Foreign Affairs* July/August 1996, 18-32. For them, "a hegemon is nothing more or less than a leader with a preponderant influence and authority over all others in its domain" (20, that is, a hegemon is a moral authority as well as one with a preponderant control of the instruments of coercive force.

46. For an analysis of various theories for the end of the Cold war, see Allan and Goldmann (1992).

47. This argument is very effectively challenged by Lebow and Stein (1994). "Deterrence is widely credited with preventing war between the superpowers and teaching Soviet leaders that aggression would not pay. The central argument of this book is that this claim is unfounded..We argue that strategies of deterrence and compellance provoked as much as they restrained" (p. 4) I have no argument with that thesis. But it was the arms race behind deterrence and compellence, and not the strategies themselves, which undermined the Soviet Union even if the buildup of arms and their use in proxy wars harmed the relationships between the superpowers.

48. Even Robert M. Gates (1996) acknowledges as much.

49. Many realists tend to forget that their mentor, Thomas Hobbes, made concern with reputation as important, if not more important, a motivating factor as self-interest (the desire for gain) and power (fear of one's competitors). Cf. *Leviathan*, 13:para. 6-7. Johnson (1993) has a very interesting analysis of the role of pride in Hobbes.

50. Tunander, Ola (1989) "The Logic of Deterrence," *Journal of Peace Research* 26: 353-365. In fact, I think this formulation of the paradox is slightly incorrect. For it is not that deterrence is not credible if these weapons cannot be used, but deterrence is not credible if it is believed that the other side is *not willing to use them. It does not matter if, in using them, they are useless.*

51. Cf. Fisher (1985), Hardin et al (1985), Nye (1986) and Paul et al (1986) for a discussion of the ethics of nuclear deterrence strategy.

52. As shall soon become clear, I agree that we are now part of a Globalalized World, but my disagreement is that this was revealed with the end of the Cold War. I have an alternative revelation thesis. The end of the Cold war did not unveil previously repressed forces or a new world with which we were previously unaware. The revelation has been about ourselves, not the external world. The Cold War helped to produce the high sense of moral commitment desired by the idealists, but the unwillingness to back that idealism up with self-sacrifice

and risk that the realists contend are central to any political enterprise intent on collective self-preservation. Hence, our unwillingness to see our states become involved in overseas 'adventures'. As Goldmann (1994, 33) notes, L. Freedman, in a paper on, "Control and order in the new international system," given at a conference organized by SIDA, the Swedish International Development Agency and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Saltsjöbaden, Sweden, May 18-20, observed that after the end of the Cold war, "we are not faced with a revitalized UN but with reluctance to get involved."

53. E.H. Carr (1946) described realism as focusing on 'what was and what is' in contrast to the utopian focus on what could and should be. **For an attack on the realist position dividing the world radically into what is and what ought to be, Cf. chapter 2, Frost (1996) 41-72.**

54. Thus, while agreeing with the distinction between the two perspectives, unlike Ernst Haas (1983), I see the two perspectives as complementary rather tahn facing one another as polar opposites. "Theorists of regimes who identify with closed systems will incline towards a homeostatic view of the interactions between man, politics, and nature. They will opt for a view of the 'system in equilibrium' and will tailor their notions of regimes so as to restore equilibrium if it is disturbed. Human adaptation is seen as 'learning to live in the system'. Those who take the opposing view, however, see in disequilibrium a warning and an opportunity to do better. Adaptation to the system, for them, means learning the kinds of lessons about interdependence among causes that will assure survival to mankind, to specific states, or to a particular form of social organization." Haas (1983) 31.

55. Cf. Hobbes' *Leviathan*, 13: para. 11-12 where civil war is presented as a society abstracted from government and, hence, closest to a state of nature. (cf. Johnson 1993, 4)

56. Cf. Johnson 1993 for a defense of Thucydides as not being a modern or contemporary realist.

57. Cf. Walker 1993, ch.2 for a defense of Machiavelli as not being a realist - that is, a modern or contemporary realist.

58. "On all these points, Thucydidean 'methodology' presents a different, sometimes completely opposite, point of view. Actors' motivations are not so uniform or predictable. Anarchy is not equated with constant fear, struggle and danger. National interest is important, perhaps even depicted as the preferable route to take for survival, but we have seen...that Thucydides understands that survival may not be a state's top priority. Whether this is attributed to hubris (as in the downfall of Athens) or a sort of moral nobility....The Thucydidean approach, morover, stresses the important role of character of nations and leaders, and the role of political rhetoric. In the *Hostory* it was the decline of the quality of both that led to Athen's catastrophe." (Johnson 1993, 70-71)

59. Waltz (1979) claimed that it was an error "to mistake a theory of international politics for a theory of foreign policy." International relations provided a theory of constraints on foreign policy rather than a theory of foreign policy. (121-2; cf. George 1993, 110) George from a classical realist perspective criticizes contemporary structural realism for its failure to live up to its scientific pretensions. "Although cast in the form of a deductive theory, structural realism is not a full-fledged deductive theory, because its key variables and hypotheses have not been 'operationalized' so that outcomes can be predicted in specific cases. In consequence, structural realist theory can make only general probabilistic predictions. But since such predictions lack grounding in systematic empirical analysis of the observed relationship between relative capabilities and outcomes in a large and presumably representative sample of interactions between states, the theory cannot express probability in statistical terms and is little more than a statement of likelihood. Nor does structural realism do much by way of identifying the conditions under which it expects its predictions to materialize." (George 1993, 109) The limitations of structural realism because of its restriction to high degrees of generality can be summarized as follows:
- no ability to ascertain long term trends
- no help on how to promote peaceful change
- or how to avoid conflict and resolve it via diplomacy
- or how to achieve cooperation among states
- of how to understand and promote foreign policy learning.

(George 1993, 112-113) There is also a historicist critique of realism. Neo-realism "has the effect of portraying as natural and universal a set of social relations which are historically specific and socially mutable." (Rupert 1993, 83)

60. I am not concerned at this point in arguing that Grotius would actually have qualified for membership in such a school. (For example, cf. Forsythe (1992, 27) for a brief summary of the case against his inclusion.

61. For a portrait of President Carter as a grotian, cf. Rosati, Jerel A. (1987) *The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behaviour*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. President Clinton may also be a grotian, but he could be a utopian moralist in realist clothing or a realist in moral utopian clothing or simply confused when he makes humanitarianism a matter of national interest. Bill Clinton (1995) in *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, defined three levels of national interests: vital, important but non-vital (that "affect importantly our national well being and the character of the world in which we live"); and humanitarian. (Washington: The White House) In giving priority to vital national interests, he is a conservative realist.

62. "(W)hen one considers how international relations theorists give accounts of history, concepts, and issues in their discipline, they seemingly are presented with a choice between two opposed options. They may provide explanations from within the tradition of realism which takes individual sovereign states as its point of departure. Alternatively, they may give their accounts from within the tradition of idealism which takes a community of sovereign states as its point of departure." (Weber 1995, 1)

63. For a succinct summary of the Kantain paradigm, cf. Hurrell (1990).

64. For an analysis of the concept of hegemony, see Cox's classical essay, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method," (originally published in *Millenium*, 12, 127-155 and reprinted in Gill 1993, 49-66) For a summary, see Cox's other essay, "Structural Issues in Global Governance" p. 264 in the same volume.

65. In contrast, I will argue that technology is not a determiant, but depends on seredipity. Further, paradign shifts in mental frameworks and the role of the class responsible for propagating such frameworks are also critical.

66. "Recent years have seen: Waltzian structural neorealism forced to share pride of place with Keohaneian institutionalism and neoliberalism; the emergence of neoidealism and a revived interest in overtly normative theory." (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996, 261)

67. For a very general version of this thesis, see Luttwak (1996)
- "while the Cold War induced caution, present circumstances evidently do not. A New season of bellicosity is upon us, and it is inlikely to long endure without consequences. Because wars have become less dangerous to fight, the danger that wars will be fought has increased." (p. 34)

68. Cf. Huntington (1993a) and (1993b). Huntington, particularly in his response (1993b), stated that he wanted to "lay out the elements of a Post-Cold War paradigm" which would replace both the descriptive and explanatory role of the Cold War in dealing with international conflict. According to Huntington, civilizations, not states, political regimes or political ideologies, are the essential unit for understanding international conflict. That conflict takes place along the fault lines separating civilizations such as Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, and Slavic-Orthodox. Huntington depicts Latin America and even Africa as having separate civilizations so that the term 'civilization' begins to lose any meaning other than large geographical divides with some cultural correlates, though he defines civilizations as being differentiated by history, language, culture, tradition, and, most importantly, religion which give the people who belong to these different civilizations different world views. The most important fault lines are the ones dividing Islam respectively from Eastern-Orthodox (in the Balkans), the Hindu (in India), but particularly Western (in the Middle East) civilizations. This perspective is not simply a theoretical one, but a view held by American officials. "A fourth significant outcome of the end of the Cold War is a growing perception within the policymaking establishment that Islamic fundamentalism is a threat to US interests on the African continent. Many officials privately note that the decline of

the Soviet Union and communism have created a power vacuum on the African continent that could easily be filled by 'radical' forms of Islamic fundamentalism, particularly the 'shia' variant espoused by Iran." (Schraeder 1994, 253.) This view is held by both officials at the highest echelons of policymaking in the United States ("There appears to be a growing perception at the highest levels of the policymaking establishment that Islamic fundamentalism is a threat to US interests on the African continent." - p. 30) and at the level of Foreign Service Officers, though the views of the latter seem to be more contextually nuanced. (**"These same FSO's...**when addressing the nature of conflict in a particular African country, also tend to balance the traditional impulse to attach blame to external powers - whether a communist Soviet Union of the 1980s or a 'radical' Islamic fundamentalist Iran of the 1990s - with a well-grounded understanding of the conflict's internal cultural, economic, historical, and political roots." - p. 17) But it is not only the views of Americans. It is an obsession of African leaders and the OAU. "The foremost issue that is challenging the OAU in this respect is the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, which threatens the stability of the secular state." (Gomes 1996, 43) "At its fifty-sixth ordinary session in 1992, the OAU Council of Ministers discussed the issue, and views were expresses to the effect that the rise of Islamic fundamentalism is the work of dissidents, extremists, and subversives." (Ibid, pp. 43-44) Further, organizations, not normally identified with realism, such as Human Rights Watch/Africa have documented the reality of the threat. (Cf. Human Rights Watch/Africa 1996, especially the part of chapter 7 pp. 193-219, dealing with freedom of religion for an account of the discrimination practiced against Christians, forced Islamicization of abducted Christian children, and other forms of persecution against Christians and Islamic moderates.) For other scholars holding this view, cf. Lewis (1993) and the special issue of *Current History*, 94 (January), and Gary Abramson, "Rise of the Crescent," *Africa Report* 37:2, March–April 1992, 18-21. For scholars who, on a variety of grounds, challenge the view that Islam poses a civilizational challenge to the West, cf. Esposito (1991), Fuller and Lesser (1995), Hader (1992), Husain (1995), Pipes (1983), Roy (1994), Sisk (1992), Midlarsky (1995). Based somewhat on this material, but mainly my own encounters with the fundamentalist branch of Islam (as distinct from Traditionalists, Modernists or

Reformists, and Pragmatists or Secularists) in both my survey of the homeless and encounters with Khomeini Shiites in Southern Lebanon followng the Israeli invasion in July/August of 1982, and my own direct encounters with the leaders of the intifada in the academic back channels exploring the prospects of peace with the United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) in which Hamas participated while also remaining apart, I have been convinced that the contest between Islam and Western secularism, though real enough, will **not** be the central arena of the next global ideological struggle.

69. Cf. Homer-Dixon (1994) for the clearest and most succinct statement of this perspective. There are three causes of environmental scarcity: environmental degradation and depletion, population growth, and unequal resource distribution. Like the macro-vision of the clash of civilization doctrine, the conflicts produced are long term and chronic, persisting through the superficialities of political conflicts, but unlike the clash of civilization model, the conflict is diffuse rather than focused, and sub-national rather than supra-national. Unfortunately, environmental scarcity produces conflicts that inherently spill over borders. For example, of the many others who hold this view, Stanley Hoffman (1990) wrote: "the weakness and heterogeneity of some of these states and the pressure of increasing populations, may well lead to violent regional conflicts, as well as to formidable quarrels over immigration and refuge to and expulsion from the richer countries. Two of the problems that have become urgent, drugs and the environment, could all too easily lead to confrontations between advanced states eager to protect their health and their future, and states such as those of South America that need to cultivate drugs, or to forego struct protection of the environment, in order to develop." (116-7).

70. Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hedley Bull, and Henry A. Kissinger are names identified with Cold War realism. George F. Kennan was a more traditional realist. For the purpose of this paper, I will ignore the subtle differences between realism and neo-realism, though generally traditional realists tended to belittle the importance of democracy and eulogize a high sense of culture and civilization. For traditional realists, such as Kennan, that high sense of culture was thought to be found in the past, whereas neo-realists invested the contempory political regime with a high

sense of moral value. In a broader sense of realism, writers like Lewis and Huntington defined civilizations rather than states as the operative category (see endnote 39). Traditional realism was built on an assumption about human nature - namely that "*men* [my italics] are ambitious, vindictive and rapacious." (Cf. Alexander Hamilton in *The Federalist Papers*, 1961, No. 6, p. 54.) Chance counts as much as rational deliberation. Humans operate within the confines of a short, ephemeral life and very limited knowledge. The real dilemma is to choose that which is least damaging. To protect themselves and survive, humans clustered into political units, in the traditional view, states or federations of states. The game of international politics was to enhance one's own prosperity and power by seeking spheres of influence and alliances to forge a balance of power between contending forces. For realists, idealism, associated with Woodrow Wilson or the founders of the United Nations, was suspect at the very least in its ignoring of simple prudence. That idealism, when identified with a doctrine of American exceptionalism and the unique mission of the United States to bring the benefits of liberalism and democracy to the rest of the world, was regarded as both self-deceiving and downright dangerous. For realists, the goals of foreign policy were inherently limited. The postulates of international law and the force of an international organization were illusory if they led one to believe in the reality of a universal moral and political authority or tried to substitute moral claims for state authority and responsibility based on prudential rather than principled judgement. The major difference between traditional and neoliberal realists was that the latter invested the national interest itself with "moral dignity". The high value given to current political cultures thus served as the foundation for a prudential internationalism rather than a neo-isolationism or a very cautionary approach to international involvements. But both schools opposed any sense of obligation on one state to intervene in the violence, external or internal, that embroiled parties with whom that state had no abiding interest. Nor did a state have any charitable obligation to develop the Third World. The essential responsibility was conservative - to pass on the world to future generations in at least no worse a state than the one inherited. (Cf. Kennan (1954), Gellman (1984), Morgenthau (1951), Niebuhr (1958), Kissinger (1974), and Bull (1977). Kenneth Waltz (1979) articulated a neo-realist position which took into account the effect of international

structures on states which remained the basic actors concerned with relative power as the basic means of ensuring security and, in the end, survival. However, neo-realists in contrast to structural realists, continue to regard international cooperation sceptically. For an excellent summary of the traditional realists in modern dresss, cf. Donnelly (1992). For a more extensive analysis and evaluation, cf. Smith (1986).

71. "Realism and pluralism are both decision-centred approaches to international relations and it is comparatively easy to interpret them, as many have done, in terms of the rational choice model. Classical realism takes the state as the unit and attributes to it a particular utility function: the maximization of power...The claims of big differences between the pluralist and realist research programmes, which go as far as claims that they are incommensurable, are misconceived. They are rather close from a methodlogical point of view, both being aspects of the rational choice research programme." (Nicholson 1996, 151-2)

72. "Some analysts, particularly those who borrow their imagery from the natural sciences, think of regimes as 'real,' as factually and conceptually correct ways of describing the reality that shapes regimes; others, primarily from the social sciences, think of systems as heuristic simplifications of a very complex reality." (Haas 1983, 30)

73. "The opposing conceptions of structure also contain opposed notions of causation. Do human choices (policies) shape the system or does the system determine the kinds of policies worked out by the actors? Does structure precede action or do actions bring about structure? Believers in closed systems hold that the structure of the system sharply constrains human choice; men and states do what they must in order to survive. Causation, then, flows downward from the system to the actors; the whole shapes the parts. The system is animated by its structure and the structure consists of lawlike propositions, derived from the theorist of regimes from physics, genetics, or economics. If the structure is 'anarchical,' the actors must husband power to assure their ability to practice self-help; if the structure is 'oligopolistic,' they must mix competition with cooperation to prosper; if the law is natural selection, the actors must compete for limited niches." (Haas 1982, 30-31)

74. "The difference (with neorealism) is substantive, not methodological: neo-realist theory presumes the essential features of the international system to be nearly constant, whereas internationalism presumes that some systemic features essential for war and peace are variable." (Goldmann 1994, p. 198)

75. "The Grotian tradition that Hopkins and Puchala, and Young draw upon, offers a counter to structural realism of either the conventional or the modified form. It rejects the assumption that the international system is composed of sovereign states limited only by the balance of power. Rather, Hopkins and Puchala suggest that elites are the practical actors in international relations. states are rarified abstractions. Elites have transnational as well as national ties. Sovereignty is a behavioral variable, not an analytic assumption. The ability of states to control movements across their borders and to maintain dominance over all aspects of the international system is limited. Security and state survival are not the only objectives. Force does not occupy a singularly important place in international politics. Elites act within a communications net, embodying rules, norms, and prinicples, which transcend national boundaries." (Krasner 1983, 9) As Puchala and Hopkins (1983) put it themselves, "the tenets of the international regime come to match the values, objectives, and decision-making procedures of the pre-eminent participant or participants." (63)

76. "(R)egime particpants are most often bureaucratic units or individuals who operate as pars of the 'government' of an international subsystem by creating, enforcing or otherwise acting in compliance with norms. Individuals and bureaucratic roles are linked in international networks of activities and communication. These individuals and rules govern issue-areas by creating and maintaining regimes." (Puchala and Hopkins 1983, 63)

77. Cf. Gardner (1990), 23-39. Idealists have also argued that the state as a powerful source of loyalty and identity is obsolete in the current globalized world so that so-called 'realists' are state ideologues rather than realists in the ordinary language sense of the term. New supra-state institutions are replacing and need to replace the state as the ultimate unit of political authority. Cf. Rosenau (1990) and (1992). See also Camilleri and Falk (1992).

78. The failure to commit the economic resources required may be blamed on a combination of factors in turn - the low savings rates of wealthy societies such as the USA, inadequate investments in education, research and productivity in the obsession with speculative and short-term profits, or narcissism and anti-state tendencies combined with a lack of political leadership.

79. Cf. Frost 1996, chapter 4, 104-136 for an analysis of each of these approaches. Bonante (1995) refers to them as realist, utilitarian and deontological positions best represented by the following respective books: F. Oppenheim (1991) *The Place of Morality in Foreign Policy*, Lexington; G. Elfstrom (1990), *Ethics for a Shrinking World, London*; D. Warner (1991) *An Ethic of Responsibility in International Relations*, Boulder.

80. The following bibliography on Zaire can be used for a fuller account:
Amnesty International (1990) *The Republic of Zaire: Outside the Law - Security Force Repression of Government Opponents, 1989-1990*, London.
Gibbs, David N. (1991) *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and US Policy in the Congo Crisis*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gould, David J. (1980) *Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the Third World: The Cse of Zaire*, Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press.
Kalb, Madeleine G. (1982) *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa - From Eisenhower to Kennedy*, New York: Macmillan.
Pachter, Elise Forbes (1987) *Our Man in Kinshasa: US Relations With Mobutu, 1970-1983; Patron Client Relations in the International Sphere*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, PhD dissertation.
Schatzberg, Michael G. (1988) *The Dialectics of Oppression in Zair*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988; and (1991) *Mobutu or Chaos? The United States and Zaire, 1960-1990*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Weissman, Stephen R. (1974) *American Foereign Policy in the Congo, 1960-1964*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Young, Crawford (1985) "The Zairian Crisis and American Foreign Policy," in Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman and Richard L. Sklar, eds. *African Crisis Areas and US Foreign Policy*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 214-219. Though I take a very different take on the case, the material

is largely drawn from Peter J. Schraeder's excellent case study of Zaire in chapter 3 of his 1994 volume, and Durch 1993b, although supplemented by a few other sources.

81. "In his last annual report to the General Assembly, he (Hammarskjöld) noted that the purposes and principles set out in the Charter 'lay down some basic rules of international ethics by which all member states have committed themselves to be guided.' Hamarskjöld felt deeply about those rules and about the Charter in which they were embodied. The Charter was many things to Hammarskjöld: guide, legitimating source for all his actions, blueprint for the future, inspiration for the present. To it and all it stood for he had pledged himself and his best eggorts in this life." (Jones 1995, 144) Influenced by the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber, Hammarskjöld belived that, "Distrust was the curse of the twentieth century, not just between states in the international system, but between people in their daily lives as well." (ibid, 142)

82. Richard M. Nixon, "The Emergence of Africa, Report to President Eisenhower by Vice President Nixon," *Department of State Bulletin 36*, 930, April 22, 1957, 640.

83. "Conventional structural arguments, whether realist or Marxist, see transnationalization as a direct reflection of hegemony; high levels of trade and capital flows obtain under the *pax Britannica* and the *pax Americana*. The regimes for trade and money are largely epiphenomenal adjuncts that may be invoked to legitimate this outcome, but they have little or no bearing on it. Conventional liberals, on the other hand, hold that high levels of trade and capital flows will obtain only if there is strict adherence to open international economic regimes, so that these become virtually determinative. Neither formulation is satisfactory." John Gerard Ruggie, "International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order," in Krasener, ed. (1982) 199.

84. "Great Powers in relative decline instinctively respond by spending more on 'security,' and thereby divert potential resources from 'investment' and compound their long-term dilemma." Kennedy (1987) xxiii.

85. "Traditionally wary of placing its advisers (and therefore

its credibility) under the command of even a US-dominated multilateral UN force, the Defense department preferred dealing directly with the Zairians on a bilateral basis. Most important, the decision signalled the beginning of a movement away from the Africanist coalitions ideal of fostering a moderate and democratic civilian regime in favor of the CIA's preference for a military strongman capable of ensuring stability." Schraeber (1994) 66.

86. "US policy was itself a matter of contention between liberals and conservatives who took very different views of African nationalism, the role of Communist influence in the region, and the relative importance of good relations with Third World countries when that goal clashed with traditional relations with NATO allies, several of whom retained colonial empires. These tensions existed within the State department, within Congress, and among the media's many shapers of public opinion. They reduced the Kennedy Administration's flexibility and made it reluctant to endorse the use of force by the UN until it was eminently c;ear, in late 1962, that force was the only remaining option." (Durch 1993b, 323)

87. For Kennedy, the "only real question is whether these new [African] nations will look West or East - to Moscow or Washington - for sympathy, help, and guidance in their effort to recapitulate, in a few decades, the entire history of Europe and America." "The Challenge of Imperialism: Algeria," in Theodore C. Sorensen, *"Let the Word Go Forth": The Speeches Statements, and Writings of John F. Kennedy*. New York: Delacorte Press, 1988, pp. 331-37. Cf. also his speech in that same volume, "The New nations of Africa." pp. 365; 368. proposal for a bold imaginative, development program for Africa. "We see Africa as probably the greatest open field of maneuver in the worldwide competition between the communist bloc and the non-communist world." John F. Kennedy, Memorandum, "Guidelines for Policy and Operations, Africa," Washington: US Department of State, March 1962, p. 1., in *Africa: National security Files 1961-1963, Reel No. 1, microfiche, University Publications of America*. For a discussion of Kennedy's views, cf. Schraeder *(1994), 15, 32-34, 69, 59-69, 108-109, 200-206.*

88. George Ball, *The Disciples of Power*. Boston: Little Brown,

1968, p. 240. Cf. Schraeder (1994) p. 15.

89. Schraeder (1994) 15.

90. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, G. Mennen Wiliams, testified before a closed hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that, "If we pulled out completely and the Russians could fill this vacuum in the center of Africa, we would soon lose much, if not all, of Africa." (ESFRC 13:1, 116; in Durch 1993, 322) The domino theory had been promulgated before in Africa before the Americans were even involved in Vietnam.

91. "The Africans within the administration, led by Ambassador Gullion, skillfully used the threat of a possible communist victory to convince Kennedy of the need for more forceful action as favored by the African-Asian bloc. Toward this end. Kennedy instructed Stevenson to vote for a November 24 Security Council resolution which permitted UN troops, if necessary, to employ 'a requisite measure of force' to expel foreign mercenaries and advisers from Shaba. After a bruising NSC meeeting during the first week of December in which the Africanist position prevailed, Kennedy also ordered the defense department to place twenty-one transport planes at the disposal of the UN command to facilitate a major airlift of miltary equipment and personnel. However, rather than achieving a quick victory over Tshombe's forces, the long-awaited UN offensive quickly bogged down in the face of strong ground resistance." (Schraeber 1994, 63)

92. "For its first eight months, ONUC found itself in an impossible situation: reluctant to withdraw, for the sake of the civilian populace; reluctant to take sides, to preserve a semblance of impartiality; and unable to take significant military initiatives, because the mandate was interpreted to forbid such actions, particularly by Hammarskjöld, who was strongly averse to violence. ONUC therefore marched in place..." (Durch 1993b, 327)

93. "The Kennedy White House's decision to move away from the Africanist coalition's ideal of fostering a moderate coalition regime in favor of the ahrdliners' preference for a military strongman capable of maintaining stability constituted an important aspect of growing US involvement in the paramilitary

war...The addition of Tshombe to the central government
created a bureaucratic rift within the US policymaking
establishment which further revealed the declining fortunes of
the Africanist coalition in favor of the more hardline views
advanced by the CIA." (Schraeder 1994, 69)

94. A CIA reorted in a statement of supreme irony given
subsequent events that Mobutu "with careful and skillful
exercise of power, plus an unusual amount of luck (translate
that as CIA assistance), has brought the Congo to its present
pacified position." CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, "Mobutu
and the Congo," *Special Report, Weekly Review*, 23 June 1967,
1, University Publications of America, *CIA Research reports
(Africa 1946-1976), microfiche, reel 2; cf Schraeder 1994, fn.
84, 281.*

95. "(T)he twin goals of the CIA's bureaucratic mission in
Zaire - the permanent disposal of Patrice Lumumba and the
creation of a pro-Western military government capable of
maintaining stability - were initially thwarted by the arrival
of Rajeshwar Dayal, the new Special Representative of UN
Secretary-General Hammerskjold." (Schraeder 1994, 57)

96. Schraeder (1994) 86; see also US Senate, Committee on
Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, curity
Supporting Assistance for Zaire,
Hearings, October 24, 1975, 94th Congress, 1st Session,
Washington: GPO, 1975.

97. Schraeder (1994) 86.

98. "The issue of human rights reforms was a characteristic
starting point for the Carter administration and figured
prominently in State Department instructions to the US Embassy
in Kissasha. Although willing to recognize that human rights
'problems' existed in Zaire, the State Department believed
that it was improper to designate the country as a 'gross and
consistent violater' of those rights. More problematic was
that several Africa specialists within the State Department's
Africa Bureau had serious misgivings about the human rights
approach (which were shared by their counterparts at the CIA
and the Pentagon). According to these officials, especially
those who had served in Zaire, not only was Mobutu an

'unavoidable evil' who had to be dealt with, there was, in actuality, 'very little' that Washington could do to make Mobutu meet the human rights demands of the Carter White House. In short, for a bureaucracy which perceived its mission as the maintenance of untroubled relations with African regimes, the sensitive issue of human rights threatened that mission." Schraeder (1994) 89-90.

99. "According to this *realpolitik*-inspired vision of the international system, power politics, military preparedness, and a resolve to intervene remained essential components of US foreign policy in the post-Cold war era. However, the Bush administration tempered its *realpolitik* vision with a pragmatic desire to enhance the role of regional and international institutions within the international system, albeit as instruments for the promotion of US security interests." Schraeder (1994) 35. In other words, Bush was a liberal realist. This also serves to explain Bush's disastrous policy for Somalia. "As the death toll continued to mount and Aideed's opposition to a UN force remained, nongovernmental organizations in the United states began to press for a forceful intervention to protect relief operations. Caught between a desire to address a major humanitarian disaster that had widespread television coverage and military advisers who feared protracted involvement in a civil war, U.S. President George bush put forward a compromise: the United states, under the mandate of theUnited Nations and in conjunction with other nations, would intervene in Somalia in order to break the famine." Stedman 1996a, 255.

100. Schraeder (1994) 102.

101. "A small group of military and civilian associates of President Mobutu, all from the same ethnic group, control the city of Kinshasha by virtue of the loyalty of the 5,000-man Presidential Guard known as the DSP. This same group also controls the Central Bank which provides both the foreign and the local currency needed to keep the DSP loyal. While the ruling group has intelligence information about what is going on in the rest of Zaire, there is no real government authority outside the capital city. (Cohen 1993, quoted in Weiss (1995) 157) "(E)lites who become the 'bastions of democracy' and, therefore, staunch U.S. allies have usually been traditional dictators who lack popular support, concern themselves

primarily with personal aggrandizement, and therefore
demonstrate a general disregard for social reform or braodly
shared development policies. The core of the problem is that
these dictators (whether of the right or the left) seek
legitimacy in the form of external economic and military aid
in the international arena rather than attempt to build a
popular basis for support among their own people. When the
United States has been willing to fill the role of patron by
dispensing generous amounts of aid, the dictator's need to
foster popular domestic legitimacy is sorely circumscribed.
Likewise, as dissent against the regime grows, the tendency is
toward greater repression than reform." (Schraeder 1992, 399)

102. "President Clinton's selection of Anthony Lake as
national security Adviser and Warren G. Christopher as
secretary of state suggested a return to the regionalist
policies reminiscent of the Carter administration. As a
result, the administration can be expected to downplay the
foreign dimensions of conflicts in Africa in favor of their
internal roots, and recognize the potent force of African
nationalism as a constraint on intervention by foreign powers,
including the United States." Schraeder (1994) 35.

103. "If one judges the internal functioning of the Zairean
state as it exists in 1994, and indeed has existed for quite a
few years, one must conclude that it has virtually
disappeared. The state's 'responsibility' to seek the welfare
of its citizens has been almost totally neglected. In fact,
little remains of the state's role as a provider of health
care, education, justice, the maintenance of the country's
infrastructure, and so forth." (Weiss 1995, 157) "If some of
the new tests of legitimacy (human rights, internal conditions
that threaten to disturb peace in the region) were to be
applied to Zaire, the legitimacy of the Mobutu regime would be
very much in doubt." (Weiss 1995, 158)

104. "The obstinate refusal of Mobutu to cede power may yet
have the effect of destroying the state. Over time this has
become a more real possibility, because in addition to the
dictatorial methods he has always employed (terror and the use
of state funds to buy support) he has now encouraged
interethnic hatred and conflict to such an extent that the
specter of secession has reappeared." (Weiss 1995, 159)

105. The preparation of PDD-25 setting very restrictive conditions for UN involvement in peacekeeping was already underway. PDD-25 was Presidential Decision Directive 25 released in May 1994, t*he Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, Washington: Bureau of International Organizational Affairs, Department of State; for a discussion of cf. Daalder (1996) 480-484.

106. For an excellent sceptical critique of the record and prospects for forceful intervention, see Stedman (1996a).

107. I am referring here to political neutrality. Humanitarian neutrality is a complementary doctrine usually considered easier to defend. In contrast to my view, there are many defenses, and some see the doctrine to be in grave peril. "The traditional - and underexamined - notion of neutrality of humanitarian action is severely at risk. It is ironic that at a time when universality of values, based on a shared view of human rights, is receiving greater attention than ever before, the fundamental principle of humanitarian work is in jeopardy, namely that assistance is given to those who need it without discrimination except in their favour. This is the doctrine of humanitarian neutrality." (Griffiths. Levine and Weller 1995, 35. In contrast, there are many criticisms of neutrality applied to Rwanda in the humanitarian area as well as the political one: "in the Goma camps in Zaire, international relief agencies supplied food, water, medicine, and shelter to rwandan refugees, many of whom were armed and some of whom dressed in military fatigues. Since humanitarian assistance was not predicated on the demiltarization of the camps and because the Zairean armed forces were unwilling to disarm the Rwandan military and mebers of the government who were implicated in the genocide of 1994. Not only has humanitarian assistance protected gross violators of human rights, it has enabled the Rwandan military to regroup and retrain in order to prosecute the war anew." (Stedman 1996a, 247)

108. "The singular passions of men may combine to form into the sedition of a nation; in such an instance, men may adopt the mistaken notion that they have the whole truth, which makes them think themselves special when they are not (l, 8, par. 22). Vainglory, one might say is a drunkenness produced by one's own conceit. The pride that brings about folly can

never be deserved. One cannot possibly have good judgement when under the influence of pride. Thus the natural and common delusion of pride keeps human beings from seeing their true interst, from feeling fearful in situations in which rational fear is justified. Oride stands in the way of the order Hobbes wished to impose on society, because men will destroy for vanity what is in their own best interest." (Johnson 1993, 13)

109. I say most deliberately. There are some theories who take into account the irrationality of leaders. Some argue they must be taken into account. (George 1993) But most often these analyses are concerned with cognitive dissonance, with the inability of a leader to adjust his or her prorities or perceptions given the reality faced. (Cf. Jervis 1976) Hobbes is more concerned with a deeper level of irrationality which is taken into account by some analysts. See, for example, the analysis of Pol Pot in Findlay 1995.

110. Whether this is a consequence of their concern with the issue of cheating in international relations, a problem which the realist model was unable to deal with, I am not sure.

111. Cf. Stedman 1966b for a succinct summary of most of the critical components of an effective conservative realist mediator. For a more detailed analysis of cases to argue why grotians cannot mediate successfully, cf. Toval and Zartman, eds, 1985.

112. Indirect reciprocity is "the possibility [not necessity] that not only bilateral agreements but also multilateral norms risk being undermined by single violations. The idea that reciprocity makes subjects abide by norms presumes that actors take into account how a violation on their part might affect the future behaviour of others. In the case of direct reciprocity, actors are thought to be deterred by the negative consequences of increasing the freedom of action of a particular adversary. In the case of indirect reciprocity, they are thought to be deterred by the risk of increasing everybody's freedom of action...This thought would seem to be essential for a theory of internationalism. It implies: (a) that whether a norm is obeyed or disobeyed in a particular instance affects its future effectiveness as well as the effectiveness of other norms; and (b) that governments find it more important to keep the freedom of action of others

constrained than to do what is most advantageous to themselves in the immediate situation. The latter is Kant's asumption. The former adds a new element. The reciprocity argument is that rules are effective because their future effectiveness would be impaired." (Goldmann 1994, 35)

113. Thus, for example, our report indicated the shift in Franch policy in 1992 and 1993 from conservative realism to liberal realism as symbolized and expressed by the change of ambassadors to Rwanda. In fact, that shift had already been underway earlier. "After President François Mitterand asssumed office, France sharply curtailed its tendency to intervene militarily in African affairs...Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a significant shift in French policy toward Africa. France is now less interested in military intervention than it is in creating an enabling environment for liberalized economic policies." (Keller 1996, 10) In other words, ten or perhaps fifteen years earlier, the RPF would not have had a chance because the extremists would have been right in their expectations; France would have likely intervened forcibly on their behalf.

114. As Helen Fein noted, "both (kurt) Jonassohm and (Barbara) Harff recognize the difficulty of explaining the apparent irrationality (if viewed solely in terms of material and political costs and gains) of modern ideological genocides." (Fein 1992, 5)

115. Thucydides and Hobbes were not the only ones to speak of the sense of self-esteem as a motivation for genocide. For example, cf. Sigmund Freud (1951) *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, New York: Liveright Publishing. See also H. Kobut (1978) "Thoughts on Narcissism and Narcissistic Rage," in P.H. Ornstein (ed.), *The Search for The Self*: Selected Writings of Heinz Kobut: 1950-1978, New York: International Universities Press, Vol. 2. For an application of these psychoanalytic theories of group rage and violence when the "narcissim, self-esteem, and sense of self seem threatened," to the Bosnian genocide, cf. C.G. Schoenfeld, "Psychoanalytic Dimensions of the West's Involvement in the Third Balkan War," in Stjepan G. Mestrovic, ed. (1996) *Genocide After Emotion: The Postemotional Balkan War*, London: Routledge.

116. The same motives seem to have characterized the Tutsi

extremist military leadership in Burundi.

117. "In genocides and mass killings that follow decolonization, as in Burundi and Biafra, deap-seated historical conflicts can come to the fore in the context of profound social-political change. A history of conflict and antagonism fuels a power struggle that ends in genocide." (Staub 1989, 86)

118. Cf. Chrétien 1995, 13; Africa Rights 1994, 37; Cf. Lemarchand 1992 and 1994, 3, for his critique of this thesis as well as the thesis that the genocide was an eruption of age-old hatreds.

119. Malkki's book is one of the best documents on the world views of refugees in camps and the mythico histories which refugees in camps construct which both explain their position that determined their fate. That the book was the result of research on Hutus from Burundi was fortitous. It certainly corresponds to my own reading on other refugees generally and on the Palestinian refugees with whose views I am more familiar. This is also one reason that I have little concern that the research was undertaken with Hutu refugees from Burundi rather than Hutus from Rwanda.

120. For Palestinians, it is the first arrival of the Zionist settlers culminating in the 1948 war in which the Palestinians were driven into exile. For the Hutus in Burundi it was the 1972 massacres.

121. The institution was known as *ubuhake wherein a patron gave a cow to a client and, in return, the client provided services in return for protection.* There were, in fact, other agricultural forms of patron-client relations - *ubukonde*, for example. Further, the system was made truly oppressive under the Belgian colonial regime. (Cf. Newbury 1988)

122. At Geneva in June (1996), just prior to the Rwanda Roundtable, the Canadian delegation led a united delegation of donors in a meeting with the Burundi authorities offering the country powerful economic inducements once they unequivocally moved to restore constitutional government in Burundi along with the unequivocal assertion that external sources of unds would be cut off. The Canadians were very optimistic about the outcome of the meeting. One month later, there was an

effective army coup in Burundi and the Hutu president fled to the United States embassy for safety.

123. For two complementary readings of Augustine, but going in opposite directions, cf. Milbank (1990) and Connolly (1993a). For a brilliant analysis of both, cf, Heilke (1996).

124. Cf. Heilke 1996 from who I borrow the expression and a considerable expansion of my own analysis.

125. Jean Bodin (1576) *De Republica - Six Books of the Commonwealth (tr. M.J. Tooley) Oxford: Blackwell.*

126. "Western civilization, whose beginnings I place toward the end of the eighth century A.D. [earlier, clearly, than I would place it], created a world that contained different nationalities while transcending national identity. Earlier civilizations, by contrast, whether Greek, Judaic, or Chinese, were essentially ethnic or national and maintained their identity through unity. Customs and forms adopted from the outside were fused with traditional patterns, never acknowledged as a foreign presence...The rise of duality in both rule and language marked the beginning of the Western world civilization...that would encompass national and ethnic civilizations and cultures alien to one another. The crucial factor in the process was that no single nation claimed the supranational unbrella as its own." (Masakazu 1996, 108-109)

127. For an example of the role of city-states in the origins of mercantilist capitalism, cf. F. Lane (1966) *Venice and History, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.*

128. Cf. F. Braudel (1981; 1982; 1984) *The Structures of Everyday Life: The Limits of the Possible*, New York: Harper & Row.
I (1981) *Civilisation and Capitalism, 15th-18th Centuries*
II (1982) *The Wheels of Commerce*
III (1984) The Perspectives of the World.

129. In contrast, "Chinese imperial authorities prohibited sea voyaging on the ground that it diverted valuable resources from the more urgent tasks of land defense against a threatening nomad power across the northwest frontier." (McNeill 1992, 111)

130. For an analysis of the development of 16th century capitalist agriculture, cf. Wallerstein 1974. For a discussion of its union with mercantalism to develop capitalist expansion in the seventeenth century, cf. Wallerstein 1980.

131. For an account of the state of Europe as a backwater under tremendous influence from Islam, cf. Janet Abu-Lughod (1989) *Before European Hegemony: The World system A.D. 1250-1350*, New York: Oxford University Press.

132. In this interpretation, the development of the state *precedes* the development of a commercial empire and a global economy. Wallerstein argued that the state originated as a by-product of capitalist development. For support for my claim that the state system is created prior to, but facilitated by the development of a consolidated capitalist system, cf. Zolberg (1981).

133. For an analysis of 18th-19th century capitalist imperial expansion, cf. Wallerstein 1988. These were efforts to become world empires and not just particiapnts in a global economic system. Mosley (1994) notes that, "A key distinction in Wallerstein's model is between world empires in which economic processes are politically constrained and world economies, predicated on a plurality of states." (126)

134. From Palmer and Colton 1971, 490); Palmer, R.R. and J. Colton (1971) *A History of the Modern World*, 4th ed. New York: Alfred Knopf.

135. The intervention in northern Iraq was not undertaken "to protect Kurds from dictatorial rule" (Makinda 1996, 157-8), though that may have been the effect.

136. "(F)rontier conditions ordinarily provoked not freedom but a social hierarchy steeper than anything familiar in Europe itself" (McNeill 1992, 22) "(F)rontier conditions distorted the social pyramid of Europe's society either by flattening it drastically toward equality and anarchic freedom or, alternatively, by steeping the gradient so as to divide frontiersmen between owners and managers, on the one hand, and an enslaved, enserfed, or debt-coerced work force, on the other." (McNeill 1992, 33)

137. Bob Cox has a very prescient and succinct summary of the

tension between globalization and domestic welfare, and why the latter is likely to be sacrificed to the former. "The state-capitalist form involves a dualism between, on the one hand, a competitively effecient world-market-oriented sector, and, on the the other, a protected welfare sector. The success of the former must provide the resources for the latter; the sense of solidarity implicit in the latter would provide the drive and legitimacy for the former. State capitalism thus proposes a means of reconciling the accumulation and legitimation functions brought into conflict by the economic and fiscal crises of the 1970s and by hyper-liberal politics. It remains an open question whether the expansion of the world-market-oriented sector in the form of transnational corporationsmay not develop the autonomy of this sector in relation both to the home state and the domestic welfare sector. This would make the balance in dualism difficult to maintain. The claims of international competitiveness would tend to outweigh those of domestic welfare." (Cox 1993b, 270)

138. At the time of the Rwanda genocide, 45% of UN assistance was devoted to humanitarian rather than development purposes. (Cf. UNDP (1994) "Emergencies Consuming Bearly Half of UN Assistance," *Africa Recovery*, 8:1-2.

139. There is no evidence that "televised pictures of the pandemonium in Goma *accelerated* (my italics) the decision to press U.S. troops into service." (Minear, Scott & Weiss 1996, 65) The evidence, on the contray, suggested that television coverage resulted in a *reversal* of a decision already made. Though much of the texts organization of the media coverage on Rwnda is taken directly from Adelman & Suhrke (1996), the authors seem to have only read the summary because they have been far too careless in the details. the volume even explicitly contradicts itself. Minear, Scott, Weiss (1996) speak of "relentless coverage of inhumanity" "matching the intensity of that directed toward Somalia in late 1992 and early 1993, failed...to produce Somali-style interventions." (3) But the book later quotes and summarizes our report (Adelman and Surke, 1996) to state that coverage was not relentless. Quite the revers. "Before April 1994, the warning signs of impending conflict went largely unreported and unheeded by all three institutions (governments, humanitarian organizations, and the media - in that section of our report,

we were concerned with the media only, for the events were indeed reported but also were unheeded by governments, but not because they were not reported within international and humanitarian agencies.) From April to June, genocide within Rwanda received only partial coverage and throughly inadequate response from policymakers and aid groups." (63) In that period, the coverage was largely also inaccurate.

140. Cf. Norbert Wiener (1948) *Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine*, New York: John Wiley & Sons.

141. Cf. Simon Schama, *Landscape and Memory*, Knopf, which is concerned with the residue of the past that underlies the modern world to illuminate the underpinnings of present-day sensibilities and uncover the memories, myths and cultural associations with which the inhabitants of the of the West over the past to or three millenia have perceived and shaped the natural world around them.

142. Cf. Karl Deutsch (1966) *Nationalism and Social Communication*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

143. Cf. David M. Ricci (1984) *The Tragedy of Political Science: Politics, Scholarship, and Democracy*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

144. It is interesting that in George (1993), the primary gap between theory and practice is between realist theorists and realist practitioners. "(P)ractitioners find it difficult to make much use of academic approaches such as structural realist theory and game theory, which assume that all state actors are alike and can be expected to hebhave the same way in given situations, and which rest on the simple, uncomplicated assumption that states can be regarded as rational unitary actors. On the contrary, practitioners believe they need to work with actor-specific models...that grasp the different internal structures an behavioural patterns of each state and leader with which they must deal." (9) On the other hand, for George, what the practitioners need is statecraft since, "the essential task of foreign policy is to develop and manage relationships with other states that will protect and enhance one's own security and welfare. This objective requires that policymakers clearly define their own state's interests, differentiatie these interests in terms of

relative importance, and make prudent judgements as to acceptable costs and risks of pursuing them." (xxiv) In other words, practioners (American one's at least) practice realism, but theory based on realism is of no help. What is of help is a model that is actor specific, instead of assuming one set of motives, and which is relative to the structure and situation within which the actor operates.

145. This also applies to media coverage. On non-reporting on Africa, cf. Mary Anne Fitzgerald, "The News Hole: Reporting Africa," *Africa Report* (July-August 1989):52-54.

146. Part of the reason these studies were not utilized in influencing policy is the very familiar one where the academic gained access to a prescient lower level analyses which were never used and, in retrospect, embarrass the government.

147. For a challenge to realist convictions that knowledge and historical experience are irrelevant copared to power and interest in explaining state actions, cf. Dan Reiter (1996) *Crucibles of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars*. The book is particularly relevant because it explains the different behaviour of Norway and Sweden following World War II.

148. Cf. Richard Rorty (1991) *Objectivism, Relativism, and Truth,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Hilary Putnam (1981) *Reason, Truth, and History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Toulmin, Stephen (1971) *Human Understanding*, Princeton; Princeton University Press.

149. The Torah (the Pentateuch or five Books of Moses in the Bible) demands that people who consigned children to the fire be driven out of the community.